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Abstract 
This study examines the key governance dynamics in Uganda’s rural safe water supply service 
systems. It aims to unravel policy and contextual issues that undermine effectiveness of the 
currently dominant community-based management (CBM) model of water supply and 
sustainability. Broadly, CBM is founded within the neoliberal and post-welfare policy regimes 
that promote the philosophy of a ‘reduced state’. More specifically, CBM forms part of the new 
public management (NPM) and governance frameworks that promote decentralised and multi-
actor approaches to ‘efficient’ and more ‘responsive’ public service delivery that include 
networks or partnerships between public and private (for profit and not-for-profit) actors, and 
service beneficiaries.  Whereas evidence has shown that effective CBM translates into high 
levels of equity, efficiency and overall sustainability of services, policy proposals and 
institutional frameworks promoting it continue to show varying results across and within 
countries. Uganda provides a case study of contexts where CBM has not produced good results 
despite its promotion and inclusion within the policy and institutional framework for rural safe 
water supply. Using a single case and mixed methods research design, this study undertook an 
extensive review of Uganda’s national water sector policy and programme documents, in 
addition to interviews with key water sector actors from the public, private and civil society 
sectors, and the water user community. The results of the study indicate that whereas CBM is 
well-known in Uganda’s rural water sector and policy framework to be a desirable approach for 
achieving the much needed sustainability of rural point-water supply, service authorities 
especially from government are not consciously taking the necessary actions to leverage its 
effectiveness. This failure is at the very heart of the weaknesses within the post welfare policy 
agenda which embraces policies such as decentralisation, ‘marketisation’, participatory and 
demand responsive approaches as well as networks or partnerships in the provision of public 
goods and services. The study suggests an enabling framework for CBM systems for rural point 
water facilities, which does not completely reject the idea of government withdrawal from public 
service delivery as proposed in the neoliberal framework. The framework rather argues for the 
need for public authorities in democratic states to pay deliberate attention to context specific 
circumstances and conditions that tend to disable good policy and programme proposals such as 
those embedded within the CBM model of rural water supply and sustainability in developing 
contexts similar to Uganda. The study therefore advocates an effective central and local 
government authority that consciously and creatively fulfills its ‘new roles’ conceived within the 
frameworks of NPM and good governance, and reflected in popular views of government as an 
‘enabler’, thereby extending the debates on the role of government in the post-welfare, neoliberal 
and good governance agenda.  
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Thesis Introduction 
This thesis is based on a case study of Uganda examining how governance dynamics in policy 
and institutional frameworks designed to devolve or entrust responsibility for overall operation 
and maintenance (O&M) of rural point-water facilities may serve to disable community capacity 
to manage and ultimately sustain established infrastructure and services. The global quest for 
answers to the ‘growing water and environment problem’, and earlier proposals for addressing an 
‘inefficient public sector’ especially in developing countries have combined to shape the 
trajectory of policies around water and the environment.  Community-based management (CBM) 
is now a dominant approach in rural domestic water supply projects envisaged to address the 
sustainability question.  Informed by ideologies that advocate a significant reduction in public 
expenditure, increased decentralisation and private sector participation in the delivery of public 
goods, CBM primarily demands that beneficiaries of water projects take full ownership and 
responsibility for the O&M of the service infrastructure, while ensuring equitable use of the 
water supply services.  
 
With growing evidence that CBM is failing to deliver its anticipated results on equity and 
sustainability of rural water supply projects especially in sub-Saharan Africa, it becomes 
imperative that further research on the different environments and context-specific issues 
impacting on it is conducted. This study critically examines governance dynamics present in 
Uganda’s rural water supply sub-sector in order to further the understanding of specific factors 
that undermine the potential for CBM to leverage functional sustainability of improved point-
water facilities. Given that rural point-water facilities tend to target the majority of developing 
country populations that have remained largely rural, it is expected that more sound and 
conscious mechanisms for ensuring that CBM enhances its contribution to the provision of 
equitable and sustainable rural water services are identified and consciously enforced by service 
authorities in their respective countries. But is this happening? Using the case of Uganda, what 
contextual dynamics at different levels of rural domestic water supply tend to undermine CBM 
but remain either ignored, unknown or taken for granted by key actors and decision makers? 
What theoretical and empirical arguments are helpful in explaining all this?  
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The thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter One discusses the background, context and 
justification for this study. It traces global and international developments and events that have 
led to the emergence and popularisation of CBM as a promising approach towards delivering 
sustainable water and sanitation services. A brief description of the research problem, broad and 
specific research questions, the focus of the study and the study’s anticipated contribution to the 
academia and development practice are among the key themes the chapter prioritises.  
 
Chapter Two examines Uganda’s current legal, policy and institutional framework for the rural 
safe water supply sub-sector. It aims to illuminate the enabling potential of these frameworks in 
ensuring that CBM systems positively impact on functional sustainability of rural water supply. 
The chapter begins by presenting a brief and general historical context to the current institutional 
framework for service delivery in Uganda and of the water sector in particular, along with broad 
and specific water sector performance trends. The chapter then examines in some detail, policy 
prescribed roles and responsibilities of the key sector actors, the emerging relationships among 
these actors, and how these relationships directly or indirectly have the potential to impact 
(positively or negatively) on the effectiveness of CBM.  
 
Chapter Three is divided into two parts. Part One examines the dominant development 
paradigms and theoretical foundations that have shaped policies around CBM.  Part Two 
examines the literature on the key concepts informing this study. It begins by examining the 
literature on the conceptual relationship between community based management (CBM) and 
community participation (CP). It then goes on to examine the literature on CBM and functional 
sustainability of water supply systems based on past studies. Finally, the chapter examines 
literature on the concept of ‘an enabling local authority’ and the concept’s applicability in 
informing the present investigation.   
 
Chapter Four presents the methodology and methods utilised in the study. The researcher’s 
reflexivity and the epistemological and ontological stances on the choice of the study design and 
methods are also discussed. The strengths, challenges and limitations of the overall research 
strategy are also discussed jointly with strategies adopted to minimise the effect of the challenges 
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on the validity, strengths and authenticity of results.  
 
Chapter Five discusses results from the analysis of study findings on key macro and meso level 
governance dynamics affecting community managed point-water facilities in Uganda. The 
chapter is based on the review and analysis of the water sector policy and programme 
documents, and on interviews conducted with key sector actors at the national (macro) and meso 
(district and sub-county local governments) levels.  
 
Chapter Six discusses findings from the detailed case study of Makondo Parish, a community 
purposively selected for the analysis of micro-level dynamics affecting the performance of CBM. 
The chapter utilises data collected using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, including 
a survey of 547 households.  It examines in detail, the contextual dynamics at the community 
level which continue to affect the performance of CBM systems, but which are either unknown, 
ignored or taken for granted by ‘frontline’ service providers, particularly local governments. 
 
Chapter Seven draws together the key study findings, the main thesis conclusions based on the 
study findings, and on the dominant paradigms and concepts around new public management and 
governance. The chapter examines the implications of the study’s main findings on policy and 
practice, and points towards an enabling framework for CBM and functional sustainability of 
rural point-water facilities for settings or contexts similar to Uganda.  
4 
 
Chapter One 
Community-Based Water Management Systems as a 
‘Remedy’ to the Rural Domestic Water Supply and 
Sustainability Problem 
  
Introduction 
 
The global quest for answers to the ‘growing water and environment problem’, and earlier 
debates and arguments about the ‘increasingly inefficient’ public sector, continue to shape the 
trajectory of policies and programmes around water and the environment. Community-based 
management (CBM) is now a dominant policy and programme approach envisaged to address 
the sustainability question that faces water supply projects in many countries of the world. This 
chapter traces global and international developments and events that have led to the emergence 
and popularisation of CBM as an ‘indispensable’ approach necessary for delivering sustainable 
water and sanitation services. A brief description of the research problem, broad and specific 
research questions, the focus of the study and the study’s anticipated contribution to the 
academia and development practice are among the key themes prioritised in this chapter. 
The Global Discourses and Responses to the Water Problem 
 
Well known vital water benefits have led to the long-established and widely reverberated phrase 
- ‘Water is life’. Undeniably, to have access to safe drinking water, water for domestic use, 
agricultural and industrial production or water to aid the provision of basic, emergency or relief 
services is to have ‘an insurance’ to life. However, global and local experiences continue to 
demonstrate  that access to water in all these dimensions is not simply a given, but an up-hill task 
requiring deliberate and concerted strategic actions at local and international levels. In line with 
this predicament, the United Nations Human Development Programme (UNDP) notes: 
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 Throughout history, human progress has depended on access to clean water and on the 
 ability of societies to harness the potential of water as a productive resource. Water for 
 life in the household and water for livelihoods through production are two of the 
 foundations for human development. Yet for a large section of humanity these 
 foundations are not in place (UNDP 2006: p.v). 
 
By 2000, it was estimated that one third of the world’s population lived in countries that 
experience medium to high levels of water stress
1
. It was projected in 2000 that this ratio would 
grow to two thirds by 2025, if no action was taken to avert the situation (Agarwal et al. 2000). In 
2006, The UNDP also indicated that the global water problem was growing into a crisis, which if 
left unchecked would derail progress towards attainment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) by holding back advances in other areas of  human development (UNDP 2006 p. 23). 
Initial efforts to address the global water challenge started around the 1970s with the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, followed by the 
United Nations Water Conference (UNWC) in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1977. By the early 
1990s, water scarcity
2
 and its attendant problems had firmly gained a place within the 
international development discourse. In January 1992 the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) convened the International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in 
Dublin resulting into the famous Dublin Statement, in which, management of global freshwater 
resources became a key development question of the 21
st
 Century calling for immediate action.  
The ICWE set out recommendations for action at local, national and international levels based on 
four guiding principles
3
 that embrace issues of governance and sustainability, namely: (i) fresh 
water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the 
environment (ii) water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels (iii) women play a central 
part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water, and (iv) water has an economic 
value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good (UN 1992b). 
                                                          
1 A country or region is said to experience water stress when annual water supplies drop below 1,700 cubic metres 
per person per year. When annual water supplies drop below 1,000 cubic metres per person, the population faces 
water scarcity, and below 500 cubic metres "absolute scarcity (UN-Water  2012) . 
2
 Water scarcity is the point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water 
under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, 
cannot be satisfied fully (UN-Water  2012)  
3
 In the water development and academic discourses, these principles are commonly referred to as the ‘Dublin 
Principles’ 
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Regarded as the most significant global conference on water since the 1977 UNWC in Mar del 
Plata, the Dublin conference also provided major inputs on fresh water problems to the June 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil.  At this Conference
4
, 108 Governments represented by heads of State or Government 
adopted three major agreements namely: Agenda 21, a comprehensive programme of action in 
all areas of sustainable development globally; The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, and the Statement of Forest Principles to underlie the sustainable management of 
forests worldwide. All these agreements were aimed at altering the development trajectory from 
one characterised, among others, by massive production and top to bottom management styles to 
one that was largely participatory and sustainable (Mulwa 2010). Related to good governance 
and embedded within its 27 principles, the Rio Declaration stresses inter alia, the importance of 
citizen participation, access to information and partnerships in development and environment 
management (UN 1992c). These principles have since become germane to global, regional and 
local water resources management policy and programmes.  
It is clear that in the past three decades, water and environment related deliberations, decisions 
and policies at international, regional and national levels have fundamentally been influenced by 
the conclusions of these international conferences. The Millennium Declaration (UN 2000), 
target 7 (c) of the MDGs, i.e., reducing by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015; the 2003 UN proclamation of the 
period 2005-2015 as the ‘International Decade for Action - Water for Life’ launched on the 
World Water Day March 22
nd
, 2005, constitute some of the examples of global efforts and 
commitments to address problems associated with water scarcity. The goals of the water decade 
put greater attention on ensuring implementation of water-related programmes and projects in a 
participatory manner in order to facilitate attainment of internationally agreed-upon water-related 
goals (UN 2003). Many other related initiatives to follow up on global commitments to respond 
to the water crisis have been undertaken. The latest of these is the October 2
nd
-5
th
, 2011 UN-
Water Conference in Zaragoza, Spain which was part of the preparation process for the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, twenty years after Rio de Janeiro, named ‘The 
Rio+20’ (UN - Water  2012) . All these global initiatives portray the extent to which contextual 
                                                          
4
 Also popularly known as the Rio Summit, Rio Conference or Earth Summit. 
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factors at local and international levels continue to significantly undermine efforts to address 
development challenges including access to safe water. Indeed, the Rio+20 held between 20
th
-
22
nd
 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro came out again, with a renewed global leadership commitment 
to uphold to the principles and address the challenges of attaining sustainable development goals 
set out 20 years earlier. 
While the MDG report of 2009 indicated that the world was on track to achieve the safe water 
target, it also cautioned that 884 million people worldwide still used unimproved water sources 
mainly surface water such as lakes, rivers, dams or from unprotected dug wells or springs for 
their drinking, cooking, bathing and other domestic activities. Of these people, 84 percent (746 
million) were estimated to be living in rural areas. The report further emphasized that access to 
clean drinking water sources was predominantly a rural problem and that even using an 
improved water source was no guarantee that the water was safe, as test results from water 
samples obtained from many improved water sources did not meet the microbiological standards 
set by the World Health Organization (UN 2009). 
Latest evidence from figures shows that global efforts towards meeting the millennium 
development target 7 (c) may be yielding positive results, particularly in reducing the number of 
people without access to safe drinking water, but these figures fall short of the socio-economic 
and spatial disparities in regions, countries and within countries. Only 61 percent of the people in 
sub-Saharan Africa have access to improved water supply sources compared to 90 percent or 
more in Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern Africa, and large parts of Asia (UNICEF 
and WHO 2012). In addition, due to cost and other logistical difficulties in most countries, a 
proxy indicator, i.e., the proportion of people using ‘improved’5 water sources is being used 
rather than actual testing of microbial and chemical quality of water (UNICEF and WHO 2012 
p.4). About 187 million  (3% of the global population) still use surface water for drinking and 
cooking, and most, i.e. 94 percent are rural inhabitants constituting 19 percent of the rural 
population in Sub-Saharan Africa and 39 percent in Oceania (UNICEF and WHO 2012 p.6). 
Thus, despite ‘global improvements’, many rural dwellers and the poor continue to miss out, and 
the burden of poor access to safe water still falls more on them and most heavily on girls and 
                                                          
5
 Water sources which, by the nature of their construction are protected from outside contamination, particularly 
faecal matter. They include for example bore holes, protected springs and shallow wells. 
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women (UNICEF and WHO 2012, UN-Water 2006a).  
The problems of access to adequate water for domestic, industrial or agricultural production have 
now been widely considered problems of governance and not just the differences in climatic 
zones, natural resource endowments, or the lack of financing and appropriate technology as the 
UN has consistently observed: 
 The water crisis that humankind is facing today is largely of our own making. It has 
 resulted chiefly not from the natural limitations of the water supply or the lack of 
 financing and appropriate technologies (though these are serious constraints), but rather 
 from profound failures in water governance, i.e., the ways in which individuals and 
 societies have assigned value to, made decisions about, and managed the water resources 
 available to them (UNDP 2004 p.2) 
 
 …the scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is rooted in power, poverty and 
 inequality, not in physical availability (UNDP 2006 p.2) 
 
Underscored in the above quotations is the significance of socio-economic, political, ecological, 
and technical capacity obstacles to addressing the water crisis, with focus directed more towards 
effective water governance, improved water management, enhanced capacity at the macro, meso 
and micro levels, and greater empowerment of the poor as key strategic means of accelerating 
progress towards meeting the Millennium targets (UNDP 2004, UNDP 2006, Rogers 2006, Jacobs 
and Nienaber 2011, Bleser and Nelson 2011). While it is acknowledged that more financing for the 
water sector is crucial for meeting the 2015 millennium targets, this is not to be seen in terms of 
more aid flows to the developing world, but much more in terms of ensuring that there is 
effective cost recovery from the investments made. However, in stressing the need for further 
investment, the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report indicated that if funding gaps are 
covered through cost recovery alone it ‘would put water and sanitation services beyond the reach 
of precisely the people who need to be served to meet the 2015 targets’ (UNDP 2006 p. 67). 
Hence, combining financing with more serious attention to the wider governance and public 
management issues in the water and sanitation sector become a crucial strategy for meeting water 
development and service delivery goals at both national and global levels. 
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Community-Based Management (CBM) as a Policy Response to the Rural 
Safe Water Supply and Sustainability Problem 
 
Among the many interventions designed to address the rural domestic water supply and 
sustainability problem, CBM or Community Management (CM) has gained considerable 
prominence since the late 1980s. Essentially CBM owes much of its origin from the neo-liberal 
traditions of a reduced role of the state, human rights and empowerment approaches to 
development. However, in the water sector, it can be traced in the publication of a concept paper 
derived from a symposium organised jointly by the UNDP-World Bank water and sanitation 
programme, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-WASH 
(Water, Sanitation and Health) in Washington in December 1998. The paper provided the 
definition of CBM to suit the water and sanitation context and accentuates the importance of 
enhancing the capacity of local communities to assume a leading role in planning, construction, 
financing, and management of new water supplies as the ‘enabling environment’ necessary for 
the sustainability of water facilities (McCommon, Warner and Yohalem 1990). Earlier, the 1980 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) had also stressed the 
importance of the shift in the way safe water services were provided emphasising approaches 
that deepened community participation in the management of water and sanitation infrastructure 
(UN 1992a, UN 1992c).  
 
It may not be incorrect to state that the community-managed model of service delivery in the 
rural water sub-sector is now the single most important of strategies envisaged by policy and 
development actors to deliver greater access, equity and sustainability in service delivery 
including the sub-Saharan African region where the slowest progress towards meeting the MDG 
targets in rural domestic water supply has so far been registered (UNICEF and WHO 2012). It is 
imperative to note that while CBM may be working well in some developing country contexts 
such as in Latin America and Asia, the results in sub-Saharan Africa are still poorly promising 
(Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011).  
 
In Uganda, CBM was first introduced in the rural domestic water supply sector in 1986 by the 
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), in its then national emergency 
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programme (MWE 2011a). It later in 1999 became part of the official national water policy 
prescription and related legislations. While UNICEF is known to have championed the CBM 
model in rural safe water service delivery in Uganda, policy roots for CBM in Uganda are clearly 
embedded in the 1980 International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD), 
and the subsequent international resolutions, declarations and guidelines particularly the Rio 
Summit’s Agenda 21, and its chapter 18 on fresh water resources (UN 1992a, UN 1992c), which 
Uganda as a UN member country, had to embrace. In addition, the economic and public sector 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were instrumental in shaping the final outlook of public policy 
and service delivery frameworks and models of most developing countries including Uganda.  
 
The reduction in public expenditure, market liberalisation, inter-governmental and market 
decentralisation, all led to a new set of policy actors and players. There may have been 
arguments that the current post-welfare development policy is western oriented and cannot be 
applicable in developing contexts of the south, however, it is also right to question why the same 
policies when applied in countries of the south produce different results. While there may be 
improvements registered in rural safe water supply since the mid-1980s, studies at the national 
level in Uganda continue to demonstrate that the performance would be much better if the CBM 
model of service delivery in the rural water sub-sector was more effective than it currently is 
(Mwebaza 2010, Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2010, Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011, MWE 2011a, 
Asingwire 2008).   
CBM and Functional Sustainability of Point-Water Facilities in Uganda 
In Uganda, rural water supply covers those communities that have a population less than 5000. 
These include villages constituting populations below 2000, and Rural Growth Centres (RGCs) 
with populations between 2000 and 5,000 (MWE  2012). RGCs are typically served by 
mechanised water supply systems, which may include pumped supply from one or more sources, 
treatment, storage and limited distribution, and management of the RGC system is through 
private operators or community formed associations accountable to the District or Sub-county 
Governments. Water supply in villages with populations below 2000, which constitute the 
present study’s focus, is typically done by point-water source technologies. These include deep 
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and shallow wells fitted with hand-pumps, protected springs, public taps from gravity flow 
schemes, and rainwater harvesting tanks. The systems are community managed with support 
from district and sub-county local governments. 
To fit the context of this study, Functional Sustainability as a concept is defined to mean a 
continuation in water supply services over a long period of time after the initial investment, or 
the ability of the water source to continuously yield adequate clean and safe water for the users at 
any particular time (Carter and Rwamwanja 2006, Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011). It includes 
capacity and efficiency in operation and maintenance (O&M), including regular preventive 
maintenance and major rehabilitation of the water supply infrastructure, regardless of whether 
government or non-governmental agencies did provide the water facility. 
Operation and maintenance of rural point-water facilities in Uganda is based on the CBM model 
supported by a system of local governance and decentralised service delivery. Essentially, as part 
of the implementation process for CBM, neighbourhood households of water users are 
mobilised, sensitised and supported to form Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs), or 
sometimes referred to as Water User Committees (WUCs). These committees become 
responsible for O&M of their respective water systems. Hand Pump Mechanics (HPMs) and 
Plumbers ‘where necessary and possible’ support communities through their WSCs to carry out 
regular repairs, servicing or preventive maintenance of the water systems under the supervision 
and facilitation of District Water Officers (DWO) with guidance from the Directorate of Water 
Development (DWD). Central and Local Governments, according to the policy framework are 
responsible for maintenance of sources ‘beyond the capacity’ of the communities (GOU 2011a, 
GOU 2007, GOU 1999).  
As illustrated in figure 1 below, the CBM model in Uganda operates on the idea that when WSCs 
are functional, i.e. when they meet regularly, collect funds for O&M, ensure proper sanitation 
and hygiene at water sources, have a signed contract with a HPM, report or handle hand pump 
breakdowns, formulate and enforce bye-laws, then high levels of functional sustainability of 
water sources that meet high access, equity and efficiency standards are realised. In addition, 
such levels of performance can be replicable in similar conditions elsewhere (Lockwood and 
Smits Stef 2011, MWE 2011a, Schouten and Moriarty 2003). 
 
12 
 
Figure 1: Operational relationship between effective CBM and functional sustainability of  
  rural point water facilities  
 
 
 
A recent country study commissioned by the Ministry of Water and Environment to assess the 
functionality levels of community management systems indicates that WSCs performed at below 
50% on most of their designated roles. The study further assessed levels of functionality of rural 
water sources and established that just over half (53%) of the water sources were fully functional 
i.e. working normally and yielding an adequate volume of water. Others were partly functional 
i.e., functional but with some faults (24%); functional only during the rainy season (5%) or non-
functional i.e. broken down for a long time e.g. one year or over [(18%) (MWE 2011a)]. Indeed, 
the findings of this study underpin the fact that if WSCs are fully functional, there is a high 
potential for them to impact positively on functional sustainability of rural point water facilities.  
Statement of the Research Problem  
Policy support for CBM of water facilities presumes that service authorities (mainly central and 
local government) must to facilitate or enable the community (through its elected 
representatives) to control, or at least influence the development, operation and maintenance of 
its water systems. As an authority, it owns and attends to system obligations, legitimately makes 
and controls decisions and their outcomes. However, while this seemingly ideal situation may be 
attainable in principle, in the context of rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Ugandan case in particular, it seems to depend almost entirely on the governance dynamics 
Source: Author's Diagram 
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present at meso and macro levels of service delivery. One of the most compelling questions to 
which this study seeks to contribute answers is; why, despite the seemingly well-known potential 
for community-managed point water facilities to yield high levels of service delivery and 
sustainability, service authorities in Uganda’s rural domestic water supply are not consciously 
taking the necessary actions to leverage its effectiveness. Given that rural point water facilities 
target over 85 percent of Uganda’s 34 million people, it is expected that more sound and 
conscious mechanisms for ensuring that CBM enhances its contribution to equitable and 
sustainable rural water services are put in place. But how is this being given attention by policy 
and programme actors?  What contextual dynamics might serve to undermine CBM but remain 
ignored, unknown or taken for granted by key sector actors and decision makers? To answer 
these questions, this study examined key governance dynamics at macro meso and micro levels 
of rural safe water supply in Uganda and how they affect and are affected by dynamics at the 
micro-level to shape outcomes of CBM systems in rural domestic water supply and 
sustainability. 
The Research Questions 
The broad research question that guided this investigation was: What governance dynamics at 
the macro, meso and micro levels of public service delivery disable CBM systems from yielding 
desired levels of functional sustainability of rural point-water facilities in Uganda?  The specific 
questions were:  
(i) In what ways do policy prescribed relationships between and among macro and meso 
level water sector actors and public service systems impact on CBM and 
sustainability rural point-water facilities in Uganda? 
(ii) What community-level dynamics and contexts are working against the goals of CBM 
systems in leveraging sustainability of improved point-water facilities? 
Significance of the Present Study 
Broadly, this study contributes to the current debates on governance and to the critical debates on 
new public management and citizen participation.  More specifically, the study contributes to 
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critical debates on water governance and sustainable rural safe water supply in Africa.  It has 
been argued for instance that even when financial resources are leveraged, the lack of deliberate 
commitment by development actors to consciously work as drivers of change will curtail 
prospects for the pursued change (Nyalunga 2006b, McNamara and Morse 2004), and more so in 
the water sector (Plummer and Slaymaker 2007, Winpenny 2003). This study thus adds to 
existing scholarship on the fundamentals that need to be adhered to by policy actors wishing to 
build effective synergies between them and the service beneficiaries, particularly those living in 
rural contexts such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. The study generates more evidence to 
demonstrate why participation in planning and implementation of rural water supplies in 
developing countries may not achieve its intended goals if targeted consumers (water users) and 
their communities are not deliberately supported by their immediate public service authorities.  
At policy and practice level, the study uses evidence generated in a single case and mixed-
methods study design to argue for innovative strategies within the CBM model for rural water 
supply, which ensure that beneficiary communities remain active rather than passive service 
delivery partners. In particular, the study pinpoints the significant role of lower local government 
actors in stimulating and sustaining the energies of water user communities to effectively play 
their service delivery mandates. By so doing, the study questions the credibility of policies that 
value the significant role of communities (service beneficiaries/users) in service delivery but 
which at implementation appear to be taking the same communities for granted. 
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Chapter Two 
Legal, Policy and Institutional Frameworks 
‘Potentially Enabling’ CBM Systems for Rural 
Water Supply in Uganda 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the questions whose answer this study seeks to address is why, despite having an 
elaborate legal, regulatory and institutional framework that supports CBM models of service 
delivery, Uganda’s rural water sector continues to experience low levels of functionality of 
point-water sources, and stagnation in levels of access to water for domestic use in rural areas. 
This chapter examines Uganda’s current legal, policy and institutional framework for the rural 
safe water supply sub-sector in order to illuminate the enabling potential of these frameworks in 
ensuring that CBM systems positively impact on functional sustainability of rural water supply. 
The chapter begins by presenting a brief and general historical context to the current institutional 
framework for service delivery in Uganda and of the water sector in particular. The chapter then 
examines in some detail, policy prescribed roles and responsibilities of the key sector actors, 
emerging relationships among these actors, and how these relationships impact directly or 
indirectly on the effectiveness of CBM for rural safe water supply and sustainability. 
Background to the current Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for 
Rural Water Supply in Uganda 
The service delivery trajectory in Uganda has gone through various systems and regimes. Prior 
to the advent of colonial rule, traditional communities organised along clan leaders or elders, 
chiefdoms or kingdoms were able to provide for basic needs of the people particularly through 
collective self-help efforts that combined participatory and partnership dynamics. During this 
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pre-colonial period
6
, traditional/clan leaders and elders successfully mobilized community 
members to participate in community self-help projects (Asingwire 2008 p. 7). Trust and high 
levels of social cohesion and unity characterised and motivated communities to support each 
other. However, these important dynamics significantly changed during the colonial and post-
colonial era until the present time when more formal and bureaucratic service systems shaped by 
modern development paradigms such as NPM predominate.  
During the colonial period, safe water service delivery was mainly under local administration 
and kingdoms. Before and immediately after independence in 1962, the British colonial 
government operated two systems of central-local government relations existing alongside each 
other. The first was a system of devolution to federal and semi-federal systems (in kingdom 
areas) and the second was a system of district councils, operating in areas without kingdoms
7
. 
The major difference between the two systems of local government was that, whereas the 
kingdoms were allowed to collect their own taxes, the district councils only relied on revenue 
from central administration (Muhangi 1996). Using their tax revenues, kingdoms could finance 
the delivery of services to their subjects. These forms of local governments were constitutionally 
maintained after independence in 1962 until 1967 when the Prime Minister Milton Obote 
abolished kingdoms and subdivided them into districts. Subsequently, the local administration 
act was enacted essentially centralising powers of local administration, making district councils 
more as agents of the central government which in principle utilised a top-down approach to 
service delivery. 
 
By independence in 1962, about 18% of the rural area, and more than 80% in urban areas had 
access to safe water, with greater prospects for greater improvement due to good governance, 
stable economics and the new spirit of nationalism (Muhangi 1996). In the post-independence 
period after 1967, the supply-driven model of service delivery inherited from the colonial 
administration dominated the water sector (Asingwire 2008). The Water Development 
Department constructed many boreholes and set up 15 borehole maintenance units (BMUs) 
based on regions to take care of the maintenance of bore holes in those specific regions, with an 
                                                          
6
 Events that led Uganda to become a British Protectorate (1896-1962) began when two British explorers - Speke 
and Stanley visited in 1862 and 1875 respectively.  
7
 The kingdoms were largely based on dominant tribal groupings especially among the Bantu tribal groups in central, west and 
Southern Uganda 
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almost absent role of the community. However, it did not take too long for these BMUs to 
become very inefficient by failing to respond to breakdowns in time (Muhangi 1996). From 1971 
to early 1980s, political turmoil led to a significant collapse in most public services including 
rural safe water supply. Poor maintenance of water sources resulted into a drastic reduction in 
safe water coverage in both rural and urban areas. Over 70% of the boreholes broken down by 
the early 1970s with no hope for them being repaired (Muhangi 1996).  By the early 1980s, rural 
safe water coverage had fallen to less than 5% from 18%. Efforts of NGOs such as UNICEF to 
fill some of the service delivery gaps were also frustrated by war and political instability which, 
in addition to brutal, short-lived and highly centralised regimes overturned the economy and the 
country’s planning and service delivery capacity for nearly two decades (1971-1986).  
 
When the current NRM government came into power in 1986, it put in place a strong system
8
 of 
participatory democracy and decentralised government administration, allowing people from 
each geopolitically defined electoral area to elect their own leaders from village level up to 
district level (Asiimwe and Musisi 2007). From this period, a quicker response to improve the 
delivery of safe water through decentralised arrangements to local governments especially in 
rural areas was realised. New concepts such as village level operations and maintenance of water 
facilities emerged. Together with the emergence and popularization of the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPS) and public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, a new set of actors 
‘coordinated and regulated by the central government also emerged. Consequently, in the 1990s, 
a comprehensive legal, policy and institutional framework for guiding all sector actors and their 
activities was developed.  
 
The improvement in safe water coverage since 1986 is as a result of a combination of efforts 
from both the NGOs and government. Initially, the sector was largely supported by NGOs 
notably UNICEF and its nation-wide emergency programme. Government recovery programmes 
were also initiated countrywide with donor support. However, until the early 1990s, sector 
coordination, funding as well as human and technical capacity were still very weak, particularly 
at the local government level, which significantly affected progress in the sector. In 1990, an 
                                                          
8 The system was later formalised in the 1995 constitution and the 1997 local government Act. 
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estimated 60% of the population in rural areas lacked access to safe drinking water, mainly 
because of fragmented project support (O'Meally 2011).  
 
Since the early 1990s there have been efforts to improve sector coordination. These efforts have 
seen a policy developed in 1999 with supportive legal and institutional frameworks. These 
frameworks together with increased sector funding coordination have seen improvements in 
coverage of rural safe water services, but with challenges to a more desirable progress (O'Meally 
2011). According to the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP), access to an improved water source 
in Uganda increased from 39% in 1990 to 68% in 2010 (WHO/UNICEF 2012). There are 
arguments that current performance levels in increasing access to safe water in Uganda would 
have been much better if the CBM model of service delivery was given appropriate attention by 
sector actors (Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011, Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011, MWE 2011a, 
Asingwire 2008, Mwebaza 2010). The rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the legal 
and regulatory framework for the provision of rural safe water services in Uganda. The 
discussion mainly highlights key aspects of the frameworks that are relevant to CBM and rural 
safe water supply. It also illuminates the relationships between and among actors supporting 
rural safe water supply and CBM in particular. 
Laws and Regulations Supporting Safe Water Supply and the CBM Model 
for Rural Point Water Facilities 
In broad and specific terms, Uganda’s Constitution provides a legal framework for addressing 
citizen’s access to safe and clean water. Under its social and economic objectives, access to clean 
water is stated as a constitutional right for all Ugandans to enjoy: 
 The state shall endeavour to fulfill the fundamental rights of all Ugandans to social 
 justice and economic development and shall, in particular, ensure that… all Ugandans 
 enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, health services, clean and  safe 
 water….’ (GOU 1995 p. xxxiii) 
In its clean and safe water objective, the constitution states; ‘the state shall take all practical 
measures to promote a good water management system at all levels’. While in its objective on 
the environment which is crucial for the attainment of clean and safe water, it states that; ‘the 
state shall promote development and public awareness of the need to manage land, air and water 
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resources in a balanced and sustainable manner for the present and future generations, and that; 
‘the utilization of the natural resources of Uganda shall be managed in such a way as to meet the 
development and environmental needs of present and future generations of Ugandans, and take 
all possible measures to prevent or minimise damage and destruction to land, air and water 
resources resulting from pollution or other causes (GOU 1995 p. xxxiv-xxxv). These are by far, 
important commitments that potentially support CBM. The constitutional commitment is further 
reflected in more specific legislations and regulations as summarised in table 3 below (See also 
GOU 1999).  
Table 1 Laws and regulations promoting CBM of water supply facilities in Uganda   
Laws and Regulations  Purpose 
Water Statute of 1995 The Statute provides the framework for the use, protection, supply and 
management of water resources including the institution of water user 
associations or WSCs and devolution of water supply undertakings. 
The 1997 Water Act The Act gives details on access rights and regulations pertaining to public and 
private sector investments in water services. When well regulated, HPMs are 
key private sector actors that support CBM. 
The 1997 Local 
Government Act 
Stipulates powers, roles and functions to decentralised government units. In 
Essence, the Act empowers, but also gives responsibility to local authorities to 
oversee central government service delivery and policy implementation 
strategies including CBM. 
The Land Act 1998 Any location of a water supply project must respect the property rights of the 
land owner or occupier. In relation to this a formal written consent is usually 
sought before construction of a water source.  
The Public Health Act 
of 1935 
The Act consolidates the law regarding the preservation of Public Health. In 
CBM WSCs are also responsible for ensuring Health and hygiene at the water 
source as well as sensitise water users on safe water handling practices. Bye-
laws related to hygiene could be enacted at the community level. 
The Public Finance and 
Accountability Act 
2003 
Sets legal procedures and guidelines for the financing and accountability in 
respect to water projects in rural decentralised settings. It therefore takes care 
of the need for transparency, efficiency and good governance in support of 
CBM functions for rural water supply and sustainability. 
The Public 
Procurement and 
Disposal of Public 
Assets Act 2003 
Sets legal standards and procedures for the procurement of supplies and works 
for various public water works and investments. Ideally, this Act should guide 
the institution of a more enabling approach to supply of spare-parts for 
pumps.  
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The constitutional commitment and the supportive legal and regulatory framework clearly reflect 
national readiness for the delivery of sustainable rural safe water services. In particular, the legal 
framework targets all providers and users of water, who according to the CBM approach work in 
close collaboration. The framework indeed acknowledges that rural safe water supply and CBM 
models are a shared responsibility between government and other water sector stakeholders 
including the community, based on rights and responsibilities. But have these commitments been 
effectively translated into concrete choices, mechanisms or actions meant to leverage CBM at the 
different levels of decentralised service delivery? It is one thing to have these legislations in 
place and another to utilise such legal resources to deliver intended outcomes. When such 
legislations are adhered to, they ought to be reflected, for example, in actions that ensure the 
existence of functional community bye-laws and effectiveness of evoking sanctions to none-
compliance on aspects such as operation and maintenance of water facilities or health and 
hygiene at water sources. But have such bye-laws been effectively enabled in Uganda’s CBM 
and functional sustainability of rural point water facilities? What governance dynamics are 
disabling this important aspect of the CBM strategy for functional sustainability of rural point 
water facilities in Uganda? 
The Policy Framework for CBM in Uganda’s Rural Water Sector 
The policy and planning framework for rural safe water supply in Uganda underscores the 
importance of CBM. The overall, national policy goal for the water sector focuses at managing 
and developing the water resources of Uganda in an integrated and sustainable manner, so as to 
secure and provide water of adequate quantity and quality for all social and economic needs of 
the present and future generations ‘with the full participation of all stakeholders’ (GOU 1999 p. 
8). With regard to safe water and sanitation, the specific objectives and strategies of the policy 
focus on: 
 Sustainable provision of safe water within easy reach and hygienic sanitation facilities, 
 based on management responsibility and ownership by the users, to 77% of the 
 population in rural areas and 100% of the urban population by the year 2015 with an 
 80%-90% effective use and functionality of facilities (MWE 2009c p. 2). 
Both the wider water sector goal and the specific objective and strategy for the water and 
sanitation sub-sector emphasise participation of stakeholders in a manner that propels 
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sustainability of the water resources, and the services these resources provide. The water policy 
highlights who the key actors are, as well as their roles and relationships recognising among 
other principles that the management of water resources and facilities ought to take place at the 
lowest level of authority in a framework of deepened decentralisation (GOU 1999 p. 9). The 
policy also emphasises the role of government as primarily that of ‘an enabler’ in a participatory, 
demand responsive and integrated approach to development. In its objective to increase access to 
rural safe water supply from 63% in 2010 to 77% by 2015, the government through its National 
Development Plan (NDP) [2010/11-2014/15] specifically prioritises construction, operation and 
maintenance of new water facilities, and improving functionality of water supply systems. It 
states very elaborately, the actions and strategies for the sustainability of rural safe water supply 
sub-sector to include: (i) strengthening CBM systems through formation of functional water user 
committees and boards; (ii) improving the spare parts supply chain through public private 
partnership arrangements to increase accessibility to spare parts of point water sources, targeting 
to have a spare parts store in each district; (iii) mobilising and increasing equal participation of 
men and women in the management of water systems, and (iv) training and certifying borehole 
mechanics, and ensuring that they are equitably distributed around the country, with at least each 
district having more than two certified borehole mechanics (GOU 2010 p 271-272). From these 
actions and strategies, effective community organisation and leadership, private sector 
effectiveness, equity and equality in decision making stand out as important ‘building blocks’ 
effective CBM and functional sustainability of point-water facilities. But are these visible at the 
community level? 
 
The other key policies supporting CBM framework include policies on gender, health and 
environment with specific aspects related to CBM as a service delivery model. Based on the 
National Gender Policy (1999) which recognises that women constitute the category of the 
population most affected by water problems, water policy guidelines provide as a minimum, that 
half of the members of the WSCs at village level should be women (GOU 1999 p. 19). The main 
justification is that the involvement of women in the management of water facilities would more 
positively contribute to issues of equity and sustainability of rural water supply. Hence gender 
participation, is in Uganda’s case, a measure of the extent to which CBM could be considered 
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effective in leveraging the sustainability of rural point-water facilities. How has this requirement 
been strictly adhered to?  
 
The National Health Policy (1999) and the Environmental Health policy (2005) also recognise 
low access to safe water and poor sanitation coverage as major contributors to the burden of 
disease in the country with special emphasis in rural areas. Consequently, promotion of personal 
hygiene and maintenance of appropriate hygiene and sanitation standards at household, within 
institutions (e.g. schools and markets etc.) and the general community are key of the strategic 
spots they address (GOU 1999 p.10). The environmental health policy views attainment of a 
clean and healthy living environment for all citizens as a key priority goal through community 
mobilisation, education and sensitisation which are fundamental aspects for successful CBM. It 
also advocates for inter-sector collaborations in health, environment, water and sanitation, 
viewing such strategies as pre-requisites for progress in addressing national water and 
environmental health challenges. Interventions that promote community participation as a means 
to empower and enable people to take responsibility for environmental health matters under their 
direct control are clearly emphasised by the policy. Hence, the policies complement and 
legitimise all efforts and decisions taken at national and local levels to enhance functionality 
levels of rural safe water infrastructure including, for instance, development and enforcement of 
bye laws concerning proper hygiene and sanitation around improved point-water sources as well 
as within households. Indeed, roles and mandates of water and sanitation committees (WSCs) 
include aspects related to health promotion in their respective communities. The assumption is 
that safe water cycle is not complete unless water related hygiene practices are effectively 
adhered to by the water users. This study examines in Chapter Six whether and how these good 
and supportive policy principles have been enabled; whether and how the WSCs under the CBM 
mechanism in Makondo Parish demonstrate the capability to address hygiene and sanitation 
concerns around their point-water facilities as well as the wider water safety issues in households 
and the entire community.  
The Institutional Framework: Actors, Roles and Responsibilities  
The rural water supply sub-sector in Uganda operates within the decentralised service delivery 
framework instated in the early 1990s. The decentralisation framework takes the traditional inter-
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governmental decentralisation of authority described by Conyers (1983), and decentralisation to 
the marked in the form of private sector participation (Hambleton, Hoggett and Tolan 1989). In 
this study, levels of safe water service delivery and the actors within those levels have been 
categorised under macro, meso and micro levels as summarised in table 2 below  
 
Table 2  Levels of safe water service delivery and major actors involved 
Macro-Level  Central Government Institutions (Ministries and Directorates) 
 National NGOs 
 Large and medium size private companies/enterprises that deal directly with 
central government water sector institutions, but also occasionally with sub-
national actors 
 Donors/Development Partners 
Meso-Level  Technical Support Units (TSUs) 
 District and Sub-County Local Governments 
 Small private sector firms and individual service providers (e.g. HPMs and Spare 
parts dealers) 
 Regional/local NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) 
Micro-Level  The community of water users 
 Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs) 
 Village Executive Council 
 
Source: Author’s Illustration 
Central Government Actors and their Major Roles and Functions 
Through the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) the central government (CG) as an 
actor is responsible for ensuring that there are appropriate legislations and regulatory controls to 
support water policy implementation. It is responsible for building adequate institutional 
capacity, coordinate planning, financing, implementation and monitoring of water programmes. 
It also guarantees that domestic water supply demands are given priority over other water 
demands such as industry, agriculture and hydro-power production. How is this prioritisation 
reflected in various planning and coordination aspects aimed at enhancing CBM through 
improved community contribution to repair, operation and maintenance of point-water facilities? 
Based on the integrated planning and development approach, the MWE does not work in 
isolation. It takes leadership in coordinating roles, functions and responsibilities of other relevant 
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sector ministries and departments. In a decentralised service delivery framework, the Ministry of 
Local Government (MLG) ensures that sound decentralized government systems are in place. By 
this function, it is directly responsible for spearheading the goals of good governance, demand 
driven, participatory and integrated social and economic development through sub-national 
governments. In terms of human resourcing of LGs, the MLG works closely with the Ministry of 
Public Service (MPS) to streamline staff structures, job descriptions and salaries among other 
human resource planning functions that are crucial both at the macro, meso and micro levels of 
public service delivery. Similarly, the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development 
(MGLSD) is a close partner with the MLG and MWE in executing water sector programmes 
especially through its staff in the community development department who take responsibility 
for community mobilisation and sensitisation.  
The MGLSD is also responsible for supporting sub-national governments to build system 
capacity for gender responsive decision making, while the Ministry of Health (MH) and the 
Ministry of Education and Sports (MES) are together responsible for hygiene education in 
communities and institutions such as schools. In the CBM framework, these functions are 
expected to be played by the WSCs with support from the district water related officers in the 
Health and Community Development Departments. This study examines how these institutions 
and their respective departments at district and sub-county local government level relate 
especially in promoting CBM and functional sustainability of rural point-water facilities. Is there 
any deliberate and conscious collaboration by these departments to promote community 
participation or contribution to repair, operation and maintenance of water facilities, or 
collaboration in the general issues of hygiene and sanitation in households? What is the nature of 
relationship these institutions and departments have with other non-state actors in promoting 
CBM?  
Under the decentralised service delivery framework, CG is responsible for leveraging technical 
and financial capacities of LGs to deliver water and sanitation services in rural areas, including 
new constructions, maintenance and rehabilitation of water supply facilities. The central 
government can delegate powers and functions to other units of government or non-
governmental actors both for-profit and not-for-profit. It can organise training for personnel in 
LG units as a capacity building function for a more effective decentralized service delivery. 
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According to the legal and policy framework, CG is also mandated to provide technical 
assistance by seconding staff with specialized skills to LGs that demonstrate a lack of such skills. 
In 2002, the MWE established eight (8) Technical Support Units (TSUs) each composed of 
specialists in Civil Engineering, Public Health and Community Mobilsation and Training. These 
provide technical support to a cluster of districts and report directly to the MWE/DWD on key 
rural water supply issues from these districts. Ideally, their work in the districts should help to 
enhance the effectiveness of CBM. But how come their impact is still yet to be felt at the district 
and community level?  
 
The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) has the role of 
mobilising and allocating funds as well as co-ordination of donor inputs. It also reviews sector 
plans and actor compliance with water sector specific objectives as well as the wider policy and 
legal framework in the sector right from the lowest level of government. Release of funds to 
implementation units is always based on the ministry’s satisfaction with compliance to financial 
guidelines. Following efforts initiated in 2002 to enhance aid effectiveness in recipient countries, 
a sector-wide approach (SWAP)
9
 to planning, financing and monitoring water and sanitation 
programmes was adopted in September 2002. Importantly, the SWAP meant that aid to the water 
sector should significantly shift from the conventional project based funding to national budget 
support in form of a ‘basket fund’, in which all donors to the sector channeled their support. In 
the same vein, government institutionalised the Water Policy Committee (WPC)
10
 and the Water 
and Sanitation Sector Working Group (WSSWG)
11
, for overall policy and technical guidance to 
the sector respectively with the Directorate of Water Development (DWD) as its secretariat. This 
                                                          
9
 SWAP was initiated in 2000 and adopted in 2002. It means that within a decentralised delivery system all significant public 
sector funding follows a common approach, is within a framework of a single sector expenditure plan and relies on government 
procedures for disbursement, accounting, monitoring and reporting on progress. 
10
 The WPC is composed of the MWE, MLG and representatives from the private sector, NGOs and district LGs. It coordinates 
the formulation of national policies, liaises with international and regional water resources organizations and coordinates the 
preparation and review of plans and projects which may affect international water resources. The WPC also initiates and 
coordinates the preparation, implementation and revision of national water resources policy and national priorities for the use of 
water and related land resources. 
11
 The Water and Sanitation Sector Working Group (WSSWG) on the other hand is responsible for sector co-ordination and 
approval of agreed minutes from the Annual Joint Government of Uganda – Donor Sector Review. The WSSWG is chaired by 
the Permanent Secretary MWE and comprises representatives from MWE/DWD, the National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
(NWSC), MH, MES, MFPED, the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIF), MGLSD, Donor 
representatives and NGOs (UWASNET as representative). The WSSWG provides policy and technical guidance for sector 
development in the country and meets at least every quarter. Two sub working groups, one responsible for Water for Production 
and another Sanitation report to the WSSWG (GOU 2007).  
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institutional and funding mechanism is indeed an enabling strategy for ensuring more efficiency 
and effectiveness. However, the extent to which these funding mechanisms are effective in 
supporting decentralised public programmes including water and sanitation remains contentious 
particularly with regard to timely allocation of funds as well as controlling financial leakages.  In 
2007, the MWE also established a Good Governance Working Group (GGWG) tasked to 
identify and recommend measures to promote and monitor transparency, accountability and good 
governance in the water sector. The initial activities of the GGWG included studies that 
informed the first joint action plan intended mainly to address corruption and public resource 
mismanagement in the water sector. But how have these efforts served to specifically impact on 
CBM and functional sustainability of rural-point water supply facilities? What governance issues 
might be disabling such good intentions and their desired levels of effectiveness? 
LG Actors, Roles and Functions potentially supporting CBM  
The structure of the decentralised LG system in Uganda is based on districts with both rural and 
urban jurisdictions (figure 2). Under the districts are lower local governments and administrative 
units in form of Counties, Sub-counties, Parishes and Villages
12
. Local Government Councils 
(LGCs) [elected politicians] constitute the planning authority of LGs. All LGCs are assisted by 
the Technical Planning Committees (TPC) [LG employees/technical personnel] at both the 
district and sub-county (for rural LGs) in overall planning and implementation of service 
delivery in their respective LGs under the national planning framework. TPCs are constituted by 
all heads of sector departments including the water sector, and are employed and supervised by 
the district and Sub-county LGCs. Hence, the nature of relationships between TPCs and LGCs 
and the dynamics that shape these relationships are critical in determining the effectiveness of 
service delivery programmes and strategies such as CBM. 
According to the Local Government Act (GOU 1997 p. 597-598), every local government 
council (LGC) should appoint an Executive Committee (EC) whose roles and functions include 
among others monitoring and coordination of activities of NGOs operating within their 
jurisdiction, initiating self-help projects and mobilising people, material and technical assistance 
                                                          
12
 The geographical sizes, settlement patterns and population density may sometimes vary significantly depending on many 
geographical and socio-economic conditions, including creation of new local government councils through sub-division of old 
ones as has recently been the case. 
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for such projects. The governance and service delivery roles and functions of LGCs run from the 
village level through to the parish, sub-county, county and district council, making five levels of 
planning, implementation and supervision of service delivery programmes. By carrying out these 
roles, the LGCs and their ECs are therefore indispensable actors supporting the effectiveness of 
CBM systems for rural safe water supply regardless of whether services are provided by 
government or NGOs.  This study examines the extent to which these roles are being played in 
support of CBM and how the relationships between the relevant LG actors in partnership with 
other actors from the private for-profit and not-for-profit sectors impact on CBM systems for 
rural water supply sustainability.  
Figure 2 Decentralised local government structure and planning functions for rural local 
governments in Uganda  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District Council (V) Accounting 
Level 
County Councils (IV) 
Administrative 
Sub-County Council (III) 
Accounting Level 
Parish councils (II)  
Administrative 
District Technical Planning Committee integrates 
Sub-county plans and priorities and presents to 
district council for budgeting; District Council 
approves budgets, and also has powers to make bye-
laws 
Source: Based on the Local Government Act (GOU 1997), and Quin, Balfors and Kjellén  (2011) 
Village Executive Council (I) 
County Executive Committee does not have a 
specific role in the rural safe water supply 
programmes.  
 Sub-county Executive Committee reviews sub-
county draft development plan; Sub-county council 
approves plan and priorities; Sub-county chiefs 
submit plans and priorities to district 
 Parish development Committee integrates village 
plans into Parish Plans and identifies priorities based 
on sub-county plans; The Parish Council approves 
plans; Parish Chief submits approved plans to sub-
county chief. 
Village Executive Committee identifies development 
needs following parish guidelines and present 
proposals to Parish Council 
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With support from the Health Office (HO) and the Community Development Office (CDO) of 
the district, District Water Officers (DWOs) are responsible for the provision and sustainability 
of water supply services in districts and sub-counties. Support staff to the District Water Office 
includes; a Hygiene Officer, an Assistant District Water Officer responsible for community 
mobilization, a Technical Officer per county in the district and a Borehole Maintenance 
Supervisor.  Although they are regarded as support staff, Health officers (HOs) and community 
development officers (CDOs) are in essence part of the technical team directly responsible for 
rural safe water and sanitation. Health Assistants (HAs) and Community Development 
Assistants, who form part of the sub-county extension services work-force, and who are part of 
the sub-county TPC are responsible for identifying community needs using participatory 
planning methods.  But how are these sector departments working in order to leverage CBM and 
functional sustainability of improved point-water facilities to desired levels in the rural 
communities? At regional and district level, water sector stakeholder coordination meetings are 
supposed to be convened at least once every year. These meetings are expected to bring together 
political leaders, technical officers, NGOs and private sector representatives to discuss and share 
district specific water and sanitation experiences and challenges. In addition, the meetings allow 
TSU staff an opportunity to deepen understanding of sector policy issues among all meso-level 
actors particularly in rural water and sanitation sub-sector on behalf of the MWE. It is also at 
such meetings that any issues to do with the effectiveness and functionality of CBM would be 
raised as a matter of priority. This study also examines whether and how this is happening to 
impact on CBM.    
The private-for-profit Actors 
Private companies, individual technicians/ mechanics and spare parts dealers constitute the main 
actors in the private sector that support rural safe water supply.  The services they provide for 
CBM and generally rural water supply range from undertaking studies, to training services, 
construction or repair of water supply facilities as well as supply of spare parts. The private 
sector thus operates at all levels of service delivery (micro, meso and macro) and embraces small 
local firms and large international ones. With regard to CBM, hand pump mechanics (HPMs) 
and spare parts dealers are the primary actors from the private sector on whom this study places 
much emphasis in examining the extent to which their roles and responsibilities as private sector 
29 
 
actors are supportive of CBM, and whether and how factors from the external environment 
impacts on their capacity to leverage CBM effectiveness. 
NGOs and Donors/Development Partners 
All NGOs involved in water and sanitation activities in Uganda are coordinated by Uganda 
Water and Sanitation NGO Network (UWASNET), a national umbrella organisation for civil 
society organisations (CSOs) in the Water sector in Uganda. UWASNET works closely with 
Government sector institutions at the macro-level on policy and collaboration with other non-
governmental agencies supporting the sector. This was specifically interested in understanding 
national level coordination efforts and collaborations that impact on CBM in rural domestic 
water supply. Given that non-profit agencies are traditionally known to be closer to communities 
they serve, the network provides an opportunity for civil society organisations to engage in many 
ways with other actors on issues that would enhance service delivery to rural communities 
including those that impact on the effectiveness of CBM. NGOs working in rural jurisdictions 
are expected to work closely with the local authorities in those areas in planning coordination 
and implementation of rural water supply activities following the national policy guidelines. It 
was therefore important that this study examines working relationships of the NGOs and other 
actors at the macro and meso levels in their effort to address disablers of the CBM of rural safe 
water supply.  
 
International development agencies such as the World Bank, Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) also 
provide funding to the rural safe water supply sector especially through budget support 
frameworks embedded in the SWAP discussed earlier. Apart from budget support, they also 
provide direct technical assistance in form of studies whose results routinely inform strategies for 
improved sector performance.  Financing and technical capacity are clearly very significant 
issues that directly impact on policy implementation in the rural water sector. This study 
examines issues related to budgeting and financing for the water sector, more specifically on 
how processes and outcomes of the modalities affect CBM. 
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Water User Community Groups and Organisations 
In a demand responsive approach (DRA) to development promoted under the decentralised 
service delivery framework, communities are expected to initiate the process of service delivery 
in their areas by making an application through the sub-county to the district under the bottom up 
planning framework.  According to DRA, formation of WSCs, who are elected by community 
members, is one of the conditions that communities must fulfill prior to submitting an 
application for a service (GOU 1999). Key positions on the WSC include the Chairperson, 
Treasurer, Secretary, Publicity, Water Source Caretaker and the Village Executive Chairperson 
(who is an ex-officio member of the WSC)
13
. The major role of the WSCs is to ensure routine 
preventive maintenance of the water facility. But, is their role and the roles of specific WSC 
members e.g. the Water Source Care-taker being effectively played? Based on the technology 
used, tools should also be provided to the water facility caretaker, who is also a member of the 
WSC to carry out minor repairs and routine maintenance of the water source on a voluntary 
basis. Have these tools been provided, and are the caretakers using such tools to undertake 
routine operation and maintenance of the water sources? 
According to the water policy, the WSC should also mobilise the community to pay a monthly 
contribution towards operation and maintenance of the water facility. Such funds should be well 
managed and preferably kept onto a bank account. The funds are not only supposed to be used 
for routine preventive maintenance such as oiling and tightening of nuts in the case of boreholes 
and shallow wells, but are also used to cover part of the costs for major rehabilitations. WSCs are 
also supposed to sensitise communities on good sanitation and hygiene so that the safe water 
chain is maintained (MWE 1999, Asingwire 2008). Are all these happening? What governance 
dynamics at national and local levels continue to affect the effectiveness of WSCs in playing 
their roles? The following diagram (figure 3) presents an illustrative summary of the different 
water sector actors, their functions and relationships on which the overall investigation was 
based.  
 
 
                                                          
13
 The Water Statute 1995 provides for the formation of Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs) as community level 
organisations for ensuring proper management and sustainability of water facilities. The water policy also provides for the 
composition of the WSC to be gender balanced with women occupying 50 percent of the positions on the committee 
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Figure 3 Water sector actors and their relationships over CBM of point -water facilities 
 
Source: Adapted with minor modifications from MWE (2011a p. 12) 
 
Development Partners 
 Financing 
 Technical assistance 
 Finance Research/Studies  
 
District (Meso-Level) 
 Financial and technical support to sub-county LGs 
 Plan for and co-finance training of HPMs 
 Provide operation and maintenance toolkits 
  Supervise sub-counties and the private for-profit and not-
for-profit actors. 
 Plan and carry out rehabilitation of point-water facilities. 
 Monitor  the water quality  
 Stock spare parts not readily available in the local market 
and sell them to WSCs  
 Enact bye-laws/ Ordinances on operation  and maintenance 
NGOs 
 Financing 
 Mobilisation and training 
 Planning and implementation 
 Follow-up support 
 Monitoring  
Sub-Country (Meso-Level) 
 Select and pay for the training technicians (HPMs) 
 Train WSCs & provide follow-up support 
 Supervise and monitor the HPMs 
 Provide custody of operation and maintenance tool kits  
 Plan and allocate resources to operation and maintenance 
 Monitor the functionality of water sources 
 Enact bye-laws  on  operation and maintenance 
Private Sector 
 Supply & distribution of tools and spare parts 
 Train HPMs, and other mechanics. 
 Maintain and repair  water facilities 
 Provide other services as required by the local 
authorities 
WSCs (Micro-Level) 
 Plan for & oversee O&M; report problems 
 Together with users select caretakers 
 Engage HPM/Plumber and pay for spares and repairs 
 Set water user charges 
 Hire and pay caretakers 
 Promote sanitation in the community  
 Make rules and regulations on use of the source  
Water User Community 
 Participate in planning and decision making 
 Elect WSCs 
 Participate in site selection and cleaning water-source 
surroundings, etc. 
 Contribute to capital cost of water source construction 
and to operation and maintenance of water source 
Source Caretaker 
 Organise the community for orderly use of water source 
 Clean surroundings of water facilities 
 Undertake minor servicing of water source (oiling) 
 Protect the water catchment area 
 Maintain the fence around the source 
 Collect the O&M funds 
Central Government (Macro-level Roles) 
 Provide financial and Technical support to districts for 
operation and maintenance of water sources 
 Ensure availability of spare parts in the country 
 Undertake Policy Regulation and Monitoring 
 Monitor water quality through water quality tests 
 Set standards for Operation and maintenance 
 Conduct studies to inform sector and service 
improvements 
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Conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion, Uganda’s legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks for rural 
safe water supply provide a potentially enabling framework for an effective CBM system for 
rural water service delivery and sustainability. This enabling potential is even reflected in the 
fact that Uganda’s water sector has more ambitious targets than those set in the millennium 
development goal (MDG) target 7(c); while the MDG target is aiming at halving the proportion 
of the global population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2015, 
Uganda is targeting (respectively), 77 and 100 percent.  Thus, looking at plans, policies and 
strategies for the sector as elaborated in the foregoing discussion, it remains unclear, why the 
‘good intentions’ fail to attract ‘good attention’. As Lockwood (2004 p.1) rightly puts it, 
‘knowing the right way forward is one thing, but achieving the rate of progress needed is quite 
another’. The ‘right way’ for sustainable community-based management models for rural safe 
water supply is certainly known in Uganda’s policy and planning framework, but ‘achieving 
progress’ remains problematic. In the next chapter, I examine among others, the dominant 
paradigms and theoretical foundations informing CBM and functional sustainability of rural 
point-water facilities. Debates and arguments generated in both theoretical and empirical 
literature are examined in order to distil varying opinions and their contextual relevance 
especially in explaining policies and practices on CBM systems for point-water supply and 
sustainability in resource poor settings. 
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Chapter Three 
Dominant Paradigms, Concepts and Theoretical 
Foundations Shaping Policies around CBM 
Introduction 
Broadly, CBM as a service delivery model is conceived under the wider notions of the post-
welfare state or post-weberianism. These notions have evolved and manifested themselves 
through the neoliberal policy prescriptions, new public management and good governance 
approaches to development. Since the 1980s, these approaches have become popular, shaping 
most if not all public policies of the developing world. In the rural water sector, CBM became an 
outcome of these notions as a policy option aimed not only at empowering users of public 
services in decision making, but also fundamentally as a cost reduction and/or public 
management efficiency project. In this chapter, these notions, concepts and development 
paradigms are examined mainly based on the wide debates in the theoretical and empirical 
literature. The aim throughout the discussion in the chapter is to distil pessimistic, optimistic or 
cautious views and opinions generated around these notions, paradigms and concepts and their 
implications on policies oriented towards community-managed models of service delivery. The 
chapter is divided into two parts; Part One examines in detail, the dominant development 
paradigms and theoretical foundations that have shaped policies around CBM. It also examines 
the literature on the concept of ‘an enabling local authority’ and the concept’s applicability in 
informing this study. Part Two examines the literature on the conceptual relationship between 
community based management (CBM) [also used interchangeably as community management 
(CM)] and community participation (CP). It then goes on to examine the literature on related 
empirical studies on CM and functional sustainability of water supply systems.  
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PART ONE 
From a Bureaucratic and Welfare State to a Neoliberal State 
Community-Based Manangement is a concept well positioned within the post-weberian 
approaches to governance in which the conventional systems for governing have become 
outmoded means of public service delivery. Until the early 1980s, production and delivery of 
basic services in most of sub-Saharan Africa was largely a domain of the state through its 
bureaus and directly to service beneficiaries (Awortwi and Helmsing 2008). The form in which 
the state was organised to deliver basic services was typical of Max Weber’s ideals of  what 
constituted an ‘effective organisation’(Udy Jr 1959). Critics of the Weberian model of service 
delivery, or ‘statism’ viewed it as an undesirable and non-viable form of administration 
developed and applied in a legalistic and authoritarian context of society, and now, inevitably 
withering away due to its incompatibility with the contemporary complex, individualistic, and 
dynamic society (Ionescu 2011a, Olsen 2006).  However, inherent as there may be weaknesses in 
the weberian model, some scholars (see for instance, Fine 1999, Stazyk and Goerdel 2011, Olsen 
2006) have argued against emphasis of these weaknesses over the strengths, pointing out that 
even within the post-weberian liberal and neo-liberal schools of thought, Weber’s principles 
remain a strong pillar of reference for those wishing to leverage organisational and managerial 
efficiency in doing business (Fine 1999), and that it may be time to rediscover Weber’s 
bureaucracy (Olsen 2006), and understand how a number of other factors could influence 
organisational efficiency (Stazyk and Goerdel 2011 p.646).  
Both orthodox and contemporary perspectives of the state as the prime actor in service delivery 
are traced in the popular conceptions of a ‘welfare’ or ‘benevolent’ state. Inspired by Richard 
Titmuss’s work; ‘essays on the welfare state’ (Titmuss and Abel-Smith 1976), much of the social 
policy literature often refers to a ‘welfare state’ as an ideal model of service delivery in which 
the state is the sole actor, having responsibility for the production and delivery of comprehensive 
and universal welfare services for its citizens (Almog-Bar and Ajzenstadt 2010, Trydegård and 
Thorslund 2010). Barr (1993 p. 13) particularly traces the origin of the concept of the welfare 
state in the the works of christian charity in the 16
th
   Century Europe but  more especially in the 
1601 English poor law legislation in Britain and its subsequent amendments in 1834, the liberal 
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reforms of 1906-1914, and the post world war legislation of 1944-1948. The proposals and their 
subsequent amendments were all directed at ensuring the well being of the people. Many other 
countries in Europe, The United States of America, and the colonial regimes in Africa and Asia 
enacetd more or less similar legislations to promote the welfare of their citizens. However, in the 
early 1980s, there was a major paradigmatic change in the ‘welfare state’ approach to service 
delivery with efforts directed more towards reducing the role of the state. Concepts such as 
‘withdrawing the state’, ‘unbundling the state’ or ‘liberalisation’ became drivers of major policy 
presriptions spearheaded by The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Consequently, these changes have led to the emergence and popularisation of a new set of actors, 
in what has been viewed as the third sector. Concepts and practices such as ‘community 
management’ (CM), also understood as community ‘self help’ or ‘cost sharing’ have become 
part of contemporary public policy and quite alien to practices in the welfare state. However, 
complete withdrawal of states from direct service delivery continues to be complex as states 
must account to their electorate, as well as adhere to human rights standards and policy practices. 
But this has had to vary by country or region. In this study, I explore complexities surrounding 
community-managed public service facilities in the rural water sector in Uganda not only to 
further the understanding of implications of a withdrawn state on public service delivery, but 
also to expand the understanding of contextual dynamics that influence the ability of states in 
executing their new roles,  particulary in young and resource poor democracies of sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
As an outcome of the redefinition of the state, the concepts of ‘failed state’ or ‘collapsed state’ 
have also emerged in reference to instutional (organisational) or functional (welfare or service 
provision) failure of states. However, questions of what constitutes a modern state or the 
benchmarks of ‘stateness’ also remain almost unresolved, as economic, political and social 
contexts and systems of independent states tend to vary significantly (Hagman and Hoehne 2009, 
Milliken and Krause 2002). While economists view state failure mainly in terms of economic 
welfare variables of production and distribution of goods and services, political scientists define 
it more in terms of  the political legitimacy and leadership capacity within a state (Hagman and 
Hoehne 2009). Despite this conceptual difference, both views can be regarded as mutually inter-
related particularly when analysing their potential to impact on public service delivery such as in 
the current debates on how best to deliver rural safe water on a sustainable basis, and whether 
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CBM provides the ‘silver bullet’ for sustainability of services. The view of political scientists 
seems to reinforce arguments that even if there is financial resource abundancy, poor leadership 
would definitely impact negatively on policies that appear to be empowering and participatory as 
is for instance reflected in CBM models of safe water service delivery, which seem to depend 
almost entirely on effective leadership at the micro and meso levels. Similarly, illegitimate 
leadership may only be pre-occupied with ‘self protection’ rather than institution building, 
thereby becoming injurious to the attaimant of CBM goals.  
In exceptional cases, Milken and Kraus argue that it is possible to have a politically failing state 
with some of its institutions persisting to function effectively. They cite the example of the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda where militia groups were so organised despite the fact that they were 
operating in a ‘politically failing’ state (2002 p. 757). However, as Cooper observes, Milken and 
Kraus do not seem to adequately acknowledge the fact that such persisting institutions of failing 
states survive on the prevailing political and economic bewilderment to serve their own selfish 
interests no matter whether they are private or public institutions (Cooper 2002).  The post-
‘September Eleven’ terrorist attack on the USA has also brought a new dimension in the 
understanding of ‘failed states’, particularly in as far as ‘global security’ is concerned. A ‘strong’ 
state is currently not only seen as one that is able to regulate markets or promote the 
independence of the economy, but also one that is not a ‘haven for global terrorist activities’ or 
one that directly supports anti-terrorist activities. Indeed, it can be argued that a lot of resources 
that would otherwise be directed to support the delivery of basic public services such as water 
and sanitation in developing countries are channelled towards anti-terrorism activities. Whether 
it is for purposes of human security, human rights, or the right economics, the more 
contemporary understanding of a strong state, as Hilgers indicates, remains largely one that 
offers a precondition for neoliberalism to deploy its moral responsibility in regulating regulate 
competitions that emerge out of spontaneous markets, or price instabilities that among others 
often characterise neoliberal regimes (Hilgers 2012).  
While the concept of the welfare state is on one hand viewed as a sound measure for the re-
distribution of wealth particularly through taxation and the use of tax revenue to support the poor 
and propell the goals of social justice (Sejersted 2011, Emre Özçelik and Eyüp Özveren 2006), it 
has on the other hand been viewed as a capitalist conspiracy or strategy to contain social unrest 
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(Mubangizi and Mel Gray 2013, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011). Hence, the role of the 
welfare state  in redistributive justice cannot be  understated, nor should it be over-exagerated 
(Batić 2011). Barr (1993 p. 103) argues that apart from its distributional objectives, the welfare 
state has a major efficiency role. The original principles or ideals of a welfare state may have 
changed as a result of the global policy shifts, but nation states remain responsible for 
guaranteeing the necessary service delivery effectiveness in their ‘new governance’ role. The use 
of the concept of ‘welfare state’ therefore remains relevant given the positions and service 
delivery responsibilities states hold over the well-being of their citizens. Therefore, it does not 
seem to matter whether public goods and services are provided directly through state institutions, 
indirectly through regulated market mechanisms or in partnershpis of service providers and 
consumers as is prescribed in CBM. What matters is for the states to consciously enable systems 
meant to impact on effective and sustainable service delivery. But how best are they doing this, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa? What can the study of policy prescribed CBM systems for 
rural safe water service delivery in Uganda contribute to this understanding?  
 
Despite the fact that the conceptual analysis of ‘welfare state’ and ‘state failure’ base on the 
evidence of the bureaucratic inefficiencies af a benevolent state producing and delivering public 
goods and services to her citizenry, debates are still going on about the inevitability of ‘statism in 
the contemporary world, as markets have also failed to deliver social equity and social justice 
(Jänicke 1990 p.31). In line with this argument, The World Development Report (1997) puts it as 
follows: 
Certainly, state dominated development has failed. But so has stateless development-a 
message that comes through too clearly in the agonies of people in collapsed states as  
Liberia and Somalia. History has repeatedly shown that good government is not a  luxury 
but a vital necessity. Without an effective state, sustainable development,  both economic 
and social, is impossible (The World Bank 1997 p.ii).  
Hence, the introduction and popularisation of concepts such as new public management (NPM), 
governance and good governance, which are  explored later in this Chapter, is partly an 
experience of the negative consequences of the ‘paradigm shift’ from direct service delivery by 
the state, and whose impact has been felt more in the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
than in its Anglo-American architects. Governments and states are increasingly getting weak to 
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‘steer’ or ‘row’, i.e. make policy and implement directly or enable other actors to deliver public 
services but are experiencing possibilities of ‘drifting’, ‘sinking’ or total failure  to perform the 
legitimate mandates they owe to their citizens (Peters 2011 p. 5-11). As Hilgers observes, the 
legitimacy of the state depends on economic growth, which is determined by the ability of the 
state to shape a framework within which individuals are free to pursue their individual interests. 
This freedom, in a world of competition should lead to the recreation and rebuilding of the state 
itself. The re-engineering of the state appears clearly in neoliberal theory as a step necessary for 
triggering the modification of subjectivities and social relations, and for making them correspond 
to the underlying principles of spontaneous markets that emerge in neoliberal frameworks 
(Hilgers 2012 p. 81-82). Therefore, competition and maximisation become the organising 
principles of the state. But they also require close supervision and deliberate monitoring to 
regulate their potential excesses on the wider economy.  
While it is obvious that both political and economic dimensions of state failure variously 
complement each other and collectively impact on the ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ features and 
functions of a state, it is also correct to argue that even within states that may be visibly 
‘functional’ as is the case with some countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) such as Uganda, 
inneffective service delivery due to accelerated tendencies towards political patronage and elite 
capture become clear weaknesses that amount to state failure (Tangri and Mwenda 2008a). 
Recent studies (Green 2010a, Green 2011) have indeed shown that political patronage is on the 
increase in SSA, and has been amplified by corruption tendencies engineered by ‘hurried’ 
neoliberal policy implementation (Hilgers 2012, Mwenda and Tangri 2005a, Tangri and Mwenda 
2006a). Consequently, failure to support effective public policy implementation such as ensuring 
that CBM systems prescribed in a national water policy become effective and sustainable can be 
conceived as an aspect of state failure. Paradoxically, the water policy design and 
implementation framework in Uganda is also conceived within the NPM and goverance 
frameworks which are conceptually meant to address state and market failures.  
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The Hegemonic Influence of Neoliberalism on Public Policy Directions in 
Developing Contexts 
As pointed out in Chapter One, rural water policy prescriptions around CBM of rural safe water 
service delivery are rooted in the neoliberal policy influence of the 1980s especially in 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. The creation of 
international institutions, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction (The World Bank) and the Bretton Woods agreements were the cornerstones that 
made neoliberalism an official economic and political gimmick of the early 1980s, particularly 
‘directed’ to southern governments affected by the debt crisis of the 1970s. An acceptance of 
neoliberalism became a pre-condition for aid (Hossen and Westhues 2012, Ammani 2012)  to 
countries whose economies were perceived as backward, stagnant, unbalanced or dysfunctional 
(Hugon 2001, as cited in, Hilgers 2012 p. 83). Founded in classic economic theory, neoliberalism 
aims at enhancing economic efficiency by reducing the influence  of states on key economic 
decisions of their countries. It is also deeply rooted in the works of Adam Smith, who in 1776 in 
The Wealth of Nations postulated that by nature, human beings are self-interested, and that 
because of this, only the invisible hand i.e. the market mechanism would help to transform 
individual self-interest into a common good. He advocated for policies which govern least as the 
best prescription for the growth of the wealth of nations. His theorisation came nearly two and a 
half century ago, and just the second year into the industrial revolution in Europe, but until 
today, it remains higly influencial in development theory and practices related to private sector 
participation in the delivery of public services (see Laffont and Martimort 2002). Influential 
economic and (public) administrative policy paradigms such as privatisation, public private 
partnerships or contracting out may sound new, but as scholars have argued, they are in fact, old 
wine in new glasses (Sebahattin Gültekin 2011, Page 2005).  
Neoliberalism is a set of economic policies that emphasise ‘freeing the state’ by allowing the 
market mechanisms to influence the movement of goods and services. Most countries in Africa 
(including Uganda) became what Hilgers has called ‘radical testing ground’ for neoliberal 
policies (Hilgers 2012 p. 83). The first phase of the neoliberal policy implementation in most of 
sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda began in the 1980s. These mainly constituted adjustment 
policies directed on the economy such as privatisation, reduction of state expenditure through 
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removal of subsidies in health and education, reduction of the size of the civil service and 
removal of trade barriers among others. The second phase started in the 1990s and entailed 
democratisation policies or political adjustments. Under this second phase, policies such as 
deconcentration, vertical or inter-governmental decentralisation and horizontal decentralisation 
to the market, civil society and to the community were promoted particularly to correct 
drawbacks inherent in the economic structural adjustment policies and programmes introduced in 
1980s (Conyers 1983). As chapter two has indicated, these are well reflected in the Uganda’s 
institutional framework for rural water supply. The private sector and the community are key 
actors in the sector playing different but related roles with the public sector actors in a 
decentralised service delivery arrangement.  
 
Neoliberalism is also seen as not just existing within states, but as a process that transcends the 
economic and political boarders of nation states due to increasing globalisation and anti-statism 
(Moore 1999). It aimed initially at getting the prices right, but when this did not effectively play 
the transformative role, emphasis was shifted to ensuring that the institutional and legal 
frameworks work to facilitate a capitalist society to thrive (Moore 1999 p. 66). It is indeed not 
uncommon to hear of complaints from the public related to private sector exploitation, either in 
form of poor execution of contracts in infrastructure development or delayed response to calls for 
repair of a damaged utility infrastructure such as point-water source infrastructure for the rural 
water users (Harvey and Reed 2007). Waves of anti-neoliberalism in the 1990s in Latin America 
provided early examples as to how apart from being un-welcome to the ordinary citizen, these 
new policy directions could result into severe leadership consequences and political changes 
from organised groups (Munck 2003). This is possibly part of the explanation as to why CBM is 
relatively more successful in enhancing functional sustainability of water infrastructure in Latin 
America than it is in sub-Saharan Africa (Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011).  Although similar 
anti-neoliberalism voices exist in sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular, organised groups 
are still heavily challenged by the unique political and social dynamics characterised by a large 
majority rural semi-illiterate and poorly mobilised peasant population.  In essence, neoliberal 
ideas may be good, but they are only so to the extent that they are implemented with the sole 
purpose of ensuring that they yield tangible benefits for the different categories of citizens in 
developing country contexts. This study questions whether the rural water policy implementation 
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and practice environment in Uganda is supportive of CBM and the latter’s proven potential for 
functional sustainability of safe water supply facilities in rural areas. Without necessarily 
divorcing completely from the neoliberal policy framework, the study advocates for new and 
contextually relevant models of benevolence amidst the hegemonic presence of the neoliberal 
policy prescriptions that inevitably continue to face democratic states of the south.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, both the first and second phase of the neoliberal policies have brought 
more development challenges than they meant to solve (Kakumba and Nsingo 2008, Hossen and 
Westhues 2012, Ammani 2012, Basheka 2011, Green 2008a, Green 2010b, Mwenda and Tangri 
2005a, Tangri and Mwenda 2001). In the first decade of the 21
st
 century, promoters of 
neoliberalism saw that believing in the independence of the economy was the major mistake of 
liberalism and a major cause of economic collapse. While it is incorrect to admit that market 
distortions are nearly/totally absent elsewhere in the world, studies on sub-Saharan Africa 
continue to generate evidence of limited state capacity to play an effective regulatory role. This 
is not just in terms of the lack of technical and financial resources, but largely because of the 
failure to deploy the right political will (Basheka 2011, Green 2008a). This lack of political will 
easily manifests at all levels of government but is seemingly more pernicious when it happens at 
the macro level. As Hilgers observes, given that in post-colonial Africa access to dominant 
positions in government is almost a precondition for access to positions where it is possible to 
accumulate wealth, the neoliberal policies have largely served to keep elite classes in power and 
to entrench political patronage (Hilgers 2012 p.84).   
 
In much of the literature on economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in Africa, the main 
consensus is that the policies themselves were not necessarily bad, but only face dynamic 
challenges at implementation. In particular, tendencies associated with rent seeking and elite 
capture become easily accommodated in the systems (Awortwi 2003, Mwenda and Tangri 
2005a, Kakumba and Nsingo 2008, Krutz 2006a, Green 2010c). Uganda even presents a unique 
context of the neoliberal policy implementation. The country had no option but to begin 
implementation of neoliberal policies when it was just emerging from long period of civil strife 
against two consecutive dictatorships led separately by Iddi Amin (1972-1979) and Milton Obote 
II (1980-1985). Initially it was difficult for President Museveni’s newly formed government in 
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1986 to adopt policies that were incongruous with his ‘bush-war’ pro-poor and highly ‘socialist’ 
philosophies. However, the need to forge ‘alliance’ with donors in order to solicit their support 
for macro-economic stability and post-war reconstruction Uganda needed at the time, it became 
inevitable for the regime to accept the neoliberal policy principles that in the short and long-run 
appeared ‘conflictual’ with the ideals of the rebel movement (Craig and Porter 2006).  
 
From the foregoing, two important points are worth noting: (i) production and delivery of basic 
goods and services was until the early 1980s a traditional responsibility of the state (ii) even if 
the the state eventually allowed the market mechanism to direct the production and distribution 
of goods and services, the overall responsibility for ensuring market efficiency has remained a 
primary function of the state. It is these two points, and particularly the latter, that largely inform 
the basis of this study. An understanding of the extent to which a government in sub-Saharan 
Africa is playing its public service delivery mandate amidst the broad economic and political 
reform agenda initiated largely from the north and ‘enthusiastically’ welcomed by southern 
governments continues to be imperative.  It is now about three decades when the neoliberal 
policies became the face of political and economic reforms in Africa and many parts of the 
developing world. There may be islands of success in terms of efficiency and reliability of public 
service delivery (Kakouris and Meliou 2011) as there may be optimists about neoliberalism 
(Larner 2005). But, on the whole, much of the literature (see for instance, Hilgers 2012, Kay 
1993, Oliver Marc Hartwich 2009, Moore 1999, Mwenda and Tangri 2005a) converges towards 
a common consensus that the hitherto ‘glorified’ neoliberal policy prescriptions of The World 
Bank and IMF have failed to deliver debt ridden countries of the South into the ‘promised land’.  
The New Public Management (NPM) and Governance Agenda 
Consequent to the problems manifested in neoliberalism, the NPM and governance agenda is 
now seen as a better alternative in re-directing action to the attainment of ‘real’ public goals 
(Hood 199, Osborne 1993). But are these helping to provide the answers to the many complex 
and dynamic contexts in sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular? In theoretical orientation, 
NPM deviates from classical mamangement approaches typical of the Weberian bureaucratic and 
hierarchical models. It is oriented towards outcomes and efficiency through better management 
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of the public budget applying ‘competition’ to organizations in the public sector. At its core, it 
emphasises business-like principles of customer service, efficiency in production and distribution 
of goods and services, competition and output oriented management (Akif Ozer and Yayman 
2011a, Hood 1991). NPM emphasises sound economic and leadership principles, just as it is 
popular in the private sector, and addresses beneficiaries of public services more like customers, 
and conversely citizens as shareholders in the public enterprises (Batley 1999, Hood 1991). 
According to Akif Ozer and Yayman (2011 p. 357), it responds to the growing demand for a 
change from hierarchical governance to more horizontal and participatory governance dynamics 
that substantially eliminate red tape, holding administrators accountable for measurable results, 
emphasizing customer satisfaction in agency dealings with the public, empower front-line 
managers to make their own decisions and contracting out whenever possible with the private 
sector for public-service delivery. In sum, the basic hypothesis of NPM holds that the market 
oriented and business-like management of the public sector will lead to greater cost-efficiency 
for governments, without having negative side-effects on other public sector objective (Leach 
and Barnett 1997, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  Hood viewed NPM as a hybrid ‘marriage of two 
different streams of ideas’ namely, (i) the new institutional economics built on the post World 
War II development of of public choice, transactions theory, and principal-agent theory, and (ii) 
the latest of a set of successive waves of business-type managerialism in the public sector 
requiring high discretionary power to achieve results’ (Hood 1991 p. 5-6). NPM seeks to re-
invent government by breaking its hitherto stiff bureaucratic configurations and opening them up 
for transparency, accountability and good governance (Kooiman 1993, Mayntz 2003, Graham, 
Amos and Plumptre 2003).  Thus, the use of terms such as ‘value for money’, ‘doing more with 
less’ and the ‘consumer as customer’ will be found in the literature on NPM (Hood 1991, 
Kakouris and Meliou 2011). At its core, NPM emphasises business-like principles of customer 
service, efficiency in production and distribution of goods and services, competition and output 
oriented management (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a, Hood 1991). The water sector reforms in 
Uganda embraced all of these aspects as reflected in the institutional framework elaborated in 
chapter two. Intergovernmental relations between the central government and the district local 
governments and sub-counties have sfor the past two decades existed along with the private and 
voluntary water sector actors. However, these have until now inadequately provided solutions to 
problems equity and sustainable access to rural safe water service delivery.  
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Governance as a concept has evolved from its orthodox meaning i.e., ‘the act or process of 
government’, to the more participatory and consultative approach to governance, now embedded 
in the NPM debates on reinventing government (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a, Denhardt and 
Denhardt 2000, Krebs and Pelissero 2006, Osborne 1993). In the context of Max Weber’s ideal 
type of bureaucratic framework, and according to the Anglo-American political theory, 
‘government’ refers to the ‘formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate 
coercive power’ (Stoker 1998 p.17). Hence, government is not synonymous with governance, 
and the confusion of terms can have unfortunate consequences because governments thrive on 
bureaucracies that are not a welcome idea in the new governance framework (Graham, Amos 
and Plumptre 2003 p. 1).  
 
The attempt to trace the origin of the concept of governance traces it as far back as the 16
th
 
century in Northern Europe (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a p.85). However, most literature 
concurs to the fact that the concept became popular in the 1990s following the 1989 World Bank 
Report
14
 on ‘Sub-Saharan Africa-From Crisis to Sustainable Development’. It provided the 
definition of the ‘new’ governance as ‘the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s 
affairs’ (The World Bank 1989 p.61). Two years later, the Bank developed the concept further by 
adding the ‘development’ nuance; ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (The World Bank 1991 p. 1). 
Further, in its 1994 publication on ‘Governance-The World Bank Experiences’, major features 
and measurements of governance were stressed thus: ‘good governance is epitomized by 
predictable, open, and enlightened policy-making (i.e. transparent processes); a bureaucracy 
imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of 
law’(The World Bank 1994 p.vii). Public sector management, i.e., ‘the capacity of governments 
to make and implement public policy, the effectiveness of public programmes, and the strengths 
of public institutions’ was also highlighted by the report as the most visible of all the other 
dimensions of governance (The World Bank 1994 p.1). Henceforth, the concept of governance, 
                                                          
14
 The report was an outcome of a study intended to understand why in the 1980s, the economic performance of 
Sub-Saharan African countries had worsened despite the implementation of the Bank’s structural adjustment 
programs (SAP’s) 
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and increasingly ‘good governance’ has infiltrated national and international development and 
academic discourses largely as subjects relating to the broad mechanisms by which humanity is 
served not only within and across national government institutions, but also globally, involving 
both for-profit and not-for-profit agencies (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a). Critical emphasis is 
placed on the array of socio-economic and political factors that mediate processes of governance 
and service delivery as reflected in the following:  
‘Governance has to do with the institutional environment in which citizens interact 
among themselves and with government agencies/officials. The capacity of this 
institutional environment is important for development because it helps determine the 
impact achieved by the economic policies adopted by the government. Hence, this 
capacity, and the governance quality it reflects, is a vital concern for all governments’ 
(ADB 1999 p.v). 
Within the academic discourse, debates not only expand perspectives about governance as a 
concept but also examine its applicability and relationship with other development paradigms of 
the 1980s i.e. neoliberalism, new public management, democratisation and participation 
(Graham, Amos and Plumptre 2003). Some debates are pessimistic about the originality of the 
concept, while indeed, others align together on the role of the World Bank in its promotion. 
Rogers (2006) has argued in fact, that the popularisation and embracing of the concept of 
governance and its subsequent integration in discussions of bilateral agencies and among the 
NGO community is merely re-naming or branding a concern that goes way back in time for most 
agencies, giving it just a new look. He argues further that what seems to have given the concept 
greater impetus is the realization that development challenges and problems are not simply the 
lack of capital but rather a complex set of factors whose solutions are embedded in governance 
(Rogers 2006 p.16). 
 
Governance has also been applied in the analysis or understanding of international trends in 
which decisions or actions in one locality are said to have increasingly been able to transcend 
national boundaries and influence decisions elsewhere in what Ohmae has written extensively 
about in his books around the borderless world (Ohmae 1990) or the end of the nation state 
(Ohmae 1995). Consequently networks between nation states or international agencies that have 
been seen to emerge in collaborative arrangements to tackle global economic, political and social 
policy issues have been regarded as an ‘inevitable alternative to the lack of a global government’ 
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(Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a p.88). Indeed, as elaborated in Chapter One, various international 
events have significantly shaped debates on CBM as a service delivery and sustainability model 
for rural safe water supply. The symposium organised jointly by the UNDP-World Bank and 
USAID-WASH programmes in Washington in December 1998 is one of such events.  It for 
instance provided a definition of CBM emphasising the need for actors to priorotise building the 
capacity of water users to assume a leading role in financing and management of new water 
supplies (McCommon, Warner and Yohalem 1988). However, while global interconnectedness 
is inevitable, nation states and their institutions ought to be astute enough to ensure that their 
visions, priorities and targets are not compromised by distant contexts. At the minimum, they 
must ensure context specific ‘global’ policy adaptation. They also ought to monitor and where 
necessary mitigate the effect and consequence of local policies inclined to international 
paradigms. Achieving this in the rural water sectors of sub-Saharan African countries would be 
one sure way to build an enabling and sustainable water policy and implementation framework. 
But how is this happening? How do government institutions and structures consciously prioritise 
service delivery models such as CBM that call for their direct support in enhancing the capacity 
of communities (service users) to manage sustain service infrastructure? 
Governance, Networks and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
Governance is viewed as ‘the development of governing styles in which boundaries between 
development actors have become blurred’ (Stoker 1998 p.17, Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a). 
This view presupposes that development actors intimately work with one another, while 
underscoring the importance of networks in planning, implementation and monitoring activities 
for efficient and optimum results. But networks are also known to be prone to unhelpful conflicts 
and may be vulnerable to evasion of downward and social accountability by some of their 
members (Wilikilagi 2009). Indeed, Ewalt (2001 p. 9) observes that ‘blurring of responsibilities 
can lead to blame avoidance or scapegoating’. This tendency challenges the very reason 
networks are advocated as enablers of effective service delivery. In addition to blurring of 
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues, Akif and Yayman (2011) 
add three more propositions about the concept of governance, namely: 
i. A set of institutions that are drawn from, but also beyond government; 
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ii. Governance breeding power dependence in collective action;  
iii. The capacity to get things done without dependence on the power of government to 
command or use its authority.  
While dependence on the power of government to get things done is no longer viewed as an 
obstacle, contemporary governance frameworks and philosophies directly and indirectly depend 
on the power and influence of governments. Indeed, Stoker (1998) views government as able to 
use new tools and techniques to steer and guide other development actors within its jurisdiction 
(Stoker 1998 p.18). It is thus imperative to assess the extent to which government and her 
institutions are able to play an effective role that fits in the contemporary understanding of 
governance. In the context of this study, the multiplicity of public, private and voluntary actors in 
the rural safe water supply sub-sector, and how their actions impact on CBM and sustainable 
service delivery is assumed to depend on how central and local governments play their steering 
role. The steering role in this case is in regard to policy management. How committed is 
government in guiding the rural safe water actors to adhere to the goals of community 
management? How effective are local authorities in ensuring that community bye-laws, which 
are crucial for community organisation, collective behaviour including compliance to operation 
and maintenance of water facilities are put to work? 
The new governance discourse also embeds public private partnerships (PPPs), which in the 
NPM paradigm or public governance relates to governments ‘serving rather than steering’ 
(Denhardt and Denhardt 2000 p.549), ‘governance without government’ (Peters and Pierre 1998 
p.223) or a move within public service delivery from ‘competition to collaboration’ (Entwistle 
and Martin 2005 p.234). While a flexible government willing to collaborate and network with 
other actors rather than steering is advocated in NPM or public governance, the complex 
relationships that result also inevitably need a strong organisation. More so, the complex 
relationships need a ‘strong’ public sector that does not control but rather, one that ‘influences’ 
the activities of others (Peters 2011 p.223). To emphasise the complexity of networks in public 
governance, Kickert (1997) notes that ‘the confusion in understanding governance offers a type 
of governance neither at a central level nor at the lowest level (Kickert 1997, cited in, Akif Ozer 
and Yayman 2011a p.89). Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) also observe that ‘a public policy 
issue where the heart of the matter is a problem of ‘governance’ becomes defined implicitly as a 
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problem of ‘government’, with the corollary that the onus for fixing it necessarily remains with 
government.  
 
Referring to PPPs between public and the business sector, Heilman and Johnson defined PPPs as 
‘the combination of a public need with private capability and resources to create a market 
opportunity through which the public need is met and a profit is made’ (Heilman and Johnson 
1992 p. 197). Hence, in the new governance framework, PPPs allow for a combination of 
government resources and those of the private-for-profit agents or not-for-profit bodies to deliver 
societal goals (Skelcher 2005). In his study on local government-non-profit sector partnerships in 
Uganda, Muhangi (2009 p. vi) noted that ‘the most extensive use of the term partnership is that 
which equates it to a ‘collective response’ or a ‘generalised relationship’ open to all actors to 
work together in a variety of collaborative forms with varying degrees of formality towards some 
shared goals’.  
 
The rural water sector in Uganda has mainly witnessed PPPs in form of contracting out to the 
private for-profit sector and strategic partnering with the NGO/voluntary sector. Broadly, 
contracting out or tendering involves separating the service provider from the service purchaser 
while maintaining a relationship on contract management/monitoring (Skelcher 2005, Savas 
1981). Central or local governments hire private firms or individuals to carry out specified tasks 
such as repair of water systems or trainings for capacity building for a period of time, based on 
the national legal framework. The public authority remains the sole provider of the service but 
pays the provider for the service under the conditions stipulated in the contract agreement. 
Service agreements may be between local authorities and mechanics and plumbers to undertake 
routine maintenance or major repairs of water systems in rural areas. But are these relationships 
always well managed to ensure that high efficiency levels are maintained for the sector and CBM 
in particular?  
 
Perhaps Skelcher’s (2005) ‘typology’ of public-private actions or partnerships may provide a 
useful alternative for PPP arrangements. He identifies two forms of PPPs, namely public 
leverage and strategic partnering for risk sharing between public and private agents, that may 
not necessarily be business oriented, and where partnerships between public institutions and the 
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non-profit sector could be located. Public leverage as a form of PPP occurs when governments 
use their legal and financial resources to create conditions they believe will be conducive to 
economic activity and growth (Skelcher 2005 p. 351). Governments may also directly encourage 
or induce private sector actor decision makers to align their plans and developments with public 
policy goals. Inducements could be in form of infrastructure improvements, business 
development and support services or financial incentives targeting the private sector. Apart from 
targeting the business community, public leverage also targets the non-profit or voluntary sector 
to participate in the production and delivery of public services. In Uganda’s water sector, such 
inducements may be seen to include supporting CBM teams e.g. the WSCs or private hand pump 
mechanics in form of trainings to enhance their effectiveness. However, Skelcher (2005) warns 
of the danger of over-supply of government inducements especially to the private sector 
particularly if there is a weak system of monitoring and regulation.  Strategic partnering on the 
other hand, according to Skelcher (2005), stresses an open-ended nature of partnering between 
the public and private for-profit or private not-for profit agents with full sharing of risks and 
rewards. Unlike in contracting out where legal and contractual agreements bind public and 
private actors on a purchaser-provider principle, in strategic partnering, trust based relationships 
cement a collaborative endeavour between the organisations. However, there may be dangers of 
the government failing to adjust to this form of working because of its traditional style based on 
institutional bureaucratic norms (Skelcher 2005 p. 358). Could these caveats raised on strategic 
partnering and public leverage constitute some of the issues that disable the effectiveness of 
CBM models of service delivery in Uganda’s context? In the current policy and institutional 
frameworks based on the NPM and governance agenda, the effectiveness of partnerships and 
relationships between government and non-state actors remains very crucial for the performance 
of CBM. 
Conceptions about ‘Good Governance’ in Public Service Delivery 
The call for ‘good governance’ is mainly associated with the failure by third world countries to 
improve economically despite the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
[(SAPs) (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a, Hilgers 2012)]. The 1989 World Bank report of a study 
on sub-Saharan Africa pointed out bad governance practices in the region as having primarily 
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caused economic stagnation, leading to a compelling need to establish ‘good public 
administration criteria’ (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a p.89). There are rather conflicting ideas in 
both academic and development literature about what constitutes good governance, with a 
remarkable convergence towards what the UNDP (1997) and (2012) outlines as the principles of 
good governance.  Based on the literature, good governance is characterised as participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive and follows the rule of law. It promises that corruption is minimized, the views of the 
minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard 
in decision-making (UNESCAP  2012 p.307). Thus, while the conventional meaning of 
governance maintains some degree of relevance, it has to a large extent given way to the much 
more broader and non-hierarchical meaning encompassing how public, private for-profit, and 
not-for-profit sectors are managed, and whether and how they seek to learn from decision 
implementation experiences (Kooiman 1993, Mayntz 2003). However, while emphasizing 
governance effectiveness in promoting equity, the UN-Water (2003) also identified integration 
and ethics as separate principles. It underscored holistic development approaches and the 
differences/variations in needs across the different socio-economic groups and contexts as 
critical for effective/good governance (UN-Water 2003). 
In her recent study on the use of the concept among development aid donor agencies
15
, Van 
Doeveren’s (2011) also identifies five commonly shared principles of good governance, namely 
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, openness/transparency, participation, and the rule of 
law. Earlier Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) also clustered good governance principles into 
five broad categories including; legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and 
fairness
16
. On the whole, these have been the fundamental principles on which most community 
managed public projects are based, including the management of point-water facilities this study 
is focused at. These conceptions and meanings of ‘good governance’ may have a strong 
convergence, but Van Doeveren’s (2011) warns against treating the concept of good governance 
as a one-best-way development strategy. She notes that the presence of common characteristics 
of good governance may imply a shared meaning of good governance that could easily mask the 
                                                          
15
 The European Union, The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The World Bank 
and The United Nations 
16
 See Annex II for detailed definitions of these principles.  
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variations in application of the concept, pointing to the need for a clear consensus among both 
academicians and development agencies on its meaning and principles. According to her, much 
consideration should be given to defining the components of good governance, identifying the 
possible interactions between their components, specifying their optimal values, and paying 
attention to outcomes (van Doeveren 2011 p.311). 
There is also growing literature around the concept of ‘water governance’, but there is not as yet 
a very clear meaning of the concept. Water governance as a concept is used in the water sector, 
partly as an extension of the orthodox meaning of governance, but more towards the good 
governance framework that emphasises networks made of actors in the private, voluntary 
(including the community)  and public sectors. Most literature on water governance cites the 
definition developed by Rogers in his work with the Global Water Partnership (GWP). He 
defines water governance as ‘the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems 
that are in place to develop and manage water resources and the delivery of water services at 
different levels of society’ (Rogers 2006 p.16). The definition builds on the general ideas about 
governance as comprising a range of systems including those of government and the public 
services provided by other sections of society (Franks and Cleaver 2007). Further, it recognises 
that these systems relate  and link to each other through inevitable political processes pertinent to 
managing natural resources such as water (Franks 2004, Franks and Cleaver 2007), and ‘suggests 
a range of outcomes (‘water resources’ as well as ‘water services’), which go far beyond the 
management functions of individual organisations or groups. Its reference to different levels of 
society implies recognition that outcomes may be different at different levels and that, for 
example, the poor may need special consideration while working out governance systems 
(Franks and Cleaver 2007 p.292). This definition is quite useful in the analysis of relationships 
between different rural safe supply water actors at the meso, micro and macro levels of the water 
policy implementation, and how these impact on community management. 
 
One of the core issues in the water sector performance debate has been that governance 
weaknesses particularly in the sector policy implementation largely contribute to the current 
global, national or locality specific water problems (Grigg 2011, Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet 
2010, Jones 2011a, Cleaver and Hamada 2010). Consequently, most countries including Uganda 
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have embraced policy and institutional frameworks for water resource development and 
management that emphasise multi-stakeholder participation and more decentralised planning and 
management, partly ‘because of the pressure from flows of resources and services across 
international boundaries’ (Franks and Cleaver 2007 p.294) to meet the global water targets. The 
dominant assumption has been that the ‘new’ approaches bring about opportunities for 
sustainable supply and utilisation of scarce water resources (Montgomery, Bartram and 
Elimelech 2009, McCommon, Warner and Yohalem 1990, Harvey and Reed 2007, Carter and 
Rwamwanja 2006).  
Decentralisation, Multi-stakeholder Participation and Service Delivery 
Efficiency under NPM 
Decentralisation, networks and collaborations between and among government and non-
governmental agencies are all aspects of the ‘new good governance’ agenda. However, while 
they call for a more people-centered and results-oriented development and service delivery 
approach, they are not completely immune from practical and contextual challenges of 
applicability. As earlier highlighted, global development and service delivery targets in sectors 
such as water and sanitation remain difficult to meet despite the wide acceptance and application 
of ‘good governance’ principles. Multi-stakeholder participation in form of inter-governmental 
and market  decentralisation, and decentralisation to the community form part of the wider public 
sector reform agenda. This reform agenda aims at deliberate changes to the structures and 
functioning of public sector organisations, with the objective of ‘getting them to run better’ 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011 p.2). Since the 1980s, administrative reforms have emerged under 
the banner of NPM or ‘reinventing government’ (Page 2005, Lodge and Gill 2011, LACINA 
2011).  
 
For greater efficeincy, NPM advocates for greater citizen participation, cross-functional 
partnerships and networks between government, civil society and profit oriented market 
institutions (Nguyen 2010, Santizo Rodall and Martin 2009, Page 2005). Its advocates further 
contend that it offers citizens more public choice and stimulates competition geared towards 
making the public service highly efficient and consumer oriented (Prokopy 2005, Etemadi 2001). 
One question that is important for this study relates to how macro and meso-level instiutions of 
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government and their partners from the private for-profit and not for-profit sectors have 
succeeded in treating consumers of rural point water facilities (the community) as ‘customers’ or 
‘partners’, and how this is reflected in their actions to enable the CBM model of rural safe water 
supply which is known to guarantee equitable and sustainable access to safe water. 
Decentralisation, departmentalisation or marketisation as structural adjustments prescribed in 
NPM may promise greater organisational autonomy in decision making, high efficiency and 
output levels, but they have partly served to split the hitherto large bureaucracies into smaller, 
and more fragmented ones (Page 2005, Thompson 2008, Torma 2010).  In developing contexts 
this fragmentation has resulted into competition for scarce resources among public officials and 
agencies, including sub-national governments (Awortwi, Helmsing and Oyuku-Ocen 2010, 
Smith, et al. 2003), and between public agencies and private firms (Sebahattin Gültekin 2011). It 
has also exercabated public resource mismanagment, largely because of the wider institutional 
weaknesses characterised by limited political will and more significantly because of greed, elite 
capture, patronage, and clientelism (Tweheyo and Twinamatsiko 2010 p.110-123). To a large 
extent therefore, NPM-inspired reforms, in particular, the change from central to territorial 
administrations has provided greater room for increased, rather than reduced, corruption (Tangri 
and Mwenda 2008a, Tangri and Mwenda 2006b, Green 2008b). This has been particularly so 
because of the more contacts spawned between public and private sector actors. It has created 
new opportunities for bribery and self-gratification (Tweheyo and Twinamatsiko 2010, Tangri 
and Mwenda 2008b), at the expense of service delivery (Basheka 2011, Awortwi, Helmsing and 
Oyuku-Ocen 2010, Awortwi and Helmsing 2008). Indeed, much literature has indicated that 
contrary to the conventional wisdom held within the NPM philosophy, corruption has tended to 
thrive on the presence of multiple rather than few markets (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997, 
Hall 1999, Celarier 1997, Wenzel 2007). Some studies in the water sector in Uganda and other 
Sub-Saharan African countries have indicate that ‘contracts and commerce’ may be more 
pronounced at the expense of efficiency (Barungi et al. 2003), and  the utility services have 
turned into real commodities (Bond 2004). Hence, the purchaser-provider principle or principle-
agent phenomena embedded in NPM and assumed to promote efficiency and effectiveness are 
questionable here. How are governments and their institutions as regulators positioned to 
mitigate problems associated with market failure? How is the rural domestic water supply sub-
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sector responding to complexities and dynamics in market oriented service delivery in Africa and 
Uganda in particular?   
 
On a positive note, more debate is emerging to show that NPM/decentralisation could produce 
greater results with the deployment of  innovations such as the use of modern information and 
communication technologies (Ionescu 2011a, Dunleavy, et al. 2006, Lodge and Gill 2011), more 
flexible decision making, and a new kind of relationship between the state and the citizens that 
more deeply promotes downward accountability and citizen empowerment (Cole 2010, Ionescu 
2011b, Nyalunga 2006b, Mugumya et al. 2008). Undoubtedly, NPM has been and is still a good 
planning framework for service delivery. However, if measured against the tempo with which it 
was introduced in Africa, and in most of the developing world, it has particularly performed 
poorly in sub-Saharan Africa (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011, Barungi et al. 2003, Awortwi and 
Helmsing 2008, Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011). Where some semblance of contracting out and 
networking exists, rent seeking and clientelism work to undermine its prospects for greater 
efficiency in public service delivery (Barungi et al. 2003, Tweheyo and Twinamatsiko 2010, 
Tangri and Mwenda 2008b) While there may be visible reforms, particularly in the 
decentralization of water, primary education and health informed by NPM, vertically integrated 
bureaucratic tendencies still slow down the process (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011, Barungi et 
al. 2003, Awortwi and Helmsing 2008).   
It is important to acknowledge that NPM and its policy prescriptions originated from the part of 
the world in which social, economic, political and democratic fabrics compared to those of the 
developing world, provide sufficient ground for NPM effectiveness, and therefore less need for 
‘tight’ implementation of laws and bye-laws at the grassroots. With high levels of access to 
modern information and communication technologies such as television, radio, and the internet 
accessed not only with a personal computer but by the multitude of mobile tele-communication 
devices, it is much simpler to pass on information. In addition, NPM origins have had a long 
history of effective democracies, and experience high levels of literacy and education. They not 
only enjoy comparatively high levels of public trust, but also high levels of social, financial, and 
downward accountability. In the 1980s, Uganda was only about 20 years beyond independence 
and was for much of the 1970s and early 1980s involved in civil wars. Today, the larger part of 
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Northern Uganda is only beginning to recover from a more than two-decade insurgency that has 
caused untold suffering and trauma to the local communities (Ochen 2012). It is these and more 
country specific contexts that would warrant specific alterations in public management as 
opposed to assuming that ‘one size can fit all’ or whether NPM is ‘public management for all 
seasons’ as Hood (1991 p. 4) questions.  
In conclusion, advocacy for the creation of sub-national autonomous authorities, privatisation, 
multi-actor approaches to public service delivery and governance, and the focus on subsidiarity, 
efficiency and downward accountability through local capacity building may be great NPM 
proposals. However, results from the implementation of NPM policies have largely been mixed, 
and more on the downside for developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Awortwi and 
Helmsing 2008, Tangri and Mwenda 2008a, Tangri and Mwenda 2006b, Green 2008b). 
Subsequently, given that these are still actively being implemented, and sufficient lessons have 
so far been learnt, the time is ripe enough for governments to re-think innovative ways of 
enhancing cost effective approaches to service delivery. One of these would be to identify and 
effectively manage factors that disable effectiveness of community managed public services such 
as rural safe water. Hence this study examines the extent to which the governance of rural water 
policies enables the effectiveness of proposals that place operation and maintenance of rural 
point-water supply infrastructure on the communities. In the NPM and governance framework, it 
is expected that policy practitioners would ensure that all disablers and threats to policy 
performance are understood and mitigated. 
The Concept of ‘Enablement’ or an Enabling (Local) Government 
The concepts ‘enabling government’ or ‘enabling local authority’ are used in literature to 
emphasise the ‘new role’ of the state (Lund 1994, Smith 1998, Smith 2000, Mulwa 1994, Smith 
2000, Wistow, et al. 1992, Muhangi 1996, Masser, Rajabifard and Williamson 2008). However, 
while the concept became more popular in the 1990s, as an approach to service delivery, it was 
much earlier already embedded within the professional practice of social work in the early 20
th
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century in Europe
17
. For example, Lund (1992 p.326) traces the ‘enabling’ function of local 
authorities as far back as the late 19
th
 Century in the United Kingdom in the housing sector when 
local authorities gave rent subsidies to individual households, and later in 1919 to collective 
provisioning when arguments for collective provision were supported. But the form taken by the 
social work model of enablement in the late 19
th 
and early 20
th
 century in Europe differs markedly 
with the contemporary World Bank and IMF sponsored forms of enablement, which conceived it 
in the context of government withdrawal from welfare or direct service provision to ‘facilitation’ of  
other players to deliver public services. What is common in both, however, is that government 
remains the lead actor responsible for public service delivery either directly or through regulatory 
and contextually enabling mechanisms.  
 
In addition to being enablers, social work professionals in generalist practice ensure that they play 
the mutually reinforcing service delivery roles as ‘advocates’, ‘brokers’, ‘negotiators or 
mediators’, and  ‘educators’ to individuals, groups and communities (Ambrosino et al. 2011). 
The generalist perspective assumes interdependence between individuals, groups or communities 
with their complex environments. It hence advocates that development and policy actors or 
change agents should have a broad base of knowledge about the functioning of individuals, 
families, groups, organisations and communities and ways in which these entities reciprocally 
support or inhibit functioning (Walsh 2009). This study among others held an underlying 
hypothesis that effective advocacy and negotiation with rural water service authorities and policy 
makers at the meso and macro levels of rural safe water service delivery can have a strong 
positive bearing on communities at the micro-level in form of functional water facility 
management committees, and improved water services. Such advocacy or negotiation would best 
be undertaken by community representatives or other civil society groups, NGOs or influential 
individuals. The study thus examines the relationships between public and NGO actors and how 
these link with communities to enhance their capacity for CBM of the rural point-water supply 
infrastructure. 
 
                                                          
17
 The Social Work profession emerged as a response to the many social problems that resulted from the industrial 
revolution in Europe expanding to America and Canada in the 20th century ( See for instance,Hopps and Collins 
1995, Ehrenreich 1985).  
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In the early 1980s enablement as an approach to public service delivery was widened to cut across 
many sectors. As already mentioned, it was part of the wider neoliberal policy advocacy for a 
reduced role of the state in territorial administration (Rydin 1998, Wistow, et al. 1992, Smith 
2000). This ‘new’ role, as prescribed under the NPM has taken as many shapes and concepts as the 
activities and service delivery strategies the governments are expected to enable (Smith 2000). 
Three different but interrelated categories of enablement are distinguished: (i) Market Enablement, 
(ii) Political Enablement and, (iii) Community Enablement (Burgess, Carmona and Kolstee 1994, 
1997, as cited in, Helmsing 2002). Drawing from the British local government experience in the 
1990s, Smith (2000 p.80-91) also enunciates six distinct strands of practices related to an ‘enabling 
local authority’. He points out such practices as contracting out, consumerism, community 
planning, community leadership, pluralist collectivism, and community participation as critical 
interventions to be adhered to by an enabling government. Indeed, as Helmsing rightly points out, 
Smith’s strands of enablement highly correspond with the three broad categories mentioned earlier 
(i.e. political, market and community enablement). These strands as they emerge from the NPM 
and governance perspectives are mutually integrated in shaping service delivery as illustrated in 
figure 2. These are further elaborated in the subsequent discussion. 
 
Figure 4:  An illustrative relationship between the three major strands of    
  enablement in relation to NPM and governance  
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Source: Author’s diagram based on Smith (2000) and Lund (1994) 
Market Enablement  
Market enablement is ideologically a perspective of the New Right (Jou 2011, Smith 2000). It 
advocates for the removal (but with ‘state regulation’) of impediments for private sector 
participation in the production and delivery of services hitherto directly provided by the state. In 
his synthesis of the various meanings attached to market enablement, Helmsing points out that 
market enablement means ‘facilitating and promoting the formal and informal business sectors and 
entrepreneurs to provide market solutions for the production, distribution, and exchange of goods 
and services. In Smith’s (2000) categorisation of enablement, contracting out and consumerism 
become part of the package of market enablement initiatives. He observes that ‘the most familiar 
form of enabling is that which aims to engage local authorities less in direct provision of services 
and more in the specification of policy objectives which are met by a variety of external agencies 
sponsored by or under contract to an authority which concentrates on its planning and 
coordinating roles’; in effect, an authority specifies a service requirement but purchases the 
service from another supplier (Smith 2000 p.80). Smith further observes that ‘an enabling 
authority in this context is one that identifies requirements, sets priorities, specifies standards of 
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service, and finds the best way to meet those standards with the emphasis shifting from ‘a 
monopoly of service delivery and management to enablement and monitoring (Smith 2000 p. 
80).  
Based on Smith’s observations, ‘accurate’ specification of the service to be produced and 
delivered, and ‘accurate’ or ‘correct’ identification of the right service provider(s) using a 
competitive bidding approach are critical ingredients of an effectively enabled market system. 
The services must be seen to meet the needs of the ‘customer’ or consumer; this he terms it as 
consumerism. In essence, local or central government authorities ‘are urged to compensate the 
consumer of public services for the lack of consumer choice by issuing customer contracts 
specifying standards of service and means of redress, statements of citizens', customers', or 
clients' rights, and information on performance levels (Smith 2000 p. 83). It is further observed 
that ‘by removing market obstacles, mobilising resources, and encouraging entrepreneurship skills, 
and innovation, market enablement would increase the supply of goods and services. It would 
produce sustainable long-term growth and employment gains, and it would enhance cost 
effectiveness of delivering services (Burgess, Carmona and Kolstee 1997, in, Helmsing 2002 p. 
322). In the context of this study, market enablement is examined in terms of how the private 
sector functions of actors in the rural safe water supply have been enabled by central or local 
government authorities to positively impact directly or indirectly on CBM effectiveness and 
functional sustainability of improved rural point-water facilities. 
Political Enablement  
Political enablement is part of what has been termed as ‘second generation’ neoliberal policy 
prescriptions (Hilgers 2012 p.83). It focuses at a ‘transformation in the structure and functions of 
central and local government, the relations between them, and their relations with the market and 
the community’ (Helmsing 2002 p.322). Central and local relations mainly take the form of 
decentralisation of fiscal and administrative authority (although in varying degrees) from the 
central government to a local authority in what has been regarded inter-governmental 
decentralisation (Helmsing 2002, Smith 2000, Smith 1998, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007), 
with ‘noble’ goals of empowering local authorities to deliver services in their localities guided by 
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the principle of subsidiarity
18
. Political enablement not only focuses on the resultant relations 
between governments but also on their relations with the market, the community and non-state 
actors (Muhangi 1996, Wistow, et al. 1992, Helmsing 2002). The change in relationship between 
this set of institutions or actors is believed to be more effective if it is informed by deeper goals for 
democratisation, political and administrative decentralisation, managerial and institutional reform, 
and good governance. Political enablement is therefore closely related with market enablement; 
lower level governments can enter into contractual agreements with the private sector or service 
production and delivery partnerships with the voluntary sector to produce and deliver goods and 
services (Helmsing 2002, Smith 2000, Wistow, et al. 1992). In the context of this study, political 
enablement forms a very useful framework for the study and analysis of the extent to which 
prevailing relations between central government actors in the rural water sector and local 
government sector actors and local authorities in general and how these relations directly or 
indirectly affect CBM models of rural point-water supply. 
Community Enablement  
Community enablement is also conceptually related to market and political enablement.  It is 
defined as ‘a strategy adopted by central and local government to co-ordinate and facilitate the 
efforts of community and neighbourhood-based organisations to initiate, plan and implement their 
own projects according to the principles of self-determination, self-organisation and self-
management’ (Burgess, Carmona and Kolstee 1994 in, Helmsing 2002 p.322). Although 
enablement as a development concept gained much popularity in the 1990s, community 
enablement is reflected in earlier works of personalities such as David Korten who, on observing 
the challenges of growth driven development trajectories, proposed a people-centred development 
strategy that incorporated values of social justice, sustainability, and inclusiveness (Korten, 
1983)
19
.  
 
                                                          
18 The principle which states that ‘action should be taken at the lowest effective level of governance’ (Jordan 2000 
p.1307) 
19
 According to Korten, prevailing growth-focused development strategy is unsustainable and inequitable. He calls for 
transformations of institutions, technology, values, and behaviour that is consistent with our ecological and social realities. He 
emphasized the need for flexibility in the procedures of implementing agencies, participation, changes in attitudes and skills, 
capacity building, accountability, and local control (Korten 1983) 
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There are several elements that make up the community-enablement strategy, but the most 
important of these is the increased significance attached to the principle of community 
participation (Helmsing 2002 p.322). Indeed, in community social work practice, ‘enabling’ as a 
professional role focuses at helping people to identify and clarify their problems using participatory 
assessment processes, while simultaneously supporting and stimulating them as groups or 
individuals to secure some change (Ambrosino et al. 2011). The change may be secured from 
government or any other actor, or from their own self-help efforts
20
. Smith identifies community 
leadership, community participation and pluralist collectivism or community self-help as key 
aspects of community enablement, although these are also conceptually related. Community 
planning also looks at measures aimed to strengthen the capacity of local authorities to plan 
strategically for the overall welfare of their areas. Such measures according to Smith would 
involve adoption of ‘synoptic’ view of the community through surveys, analysis of local 
developments and identification of needs (Smith 2000 p.85). Community Leadership on the other 
hand emphasises the importance of the presence of an effective leader to stimulate action towards 
change in the community. According to Smith, after identifying community needs, a local 
authority assumes community leadership. In this regard, ‘enabling’ means identifying and 
persuading other development agencies or actors, and networking with them to achieve prescribed 
ends (Smith 2000 p.86). This form of enablement points towards the formation of partnerships 
intended to maximise economies of scale by responding to community problems using a diversity 
of experiences, skills and financial resources brought into a common pool. In pluralist collectivism, 
enabling means ‘organisation building with empowerment as the main motive’ (Smith 2000 p.87-
88). The focus here is that a local authority or actor puts up an inventory of existing community 
self-help groups which are strengthened through such activities as training, education and 
sensitisation and access to relevant information. Where such CBOs do not exist, community 
support towards their formation may become part of this community enabling approach. Smith 
observes further that ‘enabling community organisations helps to ensure that a local facility 
remains in existence when under threat from budget cuts. Democratisation strategies within local 
authorities can focus on decentralisation to new forms of social or collective provision. 
                                                          
20 Other professional roles of a Social Work in generalist community social work practice are: Advocate – urging unresponsive 
institutions to take action and promote fair and equitable treatment of a client system; Broker  - linking communities and other 
client systems to resources so that they can achieve their goals; Educator – providing information and or using teaching skills to 
stimulate or facilitate change and; Negotiator – working as an intermediary to resolve conflicts by gathering and transmitting 
information between client systems and the broader environment (Ambrosino et al. 2011 p. 125-126). 
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Empowerment of local groups and communities is regarded as a contribution which local 
authorities can make to the development of local democracy. Such bodies can form part of a 
democratisation strategy that strengths accountability to weakly represented and dependent groups 
in society’, and the role of local authorities in this ‘pluralist collectivism’ is to “monitor, support 
and regulate ‘third sector’ provision of public services”(Hambleton, Hoggett and Tolan 1989, 
Smith 2000 p.88).With regard to participation as a form of enablement, the local authorities 
facilitate the participation of citizens as policy makers and managers at the local level rather than 
just as consumers of public goods and services. Citizens would not only be enabled to decide what 
and how needs should be met (or the quality of provision), but would also be empowered by a local 
authority to demand for the services. From such a perspective, rather than just being agencies 
providing services, development actors are primarily concerned with the rights of citizens in 
making choices affecting the development of their communities (Smith 2000 p 88-89).  
Applicability of the Concept of Enablement in the Present Study 
Based on the above conceptualisation of enablement, an enabling government or local authority 
should not be taken to mean that governments should play a lesser role in service delivery as is 
sometimes understood in the discourses on state withdrawal from direct service delivery. Rather, 
enablement implies a different role, one that lies in the fact that governments are duty bound to 
undertake a conscious effort in  facilitating and regulating the overall framework within which all 
development actors can make their most effective contribution towards the well-being of the 
populations they serve (UNHS 1991 in, Helmsing, 2002 p. 320).  Within the neoliberalism and 
NPM paradigms, enablement indeed seems to be a lesser role for governments, but when 
particularly viewed from the context of developing countries, and more so in the rural domestic 
water service delivery, it is a more demanding role. It calls for real political and leadership 
commitment that goes beyond actual numbers of ‘people served’ by the rural water schemes, how 
they are served or the magnitude of business enterprises that result, to an aggregate measure of the 
sense of contentment leaders and governments derive from serving their populace. 
 
In addition, as can be seen from the theoretical literature, the usage of the concept of enablement 
can sometimes be problematic. There is a rare attempt by its users to distinguish between its three 
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dimensions and their reinforcing character (Helmsing 2002, Goodlad 1994, Muhangi 1996, 
Helmsing 2002, Smith 2000, Smith 1998). The failure to have a clear understanding of what 
enablement means has tended to negatively amplify its contextual applicability, with a tendency to 
emphasise more market enablement than political and even much less, community enablement 
(Helmsing 2002 p.322). Market enablement also assumes that there would be a simultaneous 
increment in the volume and quality of goods and services produced and supplied and that the 
inherent forces of demand and supply (the invisible hand) would make such goods available at a 
lesser cost, generate long-term growth and employment to benefit the majority poor (Smith 2000, 
Jou 2011). However, literature on the effect of market enablement especially in the rural water 
supply brings out mixed views and opinions about it especially in developing country contexts, and 
it is easy to glimpse an emphasis of the need for a strong state (de Gouvello and Scott 2012, 
Furlong 2010, Prasad 2006, Megdal 2012).  
 
When applied in a decentralised governance context, enablement implies local government ability 
to engage in innovative practices for ensuring sustainable service delivery. Indeed, current water 
governance approaches have seen a shift in the role of government (Barungi et al. 2003, 
Asingwire 2008, Awortwi and Helmsing 2008, Oyo 2002, Lewis and Miller 1987). However, it 
has been observed that many stakeholders, particularly water and sanitation  committees, NGOs 
and local communities often lack the funds, institutional capacity and sometimes adequate 
representation or membership to contribute significantly to the governance of water facilities 
(Warner 2010, Bakker, et al. 2008). The presence of a national water policy and service delivery 
framework helps in guiding activities of different actors in the sector, but the extent to which 
adherence to rules and procedures is concerned depends much on whether public actors are 
committed to playing their oversight, regulatory and standardisation function.   
 
 Without an effective government at the macro, meso levels, there is a high likelihood for actors to 
pursue their own individual interests which automatically conflicts with rural water supply 
standards, goals and targets. Paradoxically, in its neoliberal origin and prescription, enablement 
seems to primarily suggest that governments (central or local) are the main ‘donors’ of the 
‘enabling energies’ to actors in the market, lower level governments, the community and other 
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actors as ‘recipients’21 in sort-of a unidirectional and linear style. In this thesis enablement is 
viewed as going beyond the type predominantly prescribed in the neoliberal frameworks and in the 
literature to a more multi-directional one that transcends differences in financial resource 
endowments, level of service delivery, political influence, or any other form of power. By so 
doing, the study challenges the popular belief that development actors owe a common agenda for 
the community, i.e. supporting or enabling them to maximise the utility they can derive from the 
consumption of public services. Hence, mutual support, trust, respect and collective learning are 
indispensable ingredients of an enabling framework that all rural domestic water sector actors 
(public, private, and voluntary) ought to consciously pursue so as to scale-up the quality and 
volume of services delivered to communities. 
 
PART TWO 
Community Management, Community Participation and Functional 
Sustainability of Water Supply Services 
 
In the water sector, and the rural domestic water supply in particular, community participation 
(CP) and Community Management (CM) or Community –based management are often 
combined with the Demand Responsive Approaches (DRA) in an endeavour to promote 
sustainability of projects and programmes (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011). Often, these 
concepts are utilised as tools for enhancing citizen rights to participation in making decisions that 
affect them, or as tools for enforcing citizen participation in self development in form of direct 
contributions (Cleaver 1999, Jones 2011b). However, whether understood as complementary 
approaches or not, the literature indicates that these approaches have not always been able to 
deliver good results wherever they are applied. Underpinned here is the significance of 
proximate and contextual factors (Plummer 2008, Jones 2011a, Mulwa 2010, Prokopy 2005, van 
Koppen, Rojas and Skielboe 2012). Some of the factors, which are discussed later in this chapter 
relate to the differences in conception and application of the concepts and theories related to CM 
                                                          
21
 the private sector, the voluntary or NGO sector and communities who mainly constitute the end users of human 
services 
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and CP (Harvey and Reed 2007).   
 
Community participation in deciding what level of service they want, where they want it, how 
they want to pay for it, are all aspects of CM. As distinguished from CP in the water sector, CM 
is in some literature taken to mean that beneficiaries of water supply services have the 
responsibility, authority, and control over the development of services (McCommon, Warner and 
Yohalem 1990 p. 2). Thus, CM is more conceived in relation to ‘how communities are involved 
in day-to-day operation and maintenance, in collecting, utilising and accounting for the money 
spent in relation to what is collected and is about power and control’ (Schouten and Moriarty 
2003, as cited in, Lockwood 2004 p. 7). But, according to Lockwood (2004), CM can also 
practically mean different things to different people resulting into problems in their application 
and attainment of intended results. He argues that ‘at one level, CM is a means of valorizing 
labour inputs or locally procured materials in project budgets with no corresponding transfer of 
authority or decision-making power devolved to the community itself’, and that at another, CM 
can enable people to take control of the operation and administration of their own rural water 
supply system completely and indefinitely’. In a way he argues that CP and CM are sometimes 
used interchangeably (Lockwood 2004 p. 7).  Similarly, Harvey and Reed also emphasise the 
thin but complementary difference between CP and CM in leveraging sustainable service 
delivery. They argue that ‘CP is a consultative empowerment process designed to establish 
communities as effective decision making entities. It can be stimulated by the community itself 
or by others, and begins with dialogue among members of the community to what, and how 
issues are decided and to provide an avenue for everyone to participate in decisions that affect 
their lives’ (2007 p. 367-368).  
 
Whereas CM can be viewed as a form of CP, according to Harvey and Reed (2007) (2007 p. 
368), CP does not automatically lead to CM, nor should it have to. They argue that services that 
are not to be managed by the community can still be provided following CP principles, such as 
community consultation. Hence, according to them, even without CM, CP remains a pre-
requisite for sustainability (efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and replicability in servivice 
delivery), but CM is not (Harvey and Reed  2007 p. 368). From their conceptions of the 
relationship between CP and CM in the rural water sector, it can indeed be argued that CM or 
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CBM entails mainly all aspects of governance that are aimed at ensuring that elected community 
representatives effectively discharge their responsibilities and stimulate greater sustainability for 
the projects. Such aspects include formation of committes, their training and capacity building 
and collection and management of water. 
 
The conceptualisation and emphasis of the thin difference between CP and CM shows on one 
hand that CP is just an important but not indispensable input into the success of community 
managed models of service delivery (Harvey and Reed 2007). On the other, hand it shows that 
both CP and CM are an indispensable combination needed to to be fully emphasised in order to 
leverage the sustainability of projects. In addition, both CM and CP need to be continuosly 
strengthened (with minimal internal variability) through out the life of the projects (Carter and 
Rwamwanja 2006, Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011). The meaning and conceptualisation of CM 
also implies that even when rural point water facilities are provided with minimal emphasis of 
DRA, adequate attention and emphasis to post-construction support from service authorities 
would yield good sustainability results. Community participation in governance and management 
of water supply facilities aims to produce a sense of ‘community’ between the service providers 
and the beneficiaries of services (Prokopy 2005, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Kleemeier 2000, 
McPherson and Livingstone 1993). It also aims to lower costs associated with service delivery 
(UNDP 2004, Smith 2000, Prokopy 2005). Hence, a seemingly common convergence of the 
literature on the fact that decentralising water decision making and enabling the participation of 
water users in the governance of water systems yields greater satisfaction to beneficiaries, and 
enhances opportunities for sustainability of the water facilities/projects. Viewing CM and CP 
from the angle of complementarity, this study considers CBM to be dependent on processes that 
shape community participation in rural point water service delivery. These processes are also 
embedded in what shapes the behaviour and interactions of the actors. Hence, achieving CP 
goals depends on the extent to which communities are helped to appreciate how indispensable 
they are to project success (Marcus 2007, Nyalunga 2006c, Helmsing 2002).  Empirical literature 
shows that public policies, frameworks and guidelines that promote CP may have very good 
intentions in their prescriptions, but in many cases remain ineffective due to lack of deliberate 
commitment on the part of implementers to ensure that CP yields the desired changes (Entwistle 
and Martin 2005, SPT 2004, McNamara and Morse 2004).  
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It is important to note the thin line between community management models of service delivery 
and self- help or voluntary service. Both are ‘third way’ (Mitlin 2004 p. 330) models and partly 
emerged as a result of imperfections in the market and ‘state failure’. It is partly on the basis of 
this that in early 1998, the senior Vice President of the World Bank, and Head of Economic 
Research, Joe Stieglitz came out clearly and criticised the market model of development. More 
positively, he proposed the alternative of a ‘post-Washington consensus’, among which he 
stressed the rationale for more micro level interventions, marking what for some, has been called 
the demise of the Washington consensus (Fine 1999 p.1). Hence, CM is largely a product of 
political choice, donor ideology and historical and global contexts and discourses.  
CBM as a Necessary Condition for Sustainability of Rural Point Water 
Facilities 
Studies have consistently demonstrated that effective CBM systems are a necessary precondition 
for functional sustainability of established point-water facilities and of increased equitable access 
to safe water (Carter and Rwamwanja 1999, Harvey and Reed 2004, Lockwood and Smits Stef 
2011 and MWE 2011).  However, CBM thrives on a functional and enabling policy and service 
delivery environment which, among others allows articulation of the need to address water sector 
and community specific needs (Rogers, Llamas and Martínez-Cortina 2006, Hoekstra 2006). For 
CBM to produce sustainable outputs, it also requires a strong and combined commitment from 
service providers and beneficiaries in order to support the work and motivation of community-
based structures referred to in this study as Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs), and on 
which the wider CBM dynamics depend (Montgomery, Bartram and Elimelech 2009, Oyo 2002, 
Lewis and Miller 1987). According to Lockwood and Smits Stef (2011 p. 24), ‘sustainability of 
the service is affected not only by the technical or physical attributes of the system, but also the 
financial, organisational (support functions) and managerial capacities of the service providers.  
 
In providing a precise meaning of sustainability in the context of CBM, Carter and Rwamwanja 
(1999) identify development interventions that are not sustainable or for which sustainability is 
fragile to include; ‘the promotion of technologies which require maintenance, periodic repair and 
eventual replacement, but for which institutional or financial mechanisms for such activities are 
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weak or non-existent’ (Carter and Rwamwanja 1999 p. 7). They also carefully distinguish the 
notion of project sustainability in the rural point water supply from that of project success, 
arguing from the angle of the time dimension as the major distinguishing feature. This time 
dimension is reflected in the popular concepts of functional sustainability (Carter and 
Rwamwanja 1999) or sustainable water services at scale (Lockwood et. al 2010).  A newly 
constructed water facility may work for some time but fail in future because the mechanisms for 
obtaining a spare part are not known due to factors internal or external to the water user 
community. When this happens, then there is a breakdown in service. Functional sustainability is 
therefore a function of regular facility maintenance and continuous service yield. But these 
depend much on the extent to which communities are motivated to participate in overall 
governance and management of facilities (Amerasinghe and Carmin 2009, Cleaver and Toner 
2006a, Carter and Rwamwanja 2006). If services are falling into disrepair as others are being 
newly constructed, the net progress toward full coverage decelerates, which becomes the 
antithesis of the drive toward scaling-up of service delivery (Carter and Rwamwanja 1999 p. 8).  
Factors Influencing Effectiveness of CBM Systems for Water Supply  
Based on some parameters such as ability and willingness to make financial contributions, 
attendance of meetings, functionality levels of water facilities, CBM for rural water facilities is 
believed to have succeeded in some communities and failed in others (Carter and Rwamwanja 
2006, Haysom 2006, Prokopy 2005, Isham, Narayan and Pritchett 1995). The literature attributes 
the differences in levels of functionality and performance of CBM models of service delivery to 
factors within and outside of the targeted communities (van Koppen, Rojas and Skielboe 2012, 
Haysom 2006). Further, the literature also shows that while increase in coverage of safe water 
may improve in areas where water users have participated compared to where they have not, 
maintenance of the water sources, which is their responsibility has remained a big challenge 
(Cleaver and Toner 2006a, Haysom 2006, Asingwire 2008, Singh 2006). This has meant 
therefore that participatory/demand driven processes are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for functional sustainability of point-water facilities. The discussion of the literature on the 
factors that affect the effectiveness of community-managed water facilities has been categorized 
into micro or community level factors and factors external to the communities, and attributable 
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to relations and hierarchical processes at the meso and macro levels of service delivery that tend 
to characterise most public policy frameworks. 
Macro and Meso-level factors 
CBM is embedded within the NPM framework discussed that emphasises a shift in the 
hierarchical modes of planning and delivery of public services to a more liberalised and 
decentralised design. While decentralisation of service delivery recognises the importance of 
citizens and communities in public service delivery, studies (Krutz 2006b, Mwenda and Tangri 
2005a) indicate that effective delivey of  decentralised and market oriented services including 
domestic water supply has until today faced daunting challenges, particularly in developing 
country contexts of SSA.  A multitude of socio-economic and politcal issues such as political 
patronage, weak civil society, elite capture, information imperfections, poor financing and poor 
public accountability as well as weak law enforcement systems continue to sit in the way for 
meaningfully decentralised, participatory and sustainable public policy implementation 
(Amerasinghe and Carmin 2009, Blair 2000, Kakumba and Nsingo 2008).  
 
Studies conducted in Uganda and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa identify inadequate 
leveraging of financial resources to support community water projects and local political 
interference (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011), limited government support for community 
capacity building (Carter and Rwamwanja 2006), poor financial management, poor customer 
service orientation and inadequate/absence of community consultation as some of the key 
constraints to the delivery of participatory and decentralised rural safe water services (Barungi et 
al. 2003 p. 5). Studies have for instance highlighted limited capacity of local government 
authorities to adequately comprehend macro-level policy and legal frameworks particularly 
because of the latter’s volatility (Asingwire et al. 2005, Whittington, Davis and McClelland 
1998) and the failure by institutions to promote ‘participation as citizenship’ rather than 
promoting participation as ‘payment’ for water (Jones 2011a).  
 
In their study on the local government council performance in Uganda, Tumushabe et al. (2009) 
concluded that the existence of major policy distortions in Uganda undermined service delivery 
and the accountability relationships between leaders and citizens in local governments. Such 
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policy distortions fell outside the mandate or capabilities of local governments and included; the 
absence of integrated strategic development plans, a national and local government budget 
architecture that did not propel the goals of devolution, general absence of clear power and 
accountability relationships among local government leaders, populist and civic disengaging 
policy regimes underpinned by ‘welfarism’, tax relief and ‘administrative, among others 
(Tumushabe et al. 2009). In another recent study that assessed the effectiveness of the 
community based maintenance systems for rural water supply in Uganda, service authorities and 
key stakeholders were said to have always blamed one onother for the problems in the sector. 
The study found out for example that ccommunities blamed sub-county authorities for not doing 
their part, while sub-counties in turn blame “lazy” communities for their pathetic attitude 
towards O&M, and also districts for not providing resources. The districts on the other hand 
blamed all including central government for not doing enough, while the central government 
apportions blame to district and sub-counties for not adequately performing their implementation 
role (MWE 2011a p. 44). As conceived under NPM, decentralised service delivery strategies and 
approaches assume that public officials and managers will respond to citizens or communities in 
the same way markets respond to customers (Hood 1991, Denhardt and Denhardt 2000), but 
evidence from literature especially from SSA continues to reveal market inneficiencies within 
the NPM framework, corruption and delayed implementation or execution of contracts mainly 
due to rent seeking, slowness in  disbursement of funds and a host of other bureaucratic and 
administrative negativities (Green 2011, Awortwi 2003, Awortwi, Helmsing and Oyuku-Ocen 
2010, Basheka 2011, Mwenda and Tangri 2005b). These demand for an effective central and 
local authority that prioritises the needs of citizens ahead of those of individual public servants 
and bureaus.  
 
A study on the impact of Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in Kamuli district in Eastern 
Uganda also found out that institutional barriers such as corruption and limited capacity within 
local governments were a hindrance to efficient service delivery, concluding that; ‘future 
iterations of Uganda’s PAF will have a larger impact on poverty alleviation if the poor are 
integrated more fully into the process of policy creation’, and that ‘international and national 
policymakers must be willing to temper macro-level assumptions about how people get out of 
poverty with micro or village-level realities’ (Lentz 2002 p. 1). The risk and opportunity 
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mapping study on integrity and accountability in the water supply and sanitation sector in 
Uganda also established that ‘corrupt use of state resources in exchange for electoral support, 
political interference at all government levels and the lack of political will to fight corruption’ 
constituted the major risks that the water and sanitation sector in Uganda is afflicted with. The 
study pointed out further that in the water sector, it was possible for water projects to be initiated 
based on political rather than technical considerations (MWE 2009b). Related to the above, 
Holmberg and Rothstein (2010), point out in their paper on quality of government and quality of 
water that  ‘public procurement for big contracts is a well-known source for large-scale 
corruption resulting in too high costs and too low quality of the constructions that, eventually, 
are put in place’. They further observe that petty corruption at the point of service delivery may 
deter people from using safe water and may also lead them to be reluctant to pay for water at all, 
since they may suspect that the money will be stolen instead of being used for maintenance of 
the safe water equipment, resulting into water managers having far too little money for keeping 
the installations running’ (2010 p. 5). 
 
The difficulty for many governments to effectively confront the many intertwined issues 
concerning water supply has also been underscored by the United Nations (UN-Water 2003, 
Hoekstra 2006) pointing not only to the challenges in collaboration of different departments 
within national governments but also the numerous management decisions that have to be taken 
at sub-national and community levels. The need for governments to build links with NGOs and 
the private sector further complicate management and decision-making (UN-Water 2006b). The 
lack of context specific mechanisms of engaging with the community to participate in 
community programmes has also been highlighted. Brannelley et al. (2009) point out that, 
participatory interventions at community level need to be socially acceptable and responsive to 
local priorities and community structures if they have to be long lasting and move beyond 
tokenistic participation. They argue further that engagement with communities should be 
culturally appropriate, strengthening and or revalidating positive cultural mechanisms and 
traditions, and that, the healthy aspects of community participation are negated when a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ community participation approach or a set of ‘best practices’ is implemented without 
taking into consideration local contextual issues such as cultural or social practices validated by 
the community (Brannelly et al. 2009 p. 2-3). 
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Based on a longitudinal ethnographic study of a village water supply in Tanzania, Cleaver and 
Toner (2006b) observe that the policy goals of community participation, ownership and cost 
sharing in rural water supply as aligned in the broad international consensus on water governance 
are not easily achievable and their benefits may be overstated, both in terms of efficiency of 
resource management and in equality of outcomes. They warn against assuming that managing 
water at the local level leads to broad community ownership, or ownership in the interest of all 
(Cleaver and Toner 2006b p. 216). They observe further that the limitations of ‘bottom-up’ and 
demand led approaches need to be recognised without discrediting their potential for challenging 
inequalities as a community ownership may benefit a small group of community members. They 
conclude raising some important questions about the role of the state and external agencies in 
setting and enforcing equity criteria in community-managed initiatives (Cleaver and Toner 
2006b). 
In sum, CM is embedded in the new governance and NPM paradigms that call for the 
involvement of multiple actors with different roles and responsibilities. It is thus an outcome of 
the realisation that providing water services for all ‘is beyond the reach of governments and the 
public sector of their own, and that the contribution of the private and voluntary sectors is 
essential if global water targets are to be met (Franks and Cleaver 2007 p. 292). The literature 
has however continued to indicate that while it is crucial that a ‘pluralistic’ and synergetic 
approach to the provision of essential public services is undertaken, government as an actor 
remains the mainstay for the success of programmes of all the other actors particularly in 
developing country contexts (Awortwi and Helmsing 2008, Jiménez and Pérez‐Foguet 2010, 
Helmsing 2002, Asingwire 2008). Other literature argues that even if synergies of external actors 
and their resources (human and financial) can leverage CM models, the success of CM depends 
on the willingness of the target community and its members or leaders to mobilise themselves for 
self-help (Lockwood 2004, van Koppen, Rojas and Skielboe 2012.  
Micro-level factors 
The CBM approach to service delivery is a new form of co-operation between communities and 
support agencies in the water sector, viewed as central to long-term sustainability of services 
(Brosius, Tsing and Zerner 1998, Lammerink, et al. 2001). Its basic principles include 
participation, control over decision making, ownership and cost sharing (Lockwood 2004, 
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McCommon, Warner and Yohalem 1990, Amerasinghe and Carmin 2009). But, the literature has 
criticised the approach for assuming that communities can maintain service systems alone, 
pointing out constraints such as exploitation by the private sector actors in liberalised markets 
(Barungi et al. 2003, Danert, et al. 2003, Dardenne 2006). Some literature has also attributed the 
failures in CBM models of service delivery to the inadequate application and emphasis of 
processes of community participation (Harvey and Reed 2007, MWE 2011a, Quin, Balfors and 
Kjellén 2011, Nyalunga 2006b). However, there is some evidence to show that even where CM 
has failed due to the weak participatory process that preceded it, or poor support for community 
management structures, retrospective participatory efforts of some NGO actors have been able to 
revitalise CM effectiveness to achieve long term sustainability of point-water facilities 
(Nankunda 2010, Smits et al. 2012, Lockwood, et al. 2010). 
CBM models of service delivery may also face effectiveness challenges because they thrive on 
collective action of beneficiaries of services in the communities targeted. The literature indicates 
that collective action results into multiple tasks and responsibilities for the community members 
who may already be struggling to meet their own individual needs. Consequently, some members 
in the community may fail to adequately have time to participate in collective activities that 
impact on the effectiveness of CBM. In her study of community water associations (CWAs), 
Mitlin (2004) concluded that ‘many CWAs are beset with management problems, such as lack of 
active  participation by the members, undemocratic if not oppressive management style, irregular 
or no annual elections resulting in monopoly of leadership, and the lack of financial transparency 
and accountability’. Her study further found out that it was not uncommon to hear that a CWA 
official had disappeared with the association money to the dismay of the members (Mitlin 2004 
p. 332). Mitlin further observes that ‘communities may be responsible for enforcing regulations 
but may have limited capacity and may be vulnerable to coercion and intimidation from local 
authorities and other actors, and that CBM systems may be self-governing, but this does not 
mean that they always work in the best interest of all the community’ (Mitlin 2004 p. 332-333).   
Regulations to promote CBM may also be unrealistic in terms of the realities surrounding 
communities. Studies related to this discuss the complexities surrounding willingness and ability 
for communities to contribute to operation and maintenance of water schemes. These underpin 
the assumptions the model has on homogeneity of communities as the main challenge associated 
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with its conception and application (Brosius, Tsing and Zerner 1998, Montgomery, Bartram and 
Elimelech 2009, Whittington, et al. 2007). Other studies point to challenges in ensuring that 
communities comply with making contributions to O&M (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2010, 
Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet 2010).  The studies largely converge on the idea that while it is crucial 
for water users to be key actors in the governance and management of water facilities, the 
efficacy of their role in water governance and management cannot be maximized if they are left 
on their own (Marcus 2007, Barungi et al. 2003, Cleaver, et al. 2005, Malzbender et al. 2005, 
Jones 2011a). Further, the problem of communities participating in CBM activities is even said 
to be more worrying if water users live in poor and marginalized rural areas (Jiménez and Pérez-
Foguet 2010, Jones 2011a). Indeed, some studies have indicated that most problems of CBM in 
the water sector do not occur immediately after construction and commissioning of an improved 
water sources, but from the first to the third year of commissioning (Lockwood and Smit Stef 
2011, MWE 2011, Asingwire 2008). Hervey and Reed (2007 p. 370) point out the most common 
reasons for a breakdown in CBM to include: over reliance on voluntary inputs from community 
members, high attrition rates of elected water user committes due to death, migration or total 
withdrawal of some members without being replaced, loss of trust and respect for water 
committees from the community, failure by the community to contribute to O&M, inadequate 
contact with sevice providers for possible support and communities as well as community 
inability to replace worn out parts of the service system due to poor household incomes.  
Other literature also shares the view that communities may be ineffective in their endeavour to 
have sustainable services due to elite capture (Neubert, Scheumann and Kipping 2008, Jiménez 
and Pérez-Foguet 2010, Fritzen 2007, Dasgupta and Beard 2007). In their analysis of project 
politics, priorities and participation in Rural Water Schemes in four case studies in Mali, 
Vietnam, Zambia and Bolivia, van Koppen, Rojas and Skielboe (2012) found out that the elite in 
the communities where projects were implemented appeared hardly motivated to maintain 
communal schemes, unless they themselves benefited directly and conclude that the dependency 
of projects on the elite can be reduced by ensuring participatory and inclusive planning that 
meets the project’s conditions before budget allocation. Other literature on elite capture indicates 
however, that when communities are supported by service agencies, elite control rather than 
captue may serve to meet the interests of the community. For example, inn their study on 
community-driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia, Dasgupta and 
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Beard (2007) found out that local elites were willing and able to contribute the time and know-
how needed to facilitate community-level projects and governance. Their findings challenge the 
often assumed relationship between a community’s capacity for collective action and elite 
capture, mainly as a result of deliberate actions to build the capacity of communities. Some 
studies have also indicated that in a decentralised and multi-stakeholder safe water service 
delivery framework it is hard to rule out conflicts such as between water users and private 
contractors or between private contractors and local government politicians mainly because of 
vested interests which in the long-run affect implementation and service sustainability (van 
Koppen, Rojas and Skielboe 2012, Mweemba et al. 2010).   
A synthesis from the Literature and Studies on CBM 
On the whole, the literature on the determinants of CBM effectiveness as an alternative to 
centrally managed water schemes has shown that CBM may be succeeding in some countries e.g. 
in Asia and Latin America, but failing in other contexts especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
including Uganda. Many studies also agree that more practical and pragmatic actions for 
effective CBM are yet to become a reality in sub-Saharan Africa. The studies thus attempt to 
explain the gap in terms of governance, but they do not adequately make clear how specific 
facets within the rural safe water governance and service delivery frameworks enable or disable 
community based management systems to yield the much anticipated results. Studies that have 
attempted to integrate governance dynamics in their analysis have also tended to put limited 
emphasis on its complexity at macro, meso and micro levels of service delivery. In addition, the 
role played by central and local government relations in leveraging CBM, and promoting 
sustainable service delivery is not exhaustively examined, nor have studies so far undertaken in 
sub-Saharan Africa adequately examined mechanisms that constrain individual and community 
interest to participate in CBM activities for rural domestic supply, especially using the new 
governance and new public management discourses. 
In addition, most studies on CBM or water user committee effectiveness have been undertaken in 
the analysis of large schemes of water for production especially in Asia and Eastern Europe with 
a very limited number in sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular. Studies that have recently 
targeted consumers of services or communities have also mainly focused on the analysis of the 
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motives, processes and wider consequences of the shift from supply-driven to demand-driven 
approaches (see for instance, Asingwire 2008, Whittington, Davis and McClelland 1998, 
Whittington, et al. 2007). The methodologies and research strategies adopted by many of the 
studies so far undertaken on CBM have also not prioritised integrating any participatory problem 
solving initiatives with their study communities as a strategy for enhancing not only the rigour of 
their methods but also further testing of the dominant assumptions held about CBM approaches 
for rural safe water supply, particularly in operation and maintenance (O&M) of facilities. 
Nevertheless, the literature and studies show that the orthodoxy about the effectiveness of 
community driven development or community managed service delivery models continues to 
raise debates regarding the extent and circumstances in which policy proposals related to CBM 
models of service delivery can leverage equitable and sustainable benefits to the communities 
they target. These indeed, acknowledge that if well implemented, CBM models of service 
delivery have the potential to build consumer capacity for self-support, but only after a long and 
consistent period of support from service providers as part of the enabling policy framework. 
This study undertakes to extend the debate on the governance dynamics and circumstances that 
work to disable policy intentions that potentially promote community managed models of service 
delivery using Uganda as a case study. 
The Analytical Framework and Focus for the Present Study 
The paradigms and theoretical foundations on governance and NPM, and the conceptions around 
enablement all provide a useful conceptual and analytical framework for examining the 
dynamics that shape the effectiveness of CBM in impacting on sustainability of rural safe water 
supply. The concept of ‘enablement’ or an enabling government is utilised in this study as a 
common ‘denominator’ while examining actions that promote or undermine community 
managed models of rural safe water supply and service sustainability.  In Uganda’s rural water 
policy and institutional framework three levels are distinguished at which different but mutually 
reinforcing ‘enabling actions’ may be undertaken or not, thereby affecting the performance of 
CBM in impacting on the sustainability of rural point water facilities. These levels highlighted 
earlier in chapter two include macro, meso and micro levels. 
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At the macro-level, enabling actions ought to be mainly spearheaded by central government in 
partnership with other national level sector actors. Hence such actions are reflected in the ways and 
means central government relates or functions with the private for-profit sector, sub-national 
government institutions, local and international NGOs and donor institutions. The meso-level 
includes sub-national or intermediate institutions of government, national or local NGOs, CBOs 
and the private sector. These are closer to the community of water users and are therefore at a 
vantage position in the entire policy and institutional/implementation framework for CBM. The 
micro-level constitutes individuals and households in the community, community/village leaders 
and community self-help groups. This study specifically focuses on how these micro-level actors 
have been enabled or disabled by the national policy and institutional framework to effectively 
manage point water facilities while ensuring good operation and maintenance of such facilities for 
sustainable service delivery. Therefore, policy and governance dynamics present within and 
among macro and meso level actors and institutions (central and local governments, private for-
profit and not-for profit agencies) and the levels of influence of these actors constitute this 
study’s independent variables. The relationships between and among meso-level actors, the latter’s 
relationship with the communities and central government institutions determine how enabling or 
disabling they can be to the communities they are meant to serve, especially in terms of community 
capacity to fulfil their CBM roles.  
In Uganda’s rural water sector, decentralisation has ensured that central government plays a 
subsidiary function at the lowest point of service delivery by decentralising powers and functions 
in the rural water supply sub-sector. But, the extent to which these provisions are working to 
enable CBM for rural safe water supply sustainability achieve its desired levels of performance 
remains inadequately known. In addition, within the community and particularly among 
community based water management structures, the dynamics that affect individual or collective 
behaviour and actions towards CBM and how these affect and are affected by dynamics at the 
meso level are also not adequately known. Hence borrowing from the concepts of political 
enablement, community enablement and market enablement as they relate with the wider 
concepts of NPM and governance this study explores whether and how local authorities and 
other water sector actors ensure that such behaviours or actions do not disable the effectiveness 
of CBM models in leveraging functional sustainability of installed point-water supply facilities. 
How meso and macro level institutions are enabled to ensure that they stimulate a good working 
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relationship with community level actors are also issues that this study explores borrowing from 
the concepts and literature examined earlier in this chapter.   
Thus, in the context of this study, effective CBM which happens at the level of service 
consumption  is shaped by the governance and policy dynamics at the national and intermediate 
levels. These processes depend so much on the inter-play between individual and institutional 
factors that subsequently impact positively or negatively onto CBM structures. The policy and 
institutional frameworks for rural safe water supply described in chapter two presents a clear 
definition of the roles and relationships of actors. But how these relationships effective in 
impacting on CBM? According to the institutional set-up for rural safe water supply, 
communities are almost entirely dependent on the performance of higher level actors if their role 
in operation and maintenance of point-water facilities is to have a positive impact on 
sustainability. But do these higher level actors (especially local governments) consciously 
‘enable’ communities to play their roles? In order to answer these questions, an analysis of the 
governance dynamics at the meso and macro levels, and how these are capable of influencing 
dynamics at the micro level in the community is in this study undertaken largely borrowing from 
the concept of an enabling government or local authority. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology and Methods 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the methodology and processes of inquiry. The chapter 
begins by making explicit my personal orientation on the wider subject of (community) 
enablement and how this has come to influence my research interest and motivation for this 
study, its design, epistemological and ontological stances and then the research process. An 
effort is also made to elaborate on why and how, important methodological decisions were 
considered indispensable for integration into the study design and methods, and how they have 
contributed to enhancing the validity and reliability of the results. Reflections on ethical issues 
pertinent to this study both as a policy requirement in Uganda, and as a quality assurance 
strategy for research are also discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
challenges and limitations of the study along with the ingenious choices made to minimise their 
impact on the quality of results, and what emerged as new and unique experience from the 
research strategy that could inform related future research undertakings.   
Research Design, Epistemological and Ontological Stance 
An exploratory and analytical single-case study in a predominantly qualitative mixed method 
research design was adopted. Various methods of qualitative inquiry were triangulated with a 
survey targeting households (water users) in a purposively selected rural community in Uganda.  
The survey aimed to capture quantifiable baseline information for cross-analysis and reference 
with the predominantly qualitative inquiry. This design was adopted to broadly understand the 
extent to which community managed public services can be sustained in a rural community 
context in a sub-Saharan African country - Uganda. Specifically, the case study sought a deeper 
understanding of how the effectiveness of CBM models of domestic water supply services could 
be undermined (and or, promoted) by the legal, policy and institutional frameworks, and the rural 
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community contexts they are meant to benefit.   According to Yin (2003 p. 13) ‘a case study is 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident’. Adoption of a single case study design as opposed to multiple case study designs 
popular in purely qualitative or quantitative studies was based on its suitability and convenience 
in representing ‘the critical test of a significant theory’ (Yin 2003 p. 41). This study examines the 
relevance and contextual applicability of widely held beliefs around governance, community 
management, and sustainable rural safe water service delivery using a theoretical framework 
mainly drawn from organisation and management theory. Yin also views the purpose of case 
study designs, among others, as that of theory development and argues that ‘only if you are 
forced to state some propositions will you move in the right direction’(2003 p. 22). He considers 
theoretical propositions to be a starting point rather than the result or outcome of case study 
analysis, making case studies aim at analytical generalization just as experimental designs can 
do.  
In his study of multiple-case study methods in governance-related research, Stewart (2012 p. 68) 
observes that single-case studies have been popular in governance-related research because of 
their intrinsic value rather than their interest in producing generalisable findings. This study 
examined the extent to which CBM as integrated in rural safe water policy and governance 
frameworks could deliver sustainable safe water services if assumptions ‘continued to be held’ 
that communities (water users) always respond to calls and conditions for their participation in 
the form of functional CBM organisations, as if they enjoyed it unhindered. The study held an 
underlying proposition that enforcing deliberate measures to enable CBM models of service 
delivery is a largely missing ingredient of the existing governance framework for rural safe water 
supply in Uganda. 
The choice of mixed methods was informed by the belief that narrow views of the world 
characterised by positivist orientations can be misleading, requiring that researchers approach 
complex, multifaceted and dynamic research phenomena from different perspectives and 
paradigms so as to gain a holistic perspective about phenomena under study (Greene, Caracelli 
and Graham 1989, Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). Post-positivists argue that using more than 
one method in undertaking social science research may have particular strengths with respect to 
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what the subject matter of the inquiry is addressing and that such an approach should help to get 
a clearer picture of the social world and make-for more adequate explanations (Golafshani 2003). 
They argue further that by combining methods and empirical materials, researchers can hope to 
overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and problems that come from single method, single-
observer and single-theory studies (Dick 2005). Literature indicates that the strength of mixed 
methods design is in enhancing both theory testing and theory building through extension, 
convergence and contradiction of findings (Denzin 2012, Creswell 2009, Foss and Ellefsen 2002, 
Jennifer Grafton, Anne M. Lillis and Habib Mahama 2011). According to Grafton, Lillis and 
Mahama (2011 p. 18), ‘the lack of use of such methods suggests missed opportunities’.  
Triangulation, a concept said to have been borrowed from navigation and military sciences 
(Smith 1975 cited in, Jick 1979 p. 602) is at the heart of mixed methods research. Just as the 
application of basic principles of geometry allow navigators to singly view multiple points with 
greater accuracy, ‘organizational re-searchers can improve the accuracy of their judgments by 
collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon’ (Jick 1979 p. 602), thereby  
enhancing the rigour, relevance and reliability of their results. Yin (2003) also emphasises 
triangulation as a critical imperative for mitigating the biases embedded in a single-case study 
research. In naturalistic studies, triangulation advocates for a combination of strategies, 
theoretical perspectives and methods or investigators in the study of the same phenomenon (Jick 
1979, Thurmond 2001). Any biases from particular data sources, investigators or methods and 
theoretical perspectives, would be neutralised when blended and integrated with other data 
sources, methods or investigators in an interpretive style (Jick 1979, Creswell 1994, Thurmond 
2001).  
Triangulation can take place ‘within’ or ‘between and across’ methods (Thurmond 2001, Jick 
1979). Within-method triangulation, multiple techniques within a single approach or method 
(qualitative or quantitative) are used to collect and interpret data, cross-check for internal 
consistency or reliability, while the researcher’s interest for using the between-method 
triangulation is to test the degree of external validity (Jick 1979 p. 603). Thus, using both within 
and between method triangulation approaches in a single study (as this study was designed), 
provides additional sources of valuable insights that cannot be gained from a single method. Two 
or more sources augment and verify one another reducing the impact of bias while enhancing 
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rigour, reliability and validity (Foss and Ellefsen 2002, Denzin 2012, Chauncey E. Wilson 2006, 
Thurmond 2001).  
Owing to the need for validity and reliability measures that allow convergence of data from 
different sources, mixed methods have also been referred to as a convergent methodology or 
convergent validation (Campbell and Fiske 1959 p. 83).  Creswell (1994 p. 175) identifies five 
purposes advanced for combining methods in a single study including: (i) seeking convergence 
of results (ii) complementarity of emergent findings (iii) sequential development of evidence 
from one method to another or method mix e.g. moving sequentially from qualitative research 
activities to a survey (iv) initiation, where contradictions and fresh perspectives may emerge and 
(v) expansion, where mixed methods add scope and breadth to the study. In this study, the 
findings generated from FGDs and interviews with water users were compared with results from 
macro and meso level key informant interviews as well as theory in order to arrive at 
conclusions.  
Yin (2009) also emphasises the need for precise documentation of the data base and maintaining 
the chain of evidence which provides validity in reconstructing the study from the research 
question to the conclusions. The use of qualitative methods in this study was also to some extent 
informed by grounded theory (GT). Using GT, researchers can systematically generate theory 
from data through inductive and deductive thinking.  The goal of GT is therefore mainly that of 
formulating hypotheses based on conceptual ideas as opposed to verifying hypotheses that are 
generated by constantly comparing conceptualized data on different levels of generalization 
dominated by comparisons containing deductive steps (Dick 2005). Throughout the data 
collection process, emerging findings were compared after successive interviews, focus group 
discussions or observations. Insights generated would inform subsequent data collection 
activities and processes. 
My Reflexivity and Positionality within the Study  
From the outset, as is the tradition in qualitative research designs, this study ensured the 
necessary rigour in its design and execution in order to enhance the reliability and validity of the 
research results. One of the most imperative aspects of this endeavour be self-aware, preside over 
and mitigate the influence or biases my dispositions can have had on the research process, and 
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ultimately on the results.  This is what has been coined in qualitative research as reflexivity 
(England 1994, Steier 1991, Jootun, McGhee and Marland 2009a, Parahoo 2006). It connotes ‘a 
continuous process of reflection by the researcher on his/her own values, pre-conceptions, 
behaviour or presence and those of the research participants which can affect the interpretation of 
responses’ (Parahoo 2006 p. 326-27), and involves researchers recognising that they are part of 
the social world under study’ (cited in, Jootun, McGhee and Marland 2009b p. 42).  Creswell 
also elaborately puts it that  ‘qualitative research begins with assumptions, a world view, the 
possible use of a theoretical lens and the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning 
individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem’ (2007 p. 37). Thus, the credibility of 
one’s research increases with one’s understands how their own values and views may influence 
research findings (Jootun, McGhee and Marland 2009b p. 42). 
 
My early experiences of poor public service delivery as a primary school boy in rural Uganda, 
the then (and now still) wide spread rural household poverty, and what I came to better 
understand later in lectures of social policy (as an undergraduate Social Work student) to 
constitute what Robert Chambers coined ‘clusters of disadvantage’ (Chambers 1983), are among 
the landmarks that cannot be overlooked in so far as they have significantly shaped my 
professional and academic career, interests, beliefs and world views. My social work training, 
among others, introduced me to the analysis and appreciation of the complexity of social 
problems, to the principles of social justice and the core roles of a professional social work 
practitioner. In generalist social work practice, a social worker is an ‘enabler’, ‘advocate’, a 
‘broker’, ‘negotiator or mediator’, and an ‘educator’. Ambrosino et al. (2011) elaborate more 
clearly on these roles as intertwined, mutually reinforcing and crucially important in stimulating 
and propagating socio-economic development and transformation in various social work practice  
settings e.g. among rural and urban community settings. 
Furthering my interest on enablement was my master’s degree training in development studies 
and subsequently my thesis on livelihood strategies of the poor when coping with social welfare 
deficits. This training not only built onto the earlier one I had in social work, or my earlier 
exposure to complex social realities in developing country contexts, but also effectively mirrored 
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into my future interests in promoting local economic development (LED)
22
 by building on the 
unique economic, social and political resources of localities. In addition, my personal conviction 
about the inevitability of a functional public authority, with an adequate ‘dose’ of the values of 
nationalism, and an interested and empowered civil society as a condition for achieving social 
and economic transformation and development of localities, further motivated my 
epistemological and ontological disposition to the title of this thesis and to the entire study 
design.  
Last but not least, my experience from participating in teaching and research activities at 
Makerere University have also overtime, and to great measure, contributed to my appreciation of 
the theory and rhetoric about tendencies for public authorities to want to ‘profit’ from a weak 
public service system which, alas, is amplified by a weak civil society incapable of demanding 
for downward and social accountability from public officials. A predicament exacerbated by the 
seemingly ever growing trend of political patronage and a weak civil society in most of sub-
Saharan Africa, and of the apathetic attitude among public sector workers over addressing vast 
structural problems that generally impact on public service delivery.  
The naturalistic inquiry which predominantly informs the design and approach to this study may 
appear to stand in tension with developmental approaches that seek specific improvements or 
changes to a certain status quo. However, the use of mixed methods and a highly triangulated 
research approach, including the WSC revitalization activities which lent themselves more 
towards participatory action research,  helped in ensuring that where my interpretation of 
responses during and/or after use of one or a combination of methods were checked by the use of 
another method or a combination of methods. In this chapter, and in the entire thesis, I endeavour 
to demonstrate that my own disposition to the study did not significantly affect the research 
process and indeed the validity and reliability of this work. It is however also important to note, 
as Jootun puts it that ‘while the researcher’s reflexivity is imperative for the research process, 
total detachment is also an unrealistic aspiration that can limit or hinder good results’ (Jootun, 
McGhee and Marland 2009b p. 46). 
                                                          
22
 LED is a community development framework which underscores the importance of building on the competitive 
and comparative advantages of localities, by development actors (external agencies ) who at best, should work in 
close and strategic partnership with local actors and the community in order to stimulate positive transformation and 
development.  
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Selection of the Case Study 
The Water is Life Project and the case study 
Makondo parish
23
 in Lwengo district - Central Uganda constitutes the case for this study. The 
area was purposively selected as part of the Irish Aid funded Water is Life (WIL) Project 
coordinated by the Dundalk Institute of Technology (DKIT) in Ireland. Having had earlier 
contacts with the Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMMs) in Makondo Parish, the WIL Project 
supported a multi-disciplinary doctoral research undertaking on eight broad thematic areas 
related to water. My own thematic area broadly focused on ‘participation and governance in 
water management systems’, while the other seven focused on broad and specific areas around 
water management and gender; water governance, women water and health, climate change and 
water management, hand pump technology, ground water sourcing and distribution, and solar 
disinfection of water. All of these research projects, whose fieldwork was based in Makondo 
Parish in Uganda, were each led by a PhD student researcher with individual supervisors and an 
overall WIL Project Leader based at DKIT in Ireland. The WIL project was implemented in a 
collaborative arrangement with Higher Education Institutions in Ireland [including Dublin City 
University (DCU)] and Makerere University Kampala (MUK) in Uganda. Hence, the present 
geographical area of study was purposively selected as part of the WIL Project implementation 
framework. Nonetheless, my expression of interest, and acceptance by the WIL Project to 
research under the theme ‘participation and governance in water management systems’ allowed 
me a great opportunity to identify a thesis topic and research questions that would meet my own 
research interests, while at the same time contributing to meeting the wider goals of the WIL 
Project.  
The Uganda Country context 
Uganda is a land locked country located in the Eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa about 800 
kilometers inland from the Indian Ocean. It shares borders with Kenya to the East, South Sudan 
to the North, Democratic Republic of Congo to the West, Rwanda and Tanzania to the South. It 
has a land surface of 241,500.7 square kilometers, a land cover of 199,807.4 square kilometres, 
                                                          
23
 A parish in Uganda’s local government structure is the second lowest level of government administration in rural 
areas and is headed by a Parish Chief (who is a civil servant), and an elected council representative at a Sub-county 
Local Government (immediately below a district Local Government). 
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water and swamps covering 41,743.2 square kilometres. The country has three of the major lakes 
in the Great Lakes Region namely Lake Victoria, Albert and Edward, which also constitute much 
of her border lakeshore areas. The River Nile also originates from Lake Victoria in Uganda, 
through the Lake Kyoga basin in the north-central part of the country, South Sudan and to North 
Africa into the Mediterranean Sea. Despite being astride the Equator, Uganda has more 
temperate tropical climate compared to her surroundings. 
There are two major wet seasons in a year (March-May, and September-November) and an 
average rainfall ranging between 582-1690 mm per year, while the temperatures range between 
16-31 degrees (UBOS 2010b). The country’s altitude also ranges from 620 metres in the Albert 
Nile area to 5,111 metres above sea level at the country’s highest peak on Mount Ruwenzori 
(UBOS 2011).      
Figure 5 Map of Uganda and location in the African Continent  
 
 
 
Sources: (http://goafrica.about.com/library/bl.mapfacts.uganda.htm and 
 http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/ug.htm) 
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In June 2011, Uganda’s population was estimated at 33 million people at an annual population 
growth rate of 3.4% (UBOS 2011). This places the country among those with the fastest growing 
populations in the world. Of the 33 million people, 4.9 million (14.8%) live in urban areas and 
28.9 million (85.2%) in rural areas (GOU 2011b p.153). Majority of the rural inhabitants depend 
on subsistence farming for their livelihood.  
 
Despite a remarkable recovery from very poor service delivery in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Uganda’s rural safe water access figures show that there is still a big challenge for the country to 
meet not only the millennium targets but also its own target of 77% safe water access in rural 
areas by 2015. Access to safe water in rural areas has since 2009 stagnated at 65% and even 
projected to decline to 64% in 2011 (GOU 2011b). Yet, there are also notable spatial and socio-
economic access variations within the country. Some of the north-eastern parts of the country 
have as low as 19% coverage while others notably in urban and peri-urban areas and south 
western highlands have as high as 95% (GOU 2011b p.167). Women and children have also for 
long been more greatly affected by supply and distribution problems (Rudaheranwa, Bategeka 
and Banga 2003, Water Aid  2012). Part of the factors to explain this occurrence is the 
inadequate operation and maintenance (O&M) of the rural water sources. According to the 
policy and Institutional framework elaborated in chapter two, the responsibility for O& is largely 
given to water user communities and the Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs) as their 
coordination structures. 
Makondo Parish  
Makondo Parish is located about 194 km south of Kampala Capital City, and within the south of 
the newly created
24
 local government district of Lwengo. The parish is made up of 15 geo-
political villages each having its own elected political structure locally known as an ‘LC’ (Local 
Council) or village council headed by a chair person. Based on the 2002 National Population and 
Housing Census, Makondo Parish is estimated to have around 2275 households and a population 
size of about 8193, of whom 51%t are female and  49% male (Ndagwe Sub-County 2011). 
Survey results also show that 72% of the households derive their livelihood from crop and or 
livestock farming on a subsistence basis (Macri et al. 2013). 
                                                          
24
 Lwengo district was curved out of Masaka district in a parliamentary decision in 2010. 
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Like most parts of Uganda, Makondo Parish has two rainy seasons in a year from March - May 
and September – December. It receives an average rainfall of 750-1100 mm. The parish is 
located in a region that also experiences two dry seasons which are sometimes prolonged, 
affecting farming activities as was reported in 2005 (Ssali 2005). Villages in the parish are 
endowed differently with water resources, which include; traditional hand dug wells, swamps 
and improved or protected water source facilities supplied by the government and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). As is the case in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, deep wells, 
shallow wells and protected springs are evidently the main technologies used for the provision of 
safe water in Makondo parish. This is largely because of their relative low cost in service 
delivery compared to piped water especially when targeting rural sub-Saharan communities that 
are characterised by sparsely distributed homesteads. Some households in Makondo Parish 
supplement these sources through self-supply mainly using simple rain water harvesting 
technologies.   
Figure 6: Map showing location of Lwengo district in Uganda, Makondo parish and 
location of villages in the parish.  
 
Source: (Macri et al. 2013 p. 11) 
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It is important to note that, while the selection of Uganda and Makondo Parish was purposive 
and project based, public (water) policy regimes that Uganda has gone faced are not very 
peculiar from those of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly all countries in the region have 
been implementing public sector reforms since the early 1980s, including those specific to rural 
safe water supply (Awortwi and Helmsing 2008, Van Koppen 2003). Similarly, the nature and 
quality of rural safe water service delivery in Makondo Parish is not peculiarly different from 
that of the rest of the rural communities in Uganda in terms of access, quality and governance. 
While minor deviations may not be ruled out, Makondo Parish as the case study community 
remains underserviced. As recent reports and studies have revealed, rural safe water service 
sustainability is still a countrywide problem in Uganda (MWE 2011a, GOU 2011b), as it is in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF and WHO 2012).  It was thus methodologically suitable 
for this study whose primary goal was to explore issues related to community management, 
community participation and sustainability of rural safe water facilities and services, based on 
Uganda’s policy and institutional frameworks.  
Study Implementation Process, Strategies and Justification 
The implementation of this study was undertaken in a number of successive, mutually integrated 
and reinforcing milestones/stages, involving planning and implementation of key study activities, 
strategies and decisions in an iterative manner. Activities and decisions kept unfolding based on 
insights emerging at every stage in the study process. Ensuing is a discussion of the strategies, 
activities and decisions best conceived as having been mutually reinforcing rather than purely 
unidirectional milestones of the research process. 
Reconnaissance visits and entry into Makondo parish 
Fieldwork started with a study tour of all the villages in Makondo Parish. The tour provided an 
overall picture of observable socio-economic, physical and environmental characteristics of the 
case study. Different types of community water resources including functioning and non-
functioning deep and shallow wells, a protected spring (the only one in the parish) and the 
various open water sources were visited. Of interest to me also, was observing the housing and 
sanitation conditions, dominant economic activities as well as the physical environment all of 
which were intended to contextualize the inquiry. Indeed after the tour, what I had seen on the 
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physical map of the area and what I had read in the literature about Makondo Parish came into a 
better focus. The tour was guided by a community (local) facilitator hired by the WIL project.  In 
addition to observing socio-economic, physical and environmental characteristics of the study 
community, informal conversations were held with the village leaders met in various locations. 
The same was done with water users and some of the water user committee members, 
particularly the caretakers of improved water sources irrespective of whether the sources were 
functional or not.  During and immediately after such conversations, I ensured that I took notes 
capturing whatever I found relevant for my research interests. Similarly, whatever was found 
relevant to the inquiry was noted in addition to photography. It took seven days to cover the 
entire parish. 
Meeting with village leaders  
In a typical rural African village, the presence of a new person or ‘visitor’, no matter how long 
they stay, must at least be well-known to a village elder or leader. As a new person in the 
community, more so one who was not just visiting, but a researcher hoping to interact with many 
village residents as well as visit and observe community water resources, activities and practices, 
my research activities would have not only faced problems of authenticity and acceptance in the 
community, but would have also faced tremendous challenges in accessing households without 
making the study’s goals, strategies, target groups, and its sponsors known to community 
leaders.  Earlier before my reconnaissance visits, the WIL project manager organised a meeting 
in which I was introduced to the various leaders of the 15 villages in the Parish. However, in 
order to consolidate myself, advance my own research agenda and gain full entry into the 
community, another half day meeting with all village leaders was organised. Box 1 below 
presents a summary of the key issues covered in the meeting and discussion with community 
leaders. 
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Box 1 Key topics covered in the meeting with the village leaders  
 
  
 
 
 
 
The village leaders were also requested to update lists of households in their respective villages 
and informed that the lists would later constitute a sampling frame from which a random sample 
of households (water users) would be drawn for the baseline survey. Apart from introducing my 
specific research agenda and politically/socially gaining leadership acceptance (which was very 
crucial for my inquiry on governance issues), this meeting became a springboard for the entire 
fieldwork process. In particular, it informed the decision to select two functional and two non-
functional water sources, their catchment communities and management as case-studies (within 
the Makondo Parish case study) for a deeper qualitative inquiry into contextual factors that work 
for and against community managed safe water facilities. The meeting also helped to inform the 
development and fine-tuning of the draft household survey questionnaire as well as topics for in-
depth interviews, focus group interviews (FGIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). 
 
Selection of villages for FGDs and Focus Group Interviews (FGIs) 
Following the meeting with local leaders, four villages were purposively sampled for FGDs, and 
FGIs. In broad terms, sampling ‘refers to the points of data collection or cases to be included 
within a research project. These points of data collection may be; a person, a document, an 
institution, a setting, or any instance of information or data gathering’ (2009 p. 56). The Misaana 
and Luyiyi-Kaate villages were selected based on their relevance and uniqueness to the study, 
and on their potential to represent the entire case study as theoretical or purposeful sampling 
permits (Coyne 1997).  The two villages thus represented communities with functional shallow-
wells provided by a local NGO but with committees described in the meeting with village leaders 
as ‘weak and nearly fully disintegrated’. While Kibuye and Kanyogoga villages represented 
 the general history and character of public service delivery in the area, key development 
actors and more particularly in domestic water supply services; 
 community participation in development activities, with emphasis on safe water service 
delivery; 
 knowledge of roles and responsibilities of the community or water users in safe water 
service delivery; 
 existence and functionality of water user committees; and 
 their views and opinions on mechanisms and modalities of ensuring sustainable safe water 
service delivery in the area and the envisaged challenges.  
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water user communities with non-functional government provided deep-wells, and with fully 
disintegrated water user committees, but a few of whose members were traceable for the FGDs.  
This study was not specifically interested in gender dimensions regarding CBM, but to allow free 
and socially unhindered discussions male and female water users were separated for separate 
FGDs. This was mainly because a male dominated society and culture is still apparent in the case 
study, as it is in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, group interviews constituting elected 
village executive council (VEC) members were also conducted separately from those of WUC 
members who could be traced
25
 to permit a free discussion of views and perspectives based on 
the two different community leadership portfolios. This study acknowledges that children 
(especially girl children), the disabled, extremely poor and elderly potentially face political 
marginalisation when it comes to rural community settings; it thus did not prioritise organising 
separate FGDs with them. This was mainly because they all had representatives on village 
councils covered under FGIs. In addition, the household questionnaire covered aspects related to 
vulnerability to inequitable access to public services by such population categories. 
 
While FGDs with water users were conducted based on the basic principles of strict adherence to 
numbers, homogeneity of participants and moderation (Folch-Lyon and Trost 1981), FGIs with 
local leaders were based more on their leadership portfolio as legitimate community 
representatives having more direct contact with service providers and actors from the meso and 
macro levels of policy implementation. With the help of the village leaders, a convenient 
selection of at 8-12 participants to the FGDs was made based on participant availability in the 
community at the time of the FGD, age, gender and proximity to a functional or non-functional 
water source. In all the FGDs conducted the participants had to have lived in the area when their 
respective water sources were constructed, and it did not matter whether or not households were 
known to use deep/shallow wells or a protected spring for their domestic water needs. A central 
and convenient location in the village was always considered as appropriate for the FGDs to 
allow a fairly easy accessibility for all participants. On the whole this study succeeded in 
ensuring that water user participation in the FGDs was as representative and convenient to 
participants as possible. 
                                                          
25
 For very diverse reasons, most of the WUCs in various communities had disintegrated. It was almost impossible 
to find all the members available as they had been elected by communities they were meant to serve. 
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The time taken to start and conclude a single FGD or FGI also varied depending on the nature 
and detail of participant experiences or the need for probing. A digital audio recorder was used 
always with permission from the participants after explaining to them its role as ‘secretary and 
time manger’ rather than a ‘spy’ tool. Note-taking was also done during the interview but mainly 
for probing purposes; identified probes were quickly noted and posed at the end of an on-going 
submission to avoid interruptions. Effective listening and patience were very important 
ingredients of the focus group sessions, and members were informed that they were free to leave 
anytime if they so wished, although in none of the cases did any member leave before all the 
discussions and issues were exhausted. Two FGDs (male and female) and two FGIs (LC and 
WUC) would be conducted per village and preliminary analysis of the discussions undertaken 
before moving into another village. Emerging issues from these FGDs and FGIs would be 
compared and where necessary, further explored in subsequent discussions and interviews. The 
findings also helped in the development and finalisation of the household survey questionnaire 
that explored some of the issues in structured individual interviews with a sample of households 
proportionately distributed across all the 15 geo-political villages in the parish. Both female and 
male members in WSCs or LC councils freely participated in the same interviews.  
 
In addition to the strengths of individual interviews, doing group interviews in a mixed 
methodology according to Dushku presents unique opportunities for increasing validity and 
reliability through triangulation. It also saves on the resources needed by a researcher to cover 
individuals for information that could otherwise be obtained in a group setting (2000 p. 765). 
Notwithstanding the minor differences between FGDs and FGIs (Dushku 2000, Folch-Lyon and 
Trost 1981), both approaches required effective probing on issues related to community 
management of improved water resources and how meso and macro level actors and policy 
frameworks interfaced with water users in determining levels of functionality or sustainability of 
water sources. In total, eight FGDs and eight FGIs were conducted in this phase of the study, 
although in each of these villages more meetings were undertaken as elaborated later.  
 
Both FGDs and FGIs covered topics related to community participation and community 
management of water facilities. The aim was to obtain detailed and locally contextual qualitative 
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data on participants’ knowledge and experiences about community participation in rural water 
service delivery. Opinions about their mandates as water users or facility managers of 
decentralised safe water supply, their knowledge and experiences about the support received and 
expected from the macro and meso level water actors, and amongst themselves at the micro-level 
were discussed initially using (but without strictly following) a topical guide. This is because the 
discussions could start and naturally flow un-interrupted and focused. Issues pertaining 
functionality and non-functionality of water sources and WSCs were discussed in FGDs and 
FGIs and contextual opportunities, challenges and conditions for their revitalisation and 
sustainability explored. 
 
In-depth interviews and household survey implementation 
In-depth interviews with sub-county civil servants and politicians overseeing service delivery in 
Makondo Parish were undertaken at the same stage/concurrently with the implementation of the 
household survey. 
 
The household survey  
In a predominantly qualitative mixed methods study design, researchers can undertake surveys 
on some of the quantifiable variables or indicators and use such survey results for cross-
reference, analysis and triangulation with the data obtained using qualitative methods (Creswell 
1994, Abowitz and Toole 2010). A household survey of water users was conducted using a 
structured questionnaire administered through personal interviewing. The specific strength the 
survey brought into this study was its potential to enhance reliability and validity of results by 
allowing collection and analysis of quantitative data on largely pre-coded questions covering 
among others knowledge, perceptions and experiences of water users about their mandates in 
rural water supply. The survey also investigated contextual issues at household and community 
level that are believed to have the potential to impact significantly on desired levels of CM 
effectiveness.    
The sample size (602 households), its proportionate distribution in the 15 villages of Makondo 
Parish and the actual selection of participating households were determined following 
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statistically accepted protocols. The sample was determined using Yamane’s (1967) formula as 
follows: 
 eN
N
n 2
1 

 
Where n represented the sample size of households to be selected for interviews, N the estimated 
total number of households in Makondo parish, and e=0.05 (5%) the desired 95% level of 
precision (Yamane 1967 p. 886  cited in, Israel 1992 p. 4). Using the national household survey 
(UBOS 2010a), and the national voters register (Uganda Electoral Commission 2011), the 
number of households in Makondo were estimated at 1883. Therefore, substituting into 
Yamane’s formula as indicated below gave a value of 330 households.  
  33005.0*05.018831
1883


n
 
By adding a 5% value of 330 (0.05 x 330 = 17) to cater for sampling errors, the final value of the 
minimum (statistically acceptable) sample was 347 households (330+17). However, for purposes 
of enhancing accuracy, 606 households participated in the survey, and following the process of 
data cleaning in preparation for data analysis, a total of 547 entries (households) remained in the 
sample. Having constructed sampling frames
26
 for each of the villages with the help of village 
leaders, proportionate samples were distributed to each of the respective villages and a 
systematic sampling technique
27
 employed to select the actual households for interviews. Village 
codes and household numbers (in an ascending order) were allocated each day of data collection 
for ease of their identification.  
The development of the household questionnaire was initially based on an extensive review of 
literature guided by the study’s research questions. Later, it was significantly reviewed based on 
insights generated mainly from informal conversations, FGDs, FGIs, and the observations made 
during the reconnaissance visits. The questionnaire also went through a WIL project peer review 
process led by my supervisor before it was translated in a local dialect for pretest. A suggestion 
was made to the WIL steering committee and adopted that questions for this survey be combined 
                                                          
26
 A sampling frame is the range of cases from which the participant cases can be selected for inclusion in the 
sample (Gibson and Brown 2009 p. 56) 
27
 One in every three households according to the random order of names of household heads on the sampling frame 
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in one questionnaire with those of another WIL supported survey whose main focus was on 
gender, water access and use at household level in Makondo Parish, and which was likely to be 
implemented parallel to the one for this study. The main justification for the merger was to avoid 
errors accruing from respondent fatigue in case some households were included in samples of 
both surveys. Moreover, some of the general questions around household characteristics were 
largely similar. 
 
With help from the community based health care (CBHC) project of the MMMs, seven 
community health workers (CHWs)
28
 (3 women and 4 men) were recruited to assist in the data 
collection exercise. Their age, ability to read and write well, and their experience in working 
within similar communities as mobilisers and trainers were of a great advantage to the efforts 
into preparing them for a successful household data collection exercise. In order to ensure that 
CHWs were adequately prepared for the task, they were subjected to a six-day rigorous training 
planned and implemented jointly with the lead researcher
29
 on the gender aspects integrated into 
the ‘merged’ questionnaire. The training emphasised among others the critical skills necessary 
for locating respondents, conducting and recording interviews, editing filled questionnaires as 
well as use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment
30
. During the training each and 
every question in the merged questionnaire was read and its expected responses discussed since 
most of the questions were closed. The questionnaire, earlier translated from English to Luganda 
(the local dialect) was piloted on the third and fourth day of the six-day training programme. The 
pilot took place in a purposively selected village called Luwanga located in neighbouring 
Naanywa parish. Piloting of the translated questionnaire helped in the identification of some 
inconsistencies between the translated questionnaire and its English version. These were 
carefully addressed before final questionnaire production and use.  
 
                                                          
28 CHWs are community based volunteer mobilisers and trainers in the CBHC. They had adequate experience in 
data collection at household level, which they had accumulated over a number of years of working as community 
health workers. 
29
 Also doctoral student under the WIL project 
30
 The GPS equipment was used to capture coordinates on each of the participating households for possible mapping 
and for analytical purposes. It also eventually served a validation strategy for checking interviewers to ensure among 
others that they interviewed the households that had been randomly selected and assigned to them (Fowler,J.,Floyd, 
Jr 2002 p. 133).  
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Owing to the fact that the questionnaire was fairly lengthy (after merging), it took an average of 
3-4 days to complete data collection per village and an average of an hour to fill a single 
interview.  In addition to prior notices, the first day of work in each village involved meeting the 
village chairperson for self-introduction as a survey team, talking about survey objectives, the 
randomly selected households as well as seeking for their support in locating the household 
heads for interviews. A two-hour meeting with data collectors would be held on a daily basis to 
share fieldwork experiences as well as finalise editing filled questionnaires, while a one-day 
meeting was held weekly for the same activities covering a week’s work, after which completed 
questionnaires would be parked ready for computer entry and processing. Editing and feedback 
sessions with the entire survey team on the data collection exercise provided an opportunity for 
reflection on the emerging findings as well as elicit general observations on contextual issues in 
the community that were relevant to the study. In addition to peer support as a survey team, the 
meetings constituted a good source of ideas for data triangulation and analysis. Where necessary, 
some of the useful insights were carefully followed-up in KIIs/in-depth interviews at the micro, 
meso and macro levels. 
In-depth/key informant interviews (KIIs) with local civil servants and politicians 
In this study, the application of KIIs and in-depth interviews was not particularly restricted to 
their conceptual difference in which KIIs emphasise seeking ‘expert’ opinions or experiences of 
selected individuals on specific issues as opposed to in-depth interviews that tend to be more 
open ended covering a much wider scope of issues and relatively targeting more respondents 
(Nichols 1991 p.13). In this study, exploration of issues at the micro or meso level depended so 
much on the respondents’ time, willingness and availability for the interview, and their distinct 
levels of knowledge and experience with regard to rural safe water service delivery in Uganda 
and in the case study. Moreover, most of the respondents targeted for both in-depth interviews 
and KIIs at the micro and meso level (sub-county) lived in Makondo parish. Both in-depth and 
KIIs at the micro and meso level targeted civil servants and politicians and representatives of 
local community based organisations (CBOs). Community leaders became key informants 
because they were regarded as experts on most community dynamics related to CBM of 
improved point water facilities (Gilchrist and Williams 1999 p.73). KIIs with local leaders and 
available WSCs were undertaken after deployment of the survey assistants (CHWs) to their 
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respectively assigned households for interviews. It did not matter whether a WSC weakly existed 
or had fully disintegrated in order for them to be interviewed. While very few interviews with the 
village leaders or WSCs had been conducted prior to the survey, they were treated more as 
informal interviews/conversations in preparation for the more in-depth ones.  
 
Meso level civil and political leaders interviewed especially at the sub-County level included the 
Ndagwe sub-County representative in the Lwengo district council, Makondo parish 
representative in the Ndagwe sub-County local government council, water sector specific civil 
servants and technical personnel serving the study community at sub-county and district levels. 
The non-governmental/not-for profit rural safe water service delivery stakeholders interviewed 
included staff of the CBHC project of the MMMs and field staff of Kitovu Mobile. In addition, 
private-for profit water sector actors in the area; the hand pump mechanics (doubling as ‘spare 
parts dealers’) were also targeted and interviewed. Table 1 below presents the categories of KII 
participants at the meso and micro levels. 
 
Table 3 Categories of key informants interviewed at the micro and meso levels of   
 planning and rural safe water service delivery  
Meso (District/Sub-county/Regional) Micro (Community) 
 District Water Officer 
 District Community Development Officer – Lwengo 
 Community Development Specialist (Technical 
Support Unit – Masaka Region) 
 District Health Officer 
 District Hand Pump Supervisor 
 District Secretary for Finance 
 Deputy Programme Coordinator – Makondo 
Community Based Health Care Programme 
 Field Staff Kitovu Mobile Clinic – Masaka Region 
 Lwengo sub-county Chief 
 Lwengo sub-county Health Assistant 
 Lwengo sub-county Hand Pump Mechanic 
 The Parish Chief- Makondo Parish 
 Village Executive Leaders 
 Makondo Parish Development 
Committee Chairperson 
 Representative of Makondo 
Parish in the Sub-County 
Council 
 WSC Chair persons 
 Water Source Caretakers 
 
  
 
The interviews focused on specific and contextual rural safe water governance issues that affect 
sustainable safe water service delivery. Prominent among the issues covered in the interviews 
were functionality levels of improved water sources, dynamics of community/water user 
99 
 
participation e.g. monthly contributions, community management support provided/received, 
knowledge and utilization of external support opportunities, community sensitisation and 
training provided/received, and community level conflicts. On average two interviews were 
conducted in a day. A digital recorder was used to record all the interviews although some notes 
could be taken during the interview, mainly as probe points. The interviews were also listened to 
on the same day they were carried out, and salient issues requiring follow-up or clarification 
noted for possible follow-up in subsequent interviews.  
Validation of preliminary findings, revitalisation of WSCs and repair of 
two hand pumps 
By sharing preliminary research findings with study participants or target groups researchers can 
obtain feedback that may be used to refine their results thereby enhancing validity and reliability 
of their research findings (Silverman 2010 p. 380-381), especially through recognizing and 
dealing with their own prejudices (Parahoo, 2006 p. 327). In each of the villages selected for the 
qualitative inquiry, community meetings were organised in order to: 
i. validate emerging study findings; 
ii. use the validation exercise to sensitise them on their roles and responsibilities; 
iii. motivate them to see the need for revitalisation of their WUCs; 
iv. mobilise communities to make a financial contribution towards the repair of their 
improved water sources, and 
v. obtain practical insights through direct observation on issues of community management 
and community participation in rural safe water supply services.  
While I was more of a direct observer, I also participated in some of the activities as I observed 
the processes of hand pump repair and WSC revitalisation. Jorgensen (1989 p.12) notes that  
through participant observation, it is possible for researchers to ‘describe what goes on , who or 
what is involved, when or how things happen, how they occur and why things happen as they do 
in particular situations.  In order to enhance the naturality of the processes, I ensured that the 
sub-County Hand Pump Mechanic (HPM) took the lead in the entire exercise, allowing me 
sufficient opportunity to conveniently observe, take notes and use photography to capture major 
events where necessary.  
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With support from HPM, village executive leaders and the representative of Makondo parish in 
the Ndagwe sub-county local government council, WSCs of four water user groups (WUGs) in 
Misaana, Makondo, Kibuye and Kiganjo villages were revitalised
31
. Three of the non-functioning 
hand pumps in Kibuye, Misaana and Kanyogoga villages were also repaired and their 
disintegrated committees reconstituted. In both of the cases, participation in each of the activities 
in the process provided a very rich source of insights for the study. Practical dynamics involved 
in community mobilisation such as community interest, time management, community labour, 
and other logistical and material contributions such as (food and water) were a key source of 
insights for the study. In addition to insights obtained from interviews and discussions, direct 
observation of such process brought new dimensions in understanding the issues in CBM. 
Observed also were potential sources of conflicts; e.g. processes, considerations and preferences 
while electing new members of WSCs; priorities, methods and challenges in community training 
and sensitistion on roles and responsibilities; aspects of handover of ownership and maintenance 
responsibilities to the community, the need for a committed water source care-taker as well as 
the need for follow-up by a technician or other service providers.  
Revitalisation meetings and the repair of hand pumps activities also utilised some of the 
principles in action research (AR) while keeping my positionality as an outsider.  In addition to 
being a researcher, my role as the initiator of the hand pump repair and WSC revitalisation 
meetings became more like that of a ‘change agent’. As Reason and Bradbury observe, AR 
‘involves practices of living inquiry that aims ‘in a great variety of ways, to link practice and 
ideas in the service of human flourishing’ (2008 p.1). Herr and Anderson also observe that AR 
‘generally requires that some form of evidence be presented to support assertions’ (2005 p.3).  
The validation exercise
32
 provided a very good ground for an effective process of community 
sensitisation especially on roles and responsibilities of stakeholders sustainable rural safe water 
service delivery, with a lot of emphasis placed on the rather determinant and indispensable roles 
                                                          
31
 The sub-County HPM, who earlier granted me request to work with me, was the most accessible resource person with whom I 
could work to mobilise community members and their leaders for the validation meetings, pump repair and WUC revitalisation. 
During my interactions with the community, district and sub-county leaders, I became convinced that the HPM was the best 
person to work with in this exercise. He was familiar with the Parish and it was ‘part of his job’ as a sub-County HPM to 
mobilise communities, sensitise them and facilitate formation or revitalisation of WSCs of newly established or rehabilitated 
water sources respectively. 
32This was the first activity at each of the community meetings following a welcome note and introductions made by the village 
leader. 
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of the community in CM. During my presentation of emerging research findings, I allowed and 
kept on inviting participants for questions and comments most of which I kept posing back to the 
leaders and the community members in the meeting to allow further insights and learning from 
the process intended to enrich the findings.  The use of a digital recorder to record the 
discussions was made, having explained at the beginning about its role as a minute/note taker 
and obtained the consent of the participants. Both the validation exercise and the sensitisation 
and education exercise led by the HPM motivated community members and their leaders to have 
their WUCs revitalised, with community members pledging more support towards their elected 
WUCs in order to ensure sustainability of their improved water facilities.  
National level key informant interviews (KIIs) 
The final stage of fieldwork for this study mainly entailed conducting KIIs with stakeholders at 
the macro level. These were identified based on Gilchrist and Williams’ (1999 p. 73) definition 
of key informants as ‘individuals who possess special knowledge, status, or communication 
skills and are willing to share their knowledge and skills with the researcher. Nichols (1991 p. 
13) observes that ‘it is often possible to collect valuable information from a few persons who are 
‘particularly knowledgeable about certain matters’. Researchers may use various approaches to 
ensure that such individuals adequately inform the study including use of formal and informal 
interviews or conversations, requesting KIIs to share relevant documents or use of a combination 
of interview and observations, depending on the researcher’s own ability (Gilchrist and Williams 
1999). 
 
Key informant interviews for this study mainly targeted technical personnel of the rural water 
supply Directorate, i.e. the Directorate of Water Development (DWD) in the Ministry of Water 
and Environment, water NGOs operating at national and international levels, as well as key 
private-sector actors, particularly hand pump spare-parts dealers. Members of some of the newly 
forming associations of hand pump mechanics were also interviewed. These were targeted as key 
informants because of their diverse and specialised knowledge, experience and expertise on rural 
safe water supply as and the CM model in particular.  At the sector ministry level, personnel that 
were purposively selected for interviews included the commissioner for rural water, the principal 
sociologist, his assistant and the head of the technical support unit (TSU) for the central and 
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southern region in which Lwengo district lies. Buyaya technical services, the main spare parts 
dealer in the country represented the hand pump spare parts dealers at national level. Uganda 
Water and Sanitation NGO Network (UWASNET), Network of Water and Sanitation 
(NETWAS) Uganda, Triple-S Uganda, and Water Aid Uganda were the NGOs considered and 
interviewed at national level.  Table 4 below provides a list of the participants in KIIs and the 
organisations they represented at the macro level. 
Table 4 Participants in key informant interviews at the national level 
Macro (National) Organisation 
Commissioner Rural Water Directorate of Water Development (DWD) 
Senior Sociologist Directorate of Water Development (DWD) 
Social mobilisation and gender specialist Ministry of Labour, Gender and Social 
Programme Coordinator Triple-S Uganda 
Policy and Advocacy Officer UWASNET 
Member  Good-Governance Working Group 
Directors  Buyaya Technical services (spare parts dealers) 
National Learning Facilitator  Triple-S Uganda 
Programme Officer NETWAS  Uganda 
Member Hand Pump Mechanics Association 
Head of Campaigns Advocacy Water Aid Uganda 
Research Officer Water Aid Uganda 
Programme Officer SNV Netherlands 
 
In addition to broadly seeking their independent views and opinions about the national policy 
framework for rural safe water service delivery, and how it impacted on the CBM model for 
rural safe water sustainability, I shared with these actors key of the study’s emerging governance 
and enablement issues particularly from the case study. This strategy adequately served to 
validate such findings
33
. Particularly important was to identify, collect and analyse some of the 
documented success stories of CBM in the rural safe water activities of the NGO actors so as to 
distill more information and lessons that would further inform answers to the core question of 
this study.  
The inclusion of actors as sources of data helped in obtaining answers to the question of why, 
despite their knowledge of the fact that community management was a key determinant for 
                                                          
33
 In seeking appointments for the meetings, I ensured that I emphasised sharing feedback from the field on the study 
rather than interviewing, and that the meetings would need not more than one hour, although this varied based on the 
different contexts. Stating the amount of time it would take to start and conclude the meeting was quite helpful in 
ensuring that consent for the interviews was quickly obtained from these actors. 
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sustainability
34
 service providers especially from the public sector continue to lay limited 
leverage to CBM as opposed to investing in hardware. It was envisaged that obtaining answers to 
this question in the water sector would also indirectly answer the question of why most 
community based development initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in Particular 
promise very little when it comes to their potential to trigger bottom-up development-
management, most especially through community capacity building for sustainable community 
development.  Views and opinions were also sought during KIIs on the failure by community 
development actors to build and sustain community capacity to demand for accountability from 
their representatives in public decision making forums including government, private and 
voluntary sector (NGO and CBOs) institutions
35
.  
Perspectives and experiences of key actors at the micro, meso and macro levels on what could 
leverage effectiveness of CBM systems for sustainable rural safe water service delivery, their 
roles and relationships in the governance framework were sought and examined alongside 
theoretical debates and literature as well as the actual realities from the case study. Given that 
community capacity building was considered a key enabling factor for rural safe water service 
sustainability, questions were asked in order to compare NGO and government support to 
communities in terms training and the areas of training emphasised.  Among the key training 
issues investigated were leadership attributes such as patriotism, accountability, transparency and 
conflict management. The forms of support prioritised for WSCs and their communities were 
also investigated, for example, by-law development and implementation, trust building between 
and among private, voluntary and public actors.  
In addition, views and opinions were sought during KIIs on the nature of relations between 
public officials (politicians and technocrats) and other actors including private for-profit and 
private not-for-profit, as well as relations between all the actors and the water user communities. 
Not only, was the extent to which water actors believed in CBM models as indispensable 
                                                          
34
 as stated in the policy documents and sector research reports (See e.g.MWE 2011a) 
35
 This general discussion was considered important in order to obtain respondents’ broad perspective of critical 
contemporary governance issues in developing country contexts that inevitably impact on service delivery in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is believed that communities in resource poor settings typical of Sub-Saharan African rural set-up 
can easily be ‘commoditized’ by ‘social or populist investors’ in government, NGO and private sectors; i.e. they can 
easily be treated as allies only in as far as they can help such actors to ‘sell’ their agendas rather than focus on 
ameliorating their real problems or development constraints. This was linked to the systems thinking that 
development issues are multi-faceted, complex and dynamic, and that the most effective way of diagnosing a single 
problem is to appreciate its possible links with others. 
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determinants of sustainable rural service delivery, but what they actually did to leverage its 
effectiveness. Emphasis was placed on actors’ knowledge and perceptions of policy 
contradictions, management of power relations among actors at all levels, motivations and 
expectations. Opinions on the seemingly growing apathetic public service culture among 
politicians and civil servants over public service delivery and the practice gap in social and 
downward accountability were also sought during KIIs. The case study and mixed methods 
approaches were indeed pertinent for this study in generating credible information on the 
intricacies inherent in public (water) policy implementation in the current NPM and governance 
framework characterised not only, by many actors working in formal and informal partnership 
arrangements, but also where recipients of public services are seemingly ‘only presumed’ to be 
the key determinants for policy/CBM success. 
Review and analysis of documents 
Identification and analysis of data from documents was an important and on-going process 
throughout this study. Gibson and Brown (2009 p. 65) view documentary research as a process 
of using documents as a means of social investigation, and which allows researchers to gain 
detailed insights into people’s lives, and to the workings of organisations.  Documents review 
and analysis involves identifying and using pre-existing data and information to answer a 
different research question or concern than was intended by those that collected the data or 
prepared such documents (Schutt 2011, Gibson and Brown 2009). Finding and analysing 
secondary material or data is also useful for understanding ways in which important institutions 
in the politics of development and national governments view problems and solutions in the 
domain being studied (O’Laughlin 1998). 
 
While the websites of actors had earlier provided a useful source of documents for review, more 
documents were identified during the key informant interviews with some of the national level 
actors particularly the NGOs. The documents identified during interviews with NGO actors 
mainly included annual programme reports and documented success stories of their interventions 
in support of community-managed rural point-water facilities. Annual NGO reports and case 
studies were considered key for this study mainly because it is often claimed that NGOs are more 
effective when it comes to community development work. Their reports were anticipated to 
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provide more insights into what innovative strategies could be adopted to make CM work in 
delivering sustainable rural water supply. The review of documents helped in enhancing the 
understanding of relationships between key actors in the rural domestic water supply in Uganda, 
roles and responsibilities of actors as well as the analysis of contextual challenges faced by 
actors in playing these roles to support CBM. The review and analysis of policy and guidelines 
also facilitated a deeper understanding of the relationship between international and national 
contexts of rural water supply policy formulation, its interpretation and operationalisation in the 
water legislations, implementation manuals, guidelines and the analysis of contextual limitations 
that disable policy effectiveness.  
 
In order to understand the national guidelines and laws concerning procurement, and financial 
accountability in the rural water sector, the Water and Sanitation Sector Specific Schedules and 
Guidelines 2009/2010 were reviewed along with the Public Finance and Accountability Act, and 
the Public Procurement and Disposal of public assets Act. A documents review and analysis 
checklist was developed, although it was not conscientiously followed as it could occasionally be 
revised to suit contexts and needs due to constant overlaps. It is important to note that the 
documents were not only helpful as sources of data for answering the study’s specific research 
questions but some of these documents contributed to informing the overall study design, 
methods and strategic fieldwork decisions. 
Data Management and Analysis 
Data capture, quality controls and storage 
Gibson and Brown rightly point out the importance of data protection as ‘the nature of research 
work normally involves lots of travel, multiple work places and interest groups’ such as 
colleagues and supervisors.  By implication, they argue that ‘location of data can be hard to 
specify and contain’ (2009 p. 62).  Data management strategies for this study began before and 
continued through fieldwork up until write-up and completion of the thesis. Indeed it would have 
been naive to collect good data without having a useful data capture, storage and management 
strategy.  
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Prior to fieldwork, folders specifying categories of electronic information materials were 
organised and relevant data files saved in their corresponding folders. Recorded interviews, 
FGDs and observation notes or photographs taken on observed phenomena were saved in 
appropriate folders bearing their dates and sometimes with codes bearing certain meanings. This 
served to ensure efficiency in locating such data as well as build and enhance early analytical 
categorisation and data associations.  Unlike in the survey where the use of a structured 
questionnaire was a must, in the qualitative component of this study I was more of a ‘tool’ of 
data collection as Parahoo (2006 p. 326) observes. While a digital recorder was effectively 
utilised in recording all of the qualitative interviews and FGDs, notes were also taken during 
interviews and FGDs but more as ‘probing clues’ rather than verbatim capture of data or voices 
of participants. Recorded interviews were routinely listened to and important clues for data 
analysis and further interviews and discussions noted.  With regard to survey data, filled survey 
questionnaires were edited for completeness and clarity of recording on a daily basis before 
subsequent interviews were undertaken. Data collectors also kept field diaries for record of any 
issues they found relating to the questions in the questionnaire. Such issues would be discussed 
in the daily editorial meetings to establish in particular, if they carried important meanings for 
quality assurance in the data collection and management processes.  
Further safety and controls were ensured through data backups using an external hard drive and 
(sometimes) uploading on a g-mail address account specifically opened for that purpose. Data 
summaries from FGDs, and observations as well as materials downloaded from the internet were 
saved with file names that reflected their categories, sources and dates last saved (for those that 
were updated).  
Processing and analysis of qualitative data  
Quality controls for ensuring effective data collection, reliability and validity of results were 
indeed integrated in the overall research design, strategy and methods. Method and data 
triangulation were inevitably the best research strategies that could be adopted in order to 
enhance rigour, and reliability of the case study design. As noted earlier, processing and analysis 
of qualitative data started during fieldwork and continued through the writing of the thesis. 
Listening to audio recordings, transcription, editing and storage into Microsoft-word files was 
done as more interviews were being undertaken. The process ensured that pertinent issues that 
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emerged especially from FGDs, in-depth interviews and KIIs were used not only to cross-check 
internal consistency and inform study conclusions but also reiteratively stimulated identification 
of important clues for data collection, management and analysis. The process of qualitative data 
collection involved ‘sifting and analyzing data during the interviews and discussions as well as 
transcribing and making sense of the data immediately after’ as Parahoo (2006 p. 326) observes. 
The analysis of data generated by qualitative methods was greatly informed by models and 
approaches suggested by Yin (2003 p. 110-139). Among the various techniques or approaches he 
proposes as suitable for the analysis of data generated in case study designs, pattern matching 
and explanation building were found to be very useful and have been applied in the analysis of 
this study’s qualitative data and cross-synthesis with survey data. In the pattern matching 
analytical technique, comparisons were made between the predicted patterns (mainly based on 
theory) and the emerging and observable patterns or issues from the data (empirical patterns). 
The conceptual debates and issues about new public management, enablement and governance 
discussed in detail Chapter Three greatly informed the construction of theoretical propositions 
that were tested and compared with the findings in order to generate explanations (explanation 
building). In using the explanation building technique, theoretical reflections on the empirical 
data were part of the entire fieldwork and data collection process. These reflections continued 
after fieldwork, particularly at the thesis writing stage. Tables and charts were used to map out 
and describe relationships (similarities and differences) based on data sources and study specific 
issues to allow for more correct inferences or conclusions. Theoretical patterns were constantly 
and iteratively modified to reflect theoretically significant propositions against the data. The 
initial theoretical statements or propositions based on the study’s research questions were thus 
confronted with the empirical findings. Where there were differences or mismatches between 
propositions and empirical data, theoretical revisions were made, to inform the creation or 
formation of new perspectives, theory and conclusions.  
The analytical techniques employed in the analysis of this study’s qualitative primary data i.e. 
pattern matching, explanation building and cross-case analysis techniques should not be viewed 
as having been applied in a mutually exclusive manner. Rather, their application was highly 
mutually inclusive, integrated and simultaneous following the principles of theoretical 
triangulation elaborated well by Thurmond (2001 p. 256). As rightly argued, at data analysis 
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stage, triangulation helps to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of different 
perspectives or independent approaches (Campbell and Fiske 1959 p. 83-85), especially based on 
comparing data to theory, and it is at the point of convergence that reality about a specific 
research issue or phenomenon is understood (Jennifer Grafton, Anne M. Lillis and Habib 
Mahama 2011, Thurmond 2001). Continuous cross-checking with the research question, 
focusing on significant theoretical aspects, and rival explanations were a very pertinent 
component of the efforts to enhance validity and reliability of the findings.  
Processing, analysis and presentation of quantitative data 
Before starting data collection in households, data collection assistants would first finalise 
editing filled questionnaires of the previous day. Subsequently, they would exchange individual 
questionnaires in groups of two or three for further cross-checking to ensure clarity, visibility 
and completeness of data for ease of data entry into the computer software and eventual 
processing and analysis. A full day questionnaire editing, and most crucially, discussion of 
emerging findings from the survey as well as sharing of experiences or lessons was organised on 
a weekly basis in addition to the 1-2 hour daily morning meetings. The meetings not only 
ensured a very effective and well managed fieldwork process but also most importantly 
generated very interesting clues that enriched the analysis of findings from other methods. The 
age and experience of the CHWs not only enhanced their ability to synthesise some of the 
preliminary findings from the survey data they collected but also helped to clarify most of the 
issues encountered in the community using FGDs, in-depth interviews and unstructured 
observations. Some new codes for pre-coded questions were added in the first three days of data 
collection and codes for very few of the open ended questions developed based on the recurrence 
and predictability of responses. 
Household survey data were entered into a computer using Epi Info [Epidemiological 
Information (Windows 2001)] and double entry done to ensure quality. On a continuous basis, all 
data files were crosschecked and cleaned.  Initial editing was performed from Epi Info using a 
simple frequency and pivot table observation. The data were then transferred to the Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) for further editing, summary statistics generated for each 
variable and transformation performed for some variables before the actual analysis started. Data 
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analysis involved generating descriptive, bivariate and multivariate statistics for indicator 
variables and displayed using frequency distribution tables and charts. 
Descriptive statistics focusing on measures of central tendency and dispersion (i.e. mean, 
median, mode totals, minimum, maximum and etc.) were generated for the continuous variables 
namely: age of the respondents, household size and frequency distributions generated for the 
categorized variables. Bivariate analysis was used to determine relationships between variables 
of interest and included generating cross-tabulations for household socio-demographic 
characteristics and livelihood by access to water, knowledge of hand pump functionality in the 
community and water user perceptions of safe water services and systems. The chi-square test 
statistic was also used to test the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent categorical variables. Multivariate analysis included computing logistic regression 
models in order to predict the likelihood of a household/respondent’s characteristics such as size 
and estimated monthly income or participation in training and sensitisation activities in 
influencing its contribution towards community development initiatives. 
Addressing Ethical Concerns 
Seeking ethical approval has for long been part of the research process particularly with studies 
conducted among human subjects. Gibson and Brown indicate that researchers need to give 
consideration of ethical issues because they impact on the entire research design and therefore 
the quality of their research results rather than because research boards expect them to do so 
(2009 p. 61). Official permission to undertake this study was sought from the Uganda National 
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) after submission of an application form 
specifying among others the purpose, schedule, target groups and the geographical areas for 
fieldwork.  
Getting ethical approval from UNCST was not the end of my ethical reflections and 
considerations for this study. Study participants received full verbal explanations about the aims 
and objectives of this study, its relation to the WIL project, and their consent to participate 
sought before any interviews or discussion could be held. Participants were particularly informed 
that their participation was voluntary and that they were free to withdraw even in the middle of 
the interview or discussion if they so wished. However, in order to increase opportunities for full 
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participation, their invaluable contribution to the results of the study was emphatically explained 
to participants and efforts made to variously link it to national policy and development. 
Adherence to privacy and confidentiality of the information given by respondents was explained 
to the participants as a working principle. In addition, requests to use the digital recorder, camera 
and GPS machine were always made to the participants before their actual uses. This enhanced 
their confidence levels to freely share their views and opinions, particularly regarding 
government policies and practices as well as Community participation and management 
dynamics at the micro-level. 
Overall Study Design Limitations, Challenges and Emerging Experiences 
for Future Research 
There are worries that seem to confront some academicians that project based doctoral research 
may deny doctoral researchers some degree of methodological independence. However, my own 
experience from implementing this research could contribute to reversing the trajectory of such 
perspectives. The WIL project and its broad thematic doctoral research area met my own 
individual preferences in public service delivery and community development, allowing me to 
identify a thesis topic that would motivate me to research with a good amount of enthusiasm.  In 
addition, the choice of the case study and mixed methods design to understand disabling 
governance dynamics in rural safe water service delivery could still be applicable anywhere in 
Uganda or in sub-Saharan Africa where CBM models are pronounced in policy proposals but 
seemingly practically ignored or undermined at policy implementation.  
While this study did not orient itself much into an action research (AR) design, it benefitted from 
the AR theory and techniques to integrate participant observation techniques into problem 
solving actions during repair of hand pumps and revitalisation of WSCs in four villages. By 
implication, another researcher having more time and resources could ably undertake a similar 
study using AR techniques. Before stimulating community discussions over the need for their 
participation in the management of their improved water sources, preliminary findings from 
FGDs and in-depth interviews were presented and discussed. Revitalisation meetings facilitated 
by the sub-county HPM in selected communities led to unanimous decisions by participants to 
renew their perceptions of the WSCs and support their work if sustainable access to services was 
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to be achieved in their respective villages. Follow-ups to such groups promising to succeed could 
be made to ensure that their success in CBM was used to support other neighbouring villages 
through inter-village learning activities coordinated by local leaders.  
In situations where research problems and contexts of academic researchers allow, integration of 
AR principles and theory in academic research reduces the extent to which researchers will be 
regarded as ‘data miners’. Integration of methods also allows researchers some degree of 
confidence and reduces the ‘burden’ on researchers having to always declare to the researched 
the ‘anticipated contributions to wider national policy and programming’ etc. This is because 
such policies or programmes academic researchers always hope to contribute to may never 
directly benefit the researched communities. Where they do, the time may be too long for 
communities to be able to link such programmes to any research they participated in.  
Depending on the time researchers stay in the community and the organisations they are linked 
to, community trust for the researchers can grow beyond just the research period. Most of the 
contacts built in the study community have remained, and could easily be maintained for any 
future research or WIL project interests. Undoubtedly, two months of living and working within 
the community, and my links to the MMMs, WIL project and Makerere University Kampala 
were important. They led to a strong community trust and consequently a very friendly research 
atmosphere. Coupled with a successful fieldwork and learning experience, I have until today 
kept a fresh memory of the community.  
Meetings with community leaders, formal interviews and discussions, informal discussions at 
water sources, in shops, with boda boda
36
 cyclists, in restaurants and bars not only contributed to 
my data collection experience but also helped me to quickly envisage an opportunity for testing 
some of the emerging theory and hypotheses from FGDs. The community meetings at validation, 
hand pump repair and WSC revitalisation added another dimension in the study by enabling the 
community to see their own potential for operating without always having to look up to 
government or charity organisations. Further, they were able to appreciate their responsibility not 
in contributing to O&M of their water facilities but also in demanding for social accountability 
from their leaders, local governments and other non-state service providers. This was quite 
                                                          
36
 Boda boda is a local name given to hired motor cycle transport services in Uganda and most of Eastern Africa  
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rewarding on my part as a researcher for (i) I was able to test some of my propositions around 
‘community enablement’, and (ii) I felt more confident as part of the new but already familiar 
community. I understood that a researcher as an ‘outsider’ and more so, one communities often 
tend to perceive as ‘expert’ may be helpful in stimulating community action into tackling 
community problems, but only in circumstances where the researcher has the time and sufficient 
‘community sanction’.  
Initially, it was quite challenging to implement an academic research fieldwork in the WIL 
project framework linked to the MMMs. The presence of seven more academic researchers 
running their research projects more or less at the same time even made it more challenging 
particularly in dealing with community and leadership expectations, and their time. The case 
study’s political economy, culture and socio-demographics compare very well with the rest of 
Uganda. Consequently, I found it fairly easy to deal with community expectations, although it 
always took a good amount of time to tap from my previous experiences researching in similar 
contexts in Uganda in order to address this unique challenge. Fortunately, the specific interests of 
different studies were clearly distinct. In addition, individual timelines as well as research 
designs including selection of specific WUGs in different villages were also different (except for 
the merged household survey). Despite my confidence and experience working and researching 
in similar community conditions, I still knew at the back of my mind that surprises were 
inevitable.  I knew it was very challenging to learn (in the correct time) the significant social and 
political relations in the community’s social fabric. My curiosity about the leadership-community 
relations was always considered important at every stage of my fieldwork. In particular I always 
ensured (whenever it was possible) that I obtained a more clear picture of such relations at entry 
into every village and before leaving every village I worked in. This was particularly because 
such relations were likely to have significant implications for the study both in terms of 
fieldwork and data interpretation.  
In most of the cases the community and their leadership perceived me as a ‘visitor’. I thus found 
it imperative, especially during my introduction in FGDs, FGIs and at WSC revitalisation 
meetings, to always emphasise my interests without denying the title of ‘visitor’ by making quite 
clear my research objectives, the institutions I associated with i.e. MMMs and WIL project (and 
the project partnership with Makerere University, Irish AID and Dublin City University), and my 
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role as an academic researcher. This worked very well in building the community’s trust and 
confidence for very enriching discussions and interviews. While associating and identifying with 
village political leadership is of necessity for researchers in the Ugandan rural political context, it 
was found in some cases to be detrimental to the research process particularly where such leaders 
were perceived as having been responsible for community services failure; e.g. in causing laxity 
or sometimes conflict among community members over contributions for operation and 
maintenance of water facilities, or where they maintained future political ambitions. Building 
and carefully utilizing parallel contacts with elders, retired civil servants or women groups in the 
communities was found to be a very helpful counteractive strategy for more effective fieldwork. 
But, again situations and contexts ought to vary. 
There were unique challenges associated with the revitalisation of WSCs and the hand-pump 
repair exercises. The study hoped to compare two sets of communities whose WSCs were 
revitalised with the help of the HPM by providing ‘post-revitalisation’ support to one set of 
communities and no support to another in order to be able to compare results against which 
conclusions would be undertaken regarding the impact of regular support to communities over 
their adherence to CBM principles. However, the follow-up could not be carried out beyond four 
months as the time and financial resources could not allow. Nevertheless, within the four months 
there were some good insights found useful in informing findings and conclusions for this study. 
These have been integrated in the analysis of findings on the micro-level dynamics that impact 
on   CBM presented in Chapter Six.  
In conclusion, a single case and mixed methods study design is considered to have been a 
credible design choice for this study, given the WIL project context, my reflexivity and 
positionality within the study. The flexibility in mixed methodologies allowed me to test theory 
using a range of research methods and strategies based on the unique contexts of the study 
notwithstanding its complex and time consuming rigour that required taking strong decisions 
while maintaining the credibility of research results. The design and methods greatly allowed a 
detailed analysis of available evidence from policy and programme documents of public and 
voluntary actors as well as data generated through interviews, observations and survey methods 
at meso, macro and micro levels. However, it is important to note that, by its nature, the mixed 
methods design led to the generation of huge amounts of data from different sources, and indeed, 
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this had the potential to cause confusion or frustration particularly at the analysis stage (Parahoo 
2006). A lot of time had to be spent not only in organising data-sets but also comparing and 
matching data and insights from different sources in order to enhance the data analysis rigour. 
There were situations where I could get stuck trying to make sense of different texts from 
different sources, until I consulted theory or literature several times in order to settle on a certain 
specific position. I always had to ask myself before making a final position on an issue or a set of 
issues emerging from the data. The interpretation of the data therefore was not just based on 
dominant theoretical and conceptual perspectives but also on my personal experiences with 
community structures in Uganda, general country leadership and service delivery experiences. 
Indeed another researcher could have interpreted some of the data very differently, as personal 
experiences are completely inevitable while making sense of qualitative data. Nevertheless, the 
final study results and the conclusions drawn thereof remain adequately credible to contribute to 
existing knowledge around the subject of community managed public services.  
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Chapter Five 
Macro and Meso-Level Factors Undermining 
Community Managed Point-Water Facilities in 
Rural Uganda 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
More than three decades of the neoliberal influence on public policies should have indeed meant 
that development actors, especially governments of the developing world, are sufficiently aware 
of the equity implications of state withdrawal from direct service delivery. As a result, this 
knowledge ought to have compelled them to put in place measures that address bottlenecks to 
development approaches that place ‘new’ responsibilities on consumers of public services. As 
part of the new policy paradigms, CBM in the rural water supply sub-sector is premised on its 
potential for enhancing equity and sustainability principles. Indeed, in the theoretical and 
empirical literature, the NPM and governance agenda emphasise blurring of boundaries between 
and among development actors (Stoker 1998 p.17, Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a) as an 
important recipe for enhancing effectiveness in service delivery and development. But how is 
this coming possible in a sub-Saharan context? In the context of effective CBM for rural safe 
water supply and sustainability, blurring suggests that water sector actors at the macro, meso and 
micro levels of service delivery work closely with one another for optimum results. But how is 
this happening drawing from a detailed study of Uganda? This chapter examines macro and 
meso level factors that undermine the effectiveness of community managed models of service 
delivery. Broadly, it examines the dynamics that characterise relationships between and among 
rural water supply sector actors and institutions in a decentralised and ‘networked’ service 
Knowing the right way forward is one thing, but achieving the 
rate of progress needed is quite another (Lockwood 2004 p.1) 
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delivery framework. By so doing, the chapter further illuminates how the influence of the NPM 
and governance agenda may perpetuate inequality in access to public services, even if such 
policies and programmes may be ‘designed in a pro-poor manner’. Specifically, analysis is made 
on inter-governmental/decentralised relations in budgeting and financing the rural water sector 
activities and programmes that have a direct/indirect impact on CBM effectiveness. It also 
examines dynamics and power relations among government actors and how these undermine 
CBM. The chapter also examines the dynamics surrounding private sector participation and 
whether and how the regulatory function of public authorities are executed in a manner that 
compromises the goals of CBM. Finally, the chapter examines NGO relations with government 
and the private sector, and the challenges and prospects such relations have for CBM and 
functional sustainability of rural point-water facilities and services.  
Central-Local Government Financing Relations and Challenges to CBM 
Effectiveness 
 
In Uganda’s decentralised governance framework, central government (CG), through its line 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) transfers funds to local 
governments and other public sector bodies mainly in form of conditional grants for the delivery 
of specific public services. Finances for rural water supply primarily come from the national 
treasury and donor funding (in form of loans or grants as national budget support). Budgetary 
processes for the rural water sector consider both on-budget and off-budget funding mechanisms 
in line with the sector-wide approach to funding discussed in chapter two, in which a single 
budget framework is followed by government and donor agencies. In Uganda’s budget 
framework, on-budget funds are financial resources allocated to a given sector based on the 
government’s estimates of its revenue and expenditure in given financial year. Off-budget funds 
on the other hand are estimates of funds to the sector outside government’s sector finance ceiling 
and the medium term expenditure plan usually covering a period of three years. These funds 
mainly include funds from development partners which may go directly to local governments, 
semi-autonomous government institutions or to NGOs implementing programmes/activities in 
the sector. These funds are released to district local governments (LGs) in form of conditional 
grants or equalisation grants for ‘least developed’ districts. 
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Through District Water and Sanitation Conditional Grants (DWSCGs), and/or District 
Equalisation Grants (DEGs) drawn from the Poverty Action Fund (PAF)
 37
, local governments 
receive, utilise and account for funds for rural water services, including operation and 
maintenance of systems for point water facilities. An analysis of the dynamics in national budget 
allocations for the water and environment sector, and rural safe water supply in particular, 
reveals important concerns that have far reaching implications for CBM. These are discussed in 
detail in the following sections. 
 
Changing dynamics in national budget allocations and delays in 
disbursement of funds to LGs 
The findings show that while the total national budget share for the water sector increased by 
16.1% in financial year 2010/11 (MWE 2011b), there was a 5.5% drop in the on-budget funding 
by the government of Uganda (GOU) from 74.9% reported for the financial year 2009/10 (MWE 
2011). As noted in the 2012 sector performance reports, this implies a ‘gradual but positive 
growth in off-budget funding’ for the sector (see figure 7). The 2011 water sector performance 
report, indicates that the national budget share of the water and environment sector has decreased 
by about 5% since 2004/05, although the sector budget share for rural water supply has remained 
high compared to other sub-sectors (MWE 2011b p.14). 
The reduction in government funding for the water sector not only threatens the effectiveness of 
policy options intended to enhance public service delivery with the participation of beneficiaries 
at the local level, but it is also a reflection of the difficult and contextual realities in 
implementing NPM policies in resource poor democracies. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, a decline in priority for funding the water and sanitation sector automatically affects 
CBM activities that already receive a relatively much smaller share of the funds available for the 
rural water and sanitation activities.  
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 Budgets for PAF are prioritised and ring-fenced for specific activities aimed at poverty reduction. 
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Figure 7 Overall off-budget and on-budget sector funding mechanisms since   
  financial year 2006/07  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the gradual reduction in on-budget support to the water and environment sector, 
this study found out that delays in disbursement of funds to decentralised units further undermine 
prospects for CBM to enhance opportunities for the sustainability of point-water facilities. The 
2011water sector performance report indicated, for instance, that efficiency in release of sector 
funding to districts, together with delays in procurement have often led to hurried 
implementation of activities and/or poor budget performance (MWE 2011b).  Moreover, not all 
the amounts approved for the water supply and sanitation (WSS) budget are also usually 
released, nor are all of the funds released always spent as can be seen in table 6 below.  
Table 5 DWSCG expenditure for the financial year 2002/03 – 2020/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: MWE (2012 p. 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MWE (2011 p. 18) 
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These findings indeed raise questions as to whether decentralised financing is capable of 
enhancing equity in access to essential services as the NPM and governance policy framework 
seem to suggest. At a glance, one would question the government’s level of precision in terms of 
revenue estimations at the macro level, and bureaucratic performance both at the macro and 
meso levels to identify whether the answers to such a problem are related to technical capacity 
gaps or simply an inefficient and irresponsive government. But as table 6 particularly shows, it is 
clear that, the service delivery and governance system for the rural water and sanitation sector 
does not seem to learn from a nearly ten year experience of budget inefficiency in terms of 
release and utilisation of DWSG.  
 
An analysis of the distribution of the water and environment budget may also reveal that the 
budget share for Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) has remained high at 66.6% compared to 
that of the Environment and Natural Resources (ENR) at 30.4%, and Sector Programme Support 
(SPS) at 2.9% (figure 8). However, more finances (over 60%) for the WSS sector remain at the 
centre compared to what is disbursed to districts as conditional grants (figure 9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings of this study also suggest that central government in Uganda is yet to enable lower 
level governments to effectively play their roles in ensuring equitable access to safe water 
services for the majority the rural population. The findings also seem to confirm those of an 
earlier study in Uganda that stressed inadequate financial and human resource capacities of local 
Figure 8 Budget allocation by sub-sector 
2009/10 and 2010/11 
 
Source: (MWE 2011 p.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Budget allocation by management level 
2009/10 and 2010/11 
 
Source: (MWE 2011 p.16) 
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government institutions as partly responsible for their poor performance levels (Tumushabe et al. 
2009). Indeed, as political enablement and decentralisation demand (Helmsing 2002), these 
findings reflect Uganda’s inadequate level of transformation in the structure and functions of 
central and local governments and the relations between them. This inadequacy in transformation 
is at the heart of all the problems that continue to afflict CBM and its potential for leveraging 
functional sustainability of rural safe water supply.  
Skewed funding in favour of new water supply facilities undermining 
CBM 
While the WSS sub-sector receives a higher share of the water sector budget compared to other 
sub-sectors as highlighted above, funds disbursed to the districts for rural water supply are also 
heavily skewed towards water supply installation and repair activities compared to CBM 
activities. This study found out that new water point source installation and repairs (or hardware 
activities) are allocated 70% of the budget compared to CBM software
38
activities which are 
allocated 11%, with the rest of the budget funds allocated to cover administrative costs (5%) and 
water and sanitation activities [14% (MWE 2009a p. iv)].  Indeed, CBM activities such as 
community mobilisation, training and sensitisation, and post construction follow-up support are 
indispensable inputs for building community capacity for operation and maintenance of rural 
point-water facilities. However, Key informants in the NGO sector and other sector ministries 
concurred that the present allocation between hardware and software activities would not render 
CBM effective. They argued that a significant change in budget allocations was long overdue, 
given that CBM is a cornerstone for functional sustainability of rural water supply. Other 
informants argued that it was considerably unreasonable and unsustainable to fund new 
constructions amidst high numbers of water facilities that were non-functional due to the poor 
performance of community-based water management systems. 
 You cannot use millions to construct boreholes which may be abandoned by the 
 community… the community development function should not be left at the mercy of 
 the hard ware. (Key informant, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development) 
                                                          
38
 Software is an umbrella term used in the water and environment sector to refer to a package of activities involving 
awareness creation, community mobilisation, post construction follow-up and community support with respect to 
community managed water supply and sanitation projects. Hardware activities on the other hand are those that aim 
at installation of new water sources or repair/rehabilitation of existing ones. 
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Paradoxically, the study also found out that the small software budget is also not always assigned 
to its intended purpose by the District Water Officers (DWOs) who tend to prefer investing more 
in hardware as opposed to software activities despite the fact that these remain fundamental for 
the effective performance of CBM. For example, the 2010 sector performance report indicates 
that expenditure on rural water supply activities and office operations went above the threshold 
by 2% and 5% respectively, while actual expenditure towards software activities fell by 3% from 
what had been disbursed to local governments (figure 10). While central government may set 
ceilings or guidelines on expenditure on certain activities, local governments may at their 
discretion alter budget guidelines to their convenience, and ‘hurt’ prospects for CBM. 
Figure 10: Comparison of guidelines and actual expenditure of DWSDCG in FY 2009/10 
 
Source: Water and Environment Sector Performance Report (MWE 2010 p. 20) 
It was acknowledged by key informants that the DWOs who are mainly civil engineers tend to 
undermine software activities, thereby negatively impacting on the already underfunded software 
activities within the CBM framework. 
 District water officers are mainly civil Engineers….to them construction of new water 
 sources makes a lot of sense because that is what they are familiar with…Some are 
 beginning to see the importance of community mobilisation, but many are really hard to 
 convince that community mobilisation should take money that would have been used for 
 the construction of another water source (Key Informant, NGO sector) 
 The engineers need to coordinate with the Community Development Officers who will do 
 social mobilisation with the community that the Engineers can’t do…. Budget allocation 
 should be revised in favour of social mobilisation for CBM (Key Informant, Central 
 Government Ministry). 
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With the low rate of functional sustainability established at only 53% (MWE 2011), the decision 
to continue allocating larger amounts of the budget to establishment of new point water facilities 
seems unrealistic for Uganda’s rural water sector. Political interference also seemed to worry 
many actors especially from the NGO sector. They noted for instance that budget management at 
districts seems to be in favour of what politicians can easily show to their constituents as a 
contribution. It appears therefore, that allowing an innovative budgeting process whereby equal 
amounts of DWSCGs are allocated to both software and hardware, or different amounts 
switched over a period of time to allow more capacity for CBM and cost recovery for point water 
facilities seems to be feasible in the current Ugandan CBM system for rural water supply. It 
seems that for this to happen, there will be a need for a complete change of mind-set among 
decision makers at the macro and meso-levels of rural safe water service delivery as one key 
informant observed.  
 Allocating more funding to software programmes will require a complete change in the 
 mindset of the key decision makers in this country (Key Informant, NGO sector) 
These findings indeed confirm what was earlier observed as a gap by the water sector strategic 
investment plan that (2009-2010) that equity principles in service delivery were inadequately met 
due to not only the weaknesses in processes followed at the local government level but also in 
the overall allocation of resources to and within the sub sector (MWE 2009 p. 46) 
 
General Reports of Corruption in the Water Sector and Influence-
peddling within LGs  
 
The subject of corruption generally remains a complex and contentious one, especially in the 
water sector in Uganda. It was not the intention of this study to undertake a detailed scientific 
analysis of corruption in Uganda’s water sector. However, recent studies on public financial 
leakages and other forms of corruption in Uganda’s public sector have not spared the water 
sector (MWE 2009b, Jacobson and Network 2010). General weaknesses in Uganda’s 
institutional pillars of national Integrity (including in the accountability sector)
39
, the lack of an 
independent regulator, institutional challenges and project risks in procurement, and limited 
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According to Transparency International (TI), the corruption perception index for Uganda has for the past four years been 
among the highest, deteriorating from 111th out of 179 countries in 2007 to 143rd out of 182 countries in 2011. See 
http://www.transparency.org/ 
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political commitment to fight corruption are some of the key issues are reported to be increasing 
the corruption risk in Uganda’s water sector (MWE 2009b). Holmberg and Rothstein (2010) also 
stress the positive relationship between the quality of government and the quality of water 
(Holmberg and Rothstein 2010). Corruption in the water sector not only compounds the problem 
of inadequate financing of decentralisation and CBM, but it also undermines efforts for increased 
budget efficiency in the delivery essential public services. These efforts for budget efficiency in 
Uganda are among others anticipated to result from the sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) and 
basket funding initiatives in the water sector. 
 
Despite the macro-level initiatives for increased water sector budget efficiency, most key 
informants interviewed concurred that these efforts are being undermined by tendencies of 
corruption and influence peddling at key decision making points in the sector especially at 
district local government level. It was found out in this study that tendencies by district local 
governments to re-allocate the rural water budget in favour of funding new water sources were 
not restricted to the fact that DWOs (civil engineers) were less interested in software activities 
within CBM as earlier mentioned. There were also reports of corruption and influence peddling 
on such decisions, particularly from politicians whose interests are mainly about political 
popularity. These reports featured rather prominently in interviews with stakeholders at the 
meso-level, as it did with interviews at the national/macro level.  Some politicians seeking votes 
could pay for the repair of water sources creating an impression that they could continue doing 
so which they don’t. Other politicians were also said to put all the blame on district technical 
people for not using the funds provided by government but ask people to contribute, while others 
put pressure on the council or DWOs to construct water sources in their constituencies which 
perpetuates levels of inequitable access
40
.  
Political pressure to do things the way politicians want is not a problem in the water 
sector  alone. It is almost becoming the norm across all the other public service sectors in 
the country… Our policy says that the community should contribute. But if a politician 
repairs a borehole, then his opponent would also be under pressure to repair another or do 
something for the community. It breeds dependency and affects sustainability of these 
water sources (Interview with Senior Officer, MWE) 
                                                          
40
 Interview conducted September 2011 
124 
 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study point to the fact that the WSS sector could still achieve 
great successes in functional sustainability of rural point water facilities even with reduced 
budget. Importantly, mechanisms that enhance budget efficiency in the rural water and sanitation 
sub-sector need to focus beyond good financial accounting that view community based 
management as both a means and an end to budget discipline.  Instituting deliberate measures to 
promote a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability mechanisms at all levels of 
service delivery, and more particularly building the capacity of rural communities served by 
point-water facilities to demand for social accountability are key strategies that could potentially 
leverage the impact of limited funding in service delivery. While an increase of the budget 
ceiling for software from the current 11% would be a much better option, addressing the problem 
of ‘internal budget switching’ from software to hardware activities would be another positive 
step toward a much better impact of decentralised financing on CBM and functional 
sustainability of rural point water facilities.  
In addition to ‘political demands’ for budget switching in favour of new water point construction 
as opposed to CBM software activities, key informants also concurred that unsolicited contract-
variations were also happening at district LG levels.  Although contract variation affected mainly 
rehabilitation or construction of new point-water sources as opposed to software activities, it 
contributed to financial leakages in the already poorly funded local government services. 
Occurring under the popularised public-private partnerships arrangements in the NPM, 
unsolicited contract variations practices further question the extent to which inter-governmental 
decentralisation and decentralisation to the market could enable the effectiveness of CBM to 
support sustainable rural water supply.  
The failure by LG actors to adhere to the financial and budgetary guidelines provided by the 
centre show that the creation of autonomous decision making bodies may serve to ‘empower’ 
some of the decentralised units to act in ways that are contrary to national interests and plans, 
and may perpetuate corruption and public resource mismanagement. One of the major criticisms 
of NPM and governance agenda has indeed been the assumption that, by decentralising authority 
to lower level governments, services are not only brought closer to the people, but also that 
consumers of services are enabled to participate in important decisions that affect their lives 
(Batley 1999).  
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Recognising good governance as an important enabler in ensuring sustainable service delivery, 
the Good Governance Working Group (GGWG) was formed in 2007 as a sub-group of the Water 
and Sanitation Sector Working Group (WSSWG)
41
 and tasked to identify and recommend 
measures to promote and monitor transparency, accountability and good governance in the water 
and sanitation sector. However, an analysis of the findings on the performance of the GGWG 
indicates that while it has been able to undertake some studies that informed the first joint action 
plan intended mainly to address corruption and public resource mismanagement in the sector, the 
implementation of the plan has not been wholly effective due stakeholders’ apparent failure to 
perform the tasks assigned to them in the GGAP.  
There are worries that the implementation of the Good Governance Action Plan (GGAP) 
is not happening at its best…. The initiative is very good but it will need to be funded by 
government if the sector has to see good results from it. For example, the representatives 
of the group are already busy with their work and will therefore need to hire some people 
to run day-to-day the activities (Member of the GGWG). 
 
The failure by the different stakeholders to undertake the tasks prescribed in the GGAP and to 
work towards curbing the problem of financial leakages raises questions as to whether central 
government as the lead agency for all these initiatives is sufficiently committed to enabling the 
sector achieve its policy target of ‘increased access to rural safe water supply from 63% in 2010 
to 77% by 2015’ (NDP 2010 p. 271). An analysis of the GGAP also shows that more emphasis 
has been placed on ensuring financial discipline by the different levels of accounting in the water 
sector and less on empowering communities to engage with service providers and leaders to 
demand for accountability. This capacity building strategy is strongly advocated in the NPM and 
decentralised service delivery as one surest way of enhancing good governance and downward 
accountability (Mugumya et al. 2008, Mayntz 2003, Nyalunga 2006a). 
Politics and supplementary sources of revenue for local government 
financing 
My findings indicate that the ‘politics’ of creating new district local governments by the central 
government, and the scrapping of the graduated tax severely affected funding opportunities for 
                                                          
41
 The WSSWG comprises representatives from MWE/DWD, the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), MH, 
MES, MFPED, the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIF), MGLSD, Donor representatives and NGOs 
(UWASNET as representative). It is chaired by the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Water and Environment to provide policy 
and technical guidance for sector developments in the country and meets at least every quarter (GOU 2007).   
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activities related to CBM. Graduated tax, which constituted the major source of internally 
generated revenue for all rural local government jurisdictions, was in 2001 scrapped by a 
presidential pronouncement during the presidential campaigns. The initial argument was that the 
cost of collecting this revenue was higher than the amount of revenues collected. However, until 
today, local authorities complain that the decision has severely affected service delivery in their 
localities. According to the local authorities interviewed, revenues from graduated tax would be 
utilised to solve problems such as those experienced in the rural domestic water supply services. 
 It was from local graduated tax disbursements to communities (villages/parishes) that 
 community problems such as the repair of water sources, public toilets and other projects  
 would be funded …The villages used to receive 25 percent of the taxes collected in a sub-
 county, but this is now history, and that is why almost all community projects depend on 
 community contributions (Local Official at the Sub-county) 
The local authorities interviewed seem to converge on the idea that the presidential 
pronouncement was purely intended to ‘woo’ male voters rather than cutting on costs for revenue 
collection. Similarly, the move by government to create many new districts in the country is also 
considered not only to have exacerbated the availability of locally/internally generated revenues 
to support service delivery in some communities, but has also negatively impacted on when and 
how much is disbursed from the centre, affecting local government capacity for effective service 
delivery. While politicians view and justify new district creation on grounds that it takes services 
closer to the people, on the contrary, it has bred more capacity difficulties especially with regard 
to sustainability of programmes that require sufficient funding for extension work. 
The creation of new districts from existing ones has come with it, more complex issues 
and needs for supporting CBM in the already poorly capacitated districts… It is a 
welcome development for politicians because it may promise those political positions or 
support, but where is the money to fund these districts (National level Respondent, NGO 
sector)
42
 
When a new district is curved from an existing one, the first problem you experience is 
staff instability…the lower ranking staff begin to look for higher positions in the new 
districts creating an artificial staff vacuum ... The new districts also take long to recruit 
and fill-up the necessary positions because they don’t have the money as it was Lwengo 
district (Technical Staff, TSU)
43
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 Interview undertaken January 2012 
43
 Interview undertaken October 2012 
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These political tendencies and decisions indeed serve to demonstrate that the ability of NPM to 
guide the provision of equitable and sustainable services in communities is vulnerable to central 
government politics. The findings of this study on decentralised financing of the rural water 
sector not only underpin the importance of eliminating bureaucratic bottlenecks to financial 
disbursements to lower levels of governments, but also question the circumstances that led to the 
scrapping of the graduated tax.  This tax benefitted local governments in the provision of basic 
services including rural water supply and sanitation, which is no longer the case. Theoretically, 
NPM responds to the growing demand for a change from hierachical governance to empower 
front-line service providers including local governments (Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011). 
However, rather than promote the ‘centrality’ of beneficiaries of public services as ‘customers’ 
deserving good quality and timely services, political actions such as those that reduce revenues 
for financing local services undermine rather than promote principles of equity. Good 
governance also promotes democratic decision making ideals. However, the findings of this 
study point to this gap. In addition, the findings point to the fact that effective consultations with 
local authorities on the need to scrap graduated tax were likely to inform the decision to the 
contrary. In the context of local government financing for rural safe water services in Uganda 
these political tendencies and actions have indeed led to competition for scarce resources from 
the centre and affected the quality of service delivery (Awortwi, Helmsing and Oyuku-Ocen 
2010).  
Weak Local Government (LG) Technical Capacity and Challenges in 
Central Government Support 
Many initiatives at the macro level have indeed been carried out to enhance the coordination and 
performance of the rural safe water supply sub-sector. The Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP) to 
planning for the water and sanitation sector is one of such efforts that helped in streamlining the 
financing of local governments through the basket fund (funds from government and 
development partners). A water policy committee and multi-stakeholder working groups have 
also been established at the macro-level to provide policy and technical guidance for sector 
development. This study established, however, that while these are good initiatives for enhancing 
sector performance, their impact is yet to be felt in lower levels of service delivery and in rural 
communities struggling to operate and maintain their improved water sources. This study 
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identified problems related to conflict in roles between and among key water sector personnel at 
LG level. These problems were found to affect both directly and indirectly, the effectiveness of 
CBM in enhancing opportunities for operation, maintenance and sustainability of point-water 
supply facilities as further elaborated in the subsequent sections. 
Conflict in roles and sidestepping of LG Extension Staff over CBM 
activities 
At district and sub-county levels, the water and sanitation sector is technically led by a District 
Water Officer (DWO), assisted by an Assistant District Water Officer in charge of community 
mobilization, one technical officer per county in the district and a Borehole Maintenance 
Supervisor. In addition, to this core team, the Departments of Health and Community 
Development at the district are expected to work in partnership with the DWO in executing tasks 
related to software such as health and hygiene education, community capacity building for 
operation and maintenance of point-water facilities and together participate in District Technical 
Planning Committees (DTPCs). In essence, while they are regarded as support staff, health 
officers and community development officers (CDOs) are part of the technical team directly 
responsible for rural safe water and sanitation. However, this study found out that while these 
structures and positions may be fully filled with the respective personnel, their levels of 
involvement in rural water service delivery activities usually depended on the DWO’s discretion. 
Both meso and macro-level informants concurred that tendencies by DWOs to deliberately 
disregard community development staff in spearheading software activities for rural point-water 
facilities, sometimes in preference for hand-pump mechanics, because these can ‘easily be 
manipulated’ as noted in one of the key informant interviews: 
HPMs are very easy to cheat because of their low education status… Community 
mobilisation  and training is a broad package of activities that should be delivered by a 
well-informed  person whom  I don’t see among the kind that HPMs are…most if not all 
HPMs are of  very low caliber… Others cannot even write properly [Regional Technical 
Support (TSU) Staff].  
The above was corroborated in an interview with one of the hand pump mechanics who 
confirmed that despite being engaged by the district on temporary terms, he performed several 
other functions.  
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 I am required to train water user committees at every new shallow well that I construct… 
 I also rehabilitate those with breakdowns and then submit reports to the District Water 
 Officer, as well as keep records for such activities (HPM, Ndagwe Sub-county) 
Some of the water sector actors appreciated that the HPMs can be a ‘possible alternative’ in 
filling the human resource gap created by the under-funding of CBM activities. However, they 
also cautioned that this was only helpful after the HPMs have been exposed to some training in 
community mobilisation.  
If HPM are to be involved, they then have to be trained very seriously on  participatory 
methodologies and their payment has to be streamlined to ensure that it is  not the same 
DWO who has frustrated the existing extension staff (Regional TSU Staff) 
While community mobilisation is a role that is largely entrusted to NGOs in the sector, the 
NGOs also occasionally sought support from the HPMs particularly on aspects related to routine 
operation and maintenance of hand pumps. The key informants also reiterated however, that 
training alone may not solve the gap since the HPMs themselves cannot work without being 
financially rewarded. 
 
HPMs can also easily get demoralised… If this happens, then using them will not solve 
the problem of inadequate follow-up support to communities… Personally I would not 
recommend engaging HPMs to do community mobilization (Regional TSU Staff) 
Inadequate funding or budgetary processes for decentralised service delivery, as earlier noted, 
are significant issues in disabling decentralised rural water supply services in Uganda. However, 
the findings of this study suggest that this may sometimes be used as an excuse for officials 
holding authority over financial resources to undermine the in-put of those they ought to work 
with, as noted by one respondent from the sub-county
44
. 
  
 We usually incorporate follow-up activities for supporting water and sanitation 
 committees in our work plans but they are never funded by the district…and it is not 
 possible to do anything useful without transport facilitation to be able to cover all the 
 communities in this sub-county.  
The tendency not to involve the technical staff responsible for software activities reflects not 
only the lack of capacity by DWOs but also directly impacts negatively on functional 
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 Interview conducted in September 2011 
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sustainability levels for improved rural point-water facilities, as one official from the NGO sector 
observed: 
The District Health Inspector and the Community Development Officers are supposed to 
create awareness in communities on water, hygiene and sanitation issues but they are not 
facilitated. Awareness should be created involving issues of governance and management 
for sustainability of water facilities. The community needs to be engaged continuously 
and consistently, but local governments are not doing that (Key Informant-UWASNET). 
 
The community mobilization package of the MWE has been designed in such a way that it is 
participatory in nature, with participatory rural appraisal methods and tools employed at almost 
all stages.  Owing to this, the ministry guidelines stipulate that community mobilisation should 
be undertaken by CDOs, Community Development Assistants (CDAs) and Health Assistants 
(HAs) or Health Inspectors (HIs) in the districts and sub-counties as was noted in one of the 
interviews with officers from the regional Technical Support Unit (TSU)
45
. 
 
 
 
Furthermore, HAs and CDAs not only form part of the sub-county extension services work-
force, but are also members of the sub-county Technical Planning Committee (TPC). As 
members of the TPC, they are responsible for identifying community needs using participatory 
planning methods. This makes them the most qualified and eligible team for prioritisation while 
implementing software activities for the water and sanitation work in the districts and sub-
counties. Related with inadequate utilisation of these HAs and CDAs, a respondent from one of 
the central government ministries regarded this as unfortunate for the sector. 
 
 Unfortunately, due to various reasons such as failing to pay for their services (allowances 
 for transport and lunch), the extension staff are demoralised and do not deliver, despite 
 the fact that they are the most competent to do this job (TSU Staff). 
 
New public management and governance perspectives assume that partnerships and collaborative 
networks of different professional groups and actors would enhance efficiency (Page 2005, 
Nguyen 2010), but as this study indicates, individual interests of some of the public officials 
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 Interview conducted in October 2012 
It is understood that as part of their technical training and experience CDOs/CDAs 
and HAs have been exposed to the use of participatory methodologies for adult 
learning as opposed to lecture methods that other officers are likely to use. 
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could undermine rather than enable CBM’s capacity to yield desirable effects on the 
sustainability of rural point-water facilities. The findings of this study show that policy 
prescriptions on CBM of rural point water facilities can be frustrated by personality behaviours 
and attitudes that shape working relations within and among key district water sector staff and 
politicians. Poor working relations among staff at the meso level are indeed a threat to the 
effectiveness of CBM and sustainable rural domestic water supply, more particularly because 
LGs are closer to communities. Hence, by virtue of their position in the institutional framework 
for rural domestic water supply, the water sector staff in LGs ought to bear and execute the 
greater part of the overall responsibility for ensuring functional sustainability of rural point-water 
facilities.  
 
Technical Support Units and the challenge of enhancing LG capacity 
for CBM 
In 2002, Technical Support Units (TSUs) were introduced within the institutional framework for 
the WSS, representing an enabling action by the Ministry of Water and Environment  and the 
Directorate of Water Development to build the technical capacity of lower level governments 
and other actors (private for profit and not for-profit actors) for rural safe water supply. Among 
the key priorities of these regional bodies is ensuring that national sector guidelines and 
standards are adhered to by all actors at the intermediate levels of water policy and programme 
implementation. Arguably, the absence of adequate capacity among lower level actors directly 
affects communities, including the quality of community participation and management of water 
facility infrastructure. Results from the inquiry into the performance of the TSU initiative in the 
sector reveal on one hand that TSUs are indispensable institutions at the meso level with a strong 
influence on the district water sector performance. On the other hand, the initiative of TSUs is 
viewed by some of the LG actors as interfering with the autonomy of decentralised LG entities, 
as one respondent observed: 
 Sometimes it is a struggle obtaining the attention of DWOs… They are still fully 
 empowered both by the overall decentralisation framework and sector guidelines to carry 
 on their activities without the direct involvement or interference of the TSUs (Regional 
 TSU Staff).  
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Furthermore, the terms of reference for the TSUs only allow them to have a say on district sector 
activities ‘when invited’ by the district. The belief is that districts can, on a regular basis, identify 
their capacity needs and approach the TSUs for technical support in filling the gaps. However, 
this study found out that there are instances in which TSUs are totally disregarded by district 
water officers even when such districts visibly have technical gaps in implementing rural water 
supply activities including support for CBM.  
Community-based management in rural domestic water supply in Uganda falls within the 
country’s current decentralised service delivery framework designed to transfer decision making 
powers from the center to lower levels. The intervention of the TSUs in ensuring that ministry 
guidelines regarding who undertakes community mobilisation and training for WSS activities are 
therefore susceptible to some form of ‘resistance’ from some district officials, largely because 
the decentralised system of service delivery and decision making ‘cushions’ these district local 
government officials from ‘undue interference from outside’. While explaining this conflict, an 
officials from the regional TSU illustrated how their interventions to prevent the use of hand 
pump-mechanics in undertaking community mobilisation has in some cases been ignored. 
 HPMs were engaged in Bukomansimbi (another local authority) to do community 
 mobilization against our wish …the result was that the messages were delivered while 
 turned upside down and communities were confused (TSU Official) 
 
It appears from these findings that unless the terms of reference for TSUs are revised to ensure a 
more direct link to communities, they may not deliver a fast and sustainable remedy to problems 
afflicting functionality of community-managed rural point-water facilitates. Paradoxically, while 
TSUs were set up as temporary structures funded through the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF)
46
 to 
support capacity building to districts, this study found out that the process of having them fully 
integrated into the sector was underway. This integration on one hand appears as an enabling 
strategy by government to enhance sector performance. But, on the other hand, it shows that 
decentralisation and NPM in Uganda are still faced with daunting challenges in leveraging their 
promised service delivery dividends. It is argued further that the integration of TSUs in the water 
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 In Uganda, the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF) uses a centralised project approach for delivering water supply systems in small 
towns. It helped to halt fragmentation of funding in the urban sub-sector and was more aligned with the urban department 
structure than previous projects. However, it does not use government systems beyond being reported in the budget and 
appearing on the agenda of the Ministry contracts committee (ODI 2008). 
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Uganda’s institutional framework for the water sector may also risk turning them into parallel 
structures with semi-autonomous district LGs, which may trigger undue tensions particularly if it 
has negative implications on the flow of funds to district LGs. 
 
Furthermore, this is study found out that the burden of responsibility for TSUs is exceptionally 
high, particularly if all the districts under their jurisdiction ‘simultaneously demand for their 
services’ as one key informant from the district remarked. Despite the big number of new 
districts created in the past five years, the number of TSUs has remained 8 since their formation 
in 2004. With the current 112 districts, the implication is that each TSU is primarily in charge of 
14 districts. The TSUs are expected to regularly report to the Directorate of Water Development 
(DWD) in the ministry on their activities with districts and other actors in their jurisdictions. This 
makes the TSUs remain more of central government institutions and less for decentralised 
governments. As the literature indicates, political enablement requires not only a strong state, but 
also one that effectively responds to contextually emerging demands (Awortwi 2003, Baskaran 
2011, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007). In contexts like Uganda, powers accruing from 
decentralisation to local governments can easily be abused or misused because of a weak 
monitoring system and limited central government involvement in local/grassroots development. 
 
On the whole, based on this study’s findings, it appears unrealistic for the Ugandan water sector 
to speculate that TSUs will enhance the performance of LG water sector actors and cause a 
positive (trickle-down) effect on communities. Restricting the services of TSUs to a demand 
responsive approach by LGs may be a good decentralisation principle, but which suffers 
contextual weaknesses. The findings extend the debate about whether public officials work in the 
best interest of the people they serve and whether decentralised governance frameworks can ably 
demystify boundaries and bureaucracies of a ‘reduced state’. The findings also confirm those of 
earlier studies in Uganda and elsewhere which indicated that self-seeking behaviours of actors in 
decentralised government entities remain significant disablers of policies or programmes meant 
to promote well-being of the rural and marginalised communities (Allen and Hasnain 2010, 
Mosca 2006, Steiner 2006, Tumushabe et al. 2009). 
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Limited Local government capacity to monitor service delivery 
activities   
An effective system of monitoring the performance of any sector constitutes an enabling effort to 
enhance public sector efficiency and effectiveness (Helmsing 2001, Awortwi 2003). Through a 
joint sector monitoring endeavour, Government of Uganda and Development Partners undertake 
annual technical and financial performance assessments on specific indicators including; 
household access to a safe water source, functionality of water sources, quality of the water and 
the functionality and effectiveness of WSCs. Annual performance reports are produced and 
circulated to stakeholders as a tool for informing new strategies. This is indeed, an important 
enabling feature for functional sustainability of point-water facilities. However, findings from 
interviews with key rural water sector actors indicated that much of the data-bases on which 
levels of functionality of point-water sources are based, are not reliable enough.  
We are invited once a year to technically support them do monitoring… One of the things 
the sector needs to do if it has to enhance the participation of the communities in 
operation and maintenance of water facilities is not to wait for a year to collect data on 
some indicators… I don’t even believe that the data is reliable enough… It is subject to 
mistakes and could be manipulated especially at lower levels (Senior Civil Servant, 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development) 
The technical capacity to manage data is affected by limited availability of equipment, competent 
and well-motivated technical staff. Further, the focus of the joint monitoring assessments also 
tends to put more emphasis on accountability for funds released to districts and less on software 
issues that directly affect the performance of CBM systems for rural water supply. 
At district level, the annual inter-district meetings (IDMs) and District Water and Sanitation 
Coordination Committee (DWSCC) also act as monitoring platforms for the water and sanitation 
sector as well as a vehicle for changes in the sector based on district specific experiences and 
lessons. In addition to discussing experiences, the IDMs allow TSU staff an opportunity to 
deepen stakeholder understanding of sector policy guidelines including adherence to budget 
allocations for hard and software activities for rural point water interventions. However, while 
these coordination meetings are critical for ensuring stakeholder participation in sector 
monitoring activities at the meso-level, this study found out that it is hard to understand the 
influence and impact these specific coordination meetings have on community based 
management. Besides, as one key informant observed, politicians dominate the meetings with 
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requests for new water sources in their localities’. In addition, convening of DWSCC meetings or 
follow-up on any decisions taken in the meetings is (usually) the sole responsibility of DWOs, 
who for many reasons including inadequate funding may not usually be in position to convene 
the meetings, or make an effective follow-up on issues discussed in the meetings.  
Following the decentralised service delivery structure, sub-county executive committees (EC) 
are, in addition to overseeing implementation of public programmes, expected to initiate, 
mobilise people, material and technical assistance for self-help projects spearheaded by both 
state and non-state actors. They are expected to serve as the communication channels between 
central government, the district council and the community, and generally monitor activities 
undertaken by the central and local governments and non-governmental organisations in their 
areas, and report to the district council
47
. However, owing to limited financial facilitation, the 
technical capacity for most of the members of the sub-county executive committee remains 
inadequate.  
 Local politicians especially councilors representing various constituencies largely depend 
 on district technocrats for national policy interpretation… These politicians lack the skills 
 and will need regular training for them to undertake effective supervision of service 
 delivery in their communities… But the budgets do not allow (TSU Staff). 
New public management and the concept of enablement emphasise the importance of building 
local leadership capacity as a key ingredient for enhancing the effectiveness of local authorities 
in supporting community-level initiatives such as CBM (Helmsing 2002, Smith 2000). This 
limited capacity by the local actors to effectively supervise local projects disables prospects for 
the effectiveness of community-managed projects that would benefit so much the local 
leadership capacity to mobilise and sensitise users of services on their roles and responsibilities 
such as those embedded in CBM or operation and maintenance of rural improved point water 
facilities.  
Private Sector Participation and CBM of Rural Point-Water Facilities 
In NPM, private sector participation in form of partnerships or contractual arrangements between 
public and the private sector actors occupy the vital space in the search for a more enabling and 
                                                          
47
 Please refer to figure 2 for these actors and their functions and relationships. 
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efficient public authority (Barungi et al. 2003, Pérard 2008, Prasad 2006).  As corporate entities, 
Sub-county and district local government (LG) councils in Uganda can enter into contract with a 
private provider of a service following well laid out policy guidelines. In the context of this 
study, public-private engagements for rural safe water service delivery are undertaken following 
two forms of decentralised service delivery namely, inter-governmental or vertical 
decentralisation and market or horizontal decentralisation. Private companies, individual 
technicians or mechanics and spare parts dealers (SPDs) constitute the main actors in the private 
sector that support rural safe water supply in Uganda.  Regarding CBM of point-water facilities, 
both the SPDs and especially the hand pump mechanics (HPMs) are critical in supporting 
communities. This study established that the existing spare-parts distribution chain that remains 
informally established by an ad-hoc relationship between HPMs, SPDs and the community poses 
a lot of challenges for the effectiveness of CBM especially because of the difficulties in 
regulating such a highly informal relationship as reflected in one of the interviews.   
As far as I know, there isn't any deliberate effort by the government to supply spare parts 
for hand pumps. Spares are obtained informally from Kampala by HPMs and water and 
sanitation committee members. However some HPMs are also stocking a few fast 
moving parts, although these fellows are limited by lack of adequate capital to keep large 
stock (Key Informant, MWE)  
Owing to this, duplication and other forms of fraud were reportedly common and unabated 
practices in the point-water source spare parts business in Uganda.   
People fabricate spare parts especially pedestals and sell them as original parts… They 
can also issue receipts bearing our logo because they know that parts from our store are 
genuine and trusted…No genuine spare parts are made in Uganda, but they are many on 
the market (Spare parts dealer, National Level).  
Regarding whether the ‘genuine’ spare parts dealers had taken any initiative to seek government 
protection from the ‘dubious’ dealers, the spare parts dealers expressed fears that such a move 
was risky and could lead to loss of their businesses. 
I cannot engage in that, I prefer to preserve the safety of my building and business. I do 
not care if someone goes for a cheaper part or not, because these people can harm you 
and yet lose nothing! (Spare parts dealer, National Level) 
In the country side, very few shops, mainly motor-vehicle spare parts dealers occasionally stock 
spare parts for water systems. Although limited capital was pointed out as the major cause for the 
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limited availability of well stocked shops in the country-side, very limited demand for the spare 
parts in the country-side even presented a bigger problem. Poor demand especially resulting from 
competition from other small dealers, was also reported to have discouraged earlier efforts by the 
ministry of water and environment to engage or forge partnerships with bigger firms to establish 
spare parts warehouses/outlets in different regions of the country. 
We contracted Buyaya technical services (a private spare parts company) on condition 
that it sets up outlets in districts, but it also failed. The problem was that most people had 
access to Kampala, thus they could hardly buy from these outlets… The outlets failed 
because they couldn’t make good business for these dealers (Key Informant, MWE) 
 
In addition to facing competition from small spare parts dealers operating in the country-side, the 
public-private partnership efforts were also undermined by delayed payments to companies for 
supplies made to the regional outlets.  
The ministry had previously contracted us to distribute spare parts to districts, but we 
always got problems with delays in payment for the supplies (Spare parts dealer, National 
Level) 
Perhaps the more serious problem associated with the sustainability of spare parts outlets was 
related to political pressure from politicians who wanted the limited spare parts to serve their 
constituencies as observed by a senior official interviewed from the ministry. 
Efforts by the ministry to establish regional supply stores failed because of political 
interference... Some politicians could interfere with the processes sometimes demanding 
that their constituencies be served first even when they were comparatively not needier 
than others…. such scenarios prompted the decision to leave the distribution of spare 
parts to the market and anyone interested in buying spares in bulk quantities has to get 
them Kampala (Senior Official MWE)
48
 
 
Based on the findings from this study, any innovative and sustainable means of enhancing 
availability of spare parts for improved point-water sources would indeed constitute an enabling 
strategy for enhancing the effectiveness of CBM. The study shows that some NGOs including 
the Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMM) in Makondo Parish had succeeded in buying and 
storing spare parts in bulk and would supply communities at highly subsidized rates/prices. Plan 
Uganda, another NGO operating mainly in the eastern part of Uganda is reported in 2011 to have 
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initiated a systematic supply chain for spare parts in Kamuli following dialogues between 
stakeholders including WSCs from their target communities, hand pump mechanics, the district 
water office staff as well as the spare parts dealers (MWE 2011bp. 188). It was also found out by 
this study that Comboni Missionaries have also put up big warehouses in Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, 
districts, and were engaging with government to negotiate a public-private partnership with ‘for-
profit’ actors to stock and sell spare parts to communities at subsidized prices. It appears 
therefore that efforts to enhance the effectiveness of spare parts supply chains lie in forging 
strategic public-private partnerships between key stakeholders including the community, HPMs, 
spare parts dealers Such efforts will inevitably require the direct involvement of both central and 
local government. The efforts would also prioritise strategic partnerships between government 
institutions especially at the local level with NGOs, the private for-profit sector and the 
community as espoused by Skelcher (2005).  
 
The findings of this study on the way communities were made to work with HPMs also stress the 
need for an effective regulation of the relations between HPMs and the community to avoid 
‘injuring’ community interest to participate in operation and maintenance of their water sources. 
Contrary to policy guidelines, this study found out that there a private HPM was ‘officially’ 
allocated to Ndagwe Sub-county by the District Water Office to support CBM efforts in the 
communities provided the communities would be able to hire his services. Although ‘officially’ 
allocated to the sub-county, the HPM was not an employee of the local government, nor did he 
have an official contract with the local authority or any of the communities he supported, 
implying that the communities were free to work with any other HPM in case they so wished. 
However, while communities had this as an option, they were not only limited by the lack of 
information on the availability of other HPMs in the region, but also exhibited limited 
knowledge of the actual relationship the HPM had with the local government as a private actor. 
Indeed, an earlier report also indicated that WSCs in Uganda have difficulties contacting HPMs 
whenever their water sources break down (Mommen and Kulanyi 2009). Besides, the earmarked 
Ndagwe sub-county HPM ‘knew the quality and prices’ of spare parts for point-water source 
technologies and was hired and paid by the community for his labour and any spare parts he 
supplied them. The inevitability of HPMs and the challenge posed in letting them work directly 
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with the communities is known to sector actors. However, they too express their limited options 
in streamlining the work of HPMs and how the latter relate with the communities they serve.  
We know there is a serious governance issue here… HPMs over-charge communities, but 
unfortunately, we are out of the policy of stocking spare parts and selling them (Senior 
Official MWE)
49
 
 
An earlier study by the MWE also pointed out that sub-county LGs had poorly performed their 
designated roles of regular selection and training of HPMs, supervising and monitoring of their 
work in communities and providing custody of tool kits for repair of pumps (MWE 2011a p. 43). 
Difficulties in the regularisation of the activities and relations of the HPMs with communities is 
one of the limitations for the success of CBM systems for the sustainability of Uganda’s rural 
point water supply facilities. It is also indeed a weakness engrained in the NPM’s promise for 
efficient markets or customer-oriented public services. In the context of Uganda’s rural safe 
water supply, this challenge calls for an enabling action by central and local government to 
ensure that the market works to make these indispensable actors work better. Interviews with 
officials in the MWE and with national–level NGOs indicated that there were initiatives 
underway to support the formation and registration of Hand Pump Mechanics Associations 
HPMAs as an enabling strategy to build their capacity as well as regulate their work with 
communities. It is assumed that the associations will improve their reputation as well as leverage 
their work as organised sector stakeholders with a legal status allowing them to even be awarded 
contracts on a competitive basis, enable them to do ‘better business’ and support the 
communities. However, some of the HPMs interviewed viewed the initiative with some cynicism 
as they were seemingly not sure whether the associations would operate in their interests. 
We are trying to form a HPM association in Lwengo district…. However, it is already 
being corrupted by some members (HPMs) who have visibly indicated that they are 
interested in certain specific leadership positions in the association (HPM, Lwengo)
50
. 
While the idea of establishing HPMAs is in the framework of enabling markets to work, 
membership to the association remains optional to individual HPMs whose activities remain 
largely informal. As another study noted, ‘the situation is exacerbated by central government 
failure to ensure availability of spare-parts in the country and to nurture the young private sector’ 
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(MWE 2011a p. 43). While issues around community capacity gaps in dealing with HPMs are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, it appears that any efforts to augment the effectiveness 
of HPMs in CBM systems will need to be effectively complemented by strong capacity building 
activities targeting the communities they serve. Such trainings would aim among others at 
improving their knowledge of the relevant market dynamics associated with O&M of their water 
sources including their understanding of the key parts of the water technologies or systems that 
serve them. Hence the findings of this study stress the need for central and local government 
authorities to establish an enabling environment that would enhance the effectiveness of HPMs 
and the spare parts supply chain. In addition, the feasibility of PPP models combining private-
for-profit and not for-profit actors will need to be further explored to ascertain if they can 
provide a viable alternative to the supply of spare-parts. This is indeed what is advocated in the 
conceptualisation of an enabling government under the realm of the NPM paradigm (Helmsing 
2002, Smith 2000). 
Differing NGO and Government Approaches: Philosophies yet to be 
aligned in Support of CBM? 
 
NPM and governance perspectives support the participation of NGOs or private not-for-profit 
organisations and private for-profit actors in the delivery of public services. In Uganda, NGOs 
support rural safe water supply both in direct provision of services or through policy and 
advocacy support networks/activities. Clear partnerships or networks arrangements exist at the 
national level addressing policy development, budgeting and sector performance monitoring, 
with both local and international NGOs (including donor representatives). However, while the 
national level relations between NGOs and public institutions seem better coordinated, 
interactions at the lowest/micro level in the community are not as effective. Yet, this is the point 
at which good collaboration initiatives for water and sanitation between NGO and local 
governments would promise a greater direct impact on CBM and functionality of point water 
facilities.  
 
However, it is worthwhile noting, as is reported by the MWE that there are indeed NGOs whose 
activities in water and sanitation have led to great improvements in functionality of WSCs as 
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well as the water facilities such committees take care of. The 2011 annual sector performance 
report singled out NGOs such as Caritas, Network for Water and Sanitation (NETWAS) Uganda, 
Divine Waters, African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) Uganda, and Action Against 
Hunger as having played a big role in training both communities and HPMs to improve 
management and functionality of rural water facilities (MWE 2011b p. 188).  However, the 
report also notes key challenges that continue to undermine opportunities for activities of civil 
society organisations supporting CBM. The challenges noted included among others an existing 
dependency syndrome by communities, local government reluctance to enforce bye-laws on 
O&M, a rise in the price of spare parts due to inflation and the proliferation of new districts 
resulting into increased costs in service delivery (MWE 2011b p. 198-199). An earlier study also 
noted poor working relations between local governments and NGOs as impacting on the 
effectiveness CBM of water point sources and affecting functional sustainability of water 
facilities (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011). In the subsequent sub-sections, this study brings out 
further evidence to demonstrate how the unaligned service approaches of NGOs and public 
institutions especially LGs continue to undermine the effectiveness of CBM. It also examines 
how difficulties in collaboration and networking at lower levels of service delivery may 
complicate opportunities for replication and scaling-up of some of the good practices of NGOs. 
Approaches of NGOs and LGs yet to be aligned for CBM effectiveness 
Within Uganda’s institutional framework for rural safe water supply, lower local governments 
largely rely/depend on NGOs for community mobilisation and sensitisation. In the NPM 
philosophy of ‘networks and collaborations’, this implies that NGOs and local governments have 
to work together in drawing plans and logistics to support CBM, or at least regularly and 
consciously collaborate in ways aimed at sustainability of point-water facilities. However, the 
findings of this study show that desirable collaborative efforts between NGO actors and the local 
authorities in support of CBM are among others threatened by skepticism on both sides. 
Interviews with NGO actors operating in the ‘greater Masaka’51 region, and the local 
government actors in Lwengo district indicated that NGO relations with district and sub-county 
local authorities over support for CBM are not always strong enough to promise desirable 
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results. While both actors believe that supporting CBM functionality is the most effective way 
for enhancing long term sustainability of rural safe water supply, their programmes and activities 
are yet to be aligned in support of CBM of point-water facilities.  
On the one hand, NGOs blame local authorities whose mandate is to promote effective service 
delivery for ‘neglecting’ their roles as duty bearers, and at times failing to provide the necessary 
technical and ‘political’ back-up for their activities in the community. The NGOs also complain 
of unnecessary bureaucracy and high expectation for financial rewards or facilitation by local 
authorities who presumed that NGOs always have ‘better’ budgets. 
 Local governments always expect that their time in supporting NGO programmes in 
 their localities has to be paid for… But they forget that we are actually supplementing 
 their efforts to fulfill their mandates (NGO worker, National level interview)
52
 
On the other hand, the local authorities blame NGOs of breeding high levels of dependency 
among communities by ‘not doing what the policy stipulates’ as roles of the community in CBM. 
Among the actions of the NGOs that local authorities thought undermined CBM was the practice 
of waiving community contribution to capital cost or demanding less than was supposed to be 
contributed as capital cost to the establishment of water sources. Furthermore, the local 
authorities blamed NGOs for at times hurrying water projects without always reporting to the 
districts. Hurried project implementation, was in fact, for some of the local authorities related to 
their belief that NGO actors at times took themselves to be more pro-people than governments.  
 The NGOs sometimes think that they are more ‘for the people’ compared to government 
 … They want to be felt by the community as more caring and end-up making mistakes
 (Interview with a civil servant, Lwengo DLG).  
The NGOs were also blamed for being so ‘closed’ when it came to sharing their budgets or 
activity plans with local authorities, which according to the local government water sector actors 
affects alignment and harmonization of sector activities.  
I don’t know why they are always slow at sharing with us their plans…you might plan to 
construct a certain shallow well in an area having  already informed the Ministry but only 
to find that so and so (meaning NGO) has already constructed it, then you go into the 
hassle of explaining to the ministry what happens. Thus we always emphasize that they 
should inform us earlier on (District Official, Lwengo DLG)  
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The NGOs, however, indicated that sharing of activity plans or budgets tended to become 
important to local authorities when they expect that the NGO budgets carry some allowances for 
the local authorities, the lack of which would demoralise them. The NGO actors interviewed also 
complained that sometimes they may be asked to channel funding to communities or activities 
that meet ‘political interests’ of the local authorities contrary to their plans, resulting into 
unnecessary tensions.  
 We rarely involve district technocrats in our activities because they always want to be 
 highly facilitated (paid)… We used to work  with the District Water Board for the first 
 water sources that we constructed. However, one Officer became corrupt and we lost 
 interest in working with them (NGO worker, Lwengo District)
53
 
With such counter accusations and blame apportioning, the need for deliberate efforts to enable 
effective collaborations that support CBM systems for rural safe water supply remains 
paramount for the rural decentralised water supply service delivery. It is one thing to register the 
existence of multiple actors in a sector under the NPM and governance framework and another to 
have the interventions of such actors produce desired service levels for the communities they 
target. The concept of an enabling authority places responsibility for the effectiveness of non-
state actors on local authorities or government (Helmsing 2002, smith 2000). However, their 
enabling role may not be effective if their interests are not well aligned with those of the NGOs 
or not-for-profit sector as the theoretical literature also indicates (Young 2000). Thus the success 
of CBM indeed depends on the extent to which communities are supported by frontline service 
providers. Collaborative efforts of CBOs, NGOs and local government actors especially from the 
sub-county would in the context of Uganda’s rural safe water supply produce good results for 
sustainability. But how best can such collaborative efforts get engineered for CBM 
effectiveness? How best can the good work of NGOs in bringing about stakeholder engagement 
on issues of operation and maintenance in some parts of Uganda be scaled up in other regions?  
NGO perspectives on advocacy initiatives related to CBM and the 
water sector in general 
This study notes that initiatives such as the formation of the Uganda Water and Sanitation NGO 
Network (UWASNET) in 2001 have provided an opportunity for a more effective NGO and 
government collaboration and engagement on issues of policy and sector governance. However, 
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UWASNET and her members are not completely immune from a complex and potentially 
disabling public policy environment that threatens their advocacy and service delivery roles in 
communities. It was for instance found out that some members of the network were worried that 
salaries for staff of UWASNET came from government. 
We know that most of the activities of UWASNET are funded by development partners 
such as DANIDA... It is difficult for UWASNET to effectively play their advocacy role 
when government pays their staff salaries…’ Their independence in questioning 
government actions that affect communities is questionable….they have to plead to 
government for their salary! If UWASNET members do not raise any issue, the donors 
will not… (Key Informant, NGO sector).54 
Although it was found out from the UWASNET secretariat that plans by development partners to 
fill the funding gap were nearly finalized, it was not possible to ascertain whether if this alone 
would guarantee UWASNET a higher policy and ideological on government. Regarding NGO 
advocacy strategies in support for CBM systems in rural water supply sustainability, key 
informants at UWASNET pointed out various challenges ranging from persistent unfavourable 
government budgeting for software activities over supply or hardware interventions to the 
attitudes and levels of commitment from local government actors over CBM activities. 
The allocation of 11% for the rural water supply budget is very small funding for 
capacity building and software activities in communities... The government may provide 
water facilities to communities but with no clear means to prepare people on how to 
manage these water facilities [Policy Analysis and Advocacy Specialist, (UWASNET)]. 
Other macro-level problems affecting the network related to the growing trend in neo-
patrimonial politics, corruption and a growing trend away from original poverty eradication 
agenda to an export oriented strategy that has increasingly led to channeling resources away from 
service sectors including water and sanitation (O'Meally 2011). District local governments 
(DLGs) are responsible for monitoring activities of NGOs and CBOs in their jurisdictions, 
however, this function according to UWASNET seemed to stop with ‘courtesy call meetings’ 
and no follow-ups in the communities or at offices of the NGOs or CBOs.  This study indeed 
noted a limited direct contact between Lwengo district water office and the water programmes of 
the Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMMs) in the district’s parish of Makondo. Despite 
challenges to functional sustainability of safe water sources in Makondo Parish, the perception of 
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the district water office was that Makondo Parish was doing very well because of the presence of 
the MMMs. 
Challenges in replication and scaling-up of NGO best practices for 
CBM 
This study found out that unlike government, NGOs are increasingly shifting their focus of 
activities and investment in rural water supply towards supporting communities to operate and 
maintain existing infrastructure rather than the supply of new water sources except in emergency 
and more deserving situations. Interviews and the review of reports with NGOs directly involved 
in activities to support CBM for rural water supply indicated that the NGO sector is indeed 
largely out to prioritise support for CBM as one best way to enhance sustainability of rural safe 
water supply. 
 There is need for all actors to understand and follow the same principle in their work that 
 it is not the number of boreholes that matter but also the sustainability of these facilities 
 and services that will bring benefits to communities (Key Informant, NGO sector) 
 
Consequently, some NGOs are undertaking a range of innovative practices in the country to 
enhance learning and knowledge sharing on the best practices that could leverage the 
effectiveness and functionality of CBM. Triple-S (Sustainable Services at Scale) Uganda, a 
learning initiative of the International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC) in partnership with 
other actors has in the past two-three years spearheaded a range of innovations to enhance the 
effectiveness of CBM. Triple-S seeks to pilot and test new ways of working for the delivery of 
rural water services in Uganda by identifying key challenges and bottlenecks currently 
confronting the sector. It has over the past 2-3 years identified outstanding innovations and good 
practices for enhancing the effectiveness of CBM in the regions of Lango and Rwenzori.  As a 
result of the success of their pilot activities, they note in their report that: 
‘Community members are increasingly assuming the responsibility of managing their 
sources, particularly operation and maintenance. …there is more self-determination at 
source-level and water users have a more positive and progressive attitude towards their 
facilities. …if effectively sensitised, community members exhibit willingness to  take up 
the responsibility of managing their sources’ (Nabunnya et al. 2012 p.5). 
Among the innovations piloted by Triple-S Uganda include activities designed to enhance the 
effectiveness of HPMs as private sector actors such as the use of mobile phones as tools for 
enhancing the flow of information between communities and service providers, notably the 
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HPMs and district water office. Other innovations have focused on enhancing community 
mobilisation for meetings related to CBM as well as those intended to promote the effectiveness 
of community bye-laws in support of CBM. Other initiatives have explored the use of monthly 
financial contributions to improve community livelihoods by starting a loan scheme for 
community members (Nabunnya et al. 2012).  
It is important to note that in the context of the NPM and governance agenda, the emphasis for 
networks and cross learning is made for enhanced service delivery (Jennings Jr and Ewalt 1998, 
Krebs and Pelissero 2006, Bache 2000), and more so for the water sector (Böge 2006, Rogers 
2006). In relation to this, initiatives to support the scaling-up of innovative practices of NGOs in 
support of CBM become paramount. For instance innovations such as the use of modern 
information and communication technologies (ICT) seem to be taking center stage in informing 
new ways for an enhanced government and service delivery framework, but uptake of such 
innovations continues to vary from place to place (Ionescu 2011a, Dunleavy, et al. 2006, Lodge 
and Gill 2011). Whereas the use of mobile phone technology initiated by Triple-S Uganda is 
regarded as success story it works under certain conditions. Many of these conditions are 
community based, but the others, and possibly more critical are found at the meso and macro 
level. Among the conditions identified include: Functional Community Based Management 
Systems (CBMS); WUCs must be performing their duties; users of water should be paying their 
monthly fees; the spare parts supply chain should be functioning; and users must have the right 
attitude especially with regard to ownership of the source (Nabunnya et al. 2012 p. 11).  
The NPM and governance agenda emphasise the blurring of boundaries between and among 
development actors (Stoker 1998 p.17, Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011a). This view in the water 
sector suggests that, in the pursuance of collective goals, water sector actors have to work closely 
with one another to maximise results for their service beneficiaries, who, in NPM are best 
described as ‘customers’ (Buček and Smith 2000, Helmsing 2002). The replication and scaling-
up of any of the documented good practices of NGOs in support for CBM is accordingly 
undermined by dynamics at national, sub-national or local government levels, and within the 
communities themselves. Communities can easily be swayed by politicians with opinions that 
may not be supportive of local development initiatives. At the micro level, the initiatives may be 
heavily undermined by community reluctance to contribute financially to O&M, and more 
147 
 
severely by the ineffectiveness of the WSCs. The ineffectiveness of WSCs is largely a function 
of the governance dynamics taking place at the meso and macro levels of policy implementation. 
Hence, an enabling environment for CBM calls for actions that not only allow continuous 
learning between and among public, private-for-profit and not-for-profit stakeholders, but also 
the application of knowledge to scale up good practices that benefit rural water user communities 
in fulfilling their O&M roles. I argue that this replication can only happen to benefit CBM across 
the country if central government and her LG entities are willing to appreciate and take-up NGO 
innovations, thereby completing the cycle of networks as advocated in the NPM and governance 
paradigms.   
Conclusion  
Following NPM policy frameworks of decentralisation and local governance, the rural water 
policy and institutional framework rightly places water users at the centre of the responsibility 
for enhancing the sustainability of point-water facilities under ‘the banner’ of CBM. However, as 
this chapter has revealed, individual behaviour and institutional governance dynamics in 
financing, coordination and decentralisation play an important role in shaping and maintaining 
relationships of different actors that support the effectiveness of CBM system. As a policy 
alternative for sustainability of rural water supply, CBM is envisaged to promote equitable and 
sustainable services to the rural peripheral communities. However, this chapter has shown that 
power dynamics and bureaucracies around distribution and utilisation of (financial) resources for 
rural water supply may serve disable opportunities for policy implementation, negatively 
impacting on desired results. As an outcome of the NPM and good governance paradigms, CBM 
prescriptions assume that governments will play their roles as adequately as possible to 
maximize the economic benefits that accrue from reduced state controls and hierarchies. This 
chapter has shown however, that delayed disbursement of funds to local governments from the 
centre, conflict of interest in allocation of funds for extension work and for new water source 
construction, weak sector coordination mechanisms at local government level and weak systems 
for monitoring remain among the key meso and macro level disablers of the good policy 
intentions within CBM. In reference to the concept of political enablement, this chapter has also 
confirmed that politics and ‘politicking’ remain significant disablers of the opportunities brought 
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about by decentralised budgeting and financing of rural safe water services in Uganda and sub-
Saharan Africa in general. 
 
The NPM paradigm and the new governance agenda also call for the blurring of boundaries 
between development actors in order to tap from each other’s strengths for better results (Batley 
1999). But these boundaries have persisted as this chapter has revealed.  While government 
institutions ‘may be happy’ to have service delivery models that ‘invite’ allow strategic 
partnerships with  a multiplicity of development actors, their levels of interest and determination 
to make partnerships work to serve communities remain weak as this chapter has shown. Efforts 
to enable replication of NGO best practices for improved service delivery are not only frustrated 
by bureaucratic frameworks but also a weak culture of inter-organisational learning.  
 
In its emphasis of state withdrawal, the NPM paradigm and the concept of market enablement 
emphasise the important roles of central and/or local authorities in ensuring that markets, 
communities and voluntary agencies (or the third sector) operate very effectively along with the 
right political or decentralised environment (Helmsing 2002, Smith 2000). Such activities would 
entail aspects of capacity building in form of strategic ‘public-public, public-private, private-
private’ partnerships, including those targeting communities. But as this chapter has shown, 
central and local government authorities are inadequately ensuring that such collaborative 
engagements/capacities are built and sustained. Private actors in NPM are believed to enhance 
quality and efficiency in service delivery, however, the dynamics surrounding the participation 
of HPMs and spare parts is still inadequately regulated to favour goals CBM systems of service 
delivery. Chapter Six examines micro-level dynamics that undermine the effectiveness of CBM 
but which have either remained unknown or ignored due to weaknesses at the macro and meso 
levels of rural water service delivery. 
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Chapter Six 
Micro-Level Dynamics Disabling Community Based 
Management of Point-Water Facilities in Makondo 
Parish 
Introduction 
Under the NPM and governance framework, an effective CBM system for rural point-water 
facilities is a measure of a community’s capacity to positively contribute to national policy 
objectives for safe water supply. Understanding the dynamics that influence community capacity 
to effectively play their dual role as ‘providers’ and beneficiaries of public services under the 
CBM framework remains central to efforts aimed at leveraging community contributions (in-
kind or cash) towards service delivery. In Chapter Five I examined macro and meso level 
dynamics that directly or indirectly impact on CBM systems for rural water supply in Uganda. In 
this chapter I examine community/micro-level dynamics that challenge the NPM premises 
embedded in the CBM model of rural domestic water supply, based on the case study of 
Makondo Parish. More specifically, the chapter presents and discusses study findings on 
community-level dynamics affecting community participation in operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of improved water facilities in Makondo Parish. It also examines the operational 
effectiveness and organisational capacity of Water and Sanitation Committees (WSCs), regularity 
and effectiveness of community meetings over O&M and the nature of interactions or relations 
between frontline service providers and the community of water users. In essence, the chapter 
draws from theoretical assumptions and contextual realities in order to highlight micro-level 
issues that may remain unknown, ignored or untapped by policy and programme actors, but 
which remain fundamental to the success of CBM systems for rural water supply in developing 
country contexts. To place the discussion into the primary context, the chapter begins by 
examining the community’s history of contribution to general local development initiatives and 
to domestic water supply in particular.  
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History and Dynamics of Community Contribution to Local Development 
Initiatives 
Community contribution to local development initiatives in Uganda is not limited to rural water 
supply alone, although the dynamics associated with this new approach to public service delivery 
may vary from one sector to the other, and from time to time. The status of a community’s past 
participation in a variety of local communty development initiatives can help in understanding 
current and future opportunities/challenges to the provision and sustainability of improved water 
sources in the current CBM framework. This study inquired into whether the community in 
Makondo had ever contributed to community development inititaives in their localities and the 
forms such contributions took. The findings as presented in table 6 show that more than half (302 
or 55%) of the household survey respondents had ever contributed to some communty 
development activity/project. Most (69.2%) of the contributions made were in-kind compared to 
cash contributions (30.8%). Labour was the main form (45.2%) in which households provided 
their contribution compared to cash and all the other forms of in-kind contributions (table 6).  
Table 6 History and form of community contribution to development initiatives (N=305) 
 
Activity/Project to which 
contribution was made 
Form of contribution household had ever made 
Financial  
Labour 
Ideas/ 
meetings 
 
Land 
Local  
Materials  
 
Other  
 
Total 
 
Water and sanitation  
N 62 97 18 2 14 1 194 
% 66.0 70.3 56.3 40.0 [n=2] 41.2 50.0 63.6 
 
School Development Project 
N 12 3 4 0 0 0 19 
% 12.8 2.2 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 
 
Health Promotion Activities 
N 9 22 19 1 11 1 63 
% 9.6 15.9 59.4 20.0 32.4 50.0 20.7 
 
Security/safety of life and property  
N 8 20 9 2 5 0 44 
% 8.5 14.5 28.1 40.0 14.7 0.0 14.4 
 
Community road/bridge/culvert 
N 13 28 0 1 1 0 43 
% 13.8 20.3 0.0 20.0 2.9 0.0 14.1 
 
Construction of place of worship 
N 23 6 1 0 1 0 31 
% 24.5 4.3 3.1 0.0 2.9 0.0 10.2 
  
Other 
N 15 27 3 0 6 0 51 
% 16.0 19.6 9.4 0.0 17.6 0.0 16.7 
Total N 94 138 32 5 34 2 305 
% 30.8 45.2 10.4 1.6 11.1 0.6 100 
 
It is also important to note from the results that only 5 people (1.6%)  contributed land to 
community projects with only 2 of these contributing it towards water and sanitation. 
Furthermore, the bulk (63.6%) of the contributions across all the forms of contributions was 
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made towards water and sanitation activities. This was followed by health promotion activities to 
which only about 20.7% of the households contributed.  Based on this history of community 
contribution in Makondo Parish, the results indeed suggest that community development 
proposals that demanded direct contributions from the beneficiary community in Makondo 
Parish may not be perceived by the community members as alien. However, while this may be 
true, it does not adequately address the question of why water users in Makondo Parish were 
willing or unwilling to make financial contributions to operation and maintenance of their point-
water supply infrastructure. The results further suggest that the potential for people’s willingness 
to directly contribute to community development initiatives may exist but remain inadequately 
developed to leverage greater community enthusiasm for self-development. With nearly half 
(242 or 45%) of the household survey respondents mentioning that they had never contributed 
towards any community development initiative, the results further suggest a community that has 
largely been dependent on external support, or one that has been poorly mobilised and/or 
sensitised on issues of community participation. These issues are further examined in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Most of the contributions households had ever made were towards water and sanitation or health 
promotion activities compared to what was contributed to security, education, village roads or 
developments at places of worship (see table 6). Hence, the findings suggest that safe water 
supply and its close relationship with health promotion was more likely to attract community 
contribution compared to other community development projects or activities.  Using a logistic 
regression model, factors that influence household contribution towards community development 
projects in Makondo Parish were examined (table 7). The results from the model show that 
reported contribution towards community development initiative was significantly associated 
with the safe water service provider that household respondents perceived to be the most 
important in the community. According to these results, household respondents who considered 
Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMMs) as the most important safe water service provider in 
their community were 2.49 times more likely to say that they had in the past contributed towards 
community development initiatives compared to households that mentioned government. The 
trend was the same for households which considered other NGOs as the most important safe 
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water service providers, although their odds ratio
55
 was not statistically significant due to the fact 
that respondents pointing to this were very few. These results indeed reflect the fact that more 
efforts to enhance community participation in Makondo Parish have in the past been invested in 
the delivery of water and sanitation services, mainly spearheaded by the MMMs or other NGOs 
compared to other development activities in the community such as those intended for school 
development, developments at places of worship or roads and culverts (table 7). Other 
statistically significant household factors associated with contribution to community 
development interventions were gender, household size, estimated household monthly income 
and use of water vendors for domestic water supply. The results show that male household 
respondents were 1.75 (p-value = 0.005) times more likely to say that they had contributed 
towards a community development initiative as compared to female household respondents. 
 
Table 7 Results of the logistic regression model for contribution towards community development 
initiatives 
Variable Odds Ratio p-value 
Gender (Reference = Female) 
                                                                                                          Male 
 
1.75 
 
0.005 
Level of education (Reference = None) 
Primary 
Secondary + 
 
1.12 
1.32 
 
0.638 
0.448 
Household size (Reference = One person) 
Household size 
 
1.53 
 
0.000 
Estimated household monthly income (Reference = <10,000UGX) 
10,000 - 50,000 UGX 
50,000 UGX or more 
 
1.65 
4.22 
 
0.017 
0.000 
Main source of drinking water for household (Reference=Unprotected 
source) 
Protected source (Shallow well, Bottled water, Deep /Protected well) 
 
 
1.13 
 
 
0.612 
Household buys water from vendor (Reference = No)                             
                                                                                                                       Yes 
 
1.84 
 
0.004 
Who is considered as the most important safe water service provider in 
the community? (Reference = Government) 
Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMMs) 
Other NGOs 
 
 
2.49 
1.35 
 
 
0.001 
0.325 
Who funded the construction of main water source (Reference = 
Government) 
NGO 
Community 
 
 
1.22 
1.07 
 
 
0.417 
0.789 
 
 
                                                          
55
 Odds ratio is a measure of effect size, describing the strength of association or non-independence between two 
binary data values 
153 
 
Household size also significantly influenced reported contribution towards community 
development initiatives in a sense that the bigger the household was, the more likely it reported 
having made a contribution towards a community development project in the past; households 
with more than one person were 1.53 (p-value = 0.000) times more likely to say that they had 
contributed towards a community development initiative as compared to those with only one 
person. This is possibly due to the fact that households with fewer members are more likely to be 
constrained both in terms of income or labour supply to be able to make a cash or in-kind 
contribution towards community development projects as opposed to households with more 
members capable of pooling their incomes, or which have a higher labour supply to deploy as 
earlier studies have indicated (Munro 2005). The other factors included in the model in table 7, 
but which did not return statistically significant results were the level of education of the 
household respondent, the source of the household’s main source of drinking water, and the 
service provider that funded the construction of main water source.  
 
With regard to income, households with an estimated monthly income between 10,000 and 
50,000 UGX
56
 had a 1.65 (p-value = 0.017) odds ratio or 1.65 times more likely to report having 
ever contributed towards a community development initiative compared to those with monthly 
incomes estimated to be less than or equal to 10,000 UGX. Furthermore, households with an 
estimated monthly income of 50,000 UGX or more were 4.22 (p-value = 0.000) times more 
likely to say that they had contributed towards community development initiative as compared to 
households with monthly income less than or equal to 10,000 UGX. In addition, households that 
reported buying water from water vendors for their domestic water supply needs also had 
significantly high odds (1.84 with p-value = 0.004) of saying they had contributed towards a 
community development initiative compared to those which reported not buying water from 
vendors. These results suggest that the income status of a household was more likely to influence 
its willingness to contribute to community development initiatives. As discussed later in this 
chapter, qualitative findings indicate that households that engaged water vendors for their 
domestic water supply needs were more unlikely to make cash contributions towards repair and 
maintenance of improved water facilities. However, given that many of these were located in 
trading centres or along roads, as presented in table 8, they were more likely to support other 
                                                          
56
 The exchange rate estimated at 2500 UGX for 1 US dollar 
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development interventions using both cash and in-kind contribution methods. It is also important 
to note that some of the people who are largely involved in small scale off-farm income 
generating activities may prefer to contribute in-kind rather than cash towards community 
development projects. This is partly because such households survive on a cash economy and are 
unwilling to ‘dispose of’ some their cash for activities they could contribute to using in-kind 
methods such as labour.  
 
Table 8 Household use of water vendors and location in the village  
Household use of water 
vendors for their water needs 
Location of Household in the village Total 
Within a trading centre Along a road, but not in 
the trading centre 
Completely off 
the Road 
Never at all  N 38 169 167 374 
% 50.7 65.0 78.8 68.4 
Sometimes, in wet and dry 
seasons 
N 8 16 11 35 
% 10.7 6.2 5.2 6.4 
Yes, only in the dry season N 26 56 23 105 
% 34.7 21.5 10.8 19.2 
Always N 2 8 8 18 
% 2.7 3.1 3.8 3.3 
When children are not at 
home  
N 1 11 3 15 
% 1.3 4.2 1.4 2.7 
Total N 75 260 212 547 
 
Household Income and Financial Contribution Towards O&M of 
Improved Point-water Facilities in Makondo Parish 
The literature has consistently shown that the success of CBM models in ensuring functional 
sustainability of point-water facilities largely depends on the ability and willingness of water 
users to participate in water related community development initiatives, especially by making 
financial contributions to meet the initial cost of construction, major repairs and routine O&M 
(Carter and Rwamwanja 2006, Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011, Jones 2011). Regardless of 
whether there is a breakdown in functionality of point water facilities or not, Uganda’s rural safe 
water supply policy context of CBM requires that monthly financial contributions towards O&M 
of water facilities are collected from water users. These financial contributions, which are 
supposed to be managed by WSCs are in turn utilised and accounted for whenever water sources 
break down. However, findings from the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data obtained 
through interviews and discussions at the community level show that financial contributions 
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towards the provision, operation and maintenance of improved water facilities in Makondo 
Parish were not only irregular but also did not adequately follow national policy guidelines. 
Results from the household survey indicate that 20% of the respondents had never contributed 
financially to O&M of improved water facilities. Only about a quarter (23%) reported that they 
made a financial contribution a few months back, while the rest made financial contributions 
about one year (22%) or more than two years (14%) ago (Figure 11). 
Figure 11 Last time household made a financial contribution to O&M of their water source 
(N=533) 
 
Household income and expenditure patterns have often been used in much of the literature on 
community participation and service delivery to examine willingness and ability to pay for 
services (Gertler and Glewwe 1990, Whittington, et al. 1990, Jones 2011). The assumption held 
by many of these studies is that low income households are more unwilling to pay for services 
because of issues of affordability. However, both qualitative and quantitative findings from this 
study confirm that willingness to pay for services is but not always dependent on 
household/individual incomes or their ability to pay. Using a logistic regression model (table 9), 
further analysis of the household survey findings shows that households with monthly incomes 
estimated between 10,000 and 50,000 UGX had a 1.14 odds ratio of saying they had ever made a 
financial contribution to operation, maintenance or repair of their main water source compared to 
households with monthly incomes estimated to be less than or equal to 10,000 UGX. 
Furthermore, households with monthly incomes estimated at 50,000 UGX  or more were 1.46 
times more likely to say they had ever made a financial contribution to operation, maintenance or 
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repair of their main water source compared to households with monthly income less than or 
equal to 10,000 UGX. It is important to note however that these odds ratios were not statistically 
significant. This lack of significance implies that factors other than household incomes play a big 
role in influencing household willingness to make a financial contribution to O&M of improved 
water sources in Makondo Parish.  
Results from focus group discussions, informal conversations and key informant interviews also 
indicated that willingness rather that (financial) ability accounted for the limited financial 
contributions to O&M. Respondents pointed out for instance that most households could afford 
Uganda shillings 500 per month [or 6000 UGX (about 2.3 US dollars) per year], which 
according to them was the maximum amount they expected a household to contribute on a 
monthly basis in all villages served by improved point water facilities. They also argued that 
most people in the Parish were involved in relatively economically viable farming which would 
enable them to raise the 500 UGX.  
 Five hundred Uganda shillings as a monthly contribution is nothing considering that the 
 many of the households in Makondo Parish have banana and coffee plantations that 
 could fetch tens of thousands of shillings in a month (Focus Group Interview with local 
 leaders).  
Similar remarks were made in qualitative interviews and discussions which underpinned the 
significance of other locally contextual factors other than household incomes in shaping the 
dynamics around which users of improved point water supply facilities are willing to participate 
or make financial contributions towards safe water service delivery, and more specifically 
towards O&M of their established water facilities, as observed in interviews and discussions:  
We have not usually had problems with people raising money to contribute to the initial 
cost of construction, even for boreholes that are more costly….why then do the people 
stop supporting the sustainability of a project they initially supported…the point then is 
that people in the community can afford but you have to make them trust you with their 
money….It is we the leaders to do that (KII, Community development Worker). 
People are completely able to contribute to the initial cost of establishing a water source 
and to routine operation and maintenance, but the moment they feel that their money is 
not being put to good use, they will be reluctant to contribute…Ten thousand Uganda 
Shillings is nothing! (In-depth Interview, Community Member). 
 
There is a culture that is developing in the community, that leaders everywhere are 
corrupt which is not always true. This belief is severely affecting community 
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participation even when some of the leaders are very transparent and hard working. The 
problem is the difficulty in mobilising everyone in the village to attend meetings and 
listen to the discussions (KII, Local Politician) 
 
Results from the logistic regression model presented in table 9 also underpinned the significance 
of community mobilisation and sensitisation on sustainable utilization of safe water in the 
community and the existence of an active water user committee in influencing household 
financial contribution to operation and maintenance of their water facilities. 
Table 9 Detailed results of logistic regression model for household's financial 
contribution towards O&M or repair of a water source  
Variable Odds Ratio p-value 
Household sensitized on Sustainable utilization of safe water in the 
community (Reference=Not sensitized) 
sensitized 
 
 
2.03 
 
 
0.008 
Estimated household monthly income (Reference =<10,000UGX) 
10,000 - 50,000 UGX 
50,000 UGX or more 
 
1.14 
1.46 
 
0.577 
0.260 
Who is considered as the most important safe water service provider in 
the parish/community? (Reference = Government) 
Medical Missionaries of Mary( MMMs) 
Other NGOs 
 
 
1.37 
0.54 
 
 
0.162 
0.391 
Existence of water user committee meetings (Reference = Committee 
non-existent) 
Committee meets more than once in a year 
Committee meets once in more than a year 
 
 
8.79 
1.83 
 
 
0.000 
0.025 
Who usually mobilizes households to make a financial contribution to 
operation, maintenance or repair of your main water source? 
(Reference = Have never been mobilized) 
Local Council committee 
Water user committee 
NGO/Project staff 
 
 
 
29.89 
63.47 
17.15 
 
 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.006 
Main source of drinking water for household (Reference=Unprotected 
source) 
Protected source (Borehole, Bottled water, Deep /Protected well) 
 
 
1.57 
 
 
0.072 
 
The other factors incorporated in the model but which did not return statistically significant 
results included who the household respondents regarded the most important safe water service 
provider in the community, and the household’s main source of drinking water (table 9). The rest 
of this chapter examines these factors in detail covering among others approaches in collection 
and management of financial contributions to safe water service delivery, community 
experiences of the frequency of water source breakdowns, community perceptions about the 
quality of the water, and capacity for self-supply. Many other factors related to community 
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leadership and organisation, trust and perceptions about service providers are also examined as 
contextual determinants of CBM effectiveness that have seemingly remained ignored or 
unknown to sector policy and programme actors. 
Other Dynamics Affecting CBM of Improved Water Facilities in Makondo 
Parish 
 
As founded within in the NPM, governance and neoliberal policy paradigms, CBM as a service 
delivery approach advocates state withdrawal from direct public service delivery and an 
increased involvement of non-state actors including the users of safe water services (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011, Akif Ozer and Yayman 2011). In Uganda’s rural safe water supply sub-sector, a 
community of improved point water users is viewed as part of the institutional framework for the 
delivery and sustainability of safe water supply services. Part of their contribution to the delivery 
of services is to participate (variously) in activities and processes that ensure sustainable 
utilisation of safe water supply facilities. As earlier highlighted in this chapter, this participation 
includes but is not limited to a cash contribution to the capital cost or routine O&M of their water 
supply facilities and is affected by a range of contextual factors. Based on the analysis of 
qualitative and quantitative findings from the present inquiry, I examine micro-level issues 
influencing community contribution to O&M and to overall functional sustainability of improved 
water facilities in Makondo Parish. 
Actual and perceived quality of safe water service delivery 
The actual and perceived quality of safe water service delivery (access to, and functionality 
levels of water sources) was in this study found to potentially have an effect on the motivation of 
the community to participate in O&M of improved water facilities. Despite the ranking of safe 
water service provision as top priority by the majority (96%) of household respondents in 
Makondo parish, the motivation to make a financial contribution to water source repair, 
operation and maintenance was found to be low because of the perceived and actual quality of 
service delivery in the community.  Household survey results indicate that access to safe water in 
Makondo Parish would have been higher when compared to average national coverage, but is 
undermined by low levels of functionality of improved point-water sources in the area.  While 
almost all survey participants were within a one kilometre radius of an improved water source, 
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several of these sources were non functional. As can be seen from the map in figure 12 below, 
more household survey participants, notably from the west and east of Makondo Parish (the 
survey area) are located in a more than one kilometer catchment area for a functional improved 
water source
57
, constituting 47% of all households (Macri et al 2013). When compared with 
Uganda’s recommended minimum distance of 1.5 kilometres, the results suggest that many 
households are still moving long distances to collect safe water, the burden of which was found 
to potentially impact on willingness to contribute to O&M of water sources in distant locations. 
In addition to the burden of the distance covered to collect water, the nature of the terrain and the 
quantities of water required at household level which determine the number routes water 
collectors have to make exacerbate the challenges of access to water. 
 The hilly roads and the long distances covered are all a big problem because water 
 sources are usually located in valleys, so when you add a hill to the distance, and the 
 amount of water someone has to carry per day it becomes a big burden especially to 
 women and children who sometimes suffer from backaches, nosebleeds and other forms 
 of illnesses due to the burden of water collection (FGD, General Community) 
The above findings are further elaborated in an earlier publication based on the present study and 
another study that focused on gender and water management in Makondo Parish (Asaba, et al. 
2013).  
 
Owing to poor functionality of improved point-water supply facilities, safe water coverage in 
Lwengo district is estimated at 61%, slightly above the sub-county average of 58% (WSDD) of 
Lwengo district (WSDD 2011). Whereas the coverage for functional improved water sources in 
Makondo parish rose slightly higher as a result of my fieldwork activities
58
 and those of other 
doctoral researchers under the Water is Life (WIL) project in the community, it was much lower 
at the time of my reconnaissance visit in January 2011. This coverage is expected to have further 
improved due to the countrywide borehole rehabilitation activities that took place mid 2011 
(WSDD 2011). At reconnaissance time, only 11out of 35 improved water sources (34 hand 
                                                          
57
 Map based Geographical Information system (GIS) database compiled by the Water is Life project in 2010 and 
the mapping of households survey participants using GPS in September and October 2011 
58
 As part of the research process, to observe the dynamics of community participation in some of the water 
activities, support was sought from the Sub-county Hand Pump Mechanic, water user committee members and 
village leaders in three villages, and two of the non-functioning hand pumps were repaired with the guidance of the 
water sector policy guidelines. 
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pumps and one protected spring) in Makondo Parish were functional. Nonetheless, despite the 
improvement in functionality rates by the end of 2011, none of the water user committees 
(WUCs) in the entire parish met the standard criteria to qualify as functioning
59
. In addition, both 
at reconnaissance and during my fieldwork, it was observed that communities simultaneously 
use both protected and unprotected water sources depending inter alia on seasonality, water 
source functionality, distance to the nearest safe water source, congestion at the source and (to 
some extent) specific water needs e.g. washing or watering animals versus cooking and drinking. 
 
Figure 12 Map of households within and outside of a one kilometre area of functional 
improved water sources  
 
Source: A Social-Spatial survey of Water Issues in Makondo Parish, Uganda (Macri et al 2013 p.25) 
                                                          
59
 WUCs are said to be functioning if they meet all of the following standards: hold meeting on a regular basis, 
collect operation and maintenance fees from the water users, undertake preventive maintenance and minor repairs on 
the water sources and if they promote proper hygiene and sanitation around the water source (GOU 2011b).  
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Community interest to contribute was said to gradually decline and eventually collapse in 
situations where water sources repeatedly broke down as mentioned in one FGI: 
 Even if people are willing to contribute to the maintenance of a water source, the moment 
 it keeps breaking down they will lose interest (Member of a WSC) 
In the context of this study, this problem poses as a disabler to O&M, particularly because the 
rate of pump failure was considerably high. Based on the data from the household survey, only 
about 7% of the 377 households with hand pumps in their villages reported that their hand pumps 
had never failed, while the rest reported that their pumps failed nearly every month (14.5%), 
about twice or more in a year (54%) or once a year (15.6%) as can be seen in figure 13 below. 
Some of the non-functional water sources had taken too long without being repaired and had 
turned out to be ‘land marks’ in the villages as some of the respondents remarked.  
Figure 13 Reported frequency of hand pump failure 
 
Pump failure/breakdown was partly attributed to bad pumping especially by the children who 
happen to be the main water collectors in the community, but also due to limited availability of 
alternative safe water facilities, resulting into high levels of congestion (photograph 1). 
According to policy guidelines for CBM in Uganda, every water and sanitation committee 
(WSC) ought to appoint a Water Source Caretaker charged among others with the responsibility 
of supervising hand pump usage/operation, especially at peak hours. However, these caretakers 
were not readily available to play this role mainly due to weaknesses in the wider CBM system 
as will be discussed later in this chapter. The ineffectiveness of the caretakers and the WSC also 
affected routine maintenance that helps to minimise the risk of hand pump break-down. Focus 
Group Discussions with the community about their roles in ensuring that water sources are 
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maintained through their contributions often led to indications from participants that the existing 
water sources were inadequate during water collection peak hours (evenings and mornings) as 
noted in one of the discussions: 
 Our shallow well is used by so many people…. We have to wake up early or go in the 
 evening and return very late in the night…. This is even dangerous for the children who 
 are the main water collectors…Sometimes we are as if we do not have an  improve water 
 source! (FGD, Community Members, Misaana Village). 
 
Photograph 1 Children queuing at improved water points in the community 
 
Source: Author’s photographs 
Results from the inquiry into the relationship between hand pump functionality and the dynamics 
around household contribution to O&M also show that some (28.4%) of the household 
respondents that reported having no hand hand-pumps in their villages had never made a 
financial contribution towards water source operation and maintenance (table 10). The same 
applies to 23.4% of the households who reported that the water sources in their villages broke 
down nearly every month. The results also suggest that some households in some villages may 
collect water from sources in other villages where they do not contribute towards the O&M of 
water sources in those villages.  Results from the logistic regression analysis presented in table 9 
also indicate that households whose main source of drinking water was protected were 1.75 
times more likely to contribute financially towards operation and maintenance of water sources 
compared to those whose main drinking water source was unprotected, although this relationship 
was statistically not significant (odds ratio = 1.75; p-value = 0.075). The results indeed 
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emphasize the fact that poor safe water service delivery affects community willingness to 
contribute towards operation and maintenance of improved point-water facilities in Makondo 
Parish. 
Table 10 Last time household made a financial contribution and how often hand pumps fail  
(N=533) 
 
Last time household made a 
financial contribution to a water 
source operation and 
maintenance 
Frequency of pump failure Total 
They 
have 
never 
failed 
Nearly 
every 
month 
Twice or 
more in a 
year 
Once 
a year 
Once 
in two 
years 
Have 
no hand 
pump 
Not 
sure 
Have never made a financial 
contribution 
N 2 11 24 6 3 59 2 107 
% 9.5 23.4 14.2 13.0 11.5 28.4 12.5 20.1 
One month ago N 1 3 15 5 4 15 1 44 
% 4.8 6.4 8.9 10.9 15.4 7.2 6.2 8.3 
Months ago N 5 16 46 7 8 30 6 118 
% 23.8 34.0 27.2 15.2 30.8 14.4 37.5 22.1 
Nearly a year ago N 4 10 40 16 4 40 2 116 
% 19.0 21.3 23.7 34.8 15.4 19.2 12.5 21.8 
More than  two years ago N 4 3 24 6 5 33 2 77 
% 19.0 6.4 14.2 13.0 19.2 15.9 12.5 14.4 
Can’t tell N 5 4 19 5 2 28 3 66 
% 23.8 8.5 11.2 10.9 7.7 13.5 18.8 12.4 
Other N 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 5 
% .0 .0 .6 2.2 .0 1.4 .0 .9 
Total N 21 47 169 46 26 208 16 533 
% 3.9 8.8 31.7 8.6 4.9 39.0 3.0 100.0 
 
Qualitative findings inquiry also indicated that due to frequent water source breakdown in 
functionality, community leaders always found it difficult to approach households for 
contributions towards operation and maintenance or repair of water sources.  
 People complain a lot whenever they are asked to contribute in short interval periods due 
 to frequent breakdowns… Many think that the last pump mechanic to repair the  water 
 source could have done sub-standard work (FGI, Village Leaders).  
It is usually difficult to explain to community members to contribute towards the repair of 
a hand pump barely a month has passed since the last contribution was made…Some can 
even tell you that you are doing business with their money just to push you away even if 
they know that the water source is actually broken down (In-depth interview, WSC 
member). 
Despite the fact that improved water facilities remain the main source of safe drinking water for 
the majority of the households in the study community, problems associated with these water 
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sources compelled nearly 40% of the households to depend on unprotected water sources for 
their drinking water needs (figure14). 
 
Figure 14 Main source of drinking water for household survey participants (N=547)  
 
An inquiry into factors that influence household choice of the source of their drinking water in 
Makondo Parish also reveals that most people choose a source for their drinking water needs 
because it is nearer (37.8%) as opposed to whether the source provides good quality water 
(23.9%). Seasonal variations and their impact on reliability of water sources, as was the case 
with the only protected spring in Makondo village, also influence the choice of where households 
go to fetch water for drinking. These results emphasise the fact that a household’s perception of 
water quality, and its proximity to an improved water source not only influenced its decisions on 
where to collect water, but also on whether to contribute towards operation, maintenance or 
repair of improved water sources. Results further indicate that open water sources (such those 
depicted in photograph 2) were attractive to some households because they were completely free 
of any financial charges while other households collected water from such sources to meet other 
needs such as cleaning and washing (figure15).  Evidence from qualitative interviews also 
indicates that some households opted to use unprotected sources because they served as an 
immediate remedy to the long distances and queues in use of improved sources. 
 Most people prefer the open water source if they need to be back  home early because of 
 the distances to functional water sources and sometimes because of long queues (FGD, 
 Community Members). 
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Photograph 2 children collecting water from an open water source in Kanyogoga village 
 
Source: Author’s photographs 
Results in figure 15 indicate that majority (37.8%) of the household respondents chose the source 
of their drinking water because it was closer to their households. Such households were likely to 
be less motivated to contribute towards O&M of water sources they perceived to be far away 
from their households. Hence, the results suggest that any efforts to enhance household 
willingness to contribute to service delivery need to be preceded by those aimed at instilling a 
positive change in water user perception of the quality of safe water service delivery in the 
community.  
Figure 15 Main reason for preferring water source as main source for drinking water  
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A long experience with poor functionality of improved water sources was compounded by low or 
intermittent water yields of the few water sources that were functional especially in dry seasons, 
affecting people’s willingness to make contributions towards repair of such water facilities. 
Similarly, community perceptions about the quality of the water from some of the functional 
improved water sources, mainly in terms of its colour (turbidity) or taste (alkalinity) were also 
important issues mentioned in qualitative interviews as critical issues affecting willingness to 
contribute towards O&M or repair of improved water sources. In Kibuye village for example, a 
non-functioning shallow well provided by the MMMs could not be repaired primarily because its 
water was ‘salty’ according to community members.  
We did not see it necessary to continue contributing money for the maintenance of that 
shallow well...it worked for only three months after construction and before it stopped 
working, many  people had already stopped contributing because the water was bad…it 
was dirty (turbid) and salty (high alkaline content) [FGD, community members]. 
The leaders indicated that in such circumstances, they faced difficulties in convincing people to 
make their contributions towards repair of such water sources. It also emerged from this study 
that at times communities perceived contractors hired to construct water sources not to value or 
respect their views and opinions regarding the location of a water source
60
. Findings from FGDs 
with community members in some villages indicate not only that community members are not 
always ‘ignorant’ but also that some contractors may lack the necessary competence required to 
make CBM systems succeed. 
We showed him (the contractor) where we preferred to have the water constructed but he 
changed to another location very near the eucalyptus forest…that is why it worked for 
only three months and later there was no water coming out of the ground because the 
eucalyptus trees drained it out! (FGD, Community Members). 
 
The findings indeed emphasise the challenges of private sector participation in safe water 
provision (Barungi et al. 2003, Carter and Danert 2003). On one hand they underpin the 
importance of enhanced technical efficiency of the contractors, and on the other, they point to the 
                                                          
60 The location of a water source depends mainly on the ground water potential (yield) as well as the chemical and biological 
quality of the water at a given site. 
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gap in the supervisory capacity of local authorities over private contractors in ensuring that 
services are delivered in ways that promote the goals of CBM. This is particularly because poor 
water yield or quality at constructed water sources may always be interpreted by the community 
as failure on the part of service providers and/or the technical incompetence of the contractors. 
As a result, any future efforts to involve communities in CBM activities risk yielding 
unsatisfactory responses from the beneficiary community as CBM demands. 
The foregoing discussion confirms earlier assertions that enhancing poor people’s ability to 
participate in demanding for better services requires providing the very services that people lack 
(Krishna 2007).  Promoting CBM requires providing better quality services that promote equity 
and sustainability goals. Building on existing local knowledge to enhance service delivery is one 
important phenomenon that service authorities in rural domestic water supply may need to 
advocate. Reducing the distances that water collectors have to walk, or the time they have to 
queue at a water source indeed helps in motivating people to contribute to operation and 
maintenance of services they perceive to meet their basic needs. This is because they could easily 
understand that service authorities are determined to meet their needs. However, providing 
physical services alone will not help to optimize chances for CBM effectiveness. More evidence 
from this study underpins the significance of other micro-level dynamics which remain critical 
for the effectiveness of CBM.  
Ad-hoc arrangements in financing O&M of point-water water facilities 
The findings of this study indicate that as a result of the ineffectiveness of WSCs, ad-hoc 
approaches to financing O&M have almost formally replaced the policy recommended monthly 
contribution to O&M. A financial contribution each household should make is determined 
whenever there is a breakdown. In most cases, the HPM estimates repair cost covering for 
instance spare parts, transport charges and professional fees for repair. On 
determining/estimating the amount, the community leaders decide on the modality for raising 
funds from the community. The common practice was that water user households are counted 
and the total cost of repair divided by the number of households known to collect water from the 
water source in order to determine the amount each of the households should contribute.  
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We would consider the cost of repair including spare-parts and the charges of the 
mechanic, then divide this cost by the number of households. We then collect that money 
and repair the machine or pay the HPM in case he repairs on credit. If there is a balance, 
then it would be used for other services upon the community’s decision (FGI, Local 
Leaders). 
Ability to pay was thus also influenced by the number of households per water source, as this 
determined the amount each household would contribute in case of a breakdown or contribution 
to capital cost of establishing a new water source
61
. The village executive council (VEC) leaders 
together with some of the active members of the WSC (in communities where they exist) take it 
upon themselves to move from household to household demanding for the contribution. The 
leaders argued that this method was increasingly becoming popular for O&M. According to 
them, collecting money for actual breakdown was more trusted and effective because people 
would know that there is ‘a problem to be solved’.  In view of this ad-hoc method, households in 
water user communities with fewer households were likely to contribute more compared to those 
that had fairly more.  
Whereas this ad-hoc approach has an in-built incentive as the qualitative findings indicate, it is 
not only unsustainable, but also perpetuates inequities that decentralisation and subsidiarity are 
meant to address. The policy recommended 300 persons per ‘public water point’ may appear to 
be a good move for enhancing equity in access (GOU 1999 p. 17), but in contexts where 
communities are struggling to maintain water facilities using such ad-hoc means as it is in 
Makondo parish, it becomes very challenging for the CBM model of service delivery.  As an 
input towards enhanced equity of service delivery, the standard monitoring indicators for rural 
domestic water supply, a hand pump in Uganda should serve 300 people while 200 persons 
should be served by a protected spring (MWE 2009 p. 31). However, adherence to this 
recommendation as a means for achieving equity remains problematic due to contextual 
differences in rural areas such as settlement patterns, geography, politics and other dynamics in 
decentralised service delivery in Uganda. My study found out that community leaders would at 
times consider certain household/individual vulnerabilities to determine exemptions or 
‘subsidies’ for some community members over their contribution to O&M. But, such exemptions 
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 The upfront contribution is always set as a standard usually 100,000 UGX or USD 40 for a shallow well, 200,000 
UGX or USD 80 for a bore hole or 45,000 UGX or USD 22 for a protected spring (MWE 2009 p. 20) 
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or ‘subsidies’ did not follow any standard criteria by the general community and were likely to 
be poorly enforced, causing reluctance on the part of other community members to contribute. 
 Families headed by young children or widows do not pay this money. The chairperson of 
 the village and his/her  committee always top-up on behalf of these two groups (Focus 
 Group Meeting with Village Chair persons) 
The arguments for the increasing adoption of the ad-hoc approach in community financing of 
safe water service delivery relates in part, to accountability and efficiency questions on funds 
collected. However, there is also a great potential for this approach to breed conflict and 
confusion within the community. The study shows that the responsibility to determine how much 
each household was to contribute depended on the estimated cost of repair whose precision and 
objectivity many people tended to dispute. There were also no clear mechanism identified on 
how the funds collected in excess of the actual need would be kept or utilised, nor was it easy for 
leaders to convince community members to contribute more to take care of the balance in case of 
a deficit in financing. 
I would prefer the monthly contributions because if there is any breakdown, it can be 
repaired on time. People can spend many days without water if they contribute as and 
when the facility breaks down! Sometimes the money needed cannot be collected in time 
because it is a lot! (KII, Community Development Worker) 
It was also found out in this study that the burden of responsibility for ad-hoc financing was 
almost entirely that of the village executive council leadership rather than the WSCs, who in the 
CBM framework are the community structures directly responsible. In some cases, the VEC 
leaders would borrow money in order to pay the mechanic after work. They would then go on to 
collect contributions from the community which they would use to cover the debt. It was also 
found out in qualitative interviews that in some situations, the VEC leaders would negotiate with 
the HPM who would accept to repair on credit, and later be paid after contributions have been 
collected from the community. These approaches were reported to have been problematic 
because when approached for contributions, some community members would argue asking why 
more money was being demanded when the water source was already repaired, while others 
would ask for more time to observe the functionality of the repaired water source before paying. 
This time one village member gave us money for the rehabilitation of our borehole….but 
we are getting challenges of paying him back because many of the people we approach 
170 
 
ask us to first give them time to see what happens with the water source (Interview, 
Village Leader) 
On a rather positive note, the HPM could accept to repair on credit and give leaders an 
opportunity to collect community contributions in order to pay at a future date as a way of 
mitigating the pressure leaders would have to endure collecting community contributions in a 
single round in their villages. However, this was not a good culture for the community to adopt 
as eventually the burden of payment was seen to be borne by the village leader who directly bore 
the pressure from the HPM. In addition, where payment was not forthcoming as expected, the 
HPM would be reluctant to respond to calls for help, thereby negatively affecting the relationship 
build based on trust. Based on the above, despite the ‘convenience’ ad-hoc methods gave to 
community leaders, the extent to which such methods helped in building the much needed 
community trust over the way their O&M contributions are handled is highly questionable. This 
limited community trust not only undermined community willingness to pay but also worked 
against the ideals of CBM and long term service sustainability.   
Household capacity for self-supply and dynamics associated with 
water vending   
Study findings from the qualitative inquiry indicate that some of the households that were able to 
supply themselves with water were reluctant to contribute towards O&M or repair of improved 
water sources. Such households mainly included those that were able to buy water from water 
vendors or those that had put in place rain water harvesting technologies at their homes. Those 
that paid for water from water vendors argued that by paying for O&M, they would be paying 
double and did not care where the vendors obtained the water they sold to them. Both qualitative 
and quantitative findings indicate that these were also mainly households that lived in trading 
centres. 
 Some of the households in trading centres of Kibuye, Kyamukama and  Makondo 
 villages buy water from water vendors, or simply ‘contract’ some individuals to  fetch 
 water for them on a daily basis (KII, Community Development Worker). 
Survey results also indicate that there were more households paying for water but which were 
not located in trading centres, although this may also have to do with the fact that there were 
relatively few trading centres in the study community as already indicated on the map in figure 
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12. In addition, slightly more than half (50.7%) of the household respondents who indicated that 
they never use water vendors lived in trading centers. In addition, while the use of water vendors 
depended on factors such as weather, not all the households that reported always using water 
from water vendors were located in trading centres (table 11).  
Table 11Household location and use of water vendors 
 
Times when household using water  
vendors for their water needs 
Location of Household in the village 
Within a trading centre Along a road, but not in 
the trading centre 
Completely 
off the Road 
Total 
Never at all  N 38 169 167 374 
% 50.7 65.0 78.8 68.4 
Sometimes, in wet and dry seasons N 8 16 11 35 
% 10.7 6.2 5.2 6.4 
Yes, only in the dry season N 26 56 23 105 
% 34.7 21.5 10.8 19.2 
Always N 2 8 8 18 
% 2.7 3.1 3.8 3.3 
When children are not at home  N 1 11 3 15 
% 1.3 4.2 1.4 2.7 
Total N 75 260 212 547 
% 13.7 47.5 38.7 100 
 
Whereas qualitative findings indicated that households that had self supply options were 
reluctant contribute towards operation and maintenance of improved water sources, results from 
the regression analysis of household survey data indicated that such households, especially those 
that reported buying water from water vendors contributed to general community development 
initiatives (table 7). It was also mentioned in qualitative interviews that some of the households 
that depended on water vendors and/or those that had water harvesting tanks sometimes 
contributed to O&M of improved water sources because such households would also 
occasionally use protected water sources especially in long dry periods or when they held big 
functions such as wedding parties or funerals.  
Some households who have rainwater harvesting tanks are difficult to approach for 
money when our shallow well breaks down.  They shout at you saying that for them they 
have their tanks, yet when such people have funerals or weddings their water cannot be 
enough. Others are however, willing to support financially by even giving more than 
what everyone else is supposed to pay because they have a good heart (KII, Village 
Leader). 
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Some leaders in villages where water vending was common e.g. in Kyamukama, Makondo and 
Kibuye were beginning to transfer the burden of paying onto the water vendors by charging them 
more money compared to what everyone else had to pay. In order to keep in business, some 
vendors comply while others pay for a few months and then default because of a weak 
monitoring capacity by the leaders. Besides, the water vendors also expressed concerns that such 
fees would require that they too increase prices, which their customers would complain about 
and possibly find other suppliers willing to offer cheaper services: 
For me I am happy to pay 5000 Uganda Shillings per month provided the water source 
keeps working. My only problem is that it has not been possible to increase the price of a 
Jerrycan of water to meet these costs… My customers will not accept paying a high fee 
and they can also easily find a cheaper supplier (Water Vendor). 
Some community members in these villages where water vending was common also complained 
that the water sources had been taken over by water vendors who according to them were ‘selling 
the water’ and ‘should repair’ their water source as mentioned in some of the FGDs. 
Interestingly, some of the water vendors interviewed believed that their businesses would allow 
them to ensure that the water sources keep functioning, which would be to their benefit and the 
general community. 
We are many water vendors …. I had proposed that as water vendors, we should 
contribute a certain fee towards the water facility maintenance, but this wasn’t accepted 
by some village committee members for fear that we would eventually own the water, 
which was not the case (Water Vendor) 
 
In Luyiyi Kaate village for example, the conflict was compounded by the fact that the main water 
vendor was also the caretaker of the water source, who some community members felt that ‘he 
owned the water source’ as one of the village leaders observed, causing considerable challenges 
in mobilising contributions from water users for repair whenever the water source broke down. 
Paradoxically, however, other community members took the same care taker as a great resource 
in keeping the water source clean and free from damage by children who liked playing with the 
pump: 
He lives near the water source but also fetches the water more than anyone else because it 
is his business, but some people are not happy with him selling water… He is the only 
one capable of keeping the water source safe by ensuring that children do not litter 
around it or play with the pump (In-depth Interview, Community Member) 
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These results not only confirm arguments that water is increasingly becoming a commodity even 
in rural areas (Bond 2004), but also confirms the fact that achieving equity in access to safe 
water services in rural sub-Saharan Africa is still a challenging goal (Cleaver and Hamada 2010). 
In addition, contrary to the belief that water vending is an activity exclusively practiced in urban 
settings, rural households that afford the cost of services are capable of engaging water vendors 
to meet their safe water supply needs. But the same households could also support activities 
meant to enhance O&M of improved water facilities. As past studies have indicated, households 
which pay for water from water vendors end up paying more than they could pay for O&M of 
water facilities (Whittington, Lauria and Mu 1991). The results also point towards the need for 
enhancing cooperation between vendors and the general community of water users, well as 
consumers of the services of water vendors. This would ensure that conflicts emanating from 
their diverse interests do not severely affect overall safe water service delivery in the community. 
Declining community trust in local leadership capacity to steer CBM 
The success of CBM greatly depends on the extent to which local leaders demonstrate 
commitment to service delivery through strategies that build trust and cohesiveness at the 
community level. Building trust in the CBM service delivery framework is indeed a measure of 
how WSCs and the VEC leaders are exemplary in working together as a team to serve their 
people as the literature on community emablement has emphasised the importance of leadership 
as a precursor for community participation (Mulwa 1994, Smith 2000, Helmsing 2002). In the 
context of this study, elected WSCs and the village executive council (VEC) leadership indeed 
remain very crucial institutions for CBM effectiveness. Survey results on community perceptions 
about how much say certain categories of people or institutions in their locality have in getting 
government to address issues of interest to them indeed indicate that leaders, i.e. politicians 
(70.5%), village/community leaders (65.3%) were believed to have a higher likelihood to engage 
local government authorities over issues related to service delivery in their localities. 
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Table 12 Categories of people/institutions and community perception of their   
  influence in getting government to address issues of interest to them  
Categories of people/Institutions A lot Some Little None Don’t 
know 
Total 
(N) 
Children N 104 78 57 201 105 545 
% 19.1 14.3 10.5 36.9 19.3 100 
 Youth N 88 116 141 100 99 544 
% 16.2 21.3 25.9 18.4 18.2 100 
The elderly N 52 56 128 211 93 540 
% 9.6 10.4 23.7 39.1 17.2 100 
The educated N 229 117 53 67 71 537 
% 42.6 21.8 9.9 12.5 13.2 100 
The uneducated N 20 24 66 311 106 527 
% 3.8 4.6 12.5 59.0 20.1 100 
Politicians N 377 90 23 16 29 535 
% 70.5 16.8 4.3 3.0 5.4 100 
Civil servants N 386 80 14 23 32 535 
% 72.1 15.0 2.6 4.3 6.0 100 
NGOs/CBOs N 318 117 22 28 56 541 
% 58.1 21.4 4.1 5.2 10.4 100 
Religious groups N 311 99 63 21 47 541 
% 57.5 18.3 11.6 3.9 8.7 100 
 Village Leaders (civil and political) N 357 105 36 15 33 546 
% 65.3 19.2 6.6 2.7 6.0 100 
 
Paradoxically, qualitative findings suggested that local politicians seeking political popularity 
often discouraged people from making any contributions towards O&M arguing that  water was 
provided freely by government. The findings further indicate that the capacity of VEC leaders to 
effectively monitor service delivery at the community level was getting weaker due to overstay 
in office
62
 and the subsequent ‘increase in loss of recognition and respect from some of the 
community members’ as some of leaders observed. Consequently, some local leaders were 
reported to have resorted to taking community decisions in consultation with a few village elites 
without convening community meetings as the law requires. It was commonly observed in 
interviews and discussions with the community and other stakeholders that the conduct of some 
of the leaders was derailing prospects for successful community based interventions.  
The main issue constraining community willingness to contribute to O&M is lack of 
transparency regarding the funds they collect. ...and it should not matter whether the 
money is contributed monthly or whenever there is breakdown (KII, Lwengo District) 
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 The expiry of their five year term occurred in 2001 and since then government has failed to organise fresh elections. 
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Some leaders took advantage of breakdowns to ‘earn’ money, and in extreme cases, they were 
reported to premeditate some of the breakdowns in order to defraud unsuspecting water users. 
In one of the villages, the person who was trained to do simple repairs on a borehole 
would connive with the local leader to periodically remove the chain of the pump so as to 
collect money from water users for its repair and eventually share the money after 
replacing the chain… (KII, Community Development Worker) 
In rural contexts such as Makondo Parish, the problem of premeditated water source breakdown 
is compounded by the lack of vigilance by community members which limits their ability to 
quickly detect and /or report such fraudlent practices. While there was an official HPM allocated 
to the community under the sub-county local government public private partnership 
arrangements, it was still unlikely that such unscrupulous conduct by some caretakers would be 
detected. In some instances, community members that would accept to contribute would also do 
so ‘grudgingly’ because they did not adequately trust their leaders. 
Community people are not always sure about what usually goes on… People have lost 
the spirit of serving others without exploiting them… If an expensive spare part is fitted 
in a broken down hand pump without proper explanation, people may become suspicious 
and fail to contribute money for its repair (KII, Local NGO) 
These results confirm on one hand, that the capacity and competence of local leadership, and 
politicians at local or national governments is critical for the mobilisation of the general public to 
engage service providers on the quality and adequacy of service delivery.  However, on the other 
hand, the gradual decline in the way the leaders are perceived by the community as trusted 
service providers working in the best interest of the community suggests that these institutions 
may not be adequately prepared to to steer local level development initiatives in Uganda’s 
current rural context. This was compounded by the fact that community members are also not 
quite enthusiastic to attend village meetings as elaborated later in this chapter. 
Community perception of right to services and declining trust over 
government responsiveness to needs 
CBM is conceived from the wider concepts of demand responsive approaches (DRA) to service 
delivery and community empowerment (Whittington, et al. 2009, Schouten and Moriarty 2003). 
Hence, it ought to thrive among communities that are not only capable of knowing their rights 
but also initiating the demand for such rights or services among others through self-organisation. 
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Both qualitative and quantitative findings demonstrate a low community perception of their right 
to engage government institutions over the delivery of improved safe water services in their 
localities. Survey results show that only 6.6% of the household survey participants indicated that 
they had unlimited rights, while most (41.3%) mentioned that they had no influence, or very 
limited say (38.4%) in making government to address issues of safe water service delivery in 
their localities (figure 16).  
Figure 16 Respondent perception of individual right to demand for improved water services from 
government 
 
 
The results further indicate that only 27.6% of the household respondents knew that they were 
completely free to express themselves on safe water issues without fearing government reprisal, 
while 31.8% indicated that they were not free at all (Figure 17).  
Figure 17 How free household respondents felt they were to express themselves on safe water issues in their 
community without fearing government reprisal  
 
Results from the household survey corroborated well the observations made in some of the key 
informant interviews in which respondents rated quite low, the capacity of communities to 
adequately engage with government over the quality of services.  
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As far as people’s awareness on their rights such as clean water, education and health is 
concerned, I can rate Makondo Parish at fourty percent…mainly because of poverty and 
poor politics that keep people confused and looking at politicians and their constant 
promises (KII, Civil Servant). 
Based on the above, it can be argued that rural communities in Uganda are largely still recipients 
of services and less capable of aggressively engaging with actors such as government over 
planning and delivery of services. Therefore, in the NPM framework, efforts to enhance CBM in 
rural safe water supply ought to focus among others on building the capacity and confidence of 
communities not only to engage with government but also other service providers in more 
collaborative/partnership arrangements. Past studies have indeed shown that collective action 
helps to mitigate transactions costs inherent in service delivery (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha 
2009, Bel, Fageda and Mur 2012), and this is not a concern exclusively true of formal 
cooperative arrangements between institutions. CBM is a form of cooperation between the water 
users and service providers. 
Community capacity building on rights not only enhances processes of downward accountability, 
but also builds the much needed trust and cooperation among the different actors engaged in 
CBM for rural safe water supply efficiency and sustainability. This study found out that the 
extent to which communities trusted that government will perfom its service delivery duty in 
their best interest was quite limited. Some of the observations made in FGDs and in-depth 
interviews with the community clearly reflect this limited trust. 
We trust that government will deliver services after we have actually seen the services. 
They always make promises and promises…towards elections they are very serious, but 
after elections you will have to wait for another five years (FGD, Community Members, 
Misaana Village) 
We normally write to the sub-county but they do not get back to us… During election 
time, politicians make a follow up on such requisitions and/ or work on the faulty 
boreholes. However, they don’t last long before getting spoilt again (Chairperson, Village 
Executive Committee). 
These observations indeed emphasise the experiences communities have had with regard to the 
inadequacies government actors/institutions have in responding to community needs. Such 
community attitudes and experiences serve to compromise levels of motivation by the 
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communities to participate in government programmes including those related to CBM. Further 
qualitative evidence from the community also indicates that government actors were believed to 
be more dishonest in the way they implemented water programmes compared to actors from the 
NGO sector.  
Government used to store faulty spare parts and later use them to repair boreholes… The 
MMMs (a Project of the Catholic Nuns in the Community) have a good system of 
repairing breakdowns because for them they purchase these parts from Kampala 
(Uganda’s Capital) [FGD, Community Members] 
Results obtained from the analysis of findings from the household survey also underpin the issue 
of limited community trust in government to deliver services to the community. Only 7.7% of 
the household respondents mentioned that they trusted that government was interested in the 
service of their communities.  About three quarters (43.1%) mentioned that they sometimes trust 
government, while over a quarter (28%) mentioned that they never trust that government service 
delivery systems will ever be in the best interest of the people (figure 18). 
Figure 18 Extent of community trust in government service delivery  
 
In the NPM and governance framework, public and community collaborations are highly 
emphasised strategies for ensuring service delivery efficiency and sustainability (Skelcher 2005). 
However, these collaborations are largely based on trust building. Hence, community trust and 
confidence in the capacity of service providers is an important pre-condition for meaningful 
public-community collaborations. The evidence generated from this study shows that these 
partnerships and collaborations, which are crucial for CBM and functional sustainability of rural 
domestic water supply infrastructure are being threatened by fading trust. While the NPM policy 
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framework  calls for a new set of actors in public service planning and delivery, the role of 
government in direct service delivery remains crucial for communities in developing contexts 
such as Uganda. But this role is being undermined by limited government effort to consciously 
build such trust. Recent experiences especially in Africa have also shown that citizen perception 
of an unresponsive government in terms of service delivery  not only lead to limited ownership 
and sustainability of community based programmes, but also radical declines in trust and the 
consequent wide spread civil uprisings. The civil uprisings in North Africa provide the most 
recent example.  
Community interface with contradictory government programmes and 
policies 
Compounding the problem of a declining community trust of government programmes and their 
willingness to participate in such programmes is what communities perceived in this study as  
policy inconsistencies or contradictions. Throughout the FGDs and interviews, communities 
always asked why they had to pay for water when primary and secondary education services and 
some immunisation programmes were provided for free. This they mentioned in reference to 
Universal Secondary and Primary Education (USE/UPE), and mass immunisation programmes 
for polio and measles for children that were provided freely by government. 
Very often people ask why it is water that they have to contribute to as opposed to other 
government programmes which, according to them were as important as basic access to 
safe drinking water (In-depth Interview, Local Leader) 
The suspension of graduated tax collection in 2001 is another government decision found to be 
impacting negatively on CBM, despite its popularity among the male populace. Community 
leaders indicated that they were grappling with this challenge whenever they wanted to justify 
the need for financial contributions both to the initial cost of construction and for routine 
maintenance or repair of water sources. They particularly argued that ‘the policy’ was not only 
deligitimising cost-sharing, but also reduced local government revenues that would have 
otherwise filled some of the funding gaps in central government conditional grants. According to 
them, such funds would be utilised to solve problems such as those experienced in the rural 
domestic water supply services. 
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It was from local graduated tax disbursements to communities (villages/parishes) that 
community problems such as the repair of water sources, public toilets and other projects  
would be funded especially if there was an emergency…The villages used to receive 25 
percent of the taxes collected in a sub-county but this is now history and that is why 
almost all community projects depend on community contributions (FGI with Village 
Leaders) 
These perceptions on policy contradictions also underpin the need to explore mechanisms for 
guaranteeing regular community education on government approaches to service delivery. 
Communities in rural Uganda and sub-Saharan Africa tend to depend so much on a few elite 
members in their localities for policy interpretation. These elites are however not always able to 
provide such interpretation with minimal subjectivity. Consequently, this often requires that 
service providers and polititians invest more time and other resources in explaining why 
government policies may sometimes look contradictory even if they may not intend to depict 
themselves as such. Empirical literaure has shown that provision of timely and reliable 
information to citizens can enhance the quality of public service delivery (Krishna 2007), more 
especially in the water and sanitation sector (Jacobson and Network 2010) 
Weak and de-motivated WSCs and gradual transfer of their CBM roles 
to Village Executive Council Leaders  
In the context of Uganda and the study community, village executive council (VEC) leaders and 
WSC members constitute primary actors on whom CBM of point-water facilities depends. While 
both committees are important, the WSC remains the most critical under CBM. According to 
water sector guidelines for Uganda, a functional WSC should have an operation and maintenance 
plan, it ought to collect, keep and account for monthly contributions from water users, have a 
signed contract with a hand pump mechanic, meet regularly and quickly report water system 
breakdowns whenever they occur. A WSC should also have in place well-articulated bye-laws 
with clear sanctions to non-compliance by the water user community. The WSC should routinely 
carry out O&M of the water facility including cleaning the site and should have a tool kit kept by 
the sub-county chief or a member of the WSC (MWE 2011). However, based on the findings of 
this study, it none of the improved water sources in Makondo parish had a WSC that met the 
above parameters. It also was found out that WSCs tend to be active immediately after 
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inauguration of newly constructed water sources, but later lose the interest as was observed in a 
number of interviews with key informants.  
These committees tend to be very active initially after they have formed…I do not know 
whether they develop expectations which eventually end up not being fulfilled….because 
after one year or a number of months of forming they start disintegrating, leaving the work to 
the caretaker or the LCs (Local village executive councils) [KII, Lwengo District]. 
The WSC is very important if it is well trained and has members who are patriotic… But 
they tend to lose morale with time. That is why they need continuous training (Key 
Informant, Local NGO) 
Results from the household survey findings on the community’s perception of the performance 
and functionality of WSCs also indicate a somewhat average percetion, with most of the 
respondents who reported having WSCs rating the performance of their committees as very good 
(15.2%), good (40.5%), and fair (29.8%) [table 13]. However, an analysis of the reasons 
repondents provided in favour of the performance of the WSCs produced mixed results including 
reasons that contradicted Uganda’s rural water policy expectations. For instance, some (19.5%) 
of the household respondents rated their WSCs as good  because they did not harass/mistreat or 
impose sanctions on people or households that defaulted contributing to the initial cost of 
construction or to O&M of water facilities (table 13). This contradiction clearly reflects policy 
competence gaps within the community partly because of the irregularity of community 
meetings, and undermines CBM ideals. Indeed, a limited percentage of those who felt that the 
performance of WSCs was poor complained about irregular meetings (42.1%), lack of 
transparency by the members (10.2%) or general failure to perform their stipulated roles and 
responsibilities (68.4%).  
 
Compounding the problem is the fact that CBM models as stipulated in the policy are silent on 
when the community should replace an existing WSC regardless of whether it is functional or 
not. As reflected from the experiences of stakeholders in Makondo Parish, water source 
breakdowns are not quickly attended to when WSCs are de-motivated or disintegrated. In 
addition, as indicated in table 13, when water sources are attended to, the methods or approaches 
used in their repair often fall short of the laid out policy guidelines for CBM, resulting into 
weaker prospects for functional sustainability of water facilities.   
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Table 13 Community rating of the performance of WSCs and reasons for the rating   
Reasons for rating of the performance of the WSC 
(Multiple responses were allowed) 
Rating of the performance of the WSC  Total  
Very good Good Fair Poor Can’t tell 
Regular meetings N 7 8 1 0 0 16 
%  25.0 10.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 8.7 
Transparent N 11 10 6 0 1 28 
%  39.3 13.5 10.9 0.0 12.5 15.2 
Give feedback to community on their 
deliberations 
N 11 21 16 0 1 49 
%  39.3 28.4 29.1 0.0 12.5 26.6 
Financially accountable N 2 9 3 0 0 14 
%  7.1 12.2 5.5 0.0 0.0 7.6 
Takes good care of the water source N 17 47 15 0 0 79 
%  60.7 63.5 27.3 0.0 0.0 42.9 
Do not hold regular meetings N 0 0 11 8 0 19 
%  0.0 0.0 20.0 42.1 0.0 10.3 
Are not transparent N 0 0 2 2 0 4 
%  0.0 0.0 3.6 10.5 0.0 2.2 
Do not perform their stipulated roles N 0 2 14 13 0 29 
%  0.0 2.7 25.5 68.4 0.0 15.8 
Do not harass/ mistreat/deny water access to fees 
defaulters 
N 4 33 21 0 2 60 
%  14.3 44.6 38.2 0.0 25.0 32.6 
Total N 28 74 55 19 8 184 
% 15.2 40.2 29.8 10.3 4.3 100 
 
Owing to weak and disintegrated WSCs, O&M of point water facilities has tended to rely heavily 
on village executive councils (VEC) especially their chair persons of the villages in which a 
particular water source is located. However, the level of commitment of these leaders also 
seemingly depended on their future political ambitions, or how ‘connected’ they were to other 
politicians and/or service providers. In nearly all the villages in Makondo, the village executive 
council had almost replaced the WSCs regardless of whether the members of WSCs partially 
existed in their respective villages or not. In a limited number of cases,  such as in Kiganjo and 
Makondo villages, fairly active members of the two groups (VEC and WSC) worked together, 
although they also exhibited low levels of motivation. Nevertheless, results from the regression 
analysis presented earlier in table 9 show that households which were mobilized by VECs were 
29.89 (p-value = 0.000) times more likely to say that they had ever made a financial contribution 
to operation, maintenance or repair of their main water  source compared to those households 
which were not mobilized at all. While households which were mobilized by water user 
committee were 63.47 (p-value = 0.006) times more likely to say that they have ever made a 
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financial contribution to operation, maintenance or repair of their main water source compared to 
those households which were not mobilized at all.  
 
It should be noted however, that community members were not always able to distinguish 
between VECs and WSCs at the community level, as these seemed to play CBM roles 
interchangeably. In some isolated cases, only caretakers of water sources remained working very 
closely with the chairpersons of the VECs in taking responsibility for O&M of their water 
sources. Caretakers tended to remain active more than the rest of the WSC members mainly 
because, by CBM design, priority for their selection is given to their proximity to the water 
sources. Some of the caretakers who remained working after the disintegration of their 
committees were reported to have started demanding for a financial compensation from the 
community and the village leaders arguing that ‘the work was too much for an individual’. For 
example, during one of the revitalisation meetings in Misaana village, the caretaker of the 
shallow well made it explicit to the village members that he needed to be paid, arguing that ‘the 
water source operation and maintenance had been left to him alone’.  
 
Whereas the village executive leadership may remain a useful ‘temporary’ replacement of 
disintegrated or de-motivated members of the WSCs, the study also found out that their 
legitimacy was growing weaker as a result of their overstay in office, having missed elections 
thrice since 2001
63
. Besides, there is an inexplicable gradual decline in government support for 
fully enforceable bye-laws at the community level to ease the work of village councils. While 
such bye-laws would help in ensuring community compliance with public policies and service 
delivery models that demand user contributions as is required in the CBM model of rural safe 
water supply, the legitimacy and local government support for the development of enforceable 
community bye-laws had almost diminished. 
 
It is believed in the rural water sector in Uganda as it is in the literature that having female 
members occupying key positions on the WSC such as the positions of chairperson, treasurer and 
secretary enhances opportunities for functional sustainability of improved point-water sources 
                                                          
63
 There is an ongoing belief in Uganda that after endorsing multi-party politics, the ruling National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) government became cautious on allowing village level electoral politics for fear of dividing communities along party-
lines without mechanisms of mitigating the likely conflicts that would potentially emerge from the process  (Kaheru 2013) 
184 
 
(MWE 2009, Cleaver and Hamada 2010, Asaba, et al. 2013). However, the results of this study 
show that none of the existing WSCs in the study community was chaired by a woman. The 
results further show that although relatively more women occupied the position of treasurer 
(45.8%) or secretary (28.1%), their participation in this position was still lower than that of men 
(table 14).  
Table 14 Gender participation in water management committees  
  
Position on the Water and sanitation Committee 
Gender Composition of Existing WSCs  
Total Male Female Not sure/ 
Can’t tell 
Chair person N 129 14 5 148 
% 87.2 9.5 3.4 100 
Vice chair person N 44 35 19 98 
% 44.9 35.7 19.4 100 
Secretary N 63 32 19 114 
% 55.5 28.1 16.5 100 
Treasurer N 59 60 12 131 
% 45 45.8 9.2 100 
Care taker N 117 3 10 130 
% 90 2.3 7.7 100 
Ex-official N 45 9 26 80 
% 56.3 11.3 32.5 100 
Advisor N 41 4 32 77 
% 53.2 5.2 41.6 100 
Information/Public Relations Officer N 70 15 12 97 
% 72.2 15.5 12.4 100 
 
The results show that prospects for CBM effectiveness to benefit from the existence of women 
on WSCs for their functionality remain limited. Besides, Uganda’s water policy itself does not 
explicitly state whether women should be chairpersons of the committees, nor are there 
deliberate and regular WSC revitalisation exercises conducted in which communities would be 
advised to elect female chairpersons. 
As earlier elaborated, the concept of enablement emphasises the significance of an effective 
community leadership system (Smith 2000, Helmsing 2002). In the context of CBM, an effective 
system of local leadership ensures that regular community sensitisation meetings and follow-up 
support to WSCs and the general community of water users are undertaken. Frontline local 
government service providers in partnership with the private for-profit and not-for profit actors 
are best placed to provide this support to communities. However, as this study has shown, this 
important CBM function is not effectively being carried out.  
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Irregularity of community/WSC meetings and a growing culture for 
people shunning community meetings 
One of the indicators of a functional CBM system is the ability of WSC to mobilise the rest of 
the water user community for meetings over their roles and responsibilities in water and 
sanitation issues (Montgomery, Bartram and Elimelech 2009, Brikké 2000). Regular community 
meetings not only provide an opportunity for community leaders to sensitise members on the 
need for safe water, but also allow leaders to make the necessary clarifications on community 
contributions to O&M as was observed in one of the WSC revitalisation meetings in Makondo 
and Kibuye villages (photograph 3). It is also within such meetings that accountability for 
previous contributions are made, which help in strengthening community trust for the WSCs in 
managing their funds. However, findings from this study show that WSCs are still faced with 
challenges of effectiveness not only in organising general community meetings but also their 
own management meetings over O&M.  
 
Photograph 3 Community leader and the hand pump HPM clarifying roles of the community 
and the WSCs in Makondo and Kibuye villages  
 
Source: Author’s photograph 
 
Household survey results show that nearly half (44.6%) of the household survey participants had 
never heard or personally witnessed any community meeting being convened by the WSCs to 
discuss water related issues. Only a quarter (21.7%) of the respondents mentioned that meetings 
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were taking place at least once a year, while 19.3% could not tell whether the meetings had been 
taking place or not (figure 19).  
 
Figure 19 Frequency of general community meetings over safe water supply water issues  (N=533) 
 
Furthermore, the results show that nearly half (42.4%) of the household survey participants who 
reported a presence of WSCs in their communities (N=184) were not sure if any WSC meeting 
had ever been convened, 13% could not remember, while only about 30% mentioned that WSCs 
met within months ago or the previous month (figure 22).  
Figure 20 Last time the WSC is known to have met (N=184) 
 
To further illustrate the importance of regular meetings in impacting on the O&M systems for 
improved point-water facilities, results from the regression analysis presented earlier in table 9 
indicate that households whose main water sources had their WSC holding meetings more than 
once in a year were 8.79 (p-value = 0.000) times more likely to say that they had ever made a 
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financial contribution to operation, maintenance or repair of their main water source compared to 
households whose WSC had never met at all. 
The general loss of interest by the community to attend community meetings not only reflected 
the weaknesses in capacity and performance of WSCs but also gradually impacted negatively on 
people’s perception of the importance or relevance of CBM systems. Qualitative findings from 
interviews with leaders indicate that people hardly attend community meetings unless the 
meetings concern security matters in their localities. As such, it was almost official among the 
community leaders that for every community meeting organised, security issues had to be a 
priority on the agenda. As a coping mechanism, the leaders also try to ensure that there is a 
security personnel (usually a police officer) to speak on security issues in the area before 
allowing the rest of the time for the discussion of ‘other issues’, with priority given to the actual 
purpose of the meeting. 
If you want a high attendance for a community meeting, security must be number one on 
the agenda…and people will come in big numbers when they hear that there will be 
police….some people will fear that if they do not come they will be the first suspects in 
case anything happens (Local Leader).  
While this coping strategy was found to be preferred by the leaders, it remained a temporary 
measure that is also potentially likely to ‘delegitimise’ future calls for water related community 
meetings, more particularly when security issues are no longer able to attract attention. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that bye-laws and sanctions for people who deliberately 
dodge community meetings have for a long time not been supported at village level as they were 
in the past.  
As earlier elaborated, gender participation in CBM systems is widely believed to leverage 
opportunities for the sustainability of services. Using a gender lens, qualitative interview results 
indicated that men were more likely to shun meetings about O&M of water facilities compared 
to women. The results underpinned men’s tendency to prefer activities where they could earn an 
income as opposed to attending community meetings, leaving meetings to the women or 
children, although it was considered by women as men’s usual pretence.  
The men pretend to be busy doing ‘more important things’ and will always have no time 
for meetings that do not bring any money to them at the end. They always claim that they 
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have to go and work for money because they must provide for their families…So they 
always ask their wives or children to go for the meeting (FGD with women) 
Some men do not even know where the water sources are located in the community. 
Women and children fetch water. When meetings are called upon, the highest percentage 
attendance is the women. …and some men start leaving even before the meeting has 
ended. (Female FGD participant) 
Based on the household survey, the reasons provided for this gender disparity in attending water 
related meetings related to the generally held beliefs that care most about the water needs in their 
households (51.2%), or because they are more affected when there is scarcity of safe water 
supply in the households (24%) including bearing the cost of treating members in their 
households who may suffer water related ailments (Table 15) 
Table 15 Respondent knowledge and perception of gender differences in attendance 
of community meetings and reasons for the gender disparities   
Reasons why women/men attend/don’t 
attend community meetings regarding water 
Attendance of community meetings by Gender Total 
Both men and 
women equally 
Mainly 
women attend 
Mainly men 
attend 
Can’t 
tell 
Don’t 
know 
They care most about water in the 
household 
N 9 66 6 1 2 84 
% 36.0 51.2 15.4 14.3 28.6 40.6 
They are affected most when water is not 
available 
N 3 31 1 0 0 35 
% 12.0 24.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 16.9 
They spend/incur expenses when water-
related diseases attack household members 
N 0 0 13 0 1 14 
% 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 14.3 6.8 
Are more educated than women N 0 1 1 1 1 4 
% 0.0 0.8 2.6 14.3 14.3 1.9 
They do not care about water or its 
availability in the household 
N 2 7 1 5 1 16 
% 8.0 5.4 2.6 71.4 14.3 7.7 
Spend money on repair and maintenance 
of water pump/source 
N 3 0 8 0 1 12 
% 12.0 0.0 20.5 0.0 14.3 5.8 
Men send women/their children to 
represent them in the meetings 
N 0 17 0 0 1 18 
% 0.0 13.2 0.0 0.0 14.3 8.7 
Are responsible for attending the meetings N 8 7 9 0 0 24 
% 32.0 5.4 23.1 0.0 0.0 11.6 
Total N 25 129 39 7 7 207 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Other observations made during the study indicated that the men already know that the meetings 
are about financial contributions towards O&M which they cannot make unless they are given 
time to go and work for the money.  
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They believe it is better their wives go for the meetings  because they believe that their 
role is more to do with paying money on repair and maintenance of water sources, 
although women in many cases are the ones who pay the money from the sale of their 
harvests (In-depth Interview, Community Leader) 
Paradoxically, it was mentioned that when there are ‘very pressing issues’ in the community, the 
men are even more likely mobilise one another to turn up in bigger numbers to express 
themselves to the leaders or ‘pin-down the officers’ as one community leader stated it. Also, 
what is discussed or prioritised at the meetings, the convener as well as moderator at the meeting 
may matter a lot for the effectiveness of the meetings, and of the future of the CBM of rural 
domestic water supply. It was observed during field work that meetings convened by village 
leaders were likely to attract more people than those called by members of the WSCs in 
communities where they still existed.  
Photograph 4 A WSC revitalisation meeting in Kibuye village  
  
 
Source: Author’s Photographs 
The loss of this enthusiasm is indeed a disabler to CBM. In a WSC revitalisation meeting 
organised during fieldwork in Kibuye village (photograph 4), it was observed that many people 
continued to carrying out their activities in close proximity to the meeting place, despite being 
given reminders. Many pledged that they would attend but could not show up or would simply 
tell the mobilisers that they will go by the decisions at the meeting giving different excuses. One 
of the men in Kibuye trading centre was for instance heard saying; ‘I will give them whatever 
they will decide as a contribution. There is no need to close my shop’. Men were indeed seen 
walking away in the middle of the meeting and could not return. 
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Inadequate community knowledge of the role of WSC in convening regular meetings also greatly 
undermines CBM. Community knowledge of this role and others is not only important for trust, 
respect or confidence building between the community and their leaders, but is also an important 
aspect for accountability over funds for O&M. Results from interviews with household survey 
participants suggest that the community in Makondo Parish was not completely ignorant of the 
roles and responsibilities of their WSCs. Most respondents mentioned collecting funds for 
operation and maintenance (59.7%), cleaning around the water source (30.9%) and supervising 
pumping (25%) as the functions of the WSCs. A considerable percentage also mentioned 
reporting of breakages (22.2%) and routine maintenance/oiling and greasing (14.6%) as other 
roles (table 16).  
Table 16 Respondents’ knowledge of the roles and responsibilities of WSCs (N=184) 
 Knowledge and Roles and responsibilities of WSCs Frequency (multiple response 
allowed) 
Percent 
Collecting money for Operation & Maintenance 110 59.7 
Cleaning the source 57 30.9 
Routine maintenance 27 14.6 
Supervising water source operation 46 25 
Undertaking minor repairs 11 5.9 
Reporting major breakages 41 22.2 
Organising community meetings over O&M issues 28 15.2 
 
It is important to note from the above that overall, communities largely understand the roles and 
responsibilities of WSCs. However, the WSC function which holds the key to effective 
performance of other roles namely that of organising regular community meetings over issues of 
O^M of their improved water sources was mentioned by only 15.2% of the respondents. These 
findings point towards the need for community level strategies/innovations that would help to 
build the interest and motivation of the general community to respond to calls for community 
meetings. Addressing the underlying factors that undermine community interest towards local 
development initiatives in the context of this study seems to require not only education and 
sensitisation strategies targeting the community but also those that would revitalise 
village/community level bye-laws to reinforce adherence to collective development initiatives 
and strategies pertinent in the rural domestic water supply. This is because CBM thrives much on 
collective effort, effective communication and positive attitude of the members. 
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Absence of authentic and enforceable village bye-laws on O&M 
In a context daunted by a remarkable reduction in interest by communities to voluntarily 
participate in public programmes and activities, as this study has revealed, innovative ways to 
sustainably revitalise community interest to appreciate the roles they can play in achieving 
desired levels of service delivery become very critical. This study found out that CBM was 
highly disabled by the fact that bye-law development in relation to O&M of water sources was 
inadequately given attention. The local government act empowers sub-county or village council 
to make bye-laws provided such bye-laws are not inconsistent with the national constitution, any 
law enacted by parliament, or an ordinance or a byelaw passed by a higher council. Bye-laws 
made by village councils are forwarded to the sub-county council for verification, while those 
proposed by sub-counties are forwarded to the district council for verification. Bye-laws and 
ordinances made by councils may prescribe penalties agreed in terms of fees, charges, fines or a 
term of imprisonment once breached. However, in the context of this study, a clear lack of higher 
local council support towards development and legalisation or ratification of village level bye-
laws that impact positively on CBM of rural point water facilities was noted.  
There is a time when failure to attend a community meeting called by the LCs (Village 
Council Executive) would go with a fine. That time household heads, who are usually 
men would be responsible. But today even if they find you meeting, they can by-pass you 
and move on. Also those that come are usually in a hurry going and you wonder why the 
hurry when you know that they are rushing for bars. I think this government has become 
so simple on people, and people are abusing this freedom (Local politician) 
Reasons related to political influence and some extent of political patronage seem to be 
accountable for the loss of popularity or usefulness of bye-laws as engines for enforcing 
community compliance to collective decisions. Cases of local politicians disenfranchising 
communities over the latter’s collective decisions on their safe water source governance were 
reported as uncommon. 
We had committees here that were working well and people were willing to contribute 
but one day the LC III Chairman (political head of a sub-county local government) sent 
orders from the sub county stopping caretakers from collecting money and people were 
happy not to contribute, and some were almost asking that their money be paid back…. 
But we now hope for the better because he lost an election and will never come back as 
LC III (Village Leader) 
192 
 
It was also found out that despite the inadequate support from government on more legally 
binding community bye-laws, community leaders would take some corrective actions against 
erratic community members based on what may suddenly emerge as critical for their social 
fabric. In some cases it did not even matter if such actions flouted other laws of the country, 
risking undermining the much needed community cohesion and underpinning the need for 
community support in the development of bye-laws as is reflected in the case study in box 2 
Box 2Case study on challenges in implementation of some of the community bye-laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It appears from the above case study that the need to ‘correct’ the behaviour of the ‘errant’ girl 
overtook that of implementing the community’s earlier collective decision i.e. fining her 
household 10,000 Uganda Shillings because of the seemingly socially distressing conduct of the 
girl. In addition, the idea of caning a child contravenes Uganda’s laws on child protection and 
puts the community at the risk of facing the action of child protection advocates in the country if 
any concerned person pursued a community action on the girl, who in legal terms would only a 
be a suspect possibly requiring parental guidance and counseling.  In an endeavour to reduce the 
extent of pump failure, village leaders in one of the focus group meeting proposed punishing of 
children or the parents of children who cause damage to the pumps while collecting water, but 
In Misaana village,  a bye law existed in which if any member of the village abused or 
insulted the water source caretaker while executing his/her roles and responsibilities at the 
water source, the head of that household where that person belongs would be made to pay a 
fine of 10,000 Uganda Shillings (about 4 Us Dollars). During fieldwork, a 14 year old girl 
was guilty of the offence but the bye-law could not be enforced as it was stated because the 
girl was not apologetic before a community meeting that was called to implement to 
discipline the girl and implement the decision based on her conduct. This community was 
more furious with the girl because they believed from those who witnessed the incident that 
the girl was guilty over insulting their caretaker because of his commitment to his work. 
The father of the girl was very apologetic to the caretaker and the community over his 
daughter’s socially erratic behaviour but his daughter’s disrespectful responses in the 
meeting made matters worse when she was asked to apologise before the elders and village 
leaders in the meeting. A female elder quickly stood up at the meeting and ruled that the 
girl be given five strong strokes of the cane, and her father was quick to say he would do it 
himself, which everyone in the meeting supported and consequently no fine was paid by 
her household. 
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such proposals would not only meet resistance from higher resistance from the community but 
also from higher local government authorities because of their potential to clash with other laws 
especially around child protection. 
 In my opinion, since children are the future leaders, they should be punished first,  instead 
 of their parents. Grown-up children between the age of 14-15 years can differentiate 
 between what is wrong and bad! They can be given community service as  a punishment 
 (Focus Group Meeting with village leaders).  
Other attempts to put up community bye-laws related to O&M, but which would lack a legal 
support to enforce sanctions against non-compliance were also mentioned in villages such as 
Kiganjo. In this village, community members agreed that households that would host big 
functions such as parties would have to pay some money towards O&M to the WSC/village 
leaders (although the amount was not fixed). They argued that a lot of water would be collected 
throughout the function, which according to them was not only risky for the pumps but also 
inconvenienced regular collectors. Watering animals at a water source or fetching water for brick 
making were in most of the villages prohibited but with no clear fines/sanctions for non-
compliance. 
In sum, the legal framework for the development and implementation of the bye-laws exists to 
serve as a good intention for effective CBM and functional sustainability of rural point water 
facilities, but its usefulness in leveraging CBM has not been effectively attended to.  This study 
confirms that some members of the community may fail to contribute to O&M of water sources 
not because they cannot afford, but because they do not expect any sanctions against them and 
hence choose to ‘free-ride’. Hence, despite the powers given to local authorities to develop and 
implement bye-laws, local governments have continued to rely on the centre for major decisions. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that nearly all funding for local government programmes comes 
in form of conditional grants from the centre. In addition, they have always had to rely on the 
centre for major capacity building needs for both human and material resources. Thus, while it 
may require a considerable amount of time, effort and innovation, revitalising the perception and 
effectiveness of bye-laws in Uganda’s rural communities could serve to not only reverse the 
current glaring trend towards total dependency by communities on external support in the 
operation and maintenance of point water sources, but could also broadly serve to revitalise the 
hitherto reliable and now seemingly fast-fading African culture of mutual support and collective 
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self-reliance. This might take not just a change in the mind-sets of national politicians and public 
institutions, but also those of local level politicians and the general civil society as one key 
respondent noted, 
‘building awareness on the importance of bye-laws should be a considered a priority 
before developing and enforcing any law to ensure that communities and leaders know 
the benefits from having water and sanitation related laws and what they are expected to 
do’. 
In addition, once used as compliance tools, the enforcement of such bye-laws should remain 
consistent over a long period of time so that they may become permanent community practices 
that eventually shape community behaviour and culture. Findings further suggest that supporting 
communities to establish and enforce legitimate community bye-laws is important for building 
and sustaining the confidence of WSCs and other community leaders in using them as ‘useful 
tools’ for enforcing compliance to O&M.  
Limited training and sensitisation initiatives for communities on CBM 
issues 
Support to water user communities aimed at enhancing their levels of participation in the 
management and sustainability of rural point-water facilities is fundamental to the overall 
success of rural water supply programmes in resource poor settings in Africa. It is surprising as 
this study reveals, that this important determinant of CBM success is not given adequate 
attention by service authorities and agencies seeking long term sustainability of services. 
Household survey results indicate that 80.2% of the respondents had never received any 
sensitization or training on safe water service delivery in their communities. While the guidelines 
for an effective CBM for improved rural point-water facilities demand that training and 
sensitisation on the roles of WSCs, revitalisation of community knowledge of O&M as well as 
their roles in what is sometimes termed as ‘support supervision’ should be undertaken on a 
regular basis, the findings of this study indicate that this has not been the case, ‘especially in 
communities served by government departments’ as observed in one of the key informant 
interviews at the district.  
The few (N=109) community members who reported having ever received some form of training 
mentioned election of WSC members, sensitisation on roles and responsibilities including 
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financial contributions to O&M, and development and enforcement of bye-laws as some of the 
issues on which they were trained (figure 21). Results from the logistic regression analysis 
presented in table 9 emphasise the importance of community sensitisation and training on CBM 
effectiveness. The results show that households which reported having ever been sensitized on 
sustainable utilization of safe water in the community were 2.03 (p-value = 0.008) times more 
likely to say that they have ever made a financial contribution to operation, maintenance or repair 
of their main water  source compared to those households which were not sensitized at all.  
Figure 21 Form of sensitisation received in the past on safe water service delivery  (N=109) 
 
 
Within the CBM framework, WSCs are also expected to mobilise and sensitise communities on 
issues of O&M. However, study results show that WSCs did not feature among the categories of 
people/institutions that provided any training and sensitisation on issues related to safe water 
services, although some of the respondents could not tell who the service provider/actor could 
have been (table17). From the results, NGO actors constitute the major service providers 
reported to have provided training and sensitisation in all the aspects of training and sensitisation 
received. This may be partly because in the context of Uganda, NGOs are expected to 
supplement or assist local governments in direct provision of safe water supply sources but more 
so in undertaking mobilization, sensitisation and education activities within communities.  
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Table 17 Training received and service provider giving the training  
 
Training Received 
Training Provider Total 
Government Local Politician NGO/Project 
Staff 
Can’t tell  
Forming water user committee N 1 0 32 2 34 
%  2.9 0 91.2 5.9 100 
Cleaning the water source N 3 1 41 5 50 
%  6.0 2 82.0 10.0 100 
Undertaking minor repairs   N 0 0 11 1 12 
%  0.0 0 91.7 8.3 100 
Operation of the water source N 3 3 21 2 29 
%  10.3 10.3 72.4 6.9 100 
Management of cash 
contributions 
N 0 1 13 1 15 
%  0.0 6.7 86.7 6.7 100 
Forming& enforcing bye laws N 1 4 16 1 22 
%  4.5 18.2 72.7 4.5 100 
 
While it is necessary that messages pertinent to the success of CBM are regularly provided and 
made clear to rural communities in a developing context like Uganda, irregularity of such 
support in training and sensitisation as was the case in Makondo parish threatens the very 
essence of CBM in functional sustainability of point-water facilities. The findings indeed show 
that trainings and sensitisations were irregular with most of the respondents mentioning that they 
last received such trainings about one year (21.3%) or over two years (21.3%) back, while some 
(16.7%) of the community members could not even recall (figure 22). 
Figure 22 Last time training on operation and maintenance was received  
 
Qualitative findings also show that some of the training/sensitisation meetings communities 
referred to were only provided after the decision to construct water facilities had been taken, and 
immediately after construction/at handover to the community, which is clearly outside the 
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standard procedures/policy framework for CBM and functional sustainability of rural point water 
facilities as observed in a focus group discussion with water users in one of the villages: 
 We were invited to attend a meeting before the construction of our shallow well…The 
 problem however is that after construction we are left alone by the service providers who 
 never come back to check on us. The leaders rarely call for meetings. All we see is them 
 coming to demand for money from us for paying the mechanics that repair the water 
 facility whenever there is a breakdown (FGD, community members). 
At handover, the meetings were said to mainly emphasise O&M issues including the election of 
a WSCs that ought to be elected/formed prior to construction, while discussions on location of 
the water source included explanations on the need for cooperation between the land owner and 
the community. Such issues were said to have been given priority in meetings held before water 
source construction as observed in one of the focus group discussions: 
We presented our views on the best location of the water source and they told us they 
needed to seek permission from the land owner...The leaders explained to the land owner 
about how it was good for him and the community to allow construction of a shallow 
well on his land, he agreed. 
Household survey results indicated that the limited training and sensitisation support to  
communities over issues of CBM or community roles on O&M of point-water facilities mainly 
came from NGO (especially the MMMs) as opposed to government actors (see table 22 above). 
In Uganda’s decentralised service delivery framework, local authorities hold a prime 
responsibility, as duty bearers to ensure that services are sustainably delivered to communities in 
their jurisdiction. This responsibility not only involves direct provision of services but also the 
supervision of the activities and methods of none-governmental bodies.  
 
In the context of this study, the presence of an active NGO in the study community ought to have 
served as an opportunity for filling some of the service delivery gaps challenges (e.g. financial or 
human resource) that are afflicting local government institutions, but failure to put this 
opportunity to use remains a weakness among local authorities. Consequently, as was the case in 
Makondo Parish, the NGO actors are prompted to do only what they are able to do to supply 
water with very limited adherence to policy guidelines on CBM. The inability to deliberately 
nurture community capacity to own service delivery interventions in the rural domestic water 
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supply is indeed a disincentive to effective community participation and CBM. Limited follow-
up and support of WSCs remains largely responsible for the disintegration of WSC. 
Consequently, as indicated earlier, ad-hoc and unsustainable means of responding to water 
facility system breakdowns and other O&M interventions have almost replaced the official 
policy processes.  
Dynamics in market oriented O&M of water facilities and community 
capacity to cope 
In the NPM framework, the involvement of the private sector especially the Hand Pump 
Mechanics (HPM) and Spare Parts Distributors may promise to generate high efficiency levels in 
terms of quick response to breakdowns of point water sources, but this seems only possible if an 
effective system of regulation is in place. The literature on private sector participation in the 
delivery of public services has often highlighted concerns about capacity especially in resource 
poor settings of the developing world (Delamonica and Mehrotra 2005, Barungi et al. 2003, 
Pérard 2008). The study found out that it was practically difficult for the community members 
and their leaders to adjust to changes in market oriented policies and self-reliance. According to 
national water policy guidelines, HPMs are expected to sign agreements with water users over 
O& M of their water facilities. This study has in Chapter Six highlighted weaknesses in 
community capacity to negotiate with HPM and spare parts dealers for effective O&M or repair 
of water facilities.  
 
While most village leaders had a telephone contact of the HPM, indicating that they could access 
him whenever there was need, it was difficult to rule out possibilities of connivance between the 
HPM and village council representatives or active members of the WSC in determining repair 
costs. The lack of effective WSCs meant in many cases that any negotiations with the HPM were 
carried out by an active member of the village executive council or any other concerned member 
in the community. Owing to this management gap, there were fears in the community that the 
HPM was likely to connive with the leaders or do shoddy work because ‘he single handedly 
determined the costs for everything including spare-parts’ as observed in one of the focus group 
discussions in the community. 
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In addition, HPMs are expected to fix minor repairs beyond the capacity of communities, while 
the water source care takers undertake routine maintenance functions (oiling and tightening of 
the nuts). This study found that WSCs had difficulties undertaking the routine maintenance 
functions due to many reasons including the lack of skill, tools/equipment. This has ‘forced’ the 
community in Makondo to be totally dependent on mechanics who charge them money for 
carrying out such functions. None of the WSCs possessed the policy recommended tool-box for 
undertaking routine maintenance work.  Also, based on the household survey results, only 32.7% 
compared to 67.3% of the households that reported having hand pumps in their villages had ever 
personally witnessed preventive maintenance activities being carried out on their hand pumps. 
As indicated in table 18 below, only one fifth (20.1%) of survey respondents could also name at 
least one of the main parts of a hand pump.  
Table 18 Respondents’ knowledge of parts of a hand pump and whether they have ever 
personally witnessed maintenance activities take place in their communities  
 Knowledge of parts of a hand pump  N % 
Could name at least one part of a hand pump 110 20.1 
Cannot name any part of a hand pump 226 41.3 
Have no hand pump in the community 211 38.6 
Total 547 100 
 
Ever/never observed preventive maintenance activities take place in the community 
Ever personally witnessed 110 32.7 
Never witnessed 226 67.3 
Total 336 100 
 
These results seem to suggest on one hand that there have been no frequent hand pump 
breakdowns in the community, which is not the case as the results have shown. On the other 
hand the results also suggest that pump repair processes have not followed CBM guidelines that 
advocate for an adequate involvement and participation of members of the community playing 
roles including directly assisting mechanics in pump repair processes as can be seen in 
photograph 5 below.  
Whenever there are breakdowns, processes of repair take long, with some not being completed, 
while some repaired sources take a short interval period before they breakdown again. In 
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addition, the repair processes follow different criteria or approaches from those prescribed under 
the CBM approach to service delivery. For example, where there was no active water source 
caretaker, the community members (water users) who get to know of a breakdown immediately 
report to the village executive council leaders rather than WSCs as is expected. In many of the 
cases, on receiving the reports, these village leaders may or may not liaise with existing or active 
WSC members to contact a hand pump mechanic. 
Photograph 5 Community members and the author participating in a borehole repair in one  
  of the villages  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Photographs 
As elaborated earlier, the HPM undertakes the assessment including the cost for the required 
repairs, after which the local leaders or members the WSC members available move house to 
house collecting contributions
64
 from every household that uses the water source. In the 
ideal/policy recommended approach, the WSC should directly contact the HPM to come and 
assess the extent of breakdown as well as the cost of repair, after which he would be paid by the 
WSC using funds collected on a monthly basis.  
History of dependency on external support/charity  
Makondo parish, like many other rural communities in Uganda has a history of dependence on 
NGO support, with the most recent and strong actor being the MMMs, the others having been 
World Vision International Uganda, UNICEF and Kitovu Mobile. While such service providers 
                                                          
64
 Amount determined using the estimated total cost of repair divided by the number of water user households  
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have been indispensable in resource poor contexts they have always faced face high risks of 
breeding dependency syndromes among their target communities. In the case of Makondo, 
nearly all problems were seemingly directed to the MMMs. This was even compounded by 
poorly clarified roles and responsibilities of the community and their leaders, the absence of bye-
laws and weak leaders. 
 
Increase in levels of dependency on external support from NGOs, government and politicians 
seeking to be elected for positions have also served as an impediment to cost recovery strategies 
embedded in CBM. This has also been compounded by limited education and sensitisation 
activities targeting communities as well as the absence of functional bye-laws on O&M of 
community water projects. Evidence from this study suggests that the work of the MMMs has 
since their presence in the community generated and sustained a reasonable degree of 
dependence within their target communities. This has mostly affected community willingness to 
contribute to O&M of point water sources especially shallow and deep wells. 
The sisters are so generous. Sometimes they repair water sources without waiting for 
people to contribute…they also know that the men don’t want to pay and it is the women 
and children will suffer.  The MMMs have built houses for poor community members 
especially orphan headed households and could also put up rainwater harvesting tanks on 
these houses (Community Development Worker) 
While such interventions are purely out of charity and are based on need, the lack of community 
knowledge of the factors compelling actors to undertake such interventions in the way they do 
may be misinterpreted by the community, further undermining CBM initiatives. 
Some people have the money but don’t want to pay…they say that it is the government’s 
role to pay…others say that the pumps were given to us by the MMMs so why are you 
(WSC members) asking for money from us? (Community development worker) 
Some evidence obtained from the community also shows that just as water sources were not well 
maintained, some of the other government items distributed freely were not being put to proper 
use, resulting into wastage and abuse of such items. For example  during fieldwork, it was 
observed in about three households in Misaana, Makondo and Kiyumbakimu villages that 
previously distributed mosquito nets were being used by some households for rearing chicken. 
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This study also noted that initiatives by the MMMs who have been the main NGO actors in the 
community to build strong partnerships with the local authority were frustrating. It was found out 
that the efforts of the MMMs to directly involve local government actors in their implementation 
of safe water service delivery activities were often frustrated with excuses of time, financial cost 
or understaffing. Such partnerships would have possibly had greater impact on CBM and 
sustainable service delivery and eliminated community practices of viewing the MMMs as the 
panacea to everyday problems of the community. 
Conclusion 
In contexts where NPM modalities in the provision of public services have taken root, service 
beneficiaries remain potentially able to support policies that demand their direct involvement 
provided certain conditions are in place. This chapter has presented findings on community level 
dynamics that affect community capacity (ability and willingness) to support CBM. It has 
confirmed among others that the perceptions people have over the quality of the services they 
receive from government significantly affects the extent to which they are willing to partner with 
those institutions to improve the quality of services. The chapter has also indicated that limited 
capacity building in form of training and sensitisation, inadequate support in the development 
and implementation of bye-laws around operation and maintenance of their water sources, 
irregular community meetings over O&M and tendencies by the community members to shun 
the few meetings that are organised are important community level issues that have remained 
ignored or inadequately supported by the inter-mediate institutions of government in Uganda. In 
sum, the context and findings generated from this case study community clearly demonstrates 
that rural water policy implementation in Uganda is heavily challenged by complex and 
multifaceted community-level issues that owe a lot to weak systems of service delivery and 
support at national and sub-national levels. The findings hence generate insights on the 
fundamentals that need to be adhered to by policy actors wishing to build effective synergies 
with service beneficiaries particularly those living in rural developing contexts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Uganda in particular. Thus the success of CBM as service delivery model under the 
NPM and governance agenda considerably requires a careful and consistent investment in human 
resource capacity building strategies targeting not only the community as primary beneficiaries 
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of services, but also their political and technical leaders at the macro and meso levels. The ability 
of local politicians and technical authorities to appreciate and play their roles both before and 
after construction is imperative for the sustainability of rural point water supply infrastructure. 
Effective cooperation among stakeholders also helps to build a great amount of trust that has a 
strong bearing onto tangible social mobilisation for CBM.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions: Towards an Enabling Framework for 
CBM Systems for Point-Water Facilities in 
Resource-Poor Settings 
Introduction 
This chapter synthesises the key findings of the thesis and makes reflections on theory seeking to 
contribute to the wider theoretical and conceptual perspectives on CBM as another alternative to 
sustainable safe water supply in resource poor democracies. The ultimate aim of the study was to 
examine the dynamics and circumstances under which new public management and policy 
models which give responsibility for operation and maintenance of rural water supply schemes to 
beneficiaries of services may serve to disable rather than enhance prospects for the sustainability 
of services.  Specifically the study examines governance dynamics at the macro, meso and micro 
levels of rural safe water service delivery in Uganda, with emphasis on how they specifically 
impact on the potential for CBM to leverage opportunities for functional sustainability of rural 
point-water facilities. It thus examines contexts and dynamics that impact on the credibility and 
effectiveness of public, private, NGO and community interfaces, and how these affect the overall 
effectiveness of CBM systems for rural water supply and sustainability.   
Community-Based Management (CBM): Remaining Just Rhetorical? 
The discussion in chapter one indicated that CBM has emerged as one of the most commonly 
supported approaches to rural safe water delivery, along with community participation and 
demand responsive approaches to development.  All of these approaches have come in the wake 
of neo-liberal policy reforms aimed at reducing the size of the state and reflected in policies that 
aim at ‘re-inventing government’, by introducing multi-actor, demand driven and participatory 
service approaches as fundamental shifts from the hitherto supply-driven, bureaucratic and 
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inefficient models. More than three decades of this transition from supply to demand driven 
development may have meant that development actors and service providers adequately know 
the strengths of community-led development, and addressed all manifest and latent bottlenecks 
to it but the realities show that such a response is yet to be realised. As elaborated in Chapter 
Two, policy directions and strategies for achieving progress in the rural water supply sub-sector 
clearly exist, with community management of point water facilities being one of such clearly 
stipulated policy options for achieving functional sustainability of point-water facilities in rural 
peripheral communities. But, CBM or CM in rural water provision is premised on the fact that it 
leverages among others; equity, sustainability and cost recovery in projects and programmes that 
target the poor and marginalized (Cleaver and Toner 2006b, McCommon, Warner and Yohalem 
1990). Its philosophy as applied in the rural safe water supply is that when communities take 
responsibility for operation and maintenance, they own the facilities, and in turn, prospects for 
sustainability of the facilities are enhanced. With special reference to the rural water sector in 
sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, CBM is indeed premised on the idea that a community which 
benefits from an improved water source, plays a major role in its development, ownership, 
operation and maintenance, also contributes to its long-term sustainability, service delivery and 
cost recovery (Amerasinghe and Carmin 2009, Carter and Rwamwanja 2006, Lockwood 2004). 
Communities either volunteer their time and labour resources or are left to provide themselves 
services because of the absence or limited availability of alternatives.  
 
The policy prescriptions normally stipulate clearly that beneficiary communities must form 
committees to take responsibility for the management of facilities particularly in ensuring that 
the wider user community roles and responsibilities are fulfilled. The key tasks of the elected 
committees often include setting and collecting periodical community (financial) contributions as 
well as ensuring routine operation, maintenance and repair of the facilities.  But as Mitlin 
observes, such service delivery mechanisms raise new and interesting challenges for the 
regulators (2004 p. 333). As already highlighted in the discussion of the empirical literature in 
Chapter Three, CBM as a model has worked for some countries and not in others, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, including Uganda (Lockwood and Smits Stef 2011). Also, significant 
differences in levels of success exist in application of CBM as a model for sustainability of rural 
point water facilities. All these facts point to the importance of understanding context specific 
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differences in application and emphasis of CBM if it has to achieve desired degrees of success. 
These facts have for long generated questions seeking to address such discrepancies, but until 
today, the implementation of proposals as answers to these questions remains inadequate, and as 
new challenges emerge, one is left to wonder why the good policy prescriptions inherent in CBM 
that are potentially capable of leveraging the sustainability of essential services may remain 
poorly attended to by those promoting them. The arching question is summarised in Lockwood’s 
observation that ‘knowing the right way forward is one thing, but achieving the rate of progress 
needed is quite another’ (Lockwood and Harold 2004 p.1).  This study contributes to answering 
this question. In the subsequent sections, more discussion and reflection is made on the key 
findings from this study. Theoretical and practical implications of the results of this study on 
CBM and sustainable rural safe water supply are also discussed. 
Macro and Meso-level Disablers of CBM and Functional Sustainability of 
Point-water Facilities 
The findings of this study clearly show that the challenge to improving service levels in rural 
water supply in Uganda is not the lack of a policy direction, but the lack of the ‘right action’ 
especially with regard to enabling actual policy implementation at different levels of service 
delivery. As elaborated in Chapter Five, in the CBM policy framework for rural water supply, 
central and local government actors (at the macro and meso level) remain very significant 
players in the decentralised and bottom up approach to service delivery. It is arguable however, 
that as far as CBM of point water facilities in Uganda’s rural water sector is concerned, their 
actions have remained largely fragmented at different levels and do not reveal if there has been 
any learning or ‘unlearning’ from experiences of a range of problems that afflict the rural safe 
water sub-sector and CBM in particular.  Findings from the analysis of sector documents and 
reports indicate that sector coordination efforts may exist both at the national and district level, 
but the activities/actions of these institutions and bodies are not sufficiently anchored within and 
among communities struggling to operate and maintain their water supply systems.  
The inter-ministerial coordination committee and the good governance working group at the 
national level all have agendas that potentially support community-based management, but they 
remain ‘far detached from communities’ as one respondent from the NGO sector remarked. In 
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addition, in Uganda’s context of decentralised service delivery, the impact of these institutions 
on CBM management systems for water almost entirely depends on the individual behaviours 
and actions of meso level actors particularly in districts. A senior officer in the MWE equated the 
need for continuous support to communities to the way ‘Coca-Cola has never stopped 
advertising even when it is the most consumed soft drink’. By this, he particularly meant that 
even if some water sources may be functional at full capacity, they are bound to suffer 
sustainability problems unless communities served by these facilities are not ‘abandoned’ by the 
service providers. Carter and Rwamwanja based on a study in southwestern Uganda also indicate 
that a credible CBM system should be ready to support and work with communities in no limited 
time frame if it has to achieve real functional sustainability (Carter and Rwamwanja 2006). 
 
Views have been advanced by Leach and Barnett (1997 p. 39-40) on structural or organizational 
choices that promote decentralized control through a wide variety of alternative service delivery 
mechanisms including quasi-markets, with public and private service providers competing for 
resources from policy-makers and donors, and more managerial delegation and autonomy to 
make decsions. While such views are reflected in Uganda’s rural water policy and 
implementation framwework, as this study has shown in Chapter Six, poor execution of roles and 
responsibilities related to CBM at the meso and macro level greatly undermines CBM and NPM 
goals. Support to communities as incorporated in Uganda’s rural water supply programme 
should be carried out by extension workers under the direction of district water officers (DWOs). 
Training and support to communities and WSCs for CBM are however not always carried out by 
extension workers. Consequently, communities and WSCs do not have the needed capacity to 
carry out their work as expected. They need regular training, support and supervision from 
extension workers and other service providers especially the NGOs, but this does not usually 
happen as desired of CBM, except where there may be special programmes directly supported by 
NGOs.  
 
All sector policy and programme actors are aware of the need to support communities but they 
also seem to indicate that ‘their hands are tied’ as the central government does not release funds 
in time, nor is there a sufficient budget to cover CBM activities such as community mobilisation 
and sensitisation.  DWOs that are charged with the responsibility for managing rural water sector 
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budgets are also blamed of either misappropriating or mismanaging the funds to meet their 
individual preferences. All these dynamics question the extent to which government policies 
inclined towards the NPM and governance paradigms are determined to make CBM work. In 
addition, conflict of interest and political interference not only cause irregularities in rural water 
budget management that does not favour CBM activities but also in planning and allocation of 
services.  
 
As the findings have indicated in Chapter Six, local politicians may influence allocation of new 
water sources or rehabilitation of others based on how such actions will benefit their political 
ambitions.  Hence, rather than viewing financing public service delivery as an opportunity for 
improving equity and access to services in communities,  local authorities view and utilise rural 
water supply water supplies as ‘vote banks’ (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012 p. 266). This part of 
the explanation as to why post construction support in form of community mobilisation and 
sensitisation are given less attention despite being crucial for CBM effectiveness. The study also 
shows that some of the politicians even go about discouraging communities from making 
financial contributions claiming that water is supposed to be freely provided. Similarly, 
politicians seeking cheap political popularity also tend to undermine bye-laws and sanctions for 
non-compliance to mandatory contributions to operation and maintenance (O&M) of water 
sources because such bye-laws may ‘deplete the vote reserves’ in their constituencies. In their 
critique of NPM, public choice theorists have indeed argued that public actors are not motivated 
by the ethical doctrine of utilitarianism, but by individual self-interests (Andreoni 1990). In an 
effective governance framework, water supply decisions should be objectively informed by 
formal institutional mechanisms rather than informal bargaining power centres. Unfortunately, 
due to weak institutional capacity local authorities are not only unable to discipline such errant 
politicians, but are also unable to institute long term mechanisms to thwart such politics that 
impact negatively on local capacity building for sustainable service delivery. 
In their studies about structural adjustments and NPM in developing countries of South Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South America, Batley (1999) and Batley and Levi (2004) generally 
concur that the effect of public sector reforms has been mixed, with some improvements in 
efficiency and mixed effects on equity, particularly affecting the poor. Based on the challenges 
of implementing NPM in the developed country context, Batley (1999 p. 75) observes that the 
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capacity of governments to perform market-sensitive regulatory and enabling roles is weak, 
requiring that either these roles are strengthened or avoided by instead strengthening user 
accountability. Batley further argues that the increase of managerial power may represent a gain 
in the efficient use of resources and in the quality of services, but without an equivalent 
strengthening in systems of accountability, inequity is likely to grow’ (Batley 1999 p. 75). Such 
arguments and the findings brought out by this study indeed underpin the need for a well 
regulated market mechanism for CBM to be seen to be in favour of communities that are 
dependent on point-water supply technologies in rural Uganda. 
This study has shown in Chapter Five and Six that private sector roles that directly support CBM 
are ineffectively regulated by central and local government institutions, despite a policy and legal 
framework that places this role on them. At the lower level, HPMs still have the power and 
discretion not only to determine prices but also individually supply hand-pump spare parts to 
communities. Moreover, the communities demonstrate inadequate technical ability to 
differentiate between good or bad products (spare parts). The findings have indicated in chapter 
six that only about one fifth (20.1%) of the household survey respondents who had a hand-pump 
in their communities could name at least one part of a hand-pump. While availability and pricing 
problems of hand-pumps stem from macro-economic constraints in the production and 
distribution chains of spare-parts, an enabling local authority ought to put in place mechanisms 
to ensure that communities know the range of prices as well as the quality of parts especially 
those that commonly cause pump failure.  Local authorities should also be able to know such 
parts from their monitoring activities. These findings build into the argument that while 
decentralisation to local authorities increases their roles and responsibilities in planning, 
implementation as well as sustainability of services, there is a need for an effective system of 
establishing and nurturing strategic partnerships or working relationships between central and 
local governments to regulate the activities of market based actors in order to smoothen the 
quality of service delivery based on NPM and governance philosophies. Frederickson notes that 
NPM and decntralisation do not claim that central government should stop performing certain 
tasks, nor is it about whether tasks should be undertaken or not, but it is about ensuring that 
things (public administration) are done better and more efficiently (Frederickson 1996 p. 264-
265).  
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This study indeed confirms that privatization in the context of CBM does not automatically lead 
to free market behavior as past behaviors such as rent seeking and clientelism are still to be 
found (Easter 2006). Decentralisation of some of the public roles and responsibilities to the 
market (privatisation) brings with it a new role of ensuring that consumers of hand pump spare 
parts (the community) are not exploited. This is particularly imperative to local authorities and 
other not-for-profit rural water supply service providers operating in developing contexts similar 
to those in Uganda. Information asymmetries on pricing and distribution mechanisms for rural 
point water facilities tend to favour HPM creating good ground for them to exploit the system. 
This study has also shown that efforts to mitigate this problem through formalization and 
regulation of associations of HPMs have also not yet yielded much fruit as many of the 
mechanics being semi-illiterate are largely unable to come up with credible organisations that 
could easily regulate individual behaviour. 
The discussion in Chapter Three has indicated that NPM and the governance paradigms strongly 
advocate for the development of networks and collaborations between different actors as a means 
of tapping from each other’s competencies or comparative advantages to leverage service 
delivery, but practical realities in different contexts continue to show contrary results.  As 
elaborated in Chapter Six, the findings of this study show that collaborations or network 
arrangements exist between central government rural water supply institutions, national NGOs, 
and development partners to address policy development, budgeting, finance or sector 
performance monitoring. However, these partnerships and the impact of their work at the macro 
level tend to be thin or weak at the meso and micro levels, especially with regard to enhancing 
the effectiveness of CBM. The findings of this study show that interactions and working 
relations between local NGOs and lower level government institutions may not be as strong as 
they may be at national level. Yet, being closer to communities, such collaborations would 
promise to impact more greatly on CBM and functional sustainability of point-water facilities. 
Tendencies by the different actors at the meso level to place blame on one another as responsible 
for failures in CBM are not uncommon. In addition, it is not possible to rule out the tendency for 
some NGOs to pronounce themselves as more ‘for the people’ compared to local governments 
which, despite the realities associated with it may raise some levels of discomfort on the part of 
the technical staff of the local authorities resulting into some form of resentment that obviously 
impacts on communities struggling with CBM demands.  
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Distrust and bureaucratic behaviours in the districts have compelled NGOs to implement their 
activities without the district involvement. Owing to this, the NGOs are accused of hurrying 
water projects without always reporting to the districts or undertaking water quality tests and 
adequate community sensitisation and training before construction. As is indicated in Chapter 
Six, communities tend to trust NGOs more than government institutions or projects. Thus 
Initiatives such as the formation of the Uganda Water and Sanitation NGO Network 
(UWASNET) in 2001 may have provided an opportunity for a more effective NGO and 
government collaboration and engagement on issues of policy and sector governance, but 
difficulties in collaboration and networking at lower levels of service delivery not only 
complicate opportunities for replication and scaling up of some of the good practices of NGOs, 
but also those that would stimulate community engagement. Local governments are responsible 
for monitoring activities of NGOs and CBOs, in their jurisdictions, but this function seems to be 
heavily challenged by attitudes and unfulfilled expectations from both the NGOs and local 
government side. Results from interviews with NGOs indicated that supervision or support to 
NGO activities sometimes ‘stops with courtesy calls’ made at the beginning of NGO activities, 
‘unless a follow-up is made by the NGO or CBO with the district water office’. These findings 
confirm the fact that unaligned service approaches of NGOs and Government indeed undermine 
opportunities for scaling-up rural safe water service delivery (Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011). 
In addition, as earlier observed, networks or partnerships are prone to unhelpful conflicts, and 
evasion of social accountability by some of members (Wilikilagi 2009), or blame avoidance and 
scapegoating (Ewalt 2009 p. 9). Hence, in the new public policy and management framework, 
institutional and governance dynamics play an important role in shaping and maintaining 
relationships among different actors. Such relationships shape but are also shaped by the way 
power and authority are distributed within and among different actors at different levels of 
decision making. The means and dynamics of distribution and utilisation of power may hence 
serve to enable or disable opportunities for policy implementation and may impact positively or 
negatively on the desired policy results.  
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Community/Micro-level Dynamics Influencing CBM effectiveness: 
Ignored, Unknown or Taken for Granted? 
 
The findings presented in chapter six have shown that the success of CBM largely depends on 
levels of functionality or performance of leaders towards local development initiatives. In the 
context of Uganda and the study community, the village executive council and the WSC 
members are primary actors on whom CBM of point-water facilities depends. But they work on a 
voluntary basis and can easily lose the much needed motivation to serve in their respective 
positions in the CBM framework. This study therefore emphasises that importance of innovative 
strategies that keep ‘the volunteers’ motivated as much of the literature on community 
development also indicates (Cleaver 1999, Mulwa 2010). While both village leaders and the 
WSCs are crucial for the sustainable supply of rural domestic water supply the findings of this 
study show that WSCs remain the most critical for the success of CBM. However, the latter’s 
effectiveness however depends on a number of factors, many of which have been ignored or 
taken for granted by the key service authorities. Key informants in the study underpinned among 
others the importance of training and all other forms of support that could go to the community 
on a continuous basis. The lack of continuous support and capacity building, and the low sense 
of community cohesion and organisation have indeed been highlighted in much of the literature 
on CBM as a critical challenge to CBM and functional sustainability of point-water facilities 
(Carter and Rwamwanja 2006).   
 
The success of CBM also depends largely on sustainable funding for operation and maintenance 
of water facilities, more so by communities supplied with such sources. This study has shown 
that households may be willing and able to contribute (financially or otherwise) to operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of their safe water sources, but lack the motivation to do so. Whereas it is 
undeniable that rural communities remain impoverished, qualitative findings from this inquiry 
have indicated that even with low incomes, communities are able to make the (usually) small 
financial contribution to O&M, provided conditions such as trust, policy consistency and service 
delivery are fulfilled to their satisfaction. For example, the logistic regression analysis of 
household survey findings presented in table 9 showed that households with monthly incomes 
estimated above 10,000 UGX had higher odds ratios (1.14 and 1.46) of saying they had ever 
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made a financial contribution to O&M or repair of their main water source compared to 
households with monthly incomes estimated to be less than or equal to 10,000 UGX. However, 
the odds ratios were not statistically significant, implying that factors other than household 
incomes play a big role in influencing household willingness to make a financial contribution to 
O&M of improved water sources in Makondo Parish. The study indeed confirms earlier findings 
that household income is a necessary but not sufficient condition that influences willingness to 
contribute to pay for public services under the NPM framework (Carson and Mitchell 1993, Tan 
1984, Whittington, Lauria and Mu 1991). The level of community trust and perception that 
leaders responsible for the management of finances under CBM is among the key issues this 
study identifies as influencing micro-level dynamics related to willingness to contribute to O&M 
of improved water facilities. Community perception of the quality of service delivery, their 
knowledge and interpretation of other government policies and the incoherencies in them, the 
absence of well developed and enforceable community-level bye-laws and sanctions for 
community compliance with all CBM guidelines are the other critical factors this study has 
identified at the micro-level. While some of these factors are well known to all stakeholders, they 
have largely been ignored and others taken for granted.  
Compounding the challenges to effective CBM at the micro-level is the lack of an information 
system that would re-build confidence in rural water supply service systems. The study has 
indicated in Chapter Six that some politicians seeking cheap popularity constrain CBM further 
by discouraging people from paying contributions. Paradoxically, the institutions these 
politicians account to may also not be able to impose any sanctions or disciplinary measures 
because of inadequate levels of institutional capacity and development. Village Executive 
Council leaders may also be taking over the roles of some of the disintegrated WSCs as this 
study has revealed, but they too are not competent enough to replace them. The gradual change 
from monthly contributions to the ad-hoc method of seeking contributions whenever there is a 
water source break-down is also marred by challenges of mistrust by the community over how 
figures are arrived at. Consequently the leaders themselves ‘get into trouble’ when the funds are 
insufficient, occasionally compelling them to ‘borrow from other sources’ but later face 
difficulties collecting contributions in order to pay back. The absence of an effective system of 
developing and enforcing byelaws compounds this problem, as community members act on their 
discretion to contribute or not to because there are no enforceable sanctions to non-compliance. 
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On a positive note, which in fact, is a window for bye-law enforcement at community level, 
communities are sensitive to laws but this opportunity has not been tapped by local government 
and other service authorities by supporting or advocating for the establishment and 
institutionalization of bye-laws that support CBM. It is noted in Chapter Six, that the challenge 
to the effectiveness of CBM is not only limited to the absence of authentic community bye-laws 
but also on the implications of their mode of enforcement. For example actions such as caning 
errant children by the community may be found socially acceptable by the community but are 
illegal when viewed in relation to the child protection laws. Such challenges call for more 
support to communities on how best to develop and enforce bye-laws in the context of CBM and 
functional sustainability of rural point-water facilities. 
Based on one of the key tenets of good governance; the ways and means by which public actors 
are responsive to the needs of their citizens (Graham, Amos and Plumptre 2003), it is arguable in 
line with this study’s findings that governance as a means of enhancing access and enjoyment of 
rights through some of its approaches such as community participation or community 
management may be used to take people for granted. The policy prescriptions embedded in the 
NPM and governance agenda may appear to be having good intentions, but the attention given to 
them by its promoters remains poor as seen from Uganda’s rural domestic water supply sub-
sector. In the context of this study, levels of motivation of community leaders (the WSCs and 
VECs) are very crucial for CBM effectiveness. Quantitative results from the logistic regression 
analysis also emphasise the importance of effective leadership in community mobilisation, 
sensitisation and overall organisation in relation to CBM. The results showed that households 
which were mobilized by VECs were 29.89 (p-value = 0.000) times more likely to say that they 
had ever made a financial contribution to operation, maintenance or repair of their main water 
source compared to those that were not mobilized at all. Also, households mobilized by WSCs 
were 63.47 (p-value = 0.006) times more likely to have ever made a financial contribution to 
O&M or repair of their main water source compared to households which were not mobilized at 
all. 
 
Effective CBM systems can indeed propagate high levels of sustainability of point water sources 
in resource poor settings. But this will also depend on how a number of governance related 
constraints at the macro and particularly meso are addressed. Key of such factors includes 
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consistent prioritisation of government led community enablement activities which value 
communities as customers in a more consumerist approach to service delivery. It is perhaps until 
this has been achieved that CBM systems will translate into the desired high levels of technical 
functionality and sustainability of rural domestic water supply facilities. In the context of 
Uganda, and sub-Saharan Africa in general, this will take more than just increasing financial 
resources in the rural water sector, but a real change in mindset of service providers immediate to 
the community over the latter’s rights of access to services. But central government institutions 
also ought to put their mindsets right in order to undertake people cantered and service efficiency 
supervisory roles. Effective CBM will also take the change in the current flow of information 
and quality of trust between/among communities and their immediate service authorities. 
Further, it will also take a different set of cultural values among service providers especially the 
local government authorities. A new understanding of community level bye-law development 
and implementation is seemingly very critical in the current CBM frameworks in sub-Saharan 
African states with a political history and dispensation like that of Uganda. Bye-laws in such a 
context are critical community level resources not only in facilitating effective community 
participation in water management systems but could also serve to revitalise the hitherto strong 
African culture of mutual support and collective self-reliance. However, their popularity and 
support will depend on the extent to which meso-level actors especially at district local 
government level understand their importance and support them with urgency. CBM is indeed a 
service delivery model conceived from the wider concepts of demand responsive approaches 
(DRA) to service delivery and community empowerment. However, this study has demonstrated 
that rural communities in Uganda are largely still recipients of services and less capable of 
aggressively engaging with actors such as government over planning and delivery of services. 
Thus, while the new governance agenda pre-supposes that public service delivery systems would 
build community capacity to engage in service delivery programmes that benefit them, the 
question remains as to whether governments are always willing to boost community capacity 
through any training or are governments happier when communities are perpetually unable to 
place any pressure from below?. 
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Implications for Theory: The Need for a Radical Recasting of the way 
CBM is Understood and Enabled at Macro and Meso levels 
 
Contribution to knowledge and debates on decentralised service delivery 
This study adds to debates and evidence which show that the absence of deliberate commitments 
by public actors to consciously work towards achieving specific development targets may curtail 
prospects for the pursued changes (Nyalunga 2006b, McNamara and Morse 2004). This study 
adds to existing knowledge and therefore extends the debate on the fundamentals that need to be 
adhered to by policy actors wishing to build effective synergies with service beneficiaries 
particularly those living in rural developing contexts of sub-Saharan Africa. The study generates 
more evidence to demonstrate why participation in planning and implementation of rural water 
supplies in developing countries may not achieve its intended goals if targeted consumers are not 
deliberately supported by their immediate public service authorities and frontline service 
providers. Further, the study contributes significantly to the debates around what strategies could 
ensure that beneficiary communities of collective services remain active rather than passive 
development partners. In particular, it locates the significant role of lower local government 
actors in stimulating and sustaining energies of water user communities to effectively play their 
policy prescribed mandates. By so doing, the study questions the credibility of policies that value 
the significant role of communities in sustainable service delivery but which at implementation 
appear to be taking the same communities for granted. 
Contribution to knowledge and debates on sustainable water management 
The NPM and governance paradigms have successfully shaped water policies of most countries 
embracing the intersection between public, private-for-profit and not-for-profit sector actors. The 
involvement of new players in public policy has meant in the NPM that the traditional role of the 
state as the sole proviof services changes to that of an enabler. Enablement as a new role has also 
meant many things, but most importantly it has emphasised the vitality of ensuring that services 
are provided in designs and means that consider citizens as customers. It has also meant 
contracting out public services to private actors through competitive tendering processes as well 
as allowing networks of actors (public, private for-profit and not-for-profit) to jointly plan 
implement and monitor service delivery. All these changes have happened in Uganda’s rural 
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water supply sub-sector in an effort to find means and ways to enhance the sustainability of 
services. 
Following the principles of decentralisation, community participation and subsidiarity as 
embedded in the NPM and governance paradigms, the rural water policy and institutional 
framework rightly places water users at the centre of the responsibility for enhancing the 
sustainability of point-water facilities under the banner of Community Based Management 
(CBM). However, as this study has revealed,  new public policy and management framework, 
institutional and governance dynamics play an important role in shaping and maintaining 
relationships of different actors that support the effectiveness of CBM systems for rural point 
water facilities. Such relationships shape but are also shaped by the way power and authority are 
distributed within and among different actors at different levels of decision making. The means 
and dynamics of distribution and utilisation of power and other resources may hence serve to 
enable or disable opportunities for policy implementation and may impact positively or 
negatively on the desired policy results. Delayed disbursement of funds to local governments 
from the centre, conflict of interest in contracting out to the private sector, irregular spending e.g. 
re-allocation funds for extension work (software activities) to supply activities (hardware 
activities), weak sector coordination mechanisms at local government level and weak systems for 
monitoring among many others are some of the key disablers good policy intentions such as 
those exhibited in CBM. Several theories for this failure could be borrowed from those that 
explain the weaknesses inherent in NPM and the new governance agenda, particularly public 
choice theory and its related theories of collective action and principle agent theory (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1965, Olson 1965, Braun and Guston 2003).  
 
Just as some critics have commented, NPM is not completely different from earlier approaches 
and concepts in public administration and management (Kaboolian 1998, Gültekin 2011). Some 
have indeed argued that NPM is simply ‘new wine in old bottles’ (Frederickson 1996 p. 269). As 
the World Bank (1997) also noted,  the world's development success stories of today's industrial 
economies or the postwar growth "miracles" of East Asia show that development requires an 
effective state; one that plays a catalytic and facilitating role, encouraging and complementing 
the activities of private businesses and individuals (The World Bank 1997). However, this has to 
be preceded by real leadership commitment to achieve results. In the rural water sector in 
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Uganda, the major bottlenecks at the macro and meso level of service delivery range from sector 
budget ceilings that tend to favour water supply (hardware) against maintenance of existing 
infrastructure, to delays in procurement and disbursement of funds to decentralised local 
government units, resulting into hurried implementation of projects.  All these imply the need for 
a radical recasting of the way CBM is understood and enabled at national and sub-national levels 
of service delivery if it is to enhance equitable access and sustainability of rural domestic water 
supply.  
In theory, policy support for community management of water facilities follows the subsidiarity 
principle, an organising principle which supports the idea that central authority or government 
ought to facilitate decentralisation to the extent that its direct role or function in local 
development matters is a subsidiary one. In other words, central authority should perform only 
those tasks which cannot be performed effectively by the smallest, lowest or least centralised 
competent authority (Jordan 2000). In this respect, the community through its elected 
representatives forms the lowest authority capable of controlling, or at least influencing the 
development of its water systems with minimal post-construction external support. As an 
authority, the community of water users ought to be empowered by the policy framework to own 
and attend to system obligations, legitimately makes and controls decisions and their outcomes. 
The practical reality based on the findings of this study show that decentralisation of authority 
could curtail community capacity to play their roles which, in the contrary would have resulted 
into more sustainable community services. Paradoxically, the problem is not tied to rural water 
supply sub-sector alone. Districts have continued to yield a lot of power which most technical 
and political personnel are left to utilise at their discretion without being challenged by the 
communities. Coupled with the apathetic beliefs within the community or loss in confidence and 
trust that government institutions and their representatives will care about service delivery to 
communities, community interest and motivation to participate in government supported 
programmes has remained less than desired as this study has revealed. It seems therefore that 
efforts to build trust will have to be initiated by public institutions themselves and if ever 
purposefully initiated must remain consistent and active. Short of this, the gap between 
communities and local authorities will continue to negatively affect CBM and its effectiveness of 
the much anticipated rural water supply dividends. 
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It has been indicated Chapter Six community level dynamics such as weak leadership and 
community perceptions about policy contradictions continue to undermine the effectiveness of 
CBM have either remained unknown or ignored due to weaknesses at the macro and meso levels 
of rural safe water service delivery. While CBM remains a very important strategy for functional 
sustainability of rural point water facilities, without the intervention of government actors to re-
shape or revitalise this good service delivery model, its potential for success will remain poor. 
Many would-be incentives for enhancing the functionality of CBM have mainly been ignored 
and remain untapped in the sector. Thus the CBM project requires ‘renewed’ attention in all 
contexts similar to conditions prevailing in Uganda if it has to yield the much needed equity and 
equality in water supply. Contrary to the call for a withdrawn state, the effectiveness of CBM in 
leveraging functional sustainability of water facilities calls for an enhanced and innovative role 
of central and local government that seeks to ‘enable’ systems and structures that affect CBM.  
Can experience stimulate the right learning and action for CBM Effectiveness? 
Indeed, many of the disablers of CBM at the local level concern the gap between what Quin, 
Balfors and Kjellén (2011p. 278) described as ‘idealized roles of actors in the organizational 
framework and their roles in reality’. Many problems that are disabling CBM have been around 
for a long time and caused stagnation in levels of access to safe water countrywide; delayed 
disbursement of funds to local governments from the centre, conflict of interest in contracting 
out to the private sector, irregular spending e.g. re-allocation of funds for extension work 
(software activities) to supply activities (hardware activities), weak sector coordination 
mechanisms at local government level and weak systems for monitoring among many others. 
These still remain poorly attended to.  The problems indeed relate to sector governance 
weaknesses present at macro, meso and micro levels of planning and policy implementation, and 
several theories for this failure could be borrowed from those that explain the weaknesses 
inherent in NPM and the new governance agenda, particularly regarding the assumptions held 
that governments ought to allow other players to carry on tasks with ‘less’ government 
interference. The evidence from this study confirms that government direct involvement is 
fundamental for the effectiveness of CBM. Most of the roles of actors at the meso and macro 
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levels of the rural safe water supply programmes have not been adequately played out, thus 
affecting those of the community at the micro level. 
 
In an environment that hosts continuous learning, both desirable and undesirable results should 
provide opportunities for learning in order to correct deviations or maintain and/or even scale up 
good results. The results of this study have indicated that such learning would enable but also be 
enabled by regular monitoring and research, particularly integrating community dialogue or 
community engagement at the lowest level of decision making i.e. the water user community, 
following the subsidiarity principle of organisation and governance.  The subsidiarity principle 
does not denounce state intervention in matters that concern local communities, but it promotes 
the idea that state intervention in the community should only be undertaken to the least extent 
possible allowing communities more autonomy to take decisions provided they are within 
acceptable legal and policy standards (Stohr 2001). An enabling government will thus have a 
role in ensuring that communities and the institutions they have elected to manage their water 
facilities perform in its best interests, particularly with regard to policy implementation. This 
study confirms that while government institutions may be happy to have service delivery models 
such as CBM work, these institutions may not assertively demonstrate their levels of 
determination to make such models work. This study has shown that opportunities for making 
CBM work and succeed in Uganda’s rural water supply sub-sector have not been adequately 
tapped, despite the fact that most of these are well known to the key sector actors at the macro, 
meso and micro levels.  
 
Lessons that would stimulate learning and enable actions are largely ignored, while others are 
either unknown or are being taken for granted especially at the micro-level as Chapter Six has 
shown. Subsequently, the many good intentions of the policy and institutional framework for the 
delivery and sustainability of rural safe water services have largely remained unrealistic or just 
ideal rather than useful tools for empowering the poor and eliminating social and political 
inequalities associated with access to safe drinking water. Paradoxically, the consequences of a 
poor policy attention are also well known among actors at different levels, just as are, the options 
for mitigating these consequences. But the actions remain clearly weak or totally missing. In 
Chapter Five and Six, the results show that government actors and other service providers know 
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the challenges posed by a poor system of building community capacity in broad and specific 
terms, but despite such knowledge, there is little evidence to show the existence deliberate effort 
to do things differently. Good practices in the NGO sector remain inadequately replicated in 
other communities, despite their wide dissemination. Hence, NPM is not completely different 
from earlier approaches and concepts in public administration particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(see for instance, Kakumba and Nsingo 2008). Problems ranging from inequitable distribution of 
services across and within communities to lack of community interest or motivation to 
participate in public programmes still prevail. Indeed, as the World Bank (1997) noted,  the 
world's development success stories of today's industrial economies or the postwar growth 
"miracles" of East Asia show that development requires an effective state; one that plays a 
catalytic and facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private businesses 
and individuals (The World Bank 1997), but there has to be real leadership commitment. In the 
next section, a discussion of the implications of this study’s findings on policy and practice is 
made. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice: Towards an enabling Framework for 
CBM and Functional Sustainability of Rural Point-Water Facilities 
 
Despite a coherent policy and legal framework supported by an elaborate institutional 
framework, and continued commitment of financial resources, the rural water supply sub-sector 
and more particularly CBM systems still falls short of the required ‘energy’ to achieve results. 
This study establishes a number of issues in the sector that are working to disable opportunities 
for progress in sustainability of community managed water facilities and which continue to 
undermine progress.  Much of what the good legal and policy framework prescribe has remained 
purely theoretical when issues of community management and functional sustainability of rural 
safe water supply infrastructure are considered. The legal and regulatory framework is also 
predominantly top-down and is less known by communities who hardly make any reference to it 
as a basis for demanding improved services. Apart from calls for community contributions 
towards water source construction and post construction O&M, which communities are also 
struggling to uptake, this study established that very little was known by people in the case study 
concerning the relationship between safe water supply sustainability, the environment, health and 
personal hygiene. As one of the key informants interviewed at the meso level indicated, issues of 
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financing of water facilities, procurement and supplies are also still ‘far away’ from the 
community. Only few community members are knowledgeable about the purchase of spare parts 
with the help of HPMs, a phenomenon that could also be regarded as irregular, since HPMs are 
reportedly capable of distorting basic information without being detected by the community. 
 
This study confirms the fact that despite the call for a demand-responsive policy framework, the 
Ugandan rural water supply sector is characterised, effectively, by a top-down approach 
popularly known as supply-driven. As Quin, Balfors and Kjellén (2011) observe, many of the 
links between actors represented in Uganda’s institutional framework for rural safe water service 
delivery are very weak. The choice of technology for rural point water facilities is also largely 
limited to high-cost technologies which require significant technical and financial support to the 
communities. With the current weak system of devolution to local governments characterised by 
funding and budgetary processes that are devoid of proper financial predictability and continuous 
creation of new districts amidst limited human and financial resources, the rural water supply 
and sanitation sector in Uganda faces significant challenges (Mills 2006). 
 
Hence, ensuring that financial resources intended for the delivery of safe water services in rural 
communities is one of the most important benefits decentralised service delivery and the new 
public management approach is expected to bring into the water sector in Uganda.  However, the 
evidence generated by this study shows that this good intention has not yet yielded to its fullest 
potential for leveraging functional sustainability of rural point-water facilities. In terms of 
financing, the study confirms earlier conclusions which show that leveraging financial resources 
is a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for effective public service delivery 
(Winpenny 2003, Mosca 2006, Widmalm 2008), or sustainable rural water supply (Muhangi 
1996, Harvey and Reed 2004, Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2010, Quin, Balfors and Kjellén 2011). 
The major bottlenecks range from sector budget ceilings that tend to favour water supply against 
maintenance of existing infrastructure to delays in procurement and disbursement of funds to 
decentralised local government units.  
 
The analysis of policy documents and interviews on experiences and perceptions of the main 
actors in Uganda’s rural water sector indicate that the good and potentially enabling legal, policy 
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and institutional framework yet to translate into effective CBM and sustainable services. On the 
whole, study findings indicate that there is a well-known potential for CBM to sustainably 
enhance functionality rates of installed rural safe water facilities among all the stakeholders in 
the rural domestic water supply sub-sector in Uganda. This knowledge exists at all levels of 
policy making and implementation. It is not only reflected in the national policy and legal 
frameworks, but also in the many implementation guidelines and schedules at local government 
level, and most importantly in documented success cases in the country. However, despite this 
knowledge, and the existence of an elaborate policy and institutional framework, there is 
insufficient evidence to show that service authorities are deliberately concerned and are taking 
deliberate, conscious and consistent actions to ensure that CBM systems for rural domestic water 
supply do not continue to fail to produce desirable results. Some of the respondents argued that it 
is almost universal truth in Uganda that efforts and strategies that have often been taken to have 
CBM work have seemingly only concentrated on production, revision and circulation or 
distribution of sector policy documents, with minimal effort for ensuring that such efforts re-
emphasise and make-work, CBM of rural point water facilities. Communities are initially highly 
interested in supporting the projects, but this initial enthusiasm and sense of ownership that is 
evident at the beginning of the projects within recipient communities is usually poorly managed 
by actors who are ‘rushing’ to implement projects. In addition, even where meaningful 
participatory approaches have been applied, it usually takes a couple of months after 
commissioning of the rural water projects for the interest of the community to dwindle. The good 
policy and institutional frameworks meant to leverage effectiveness of community managed rural 
domestic water supply infrastructure remain loosely connected to communities. Policy guidelines 
and corresponding institutional arrangements may appear sufficient enough to leverage excellent 
levels of effective community management, but are largely still on paper and inadequately 
understood and applied at lower levels. The level of actor knowledge and interpretation of policy 
guidelines tends to diminish among lower level actors and more so among communities.  The 
success of the community management model of rural safe water supply in Uganda seems to 
depend more on individual agency, behaviour or motives of actors and less on the wider 
institutional goals, culture and practice. Community experiences with certain policy 
contradictions, and the seemingly negative trend in their perceptions of public actors is 
increasingly affecting the extent to which communities are willing to commit their voluntary 
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time and financial resources to community development activities, more so those that are linked 
to government.  
 
It appears that deliberate efforts to enhance effectiveness of community based models of service 
delivery in Uganda’s rural water sub-sector will need a package of strategies that prioritise 
building long term community trust and confidence in public sector actors. The role of bye-law 
development and implementation in bringing about long term attitudinal change in the 
community and among local politicians has not been given sufficient attention. Given a context 
where communities almost expect that ‘all services should be provided for free’ as it almost were 
in Makondo, it takes heavily concerted efforts to change community mindsets. Henceforth, the 
credibility of any patriotic system of leadership ought to be measured among others by the extent 
to which they are explicit at law development and enforcement. In sub-Saharan Africa, where 
‘populist leadership regimes’ are easily found, this important regulatory institution tends to 
suffer a lot of compromise (Allen and Hasnain 2010, Awortwi, Helmsing and Oyuku-Ocen 2010, 
Green 2010a). Community-level bye laws are not only needed in the water sector programmes 
but in many other related sectors such as sanitation and health, environment, child development 
and education etc. In rural domestic water supply and CBM in particular, bye-laws should be 
seen to be institution building and pro-community cohesiveness rather than ‘pernicious’ to the 
rural community of water users. 
 
Effective CBM systems can propagate high levels of sustainability of point water sources in 
resource poor settings. But this will depend on how a number of governance related constraints 
at the macro and particularly meso are addressed. Key among such factors is the need for 
consistent prioritisation of government led community enablement activities that clearly value 
communities as customers in a more consumerist approach to service delivery. It is perhaps until 
this has been achieved that CBM systems will translate into the long desired high levels of 
technical functionality and sustainability of rural domestic water supply facilities. In the context 
of Uganda, and sub-Saharan Africa in general, it will take more than just increasing financial 
resources in the rural water sector, but a real change in mindset of service providers immediate to 
the community over communities and their rights of access to services. However, central 
government institutions also ought to put their mindsets right in order to undertake people 
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cantered and service efficiency supervisory roles. Effective CBM will also take the change in the 
current flow of information and quality of trust between communities and their immediate 
service authorities. Further, it will also take a different set of cultural values among service 
providers especially the local government authorities. A new understanding of community level 
bye-law development and implementation is seemingly very critical in the current CBM 
frameworks in sub-Saharan African states with a political history and dispensation like that of 
Uganda. Bye-laws in such a context are critical community level resources not only in 
facilitating effective community participation in water management systems but will also serve 
to revitalise the seemingly fast-fading African culture of mutual support and collective self-reliance. 
However, they popularity and support will depend on the extent to which meso-level actors 
especially at district local government level understand their urgency. Communities working 
under the CBM framework will always need at least a minimal amount of external support, 
especially from local and central government institutions as lead agencies working in 
collaborative effort with NGOs. Thus, community management is primarily a task given to a few 
(elected) members of beneficiary community. As the findings have demonstrated in Chapter Five 
and Six, the efficacy of CBM depends inter-alia on the quality and effectiveness of the overall 
project implementation cycle. 
 
Drawing from this study’s findings, a discussion of the key issues that emerge as critical for the 
future effectiveness of CBM is made. This discussion and the suggestions or proposals made are 
only provided in light of the fact that they emerge as important lessons for future development 
programmes utilising CBM as a service delivery model. On the whole the most important issue is 
about re-thinking the place of communities in the overall framework for the sustainability of 
rural point water facilities in resource poor settings. There are certain realities facing economies 
of the developing world and those of sub-Saharan Africa in particular. First, cost-sharing/cost 
recovery is permanent on the economic and public service delivery agenda especially in the 
water sector. Second, politics of patronage and aid history have for long kept communities stuck 
at the receiving end, and paradoxically, amidst economic regimes of a reduced state. Third, 
service delivery is a must and remains a responsibility of the government  regardless of whether 
new players exist or do not exist on the scene, whether the regimes in power are seeking or not 
seeking new mandates from the their citizens.  Hence, governments as their democratic 
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responsibility have to remain to be seen to steer the multitude of the many actors service 
delivery, within or outside networks so as to reap the best results from this governance 
arrangement.  
 
In addition, considering that the majority water users in sub-Saharan Africa (over 85% in 
Uganda) still live in rural areas means that investing a large amount of time and resources to 
support the sustainability of rural water projects is one sure way to significantly reduce the 
number of people using unprotected/unsafe water. In addition, mobilising them effectively can 
have a great impact on cost recovery. In the rural water sector, and CBM and functional 
sustainability of rural point-water supply facilities, the most critical issue, based on this study’s 
findings is a renewed focus/attention on building micro level capacity and removing all the 
disablers there in for CBM to yield more positive results. Once this becomes the arching 
objective for all actors, as a matter of fact, it automatically means that meso and macro level 
disablers will be identified and attended to. Thus the main caveat is that the secondary 
stakeholders must be willing and able to effectively play their roles. There must therefore be 
sufficient political will and effort to make CBM work to deliver sustainable services to the 
majority in peripheral rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa. There must also be the necessary 
determination to make and implement budgets as important caveats for translating political will 
into action. A detailed discussion of the specific actions targeting to leverage CBM and 
functional sustainability of rural point water facilities is presented in subsequent discussion on 
the proposed framework for revitalisation of CBM based on this case study from Uganda. 
A Framework for Revitalising CBM: the role of Innovative and Context-
Specific Enabling Mechanisms 
The currently promoted Community Based Management System (CBMS) for rural safe water 
service delivery in its design strategically and rightly places water users in the most important 
positions in the rural safe water governance framework. But the effectiveness of the position of 
water users in the framework much depends on whether and how policy actors are directly in 
touch with communities in ensuring that the important place they occupy in the service delivery 
framework is tapped for the attainment of the goals of CBMS. In chapter one, a conceptual and 
operational relationship between Effective CBM and Functional sustainability of rural point 
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water facilities was discussed (figure 1), while in Chapter Three, the relationship between the 
three major strands of enablement in relation to NPM and governance perspectives were also 
examined (figure 4). Based on these conceptualizations, Chapter Five and Six examine study 
findings on governance dynamics and contextual factors that determine the effectiveness of 
CBM as a model for sustainable rural safe water supply. In the following discussion, a number of 
policy implications are examined as a guide for strategic actions needed for enhancing the 
effectiveness of community managed models of service delivery in contexts similar to that of 
Uganda. I argue that government institutions more than any other actor are vital to the success of 
the CBM. An effective government (central and local) will positively influence the functions of 
the market (HPMs and spare parts distribution/availability). These in turn, will positively 
influence CBM (effective communities) to enhance sustainability of point-water facilities and 
services. The cycle in the relationship is expected to remain continuous through intra-sector actor 
interactions, learning, innovation and capacity building. This is illustrated in figure 23 below. 
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 Figure 23 Proposed framework for enhancing the effectiveness of CBM as a model for the sustainability of rural point  
water facilities in contexts similar to Uganda.  
 
  
Key Macro and Meso Level Proposals for enabling CBM 
 Timely availability of decentralised funds to Local governments 
 Prioritization of research based problem solving through community 
dialogues over O&M of supplied water sources 
Adequate facilitation and support of extension workers at lower level 
governments 
 Minimisation of public policy contradictions and inconsistencies that 
undermine community willingness to contribute to O&M 
 Development and ratification of community bye-laws that support 
CBM or O&M activities 
 
Community-Level Actions 
 Community mobilisation & sensitisation on use of  safe & clean 
water, roles & responsibilities, and on the need for bye-laws 
 Building community leadership capacity through training and 
innovative incentives 
 Making it possible for communities to work with HPM in a more 
formal relationship as a pre-condition for support 
 Make periodical accountability for funds to be clearly mandatory and 
establish these schedules in bye-laws  
 Strengthening the use and application of community byelaws in O&M  
 Mandatory payment of O&M to build a culture of responsibility 
 Protect communities from the malpractices or exploitative behaviour 
of HPMs by improving water user competence on pumps and their 
parts. 
 
Functional CBM 
 Regular and effective community 
meetings over water management 
 Minimal/absence of community 
conflicts over water use  
 Regular preventive water source 
maintenance activities 
 Collection and transparent 
management of cash contributions 
 Fair participation of men and 
women and children in decision 
making over water 
 Direct and regular contacts with 
local authorities on services 
 Direct contact with Hand Pump 
Mechanics/Technicians 
 Use of community byelaws to 
apply sanctions on flouters  
 Well-motivated Committees and 
water source care takers 
 Greater ability to hold political 
leaders and actors accountable 
 Easy access to, and utilisation of, 
all vital rural domestic water 
services information  
 
Functional Sustainability 
of Point-water Facilities 
 High levels of service 
efficiency 
 High functionality levels 
of water facilities 
 Spatially and socially 
equitable access to rural 
safe water services 
 Safe water use prioritized 
in households 
 Replicable results 
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Need to build and consciously sustain meso-level actor partnerships 
in support of CBM 
 
There is a need for Central and Local government authorities to consciously build capacity in 
support of CBM. As argued, more than any other actor in the rural safe water supply, 
government actor institutions need to consciously build capacity at all levels of policy and 
service delivery in support of CBM effectiveness using context relevant policy adjustments and 
innovations. The results of this study stress the importance of the fact that the success of CBM 
requires considerable investment in human resource capacity building strategies, targeting not 
only the community as primary beneficiaries of services, but also their political and technical 
leaders at the macro and meso levels. The ability of local politicians and technical authorities to 
appreciate and play their roles both before and after construction is imperative for CBM and the 
sustainability of the water infrastructure. Effective cooperation among stakeholders builds a great 
amount of trust that has a strong bearing onto tangible social mobilisation for CBM. The study 
findings thus support an increasing recognition that external agencies may need to play wider 
roles in facilitating equality of access, beyond merely setting criteria (Cleaver and Toner 2006a). 
I argue further that the need to address barriers to real community empowerment is more 
seriously evident at the community level, but the actors to stimulate this intervention remain 
more at the meso level and macro level. Communities need to be supported at whatever cost to 
own and govern point-water supply infrastructure supplied in their communities. The main 
outcome from ownership should be seen as a product of their ability to contribute to O&M and 
for the WSCs to be able to collect, utilise and account for O&M fees. The success of CBM and 
functional sustainability depends on functional WSCs capable of fulfilling their core functions. 
But this depends on whether macro and meso level actors are effectively playing their own roles 
to enable the private (for-profit and not for profit) sector and its interface with the community. 
Based on this study, capacity building actions to enhance the effectiveness of CBM in achieving 
functional sustainability include all those actions that enhance the effectiveness of all frontline 
service providers including Sub-county Local Government Extension Workers, HPMs, WSCs 
and the Water Source Care-takers.  
The effectiveness of these actors also makes it easier for the NGO actors to play their part. This 
study established that initiatives from the major NGO actor to work with local authorities were 
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frustrated by complaints of poor staffing or high expectations from local authorities on 
facilitation or allowances from the NGO. Such a scenario questioned the extent to which a local 
authority exists to deliver services closer to its people or not. Whereas it may be true that the 
district capacity may have been challenged by the fact that it had just been established, the 
existence of an active and fairly better funded water and sanitation programme of the Medical 
Missionaries of Mary (MMMs) ought to have been taken advantage of by the local authority to 
enhance greater sustainability of the services they were providing. Effective partnership and 
collaboration remains a key pillar for the success of policies seeking user contributions as part of 
cost recovery strategies. Initiatives to build strong partnerships between service providers can be 
frustrating if they are one sided as opposed to when they are collectively embraced by sector 
actors. Poor collaboration as this study has indicated in Chapter Six may lead to un-necessary 
conflicts, counter-accusations and poor performance results and institutional mistakes. Again, the 
bottom line is that government actors have to take the lead in the case of CBM. This is because 
of their comparative advantage over other actors in terms of relative permanency. Building and 
sustaining trust among stakeholders is essential for cooperation and cooperation enhances 
efficiency and effectiveness due to the ‘hybridization’ it brings in form of resources or 
competencies from different actors (finance, technical skills, community trust as well as 
proximity to beneficiaries of service). The benefits of effective collaborations and partnerships 
are still likely to be missed, most particularly if local government authorities are slow or never 
able to exploit such opportunities. 
 
The findings of this study also show that in order to able to attract community support for 
programmes, services must consistently be seen and perceived by the community to be provided 
following the principles of equity and social justice. Unfortunately, some service providers 
especially from government may still hold the attitude that provision of public goods and 
services to the community is a favour rather than a right. For that reason, they remain quite 
comfortable with supply driven models which seemingly offer them a lot of convenience in 
implementation and accountability. Consequently technical and socio-economic information 
needs of actors have not benefitted from the experiences of users of services on the quality of 
services through regular monitoring and evaluation studies. Frontline service providers 
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especially from the sub-county local government need to form and maintain strategic 
partnerships with community based organisations in order to maintain a good level of contact 
with the community or service users.  
 
Instituting innovative ways of institutionalizing community responsibility for O&M of water 
supply infrastructure could also include mechanisms that allow more formal agreements between 
the community or their representatives and the service providers. Such formal agreements should 
stipulate in clear language the terms and conditions for service delivery including the roles and 
responsibilities of the beneficiaries as a condition for support, and local authorities should be 
careful not to fault on their side of responsibility. The agreements should also stipulate that 
stakeholders would periodically meet to review progress, collectively address discrepancies and 
allow continuous learning. Such actions will help to improve on the quality of communication 
between providers and recipients of services. They will also help to constantly clarify on 
perceived contradictions in policies by the community members as well as dymystify constraints 
to extension work that are known to undermine CBM and functional sustainability of rural point 
water facilities. But the need for local authorities to emphasise motivation and facilitation of 
technical staff in the extension service sector should not be totally ignored. 
  
Need to innovatively and consciously scale-up extension visits to 
communities in support of CBM  
It was indicated in Chapter Five that local government extension staff in charge of community 
mobilisation and sensitisation (software) are sometimes sidestepped by district water officers 
who may prefer to re-allocate some of the software funding to construction of new water sources 
rather than support software activities for O&M of existing water supply infrastructure. It was 
also found out that there were tendencies by DWOs to deliberately disregard community 
development staff in spearheading software activities for rural point water facilities, sometimes 
in preference for hand-pump mechanics, because these could easily be manipulated. Measures to 
re-emphasise and ensure that software activities are undertaken may therefore not only be seen in 
terms of increased funding, or making adjustments in budget allocation and management, but 
also ensure that extension work yields more substantial results for CBM systems. In contexts 
232 
 
similar to Uganda, the number and capacity building activities undertaken in a given period of 
time could be added to the list of indicators for measuring rural water sector performance, and 
funding for local governments tied to such performance and also used in the update of the rural 
water supply atlas of the MWE. This is on the basis of the fact that such visits as this study has 
indicated have the potential to enhance functional sustainability of rural point water facilities, but 
have seemingly been undermined by local government sector actors. The number of times 
extension workers actually visit and sensitise or support CBMs for point-water facilities would 
be considered against a minimum threshold for reporting. This would be done in such a way that 
data is recoreded by the WSCs and quarterly reports made to the district and sub-county 
leadership. This also means that such local government reports would feed into the national 
level-annual sector performance reporting of the sector ministry to guide planning and budgeting 
for CBM activities in the rural water supply. By including such indicators in the performance 
monitoring portfolio, the effectiveness of CBM would be among the prioroties in the sector, 
constituting an enabling strategy. 
 
Extension work in support of CBM could also constitute a forum for community engagement and 
action research activities on O&M and overall social transformation of communities. Some cases 
have been reported where WSCs have for instance utilised O&M funds to provide credit to 
members of the community, impacting on livelihoods (Nabunya et al 2012). But such 
innovations indeed require more support and capacity building for communities. One of the 
underlying causes for poor sustainability levels in community managed rural safe water supplies 
is limited community engagement forums that bring service providers and consumers 
(communities) together at the level where services like water are consumed. Such forums serve 
both technical and political goals for community development. Community level participatory 
enangement  or action research would not only inform planning but also serve to build 
community capacity for O&M of water sources and subsequently enable more prospective 
community development innovations, enhance downward accountability and minimize or at best 
eliminate public resource mismanagement. It would also serve to revitalise and maintain high 
levels of community cohension and trust towards public service providers. The results of this 
study as discussed in chpater seven indicate that ommunity trust towards government can indeed 
influence the extent to which communities are willing to support government programmes even 
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if they are visibly intended to benefit them. The policy framework in support of CBM in the rural 
water sector ought to enhance community knowledge of aspects in service deliverly that are 
critical for building community trust of the systems of government. Such aspects for instance 
would include procurement and contract management processes, project implementation 
schedules or timelines etc. However, owing to the bureaucratic character of public officials and 
managers rooted in legacies of their colonial administrations, community dialogue activities have 
not been given meaningful attention. Consequently, rural communities in much of sub-Saharan 
Africa including Uganda have tended to maintain rather pathological beliefs that public service 
delivery processes are too technical and therefore ‘unworthy’ for them to invest time 
understanding. Others also feel that governments always do ‘their things according to their 
wish’, bothering less on what results accrue to them from government interventions. This is the 
disconnect that will need to be tackled in the context of CBM for rural safe water supply and 
sustainability, with government institutions taking a substantial lead. 
Inter-governmental decentralisation can still work in favour of CBM  
The findings of this study point to weaknesses in fiscal decentralisation to local governments in 
support of service delivery. Intermittent and unpredictable local government funding 
characteristic of Uganda’s decentralized financing of rural water services, and local government 
dependency on central government grants to finance services compound problems of CBM. As 
indicated in chapter five, at the meso level sector coordination mechanisms (DWSSCs and 
IDMs) and the presence of technical support units (TSUs) are important steps towards enhancing 
opportunities and prospects for influencing decisions on CBM. However, the regularity and 
quality of these meetings has tended to depend among others on the availability of funds, which 
are not always readily available. While NGOs are commended for improving the socio-economic 
conditions of communities and households, particularly by increasing access to safe water, there 
is a risk of losing this hard earned achievement if the local leadership and stakeholders do not 
make their contribution towards sustainability of these investments. Local authorities 
interviewed at the district and sub-county strongly appreciated the contribution of the MMMs, 
although they did not seem adequately ready to propel such achievements.  
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The future of CBM and rural safe water supply is about improved levels of efficiency in 
financing local governments. For the water sector and CBM in particular, I already indicated 
earlier that investment in software is an inevitable intervention. As noted earlier, community 
capacity building activities (software) should be seen as strategies for long term financing of the 
rural water and sanitation programmes.  By building this capacity, the seemingly ever-growing 
dependency on external support by communities will be curtailed. In order to maximise 
opportunities that enhance long term access to safe domestic water supply, increased contact and 
trust between technical people and the community as earlier proposed, would also enhance 
uptake of alternative technologies such as rain water hervesting (for those that could afford) as 
well as existing cheaper options for enhancing the quality of drinking water. Communities could 
be trained to form groups and pool money to contribute towards a rain-water hervesting projects, 
initially to one most deserving member or on their own preferred criteria and continue on a 
rotational basis until every member is supplied. This intervention would serve to complement 
other technologies, reduce pressure on pumps especially in the dry seasons and at peak hours, 
allowing less time for queing as well as less frequency on hand pump break-down. 
 
A history of dependency on external support not only from NGOs but also from government 
programmes or individual politicians seeking to be elected in what Goodfellow and Titeca 
(2012) referred to as vote banks for positions have potentially served as an impediment to cost 
recovery, self-support potentialities and capacities. This has been exacerbated by low levels of 
sensitisation and community education on the need for collective action amidst declining levels 
of public financing. It is important for CBM to diversify its purpose beyond pumps to other far 
cheaper options for delivering sustainable services using the same principles applied in CBM. 
Again, this will take the intervention of government in ensuring that the potentially existing spirit 
of mutual support and collective action does not fade completely but is nurtured and consciously 
supported as an African resource. Indeed, it should be noted that CBM builds on much longer 
traditions of self-managed assets (Lammerink, et al. 2001, Mitlin 2004). This study has indicated 
that in developing contexts marred by high levels of poverty and inequality, households that live 
far away from safe water sources and cannot afford to pay vendors chose obtain unprotected 
water sources, yet others that could afford would pay a water vendor to deliver water to their 
homes on a regular basis. In addition, some members of the community were willing to pay more 
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than they were expected to pay as contribution for repair of water sources, while others were 
willing to individually finance repair of pumps and accept to be paid as the other members of the 
community brought in their contributions.  Such resources could be tapped for even greater 
projects if levels of community organisation and cohesiveness are sustainably kept high. The 
answer for this is in viewing community capacity building as an alternative to financing rural 
safe water programmes. 
 
Need to make the Market aspects of CBM work to stimulate high 
levels of functionality of point water sources 
The privatisation of the services of Hand Pump Mechanics (HPMs), and the liberalisation of 
hand pump spare parts distribution may have been premised on the fact that it generates high 
efficiency levels in terms of quick response to breakdowns of point water sources but the 
findings show that these private sector actors also need an effective regulation to ensure that they 
do not exploit the community. This study found out that the relationship between the community 
and the Sub-county HPM was quite informal contrary to sector policy guidelines. Actions that 
would enhance formalization of water users and HPMs are being attempted in recent initiatives 
to roll out associations of HPMs with a hope that these institutions would be more self-regulating 
entities. I argue that even if HPMAs are promoted, their effectiveness will remain compromised 
if the capacity of communities is not build to effectively deal with the HPMs. Hence, even if 
there may be institutional weaknesses in policy implementation at higher levels, building the 
capacity of communities to understand market mechanisms surrounding spare-parts dealership 
such as pricing and quality or branding would go a long way in impacting positively on their 
relations with HPMs. Ensuring that community capacity to undertake regular preventive 
maintenance is also an important strategy that could be enhanced by through training and support 
by the HPMs. This will require investment in toolkits to make sure that they are kept with WSCs 
in the community rather than having them kept at the sub-county or district local government 
head-quarters. 
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The need to combine community sensitisation with bye-laws on CBM 
While regulation of the HPMs is important, it may also not effectively impact on CBM if the 
community and their WSCs are not effective in the collection of funds for O&M within the 
community. Effective community management as currently promoted in most development 
programmes depends entirely on an effective system of ensuring long term community collective 
action. In contexts daunted by a remarkable reduction in interest by communities to voluntarily 
participate in public programmes and activities, innovative ways of sustainably revitalising 
community interest to appreciate the roles they can play in achieving desired levels of service 
delivery for community development change and transformation become very critical.  
Mechanisms to ensure community compliance with O&M in terms of fulfilling their roles ought 
to be instituted. Critical as this study has shown in Chapter Six is the need to revitalise the role 
and community bye-laws on O&M including those that are concerned with attendance of 
community meetings. This study indicates that local government support for the development 
and implementation of community bye-laws is weak and sometimes politicised. Combining 
education and sensitisation of the community on CBM with bye-law development and 
implementation would help communities to appreciate bye-laws as an important social and 
economic investment for the sustainability of their services rather than take them as government 
‘coercion’. This is based on the backdrop of the fact that sensitisation alone may not effectively 
work to instill behaviour modification within communities on a long term basis. The rural water 
sector could exploit opportunities presented by the legal framework to support communities not 
only to develop but also enforce bye-laws as a mechanism for augmenting the effectiveness of 
CBM of point water facilities.  
 
Bye-laws related on CBM are not only important for enhancing compliance to O&M, but are 
also crucial to the ‘health and wealth’ of communities.  Some of the good practices in the rural 
water and sanitation sector have in their education and sensitisation programmes linked used the 
link between water, health and wealth as a mechanism for motivating them to support their 
programmes for long term sustainability. Integrating the importance of bye-laws in such 
campaigns would be another important addition to strengthening opportunities for service 
sustainability. To avoid associating laws with government as is the challenge identified in this 
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study, the NGOs in the sector would take lead using strategies that would ensure that the 
communities would eventually own the bye-laws. 
 
While it may require a considerable amount of time, effort and innovation, revitalising the 
perception and effectiveness of bye-laws in Uganda’s rural communities could also serve to not 
only reverse the persistently glaring trend towards total dependency by communities on external 
support in the operation and maintenance of waterfacilities, but could also broadly serve to 
revitalise the hitherto reliable and now seemingly fast-fading African culture of mutual support 
and collective self-reliance. Community bye-laws are also crucial in for revitalising community 
interest to attend meetings especially by the men who have tended to relegate community 
meetings to women. It seems that bye-laws and sanctions for none-compliance can only be made 
legitimate if local authorities are seen to be consistent and uncompromising towards their 
enforcement.  
 
Community education and sensitisation on the importance of bye-laws will not only mitigate the 
influence local politics on their implementation but may also help to mitigate the impact 
misconceptions about other policies can have on O&M. In this study, policies such as mass 
immunisation, universal primary education and the scrapping of graduated tax were found to be 
impacting negatively on community willingness to pay for O&M of their water sources. In bye-
laws and sanctions on attendance of general community meetings inclusing those on water 
supply would complement other mechanisms that revitalise community trust and respect for their 
leaders including the WSCs.  
 
The need to innovatively incentivize membership to WSCs and Water-
Source Care-taking 
There is need for introducing social incentives for the WSCs and (especial) point-water source 
caretakers in very innovative ways that would keep individual members or the entire groups 
motivated to volunteer their time. Such initiatives and strategies need not be financial incentives 
rather they would include things like; consistent official recognition in public meetings or 
gatherings by local political leaders or religious leaders on worship days, in schools where their 
children go to school etc. This is in recognition of the fact that human resources at the 
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community level are pertinent to the success of community managed projects. In addition, 
human attitudes play a big role in sustaining the supply of voluntary labour/time, and these could 
easily be compromised by simple conflicts and disagreements characteristic of rural community 
contexts such as the case between a water source caretaker in Misaana and the abusive girl 
(described in Chapter Six). Regular group support and guidance by local authorities and other 
service providers could also further enhance members’ understanding of community 
development dividends or benefits that accrue from working in groups as opposed to abandoning 
responsibility to individuals (caretakers). Periodical election of WSCs should be encouraged in 
order to reduce the monotony of voluntary work that some members may suffer, affecting their 
levels of motivation. These strategies would serve to contribute towards addressing interests of 
individual without necessarily compromising group goals. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
Broadly, the findings of this study emphasise the current importance of effective collaborations 
and partnership between users and providers of public/basic human services as embedded in the 
NPM and governance frameworks. The results bring out interesting issues that could be pursued 
in much more detail in future research on community based managed public/basic service 
delivery, especially in sub-Saharan Africa; How do public service delivery actors understand 
their role of working to serve the basic interests and rights of citizens in the NPM framework for 
basic service delivery mechanisms that emphasise CBM? How do users of services delivered 
under the CBM model perceive such approaches and those promoting them? Do communities 
appreciate the current changes in policy frameworks? Do they view them as intended to 
genuinely serve their interests? Do they see these as exploitative? How can a positive 
understanding of the shift in service delivery and associated challenges in roles and 
responsibilities be propelled, and what circumstances can sustain positive learning between and 
among the different stakeholders?  
Methodologically, this study was only limited to the study of CBM of point water facilities for 
domestic water supply in Uganda which included protected springs, shallow wells and deep bore 
holes. The study did not cover other community managed technologies such as rain-harvested 
water technologies or gravity flow schemes common for rural growth centres. The study did not 
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also include any community managed schemes for water for production. Given that these water 
technologies are also provided using the same institutional framework, it would be important for 
future studies to include consider them in their sample, as there may be enabling and disabling 
issues unique to such schemes the present study could have missed out especially at the 
micro/community level. 
Longitudinal studies pre-dominantly using action research techniques would offer the best option 
for understanding the impact direct and regular community sensitisation would have on 
community willingness to support CBM. It would also help explore more deeply the other 
dynamics of such as the time it would take, the tools and methods needed in order to stimulate 
full community interest that generates good results on CBM. Further it would explore more 
dynamics around bye-law development and implementation by allowing researchers more time 
to participate in their development and implementation. The Action research approach would 
also allow more time to examine the extent to which local politics could be utilised to support 
rather than undermine community contributions to O&M through dialogue and community 
engagement. Given that children were observed to be the major water collectors, the action 
research study would also explore opportunities that would come from using children to sensitise 
parents over the need for safe water by linking it to their right to health and education. This is 
because safe water ceases to be safe when children are exposed to risks of physical attacks, 
and/or when the processes of accessing it undermine children’s enjoyment of other basic rights. 
Other messages would cover comparisons of expenditure between treatment of water related 
ailments and monthly contributions to O&M in order to demonstrate the amount of savings 
households could make by contributing to O&M of safe water facilities as a preventive strategy 
against water related illnesses. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex I: Research Tools 
 
Qualitative Interview Guides 
Guide A: 
FGDs with Water Users (not on any water committee i.e. ordinary water users) 
 
A1 Identification 
i. Village/LC 1 
ii. List of participants and their designation (Ordinary Member/Leader) 
iii. Types of safe water sources in the community, when they were constructed, the institution that 
constructed them and present functionality level 
iv. Number and alternative sources of water existing in the community 
 
A2 Knowledge of safe water as a key health and economic resource 
i. What do you regard to be the importance of water to human life? 
ii. How does safe water rank in terms of other needs of your community? (Probe the other needs and ask 
the community to indicate whether/how availability of safe water contributes to their attainment) 
iii. Please tell me how water contributes to household social and economic well being 
iv. Which people/persons are most affected when there is safe water scarcity in your area? 
v. What would you consider to be a good water source and a bad water source? 
 
A3 Community knowledge of the roles of different actors and modalities for  establishing safe 
 water sources 
i. What do you know with regard to government policies, guidelines or conditions governing the 
provision of safe water to rural communities? 
ii. What do you know with regard to specific roles and responsibilities of the central government, your 
district and sub-county in provision and maintenance of rural safe water sources? 
iii. Who else apart from Central and Local governments do you find important in the provision and 
maintenance of safe water sources in your community? 
iv. What do you know to be the roles and responsibilities of the community when it comes to rural safe 
water service delivery?  
 (Probe whether water users know their roles as stipulated in National Policy  Framework i.e. 
Participation in: Planning and decision making; Election of WSC;  Site  selection; improving 
 sanitation; cleaning water source surroundings;  Determination of how much to contribute 
and actual contribution  to  capital  and O & M costs; enactment of bye laws) 
v. What difference would it make if government or any other actor came and put in place a water source 
for you to use without in anyway asking you to participate?  
vi. How helpful have been the private sector actors such as HPMs and Spare Parts Dealers to this 
community in ensuring that your water sources continue to be in good operating conditions? Which 
private institutions or individuals have been helpful in the past five years or so in your community 
vii. How helpful have been NGOs in your community with regard to safe water provision and maintenance 
of constructed water sources? Please name the NGOs that have been key players in safe water service 
delivery in your community. 
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  A4.  Community Capacity for Water Source Operation and Maintenance  
 
i. What institutions or community structures are traditionally responsible/recognised for managing water 
sources in your community? 
ii. What have you done to ensure that existing water sources remain in good operating conditions? (e.g. 
have they ensured that they have a fairly skilled/trained pump mechanic, any contacts and agreement 
with spare parts distributors, ensure that the community members contribute, building trust between 
WUCs/WSCs and the community etc)  
iii. Do you have any bye laws that govern usage/operation and maintenance of your water sources ( Ask 
about what they are and the antecedents/motivational factors)  
iv. What are the key challenges faced by the community in ensuring that the water sources are well 
maintained (probe: community cooperation and conflict, community organisation and ingenuity 
or lack of it etc; determination, collection and accountability for funds collected for O & M etc) 
v. Knowledge of other sources of help in case the water source fails beyond the capacity of the 
community to repair. Has this knowledge been utilised in the past or can it potentially be utilised 
in future? 
vi. Factors that determine community ability and willingness to contribute to construction/capital cost and 
the cost of minor and major repairs at a constructed water source. What forms of contributions are 
preferred by the community: Cash or in-kind? Probe for other mechanisms of contribution 
preferred by the community and why etc.) 
vii. What do you do when higher levels of government (Sub-county and district) fail to adhere to your calls 
for safe water supply in your locality? 
viii. With regard to safe water services in your community, how have you been involved in the contractual 
processes? Which contractor(s) constructed your main water source and which contractor(s) repairs in 
case the community is not able to undertake specific mechanical works? 
ix. How were you involved in determining the cost and payment modalities for construction of your main 
water source(s)?  
x. What was the total cost of construction and what contribution did the community make? 
 
 A5. Community capacity to engage government and hold them     
  accountable for services. 
i. Do you think you can help a ‘reluctant’ government (central and Local) to effectively deliver safe water 
services in your communities? (Please explain why you think this way? (Knowledge of rights as citizens) 
ii. In which ways do you think you can best help government to deliver safe water services to your 
community? (Knowledge of responsibilities of citizens: e.g. probe whether and how they seek 
accountability from local councils with examples of how they have done this in the past) 
iii. How do you normally get to know sub-county and district plans and budgets with regard to rural safe 
water? (Probe: Sensitisations, announcements on radio, Council representatives or media reports) 
iv. What do would you consider to be your roles and responsibilities as citizens in ensuring that service 
providers especially local governments make known to you the status of services (especially safe water) 
they ought to deliver in your localities? 
v. Please give a full account of the processes and circumstances you go through to repair your main water 
source whenever it breaks down. 
Guide B: 
Interview Guide for Community Leaders (LC1 Executive)  
 
B1 Identification 
i. Village/LC 1 
ii. List of participants and their designation (Ordinary Member/Leader) 
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iii. Types of safe water sources in the community, when they were constructed, the institution that 
constructed them and present functionality level 
iv. Number and alternative sources of water existing in the community 
 
B2  Knowledge of safe water as a key health and economic resource in the community 
i. What do you regard to be the importance of water to human life? Probe for social and economic well 
being of communities, households and possible sources of such knowledge. 
ii. How does safe water rank in terms of other needs of your community? (Probe the other needs and ask the 
leaders to indicate whether/how availability of safe water contributes to their attainment) 
iii. Which groups of people/persons are most affected when there is safe water scarcity in this community 
and why? 
iv. What in your community do you consider to be a good water source and a bad one? 
 
B3 Community knowledge of the roles of different actors and modalities for  establishing safe 
 water sources 
i. What do you know with regard to government policies, guidelines or conditions governing the 
provision of safe water to rural communities? 
ii. What do you know with regard to specific roles and responsibilities of the central government, your 
district and sub-county in provision and maintenance of rural safe water sources? 
iii. Who else apart from Central and Local governments do you find important in the provision and 
maintenance of safe water sources in your community and why? 
iv. What do you know to be the roles and responsibilities of the community when it comes to rural safe 
water service delivery?  
 (Probe for knowledge of roles as stipulated in National Policy Framework i.e.  participation in: 
Planning and decision making; Election of WSC;  Site selection;  improving sanitation; 
cleaning water source surroundings; Determination of  how much to contribute and actual 
contribution to  capital  and O&M costs;  enactment of bye laws) 
v. What difference would it make if government or any other actor came and put in place a water source 
for you to use without in anyway asking you to participate?  
vi. How helpful have been the private sector actors such as HPMs and Spare Parts Dealers to this 
community in ensuring that your water sources continue to be in good operating conditions? Which 
private institutions or individuals have been helpful in the past five years or so in your community 
vii. How helpful have been NGOs in your community with regard to safe water provision and maintenance 
of constructed water sources? Please name the NGOs that have been key players in safe water service 
delivery in your community. 
 
B4 Village Leadership Capacity to Demand for Safe Water Services  
i. Has your community ever placed demands to the sub-county for safe water services? 
ii. Please give an account of the processes under which current water sources came to be in the community 
(ever requested for a water source? Defined type of source? When was this request made? And who 
made the request? To whom was the request made and what processes followed…) 
iii. Under what circumstances may a request for safe water services be rejected by government or any other 
actor? Has a request for a safe water facility in your community ever rejected? 
iv. What plans/arrangements are in place to improve sustainable access to safe water in your community? 
v. In which ways do you think you can best help government to deliver safe water services to your 
community? (Knowledge of responsibilities of citizens: e.g. probe whether and how they seek 
accountability from local councils with examples of how they have done this in the past) 
vi. How do you normally get to know sub-county and district plans and budgets with regard to rural safe 
water? (Probe: Sensitisations, announcements on radio, Council Representatives or media reports) 
vii. What do would you consider to be your roles and responsibilities as village leaders in ensuring that the 
sub-county and district make known to the community members the status of services (especially safe 
water) they ought to deliver in your localities? 
 
 B5.  Community Capacity for Water Source Operation and Maintenance  
i. Please give a full account of the processes and circumstances you go through to operate and maintain 
your main water source(s) whenever there is breakdown. 
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ii. What have you done to ensure that existing water sources remain in good operating conditions? (e.g. 
have they ensured that they have a fairly skilled/trained pump mechanic, any contacts and agreement 
with spare parts distributors, ensure that the community members contribute, building trust between 
WUCs/WSCs and the community etc)  
iii. Do you have any bye laws that govern usage/operation and maintenance of your water sources (Ask 
about what they are, antecedents/motivational factors and processes of their institution)  
iv. What are the key challenges faced by the community in ensuring that the water sources are well 
maintained (probe: community cooperation and conflict, community organisation and ingenuity 
or lack of it etc; determination, collection and accountability for funds collected for O & M etc) 
v. Knowledge of other sources of help in case the water source fails beyond the capacity of the 
community to repair. Has this knowledge been utilised in the past or can it potentially be utilised 
in future? 
vi. Factors that determine community ability and willingness to contribute to construction/capital cost and 
the cost of minor and major repairs at a constructed water source. What forms of contributions are 
preferred by the community: Cash or in-kind? Probe for other mechanisms of contribution 
preferred by the community and why etc.) 
vii. What do you do when higher levels of government (Sub-county and district) fail to adhere to 
community calls for safe water supply in your locality? 
viii. With regard to safe water services in your community, how have you been involved in the contractual 
processes? Which contractor(s) constructed your main water source and which contractor(s) repairs in 
case the community is not able to undertake specific mechanical works? 
ix. How were you involved in determining the cost and payment modalities for construction of your main 
water source(s)? What was the total cost of construction and what contribution did the community 
make? 
Guide C: 
Key Informant Interview Guide for Sub-county/LC III Officials 
 
C1. Safe Water Accessibility 
i. What is the current estimated sub-county safe water coverage? 
a. Are there tools for collecting water data in this sub-county? 
b. What methods do you use to collect the data? 
ii. If you were to rank the major problems faced in this sub-county, where would safe clean water fall?  
iii. Which Parishes and Villages are well covered with safe water and which ones have the poorest 
coverage and why? 
iv. What is the average distance to the nearest safe water source in the sub-county? 
v. What types of safe water sources mainly exist in the sub-county and why? 
vi. What type of water sources have the lowest functionality levels and which ones have the highest 
functionality levels and why? 
vii. What major changes in terms of access to safe water have occurred in the sub-county in the last 5-10 
years? 
 
C2. Knowledge, understanding and utilization of policies and guidelines for  CBMS for water service 
 delivery 
i. How does a community get to be served with a safe water point in this sub-county? 
ii. What guidelines and policies exist for the provision of water in the sub-county? 
iii. How can you tell that the guidelines and policies for water provision are well known or not known 
to the community and what is the status quo at present? 
iv. Are the guidelines and policies strictly followed in the allocation of water sources in the sub-
county no matter who the actor/service promoter is? Explain. 
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v. Did the sub-county participate in the formulation of these guidelines and policies? In what ways 
did the sub-county participate? 
vi. What can you comment on the existing guidelines 
What are the strengths of these guidelines and policies in the provision  of water services in this 
sub-county? What are the constraints of these guidelines and policies in the provision of water 
services in this sub-county? 
vii. To what extent do the problems and constraints of the guidelines and policies explain the 
challenges of sustainable service delivery in the sub-county?  
viii. What other factors that you think affect people’s accessibility to safe water in this sub-county?  
 
C3. Gaps in enabling water Users to participate in safe water Provisioning 
i. Community Based Maintenance System for constructed safe water sources is widely endorsed and 
regarded one of the best options for operation and Maintenance of communal water supply facilities. 
To what extent has this approach been applied in provision of safe water in this sub-county? 
ii. To what extent do you think communities in this sub-county appreciate/understand this new 
approach? 
iii. What methods/approached do you use to collect water related information/data in this sub-county? 
iv. How do you tell that water source based maintenance systems are functional or not? 
v. Looking back to the period before the community based management system (Before mid 1990s) was 
introduced and after, how do you compare safe water supply sustainability levels in the past and the 
present in this sub-county? 
vi. To what extent are the following adhered to in ensuring CBMS for safe water in this sub-county? 
 Respect for community’s decision to participate in service provision or not 
 The choice and type of technology and service level options based on community willingness to 
pay; 
 Community decisions on when and how their services will be delivered; 
 Community decision on how source maintenance funds are managed and accounted for; 
 Community decision on how the services are operated and maintained. 
 Downward accountability and information sharing with regard to funds, services etc. 
 
C4 Actor-level initiatives for Enhancing Effectiveness of CBMS for rural Safe  Water 
i. How does poor participation of the community affect actors in safe water service delivery? How 
does it affect central and local governments, the private sector and NGO actors to deliver safe water 
services?   
ii. What activities is the sub-county often engaged in to build the capacity of water users/communities 
in the provision of safe water through Community Based Management Systems? 
iii. How often are these activities undertaken? How are they prioritized over other activities? 
iv. How has private sector involvement in rural safe water promoted or hindered effective CBMS for 
safe water provision in this sub-county? 
v. In what ways has NGO involved in water provision in this sub-county promoted or constrained 
CBMS? 
vi. What role is played by the sub-county in creating an enabling environment for the PS and NGOs to 
promote safe water provision in the sub-county? Please describe the nature of relationships that exist 
between the sub-county and the private sector and NGOs 
vii. How does the sub-county ensure that the activities of the private sector and NGOs do not 
compromise goals of CBMS? 
viii. If anything was to change in the current approaches to rural safe water provision, what would you 
suggest should change and what is your basis for your position? 
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GUIDE D 
Interview Guide for District Political and Technical/Civic Leadership 
 
D1 Identification 
i. Designation of the informant 
ii. Time served in current designation and length of time spent working with MWE/DWD 
D2. Safe Water Accessibility 
i. What is the current estimated district safe water coverage? 
a. Are there tools for collecting water data in this district? 
b. What methods do you use to collect such data? 
c. How is data utilised to enhance service delivery? 
 
ii. If you were to rank the major problems faced in this district, where would safe clean water fall?  
iii. Which sub-counties and Parishes are well covered with safe water and which ones have the poorest 
coverage and why? 
iv. What is the average distance to the nearest safe water source in the district? 
v. What types of safe water sources mainly exist in the district and why? 
vi. What type of water sources have the lowest functionality levels and which ones have the highest 
functionality levels and why? 
vii. What major changes in terms of access to safe water have occurred in the district in the last 5-10 
years? 
 
D3. Knowledge, understanding and utilization of policies and guidelines for  CBMS for water service 
 delivery 
i. How does a community get to be served with a safe water point in this district? 
ii. What guidelines and policies exist for the provision of water in the district? 
iii. How can you tell that the guidelines and policies for water provision are well known or not known to 
the community and what is the status quo at present? 
iv. Are the guidelines and policies strictly followed in the allocation of water sources in the district no 
matter who the actor/service promoter is? Please explain. 
v. Did the district participate in the formulation of these guidelines and policies? In what ways did the 
district participate and if not what would you comment on this? 
vi. How does the district utilize these guidelines and policies? Are there any ingenious modifications to 
the national guidelines and policies that suit local contexts? 
vii. What can you comment on the existing national guidelines for safe water service delivery to rural 
communities  
 What are the strengths of these guidelines and policies in the provision of water services in this 
district? 
 What are the constraints of these guidelines and policies in the provision of water services in this 
district? 
viii. To what extent are the problems and constraints of the guidelines and policies explain the challenges 
of sustainable service delivery in the district?  
ix. What other factors that you think affect people’s accessibility to safe water in this district? 
  
D4. Gaps in enabling water Users to participate in safe water Provisioning  through CBMS 
i.   Community Based Maintenance System for constructed safe water sources is widely endorsed and 
regarded one of the best options for operation and Maintenance of communal water supply facilities. To 
what extent has this approach been applied in provision of rural safe water in this district? 
ii. To what extent do you think communities in this district appreciate/understand this new approach? 
iii. How do you tell that Community Based Maintenance systems are functional or not? 
iv. What methods/approached do you use to collect water related information/data in this district? 
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v. Looking back to the period before the community based management system (Before mid 1990s) was 
introduced and after, how do you compare safe water supply sustainability levels in the past and the 
present in this sub-county? 
vi. To what extent are the following adhered to in ensuring CBMS for safe water in this district? 
 Respect for community’s decision to participate in service provision or not 
 The choice and type of technology and service level options based on community willingness to 
pay; 
 Community decisions on when and how their services will be delivered; 
 Community decision on how source maintenance funds are managed and accounted for; 
 Community decision on how the services are operated and maintained. 
 Downward accountability and information sharing with regard to funds, services etc. 
 
 
D5.  Actor-level initiatives for Enhancing Effectiveness of CBMS for rural Safe  Water 
i. How does poor participation of the community affect actors in safe water service delivery? How does it 
affect central and local governments, the private sector and NGO actors to deliver safe water services?   
ii. What activities is the district often engaged in to build the capacity of water users/communities to 
participate in the provision of safe water through community Based Maintenance Systems? 
iii. How often are these activities undertaken? How are they prioritized over other district/sector activities? 
iv. How has private sector involvement in rural safe water promoted or hindered effective CBMS for safe 
water provision in this district? 
v. In what ways has NGO involved in water provision in this sub-county promoted or constrained CBMS? 
vi. What role is played by the district in creating an enabling environment for the PS and NGOs to promote 
safe water provision in the district?  
vii. Please describe the nature of relationships that exist between the district and the private sector and NGOs 
viii. How does the district ensure that the activities of the private sector and NGOs do not compromise goals of 
CBMS? 
ix. If anything was to change in the current approaches to rural safe water provision, what would you suggest 
should change and what is your basis for your position? 
GUIDE E 
Interview Guide for National level Technical and Policy Actors (Ministry of Water and Environment & 
Directorate of Water Development) 
E1. Identification 
iii. Designation of the informant 
iv. Time served in current designation and length of time spent working with MWE/DWD 
 
E2. Implementation of Community Based Maintenance Systems for rural Safe  Water 
i. Community Based Maintenance System for constructed safe water sources is widely endorsed and 
regarded one of the best options for Operation and Maintenance of communal water supply 
facilities. What processes did government go through to change from a Centralised Management 
to CBMS? 
 
ii. Under Community Based Management System for rural water services, all major actors have 
specific mandates for ensuring that this service delivery approach is effectively followed as a 
precursor for sustainable rural safe water service delivery. How have the following actors played 
their policy mandates towards effective and functional CBMS? 
a.  Central Government 
b.  Local Governments (Districts and Sub-Counties) 
c.  NGOs and CBOs 
d.  Private Sector 
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e.  Development Partners 
f.  Communities 
 
iii. How does government ensure that the activities non government actors (private sector and NGOs 
and development partners) do not compromise goals of CBMS? 
  
E3.  Outcomes of Promoting CBMS as a policy prescription 
i. How does poor participation of the community affect actors in safe water service delivery? How 
does it affect central and local governments, the private sector and NGO actors to deliver safe 
water services?   
ii. To what extent is equitable distribution of safe water services promoted or compromised by using 
CBMS in providing water to poor rural communities? 
iii. There has been increased funding for rural safe water services in the recent years. How does the 
increase in funding relate with effectiveness or lack of it with regard to CBMS approaches to rural 
safe water services? 
iv. The CBMS seems to raise some contradictions with regard to access to safe water being a 
fundamental human right. How is this seemingly contradicting arrangement being mitigated 
ingeniously by government and other water actors? 
v. What visible indicators can you point to and show that provision of safe and clean water is 
contributing to poverty reduction as a national objective linked to access to safe water?  
vi. How in your view does CBMS cater for disadvantaged groups such as the disabled, women, the 
very poor and other indigent categories in society whose effective participation is often 
compromised by their predicament? 
 
E4. Enhancing CBMS through ingenious enablement approaches (beyond the  present guidelines) 
i. How has CBMS so far influenced rural safe water sources sustainability levels 
ii. What has specifically gone wrong in areas where CBMS have failed to deliver the much needed 
rural safe water service sustainability levels? 
iii. What has gone well in areas where CBMS have delivered significant sustainability level? 
iv. What in your view needs to change in order to maximize benefits of CBMS and at what level in 
policy implementation should such change (s) be effected?  
v. How empowering or disempowering is CBMS to rural water users? 
vi. What aspects/principles of CBMS do you feel need to be revisited in order to enhance sustainable 
access to safe water in rural areas? 
vii. Who is best placed to enhance CBMS effectiveness? 
GUIDE F 
Interview Guide for Development Partners and NGOs 
F1. Identification 
i. Development partner/NGO 
ii. In what aspects of safe water provision are you involved or supporting the GoU? 
 
F2.  Involvement and experiences in Promoting CBMS for rural safe water  provisioning 
i. How does poor participation of the community affect actors in safe water service delivery? How 
does it affect central and local governments, the private sector and NGO actors to deliver safe 
water services?   
ii. How do the activities and processes of government in the water sector affect your own activities in 
safe water service delivery? 
iii. To what extent and in what ways have you been involved in promoting CBMS for safe water 
provisioning in the rural water sub-sector?  
iv. Have you always followed national guidelines as stipulated in the National framework or so but 
with modifications?  
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v. What is your view about CBMS in terms of sustainable accessibility to safe water in relation to 
Centralised Management by either government or NGO? 
vi. Would you consider the approach as promoting or hindering equitable distribution of safe water 
services in Uganda? Explain. 
vii. Why do you think CBMS is being promoted despite its potential shortcomings in developing 
country contexts? Any external influence you think compelled government to adopt such an 
approach? 
viii. How has been the experience in terms of promoting accessibility and equity? What in your view 
needs to change in order to maximize benefits of CBMS and at what level in policy 
implementation should such change (s) be effected?  
ix. How empowering or disempowering is CBMS to rural water users 
x. What aspects/principles of CBMS do you feel need to be revisited in order to enhance sustainable 
access to safe water in rural areas? 
xi. Who is best placed to enhance CBMS effectiveness? 
 
F3. Outcomes of Promoting CBMS as a policy prescription  
i. The CBMS seems to raise some contradictions with regard to access to safe water being a 
fundamental human right. How is this seemingly contradicting arrangement being mitigated 
ingeniously by government and other water actors?  
ii. What visible indicators can you point to and show that provision of safe and clean water is 
contributing to poverty reduction as a national objective linked to access to safe water?  
iii. How in your view does CBMS cater for disadvantaged groups such as the disabled, women, the 
very poor and other indigent categories in society whose effective participation is often 
compromised by their predicament? 
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON LIVELIHOODS, GENDER AND WATER 
GOVERNANCE IN MAKONDO PARISH, NDAGWE SUBCOUNTY, LWENGO 
DISTRICT 
Date:………………………….…….………….…. 
Time Started:…………...………………..………. 
Time Ended:……………………………………… 
 
A: HOUSEHOLD AND INTERVIEWER IDENTIFICATION  
1. Interviewer’s  Number  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
2. Interviewer’s Sex   
1. Male  2. Female  
3. Household Number  
 
4. Name of the village? 
1. Misaana  
2. Kyamukama  
3. Luyiiyi Kaate  
4. Luyiiyi Protazio 
5. Makondo  
6. Micunda  
7. Kiyumbakimu 
8. Kiguluka 
9. Kiganju 
10. Kiteredde 
11. Kibuye 
12. Kanyogoga 
13. Wajjinja 
14. Kayunga 
15. Kijjajasi 
5. Where is the household located in relation to the village? 
1. Within a trading centre  
2. Along a road, but not in the trading center  
3. Completely off the Road  
 
6. GPS Number and Reading  
Northing  
 
Easting  
 
B: RESPONDENTS CHARACTERISTICS  
 
1.  Sex of the respondent  
1. Male  2. Female  
2. What is your status in the household? 
1. Male  head of a household  
2. Female head in a male headed household  
3. Female head of a household 
4. Male head of child/orphan headed 
household  
5. Female head of  child/ orphan headed 
household 
6. Wife in a male-headed household 
7. Male in a female-headed household 
8. Male in a male-headed household 
9. Other (specify) 
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3. What level of education (formal) have you attained? 
1. None 
2. Primary  
3. O level  
4. A level  
5. Dip Holder  
6. Degree Holder 
  
4. What is your main occupation? 
1. Crop farmer/Peasant  
2. House wife  
3. Student 
4. Salaried Worker 
5. Casual Labourer 
6. Self –employed 
7. Livestock Farmer 
8. Mixed Farmer
9. Other (please specify) 
 
5. How many are you in this household? 
 
6. How Old are you? (age in complete years) 
 
 
7. Relationship to you of other members of the Household  
 Husband Wife Son Daughter Aunt Uncle Brother Sister Grand 
Mother 
Grand 
 Father 
Grand 
Child 
In-
law 
Worker Other 
(Specify) 
Member 
One 
              
Member 
Two 
              
Member 
Three 
              
Member 
Four 
              
Member 
Five 
              
Member 
Six 
              
Member 
Seven 
              
Member 
Eight 
              
Member 
Nine 
              
Member 
Ten 
              
 
8. What is your tribe /ethnic background? 
1. Muganda  
2. Munyarwanda  
3. Munyankole  
4. Munyoro 
5. Murundi 
6. Mukiga 
7. Other (please specify) 
 
9. Which religious denomination do you belong to? 
1. Roman Catholic  
2. Protestant  
3. Islam  
4. Pentecostal  
5. Traditional believer 
6. Other (please specify) 
10. What is your current marital status? 
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1. Married  
2. Cohabiting  
3. Widow 
4. Widower  
5. Divorced/separated 
6. Single/ not yet married/ never married 
 
C: HOUSEHOLD  LIVELIHOODS & WELL BEING  
 
1. What is your household’s major source of income? 
1. Remittances  
2. Sale of labour  
3. Business  
4. Salary  
5. Mixed Farming  
6. Crop Farming  
7. Livestock Farming  
8. Other (please specify) 
 
2. What is your estimated monthly household income?  
1. Less than 10,000 UGX 
2. 10,000-50,000 UGX 
3. 50,000-100,0000 UGX 
4. 100,000-200,000 UGX 
5. 200,000-300,000 UGX 
6. Above 300,000 UGX  
 
3. What forms of expenditure related to your household water needs has your household 
incurred in the last one year? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED IF ANSWER IS 
NOT  NONE)  
1. None  
2. Monthly contribution to operation and 
maintenance  
3. Contribution towards repair of pumps 
when they breakdowns 
4. Purchase of water transport equipment 
e.g. bikes, wheel barrows etc 
5. Purchase of water storage equipment 
e.g. buckets, pots, jerry cans  etc 
6. Water treatment  
7. Buying water 
8. Others (please specify) 
 
 
4. Please estimate how much money your household spends on water in a month? 
1. No expenditure  at all  
2. Doesn’t know/ cannot tell how much is 
spent  
3. 500 UGX or less 
4. Between 500-5,000UGX 
5. 5,000-10,000 UGX 
6. Above  10,000 UGX  
 
5. Type of dwelling unit? 
1. Permanent (plastered /unplastered brick wall, cemented floor & iron roof) 
2. Semi-permanent (plastered /unplastered mud & wattle with cemented /uncemented floor & iron roof) 
3. Temporary (mud and wattle with grass thatch & no cemented floor) 
4. Built in permanent materials but no cemented floor  
 
6. How many meals did you have yesterday as a household? 
1. One  
2. Two 
3. Three  
4. Four  
5. Other (please specify)  
 
7. If less than 3 meals were eaten, why?(MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. Lack of enough food  
2. Lack of charcoal / firewood  
3. Very busy /lack of time  
4. Lack of enough money  
5. Lack  of enough water  
6. Other (please specify) 
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8. Have you ever made a contribution towards any community development initiative in your 
area? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
3. Doesn’t  know /can’t remember  
 
9. If yes, what contribution did you make? 
1. Financial 
2. Labour   
3. Ideas /meetings  
4. Land  
5. Local Materials  
6. Other (please specify) 
 
10. Towards what development  project /initiative/ activity was your contribution (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. Water and sanitation  
2. School development project  
3. Health promotion (Malaria, HIV/ AIDS 
etc ) 
4. Security and safety of life and property  
5. Community road/ bridges /culvert  
6. Construction of place of worship  
7. Other (please specify) 
 
D: KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPORTANCE SAFE WATER TO A 
HOUSEHOLD’S HEALTH 
 
1. Please tell me how you ensure that water is safe for drinking in your h/hold (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. Boiling  
2. Use of water guard / similar chemical  
3. Keep it in well cleaned containers  
4. Wash hands before handling water  
5. Regularly clean water containers  
6. Solar disinfection  
7. Do nothing  
8. Other (please specify) 
 
2. What diseases do you know that are caused by water which is not safe? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. Don’t know  
2. Diarrhoea  
3. Stomachaches  
4. Worms  
5. Cough/Flu 
6. Eye infections  
7. Skin rash  
8. Malaria  
9. Others (please specify) 
 
3. Have you or any member of your household ever suffered from water-related diseases such 
as diarrhoea, stomachaches, worms or malaria?    1. Yes       2. No (go to no. 9) 
 
4. Who in your household has suffered from the following diseases in the last one year? 
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED) 
 Adult Males Adult Females  Male 
Youths 
Female 
Youths 
Female 
Children  
Male Children  
 Diarrhea        
Stomachaches       
Cough       
Worms       
Eye infections       
Skin rash       
Malaria       
None (go to no. 8)       
5. What has been the trend in prevalence of the above diseases? Would you say (READ OUT) 
1. Increasing  2.  Decreasing  
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3.  Same  4. Don’t know / can’t tell
 
6. How have the above water-related diseases affected your h/hold? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
ALLOWED) 
1. Increased household expenditure  
2. Reduced family labour  
3.  Reduced / interrupted school attendance  
4. Increased burden on healthy family 
members  
5. Other (please specify) 
 
7. How much has your household spent on treating the disease(s) mentioned above in the last 
one year? 
1. Nothing  
2. Less than 10,000 UGX 
3. 10,000- 50,000 UGX 
4.50,000-100,000 UGX 
5.100, 000-200,000 UGX 
6. 200,000-300,000 UGX 
7. Above 300,000 UGX 
 
8. Use traditional/indigenous medicines that are 
free/not paid for
 
8. What household items have you forfeited expenditure in order treat any or all of the above 
water-related diseases? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED) 
1. None 
2. Food 
3. Clothing 
4. Housing 
5. Education(of children or any other 
household member)
6. Other (please specify) 
 
 
9. What benefits does your household gain as a result of using clean and safe water? 
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED) 
1. Improved health/Reduction in diseases 
2. Increased water usage/consumption  
3. Saving time 
4. Saving h/hold  income  
5. Reduction of household poverty  
6. Don’t know  
7. Other (please specify) 
 
 
E: ACCESS TO SAFE WATER  
 
1. What is the main source of drinking water for your household? 
1. Borehole /deep well  
2. Shallow well  
3. Protected spring  
4. Rain water (in tank/drum/jerry can/other 
container) 
5. Bottled water 
6. Unprotected source (open well, stream, 
river, pond, wetland  etc ) 
7.  Other (please specify)   
 
 
2. Why is the above mentioned the most common source for your drinking water? 
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP TO THREE ONLY) 
1. Close/ near to the h/hold  
2. Permanent  and reliable source of water  
3. Has good quality of water  
4. Meets/provides all the water needs at 
home  
5. No treatment required before drinking  
6. No need to pay money in order to use it  
7. Other (please specify)  
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3. Who funded the construction of this water source? 
1. Government /District /Sub –county  
2. NGO (name ……………………………) 
3. Community efforts  
4. Individual (Name ……………………) 
5. Don’t  know  
6. Other (please specify)  
 
4. What major problems do you find in using/collecting water from your main source? 
(MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP TO THREE ONLY) 
1. None  
2. Too far from the household  
3. Road/path is bad  
4. Risky for children esp. girls 
5. Congestion of users /queues 
6. Irregular  flow  
7. Drying up/not permanent  
8. Contamination (e.g. by livestock etc) 
9. Maintenance charges 
10. Lack of money to buy water/pay 
maintenance fees 
11. Hard/salty water  
12. Other(please specify)  
 
 
5. What alternative sources of water do you use in your household and how often are these 
used? (RECORD ALL MENTIONED) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. What is the purpose of using the alternative water source? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
ALLOWED) 
1. Very near home  
2. Permanent source of water  
3. Can meet all water needs at home  
4. Has good quality water 
5. Unlimited access (no restrictions) 
6. Minimal/no congestion at source 
7. Has soft water/water that easily 
makes froth  
8. Other (please specify)  
 
7. How far in kilometers is your main water source from your home? 
1. Less than half a kilometer  
2. Almost a kilometer  
3. Nearly two kilometers  
4. More than two kilometers  
5. Not sure  
6. Other (please specify) 
 Always  Once /twice a 
week  
Once/twice in 
two –three 
weeks 
 Once /twice a 
month  
Three or more 
times a month 
Once /twice or more in a year 
1. Only one source of water 
is used  
      
2.Borehole        
3.Shallow well        
4. Protected spring        
5. Rain water (in 
tank/drum/jerry can/other 
container) 
      
6.Unprotected source        
7.Others (specify) 
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8. How much time does it take the following categories of people in your household to fetch 
water from your nearest water source? (PLEASE TICK)  
 Less than 10  mins  10-30 mins  30 mins -1hr  1-2 hrs  2-3 hrs  Above 3 hrs  
Adult females        
Adult males        
Female children        
Male children        
Female youths       
Male youths       
Household helps/domestic 
workers  
      
 
9. What else would your household do if you took a very short time to collect water from your 
main water source? (MULTIPLE REPONSES ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP TO 
THREE ONLY)  
1. Income generating activities  
2. Spend it on leisure activities  
3. Spend it on other household activities 
4. Children would attend  school/education 
better  
5. Resting  
6. Nothing  
7. Don’t know /can’t tell 
8. Other (please specify)  
 
 
10. Does your household get water from water vendors? 
1. Never at all  
2. Yes, sometimes, in 
wet and dry 
seasons  
3. Yes, only in the dry 
season  
4. Yes, always 
5. Yes, when children 
are at school/away 
from home  
11. What type of containers do you/your household members use to fetch water? (MULTIPLE 
REPONSES ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP TO TWO ONLY)  
1. Plastic jerry cans  
2. Clay Pots 
3. Buckets (plastic /metallic) 
4. Other (please specify) 
 
12. On average, how many times a day do the following categories of people collect    water 
from your main water source? (READ OUT AND INDICATE NUMBER) 
 Never/ None   1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5 More than 5  
Adult females        
Adult males        
Female children        
Male children        
Female youths       
Male youths       
Household helps/domestic 
workers  
      
 
13. How many litres of water do the following categories of people collect from the 
water source per visit? (READ OUT & TICK LITRERS PER CATEGORY ) 
 Never/ None   1-5 5-10 10-15  15-20  More (specify) 
Adult females        
Adult males       
Female children        
Male children        
Female youths       
Male youths       
Household helps/domestic 
workers/labourers/ vendors   
      
 
14. What type of transport is mainly used by the following people in your household to collect 
water? (PLEASE TICK) 
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 Bicycle    Hand/head lifting   Wheel 
Barrow   
Motor cycle/`’boda 
boda’ 
Motor vehicle   
Adult females       
Adult males       
Female children       
Male children       
Female youths      
Male youths      
Domestic workers /Household 
helpers   
     
 
 
15. What problems do you face with your method of transporting water to your household? 
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED, PLEASE TICK  UP TO THREE ONLY) 
1. No problem at all  
2. Tiresome, needs a lot of physical energy  
3. It is costly  
4. Bad road/terrain to and from source  
5. Limited amount of water transported at 
a time  
 
6. Takes a lot of time when transporting 
water 
7. Other (please specify) 
 
16. What ailments/ health problems have the following members of your household suffered as 
result of fetching water? (READ OUT AND TICK) 
 None    Ches
t 
pain 
Headache/
pains in 
the head 
Nasal 
bleedin
g 
Chroni
c 
fatigue    
B
ac
k 
pa
in   
Spinal 
problems/ 
deformities  
Pelvic 
pain/ 
deformitie
s  
Othe
rs 
(spec
ify) 
Adult females           
Adult male           
Female children           
Male children           
Female youths          
Male youths          
Domestic workers 
/Household helps   
         
 
 
17. What qualities would you like to see in a water source in your village/community? 
(RECORD ALL MENTIONED ) 
1. Clean water safe for drinking  
2. Does not breakdown so often  
3. Cheap to maintain  
4. No long queues  
5. Uses short time to fill container  
6. Not far from home  
7. Permanent source  
8. Not strenuous to operate  
9. Not sure   
10. Improved water source e.g. shallow well/bore hole 
11. Other (please specify) 
 
F: KNOWLEDGE OF HAND PUMP FUNCTIONALITY IN THE COMMUNITY  
 
1. How often do hand pumps fail? 
1. They have never failed  
2. Nearly every month  
3. About twice or more in a year  
4. Once a year  
5. Once in two years  
6. Have no hand pump (go to section G)  
7. Doesn’t know/not sure  
 
2. Which reasons best explain your answer in (1) above? 
1. Over-use of the pumps 
2. Misuse of the pumps 
3. Laziness/lack of responsibility of 
caretakers&users 
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4. Poor repair works 
5. Proper maintenance 
6. Few users 
7. Others (specify) 
 
3. In which particular periods of the year are the hand pumps not working and why do you 
think this is so? 
1. June, July& August because of  dry 
season  
2. All the times pumps fail due to over use 
3. Months/ periods with heavy rains e.g. 
April, September-October  
4. When children return from school due 
to long queues at the pumps 
5. Other (please specify) 
 
4. Can you name /identify any parts of a hand pump? 
1. Yes (name the part (s)………………………………………..) 
2. No /cant  name any part  
 
5. Who usually repairs your hand pumps when they break down?(MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
ALLOWED)
1. Hand pump mechanic (from 
where……………………………..….) 
2. Hand pump caretaker 
3. Anyone in the community/from 
outside  
4. Local council 1 authority  
5. District or Sub County authority  
6. Water User Committee 
7. Other (please specify) 
 
  6. Have you ever observed the hand pump being repaired while it was still working? 
1. Yes   2. No  
 
 
 
7. What are the particular aspects/problems that water users dislike the most about hand 
pumps in your community? (READ OUT AND TICK) 
 Serious aspect/problem    Moderate aspect/ problem   Low aspect/ problem   Not a problem   
1. We were  not consulted before the pumps were 
installed   
    
2. The pumps are difficult to operate      
 
 
3. The pumps  do not pump enough water       
 
4. There are often long queues at the pump     
5. The pumped water tastes bad       
6. The pumped water makes us sick      
7. The pumped water has bad colour      
8. The pumps are always  breaking down, they are 
unreliable  
   
 
 
9. When the pumps breakdown they don’t get 
fixed for a long time  
    
10. We wish we knew how to fix the pumps      
11. The pump fees are too high     
 
 
8. If a hand pump breaks down, is it reported to someone in the community?  
1. Yes (to whom is it reported ……………………………………..…………………………..………) 
2. No  
3. Don’t know/Not sure  
9. Does anybody from the outside community come to check on how the pumps are 
working/do maintenance before they break down?(MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)
1. Yes (who comes………….………………..……..……..………………………) 
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2. No 
3. Don’t know/Not sure  
  
10. To whom would you immediately report if you were the first to find out that your hand 
pump has broken down? 
1. The water committee members  
2. Pump mechanic in the village  
3. Village council /LCI 
4. Care taker of the hand pump  
5. Sub-county authorities  
6. District Authorities 
7. Don’t know /can’t tell  
8. No body  
9. Other (please specify) 
 
G: HOUSEHOLD- LEVEL WATER USE & MANAGEMENT  
 
1. On average, how many jerricans of 20 liters do you use per day in your h/hold? 
1. Less than 1  
2. 1-3 
3. 4-6 
4. 7 and above  
 
2. On average, how many litres of water do you use every day for each of the following 
activities? 
 0-1 2-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-30 Above 30 
Drinking/Cooking         
Washing clothes         
Bathing         
Washing utensils         
Cleaning house/ latrine /toilets         
Gardening/Crop farming        
Watering animals         
Construction e.g. brick making etc        
Food processing e.g. brewing, 
fermentation, making pancakes etc  
       
Washing bicycles/motorcycles/cars        
 
3. Please tell me which household water uses you  regard most important in the dry and wet 
seasons (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED, PLEASE TICK UP TO FOUR ONLY 
PER SEASON) 
 
 
Dry season  Wet season  
1. Drinking   
2. Washing clothes    
3. Bathing    
4. Washing utensils    
5. Cleaning house/ latrine 
/toilets  
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6. Gardening    
7. Watering animals    
8. Construction    
9. Food processing e.g. 
brewing, fermentation  
  
10. Washing bicycles/motorcycles/ 
Cars 
 
 
4. Who in your household usually decides how water is allocated to the different uses? 
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED, PLEASE TICK  UP TO TWO ONLY) 
1. All household members (any reason………………………………………………………………………….) 
2. Adult females (any reason…………………………………………………….…..………………………….) 
3. Adult males (any reason………………………………………………………..…………………………….) 
4. Adult males & females (any reason…………………………………………….…………………………….) 
5. Female children (any reason………………………………………………………………………………….) 
6. Male children (any reason…………………………………………………………………………………….) 
7. Male & female children (any reason………………………………………………………………………….) 
8. Household helps/ domestic workers (any reason…………………………………………………………….)
5. How satisfied are you with the way water is used in your household? 
1. Never satisfied  
2. Always satisfied  (go to question 7) 
3. Some how satisfied  
4. Not  sure  
6. If never or some how satisfied, why are you not satisfied with the way water is used in your 
household? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. There is a lot of water wastage  
2. Members who don’t  collect use most water  
3. Male members are priority users 
4. Burdens h/hold members who do water 
collection  
5. No deliberate water use plan  
6. Other (please specify) 
 
 
7.  Who performs the following water related tasks in your household (PLEASE READ OUT 
AND RECORD RESPONSE) 
 Adult  
females  
Adult  
males  
Female 
children  
Male 
children  
Female 
youths 
Male  
youths 
Laborers/
workers/H
ousehold 
helps  
Water collection/fetching          
Water storage( in tanks, drums, pots etc)          
Water treatment (e.g.  boiling drinking 
water) 
       
Cleaning house/ toilet /bathrooms         
Washing utensils         
Washing clothes         
Watering crops/plants         
Watering/spraying animals        
Cooking food        
  
 
  
 
  
  
282 
 
Washing bicycles/motorcycle/cars        
Bathing children        
 
8. If you or a member of your household has ever been denied access to a water source due to 
failure to contribute towards operation and maintenance, what did you do to get water? 
1. We have never been denied access  
2. Bought water from vendors  
3. Used unprotected water sources  
4. Collected from source in next village  
5. Started harvesting rain water  
6. Other (please specify) 
 
 
9. Who in your h/hold is responsible for providing water when there is such a crisis? 
1. Adult  female  
2. Adult males  
3. Adult males & females  
4. Female children  
5. Male children  
 
6. Female & male  children  
7. Household workers  
8. All household members  
9. None/nobody is responsible 
 
10. How often do you get disagreements/conflicts over water collection and water use in your 
household? 
1. Never (go to section H) 
2. Some times  
3. Often  
4. Always  
5. Not sure/Don’t Know  
11. Which members of your household usually disagree/conflict over water collection and use?  
1.  Adult females & adult males  
2. Adult females & male /female children  
3. Adult males & male /female children  
4. Adult females & domestic 
workers/household helps  
5. Adult males & domestic 
workers/household  helps  
6. Other(please specify) 
 
12. What are the consequences of the disagreements /conflicts over water collection and use in your 
household? 
1. Reduced willingness to collect water  
2. Disproportionate rationing of water  
3. Household distress  
4. Delayed payment of monthly operation 
and maintenance fees  
5. Disruption of work/ daily activities  
6. Missing school 
7. Reduced cohesiveness of family 
members 
8. Other (please specify) 
 
 
H: WATER USER PERCEPTIONS OF SAFE WATER SERVICES AND 
SYSTEMS  
1. If you were asked to rank your major household needs, where would you put clean and safe 
water? 
1. Top priority 
2. Second priority 
3. Medium priority  
4. Very low priority  
5. No priority 
2. If water is second, medium or very low among the priorities, what is the first priority? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………...……………….. 
 
283 
 
3. What other priority community need(s) other than water would you prefer to have in your 
village/community? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE RECORD UP TO 
THREE ANSWERS) 
1. None  
2. Clinic/Hospital  
3. Road  
4. School  
5. Food  
6. Agriculture related  
7. Other (please specify)  
 
4. Who do you consider the most important safe water service provider in your 
parish/community? 
1. Government 
2. Medical Missionaries of Mary( MMMs)  
3. The general community 
4. Private contractors
5. Can’t tell/Not Sure/Don’t Know 
6. Other NGOs (please name …………………………………………………………………………………..) 
7. None 
8. Other (please specify) 
 
5. How would you rate safe water service delivery in your community? (READ OUT)
1. Good  
2. Fairly good 
3. Bad 
4. Very bad  
5. Can’t tell 
 
 
6. Which reasons best explain your rating of safe water service delivery in your community? 
(MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY THREE) 
1. Breakdowns take long to be repaired  
2. Water user committees are 
inactive/inexistent 
3. Mandatory monthly financial 
contributions  
4. Conflicts in management of the water 
source (s) 
5. Breakdowns are always repaired in time  
6. Reduction in waterborne diseases  
7. Participation of water users in service 
delivery  
8. Conflicts over water use are common  
9. Takes a short time to collect water  
10. There are alternative safe water sources  
11. Water User Committee not transparent 
in use of water user fees collected 
12. Other(please specify) 
7. How would you rate the way safe water service delivery programmes in your community involve 
you in deciding what water service to provide and where they are to be provided? 
1. Very Good  
2. Fairly good  
3. Bad  
4. Very very bad  
5. Can’t tell  
 
8. Which reasons best explain your rating of how safe water delivery programmes involve you in 
deciding water service to provide and where?(MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED PLEASE 
TICK ONLY TWO) 
1. Not involved at all  
2. Only involve few members of 
community  
3. Involved throughout all planning 
meetings  
4. Our views are considered in all decision 
making 
5. Water user meetings not held/not there  
6. Other (please specify) 
 
9. What in your view can be done to improve the way safe water services are delivered in your 
community? (Probe by asking ‘any other’; MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK 
ONLY THREE) 
1. Involve community members in service delivery  
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2. Sensitize water users to make 
contributions 
3. Put up more alternative water sources  
4. Undertake repairs of all broken down 
sources  
5. Build capacity of water user committees  
6. Eliminate conflicts  over water 
collection/access/use 
7. Train and equip local pump mechanics 
8. External support  
9. Other(please specify) 
10. What safe water services does the government provide in your community? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY THREE) 
1. None      
   
2. Establishing various water sources    
3. Regular maintenance and repairs    
4. Training and sensitizing water users  
5. Monitoring to ensure quality of services  
6. Hiring and paying contractors  
7. Don’t know
 
8. Others (please specify) 
 
 
11. What is your rating of the contribution of government to your community’s access to safe water 
services? (READ OUT) 
1. Adequate   2. Inadequate    3. Can’t tell 
 
12. What would you like to tell government officials at your district regarding safe water services 
delivery in your community/areas? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY 
THREE) 
1- Services are good    4. Need more community involvement  
2- Services need improvement   5. Support training of water users on their roles  
3- Services are poor  
6- More government involvement in water service delivery 
7- Construct more pumps(boreholes/shallow wells) 
8- Others (specify) 
 
13. What other safe water services should government provide? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY THREE) 
1- Training and equipping pump mechanics  5-Undertake regular maintenance  
2- Construction of more safe water sources 6-Regulation of spare parts distributors  
3- Community sensitization on roles   7- Supervision of hand pump mechanics  
4- Ensure availability of spare parts  
8-Don’t know 
9-Other (please specify) 
14. What do you think community members make as a contribution to safe water service delivery in 
your community? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY THREE) 
1. Contribute to capital cost (e.g. cash, 
materials or labour) 
2. Contribute cash to regular operations and 
maintenance  
3. Attend meetings and contribute ideas 
4. Provide meals for contractors/workers 
during construction  
5. Other (please specify) 
 
15. What is your rating of the contributions of your community to safe water service delivery? 
(READ OUT) 
1. Adequate   2.Inadequate     3.Doesnot know/can’t tell  
4. Completely inadequate/they don’t care at all  5. Do not have/have never got a safe water source (go 
to question 17) 
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16. Which reasons best explain your rating of the contributions of your community to safe water 
service? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK ONLY TWO) 
1. People don’t want to pay maintenance fees  
2. People uncooperative/do not attend 
meetings  
3. People pay operations & maintenance fees 
well  
4. People attend meeting
5. People work together 
6. People do not have enough money 
7. Other (Please specify) 
 
17. In your opinion, what else should they do? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE 
TICK ONLY THREE) 
1- Provision of labour and materials e.g. stones, sand etc   4- Support training of water user 
committee members 
2- Selection of water user committee members   5- Maintenance of water sources 
3- Ensure proper hygiene at water source   6-Compensation of water source caretakers  
7-   Cooking for the workers/providing their food 
8-   Others (specify) 
18. As an individual, what contribution (s) have you made towards safe water service delivery 
in your community in the past one year? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED. PLEASE 
TICK ONLY THREE) 
1- None (go to question 20)    5- Member of  a water user committee  
2- Labour and materials during construction   6- Cash contribution towards capital cost 
3- Community mobilization and sensitization on roles  7-Cash contribution towards operation &maintenance 
4- Participate in community meetings  
8-    Accommodating the workers 
9-Other (please specify) 
 
19. If money was contributed, how much was it in Uganda Shillings? 
1. 100 UGX or less    3-Between 3000-5000 UGX 5. Can’t remember  
2. Between 1000-3000 UGX  4. Above 5000 UGX  6. Doesn’t know 
20. What are you willing to contribute in future? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED. 
PLEASE TICK NOT MORE THAN THREE) 
1. Nothing     4. Attending planning  & sensitization meetings  
2. Labour/materials towards capital cost  5. Cash contribution to operation and maintenance  
3. Cash contribution towards capital cost 6. Leadership role e.g. member of water user committee   
7.  Cooking for the workers/providing their food 
8.  Accommodating the workers 
9. Other (please specify) 
 
21. If unwilling to contribute, why are you unwilling? 
1- I have no job    4- It is the role of NGOs/CBOs 
2- I have no money     5-I have too many responsibilities  
3- It is the role of Government   6- I don’t have enough time 
 
7-Other (please specify) 
22. When was the last time your household made a financial contribution towards the 
operation, maintenance or repair of your water source? 
1- Have never made a financial contribution  5- More than  two years ago 
2- One month ago    6. Can’t tell  
3- Months ago 
4- Nearly a year ago 
7- Others (please specify) 
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23. Who usually mobilizes you to make a financial contribution to operation, maintenance or 
repair of your water main source? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP 
TO THREE ONLY) 
1- Have never been mobilized  3-Water user committee   5. Extension staff  
2- Own initiative/voluntary  4. Local officials   6.  NGO/Project staff 
7-Local Council 1 committee 
8-Other (please specify) 
 
24. Who pays this money in your household? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE   
TICK UP TO TWO ONLY) 
1-Adult females    5- Male Children 
6-Female & male children 
2-Adult males    7-Household helps/domestic workers  
3-Adult males & females   8- All household members  
4-Female children    9-Female youths 
10-Male youths    11-Nobody (go to question 25) 
12- Don’t Know (go to question 25) 
 
25. Why is it that this/these person(s) are the ones who pay? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS 
ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK TWO ONLY) 
1- Household head  
2- Is more available  
3- Has the money  
4- Is the one responsible for paying  
5- Don’t know /not sure  
6- Other (specify) 
 
 
26. How much say do the following categories of people /institutions have in getting government to 
address issues of interest to them in this community? (READ OUT) 
 A lot  Some  Little  None  Don’t know  
1. Children       
2. Youth      
3. The elderly        
4. Men       
5. Women      
6. The educated       
7. The uneducated       
8. Traditionalists      
9. Politicians      
10. Civil servants       
11. Students       
12. The unemployed       
13. NGOs      
14. CBOs      
15. Religious groups       
16. Community leaders       
 
27. How often do you trust the government to do what is right? 
1. Always  
2. Sometimes/hardly  
3. Never  
4. Don’t know/not sure  
28.  As a person, how much rights do you have in getting the government to address safe water 
issues of interest you?(READ OUT)
1. Unlimited  
2. Some say  
3. Very limited/No say at all 
4. Don’t know/not sure  
 
29. How free do you think you are to express yourself on safe water issues concerning your 
community without fear of government reprisal? 
1. completely free 
2. moderately free  
3. not free at all  
4. can’t  tell/ not sure  
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I: KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE& FUNCTIONALITY OF COMMUNITY BASED 
WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
1. Does your improved water source have a water user committee (WUC)? 
1. Yes  2. No (go to section J)
3. Don’t know  4. Have no borehole/shallow 
well/protected spring(go to section J)
2. If your water source has a user committee, what are the roles and responsibilities of the 
committee in your community? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED. PLEASE TICK UP 
TO THREE ONLY) 
1. Collecting money for 
Operation&Maintenance 
2. Cleaning the source  
3. Routine maintenance 
4. Water source operation  
5. Carry out repairs  
6. Reporting breakages  
7. Calling/Holding meetings 
8. Other (please specify) 
3. Please mention any one position in the composition of your water user committee 
1. Doesn’t know/ can’t tell (go to qn 5) 
2. Chairperson  
3. Vice chairperson  
4. Secretary  
5. Treasurer  
6. Care taker  
7. Ex-official  
8. Other (please specify) 
 
 
4. What is the current composition of the water user committee for your protected water 
source by gender? (PLEASE TICK AS APPROPRIATE/MENTIONED) 
 1. Male  2. Female  3. Can’t tell/Doesn’t know 
1. Chair person     
2. Vice chair person     
3. Secretary     
4. Treasurer     
5. Care taker     
6. Ex-official     
7. Advisor    
8. Information/Public Relations Officer    
9. Other (specify)    
 
5. What is the percentage of women that ought to constitute your WUC? 
1. Don’t know /not sure  
2. One third (33%)  
3. Half (50%) 
4. Other (please specify) 
6. Looking at your water user committee, who are the majority that compose it?(READ OUT)
1. Women 
2. Men 
3. Don’t Know/Not sure 
7. How do you rate the performance of your water user committee? 
1. Very good  
2. Good 
3. Fair  
4. Poor  
5. Can’t tell  
8. Please give reasons for your rating above (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED. 
PLEASE TICK UP TO TWO ONLY) 
1. Regular meetings 
2. Transparent  
3. Give feed back to community on their 
deliberations  
4. Financially accountable  
5. Takes good care of the water source 
6. Do not hold meetings 
7.  Not transparent 
8. Do not perform their stipulated roles 
9. Do not harass/mistreat/deny fees 
defaulters access 
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10. Other (please specify) 
9. When did your water user committee last meet?  
1. The committee has never met  
2. Within this month  
3. Last month 
4. Months ago  
5. About a year ago  
6. About 2 years ago  
7. Can’t remember  
8. Don’t know/Not sure  
 
10. How often does the entire community of water users meet to deliberate on water issues?   
1. Never met  
2. Once a month  
3. Several times a month 
4. Once a year  
5. Twice or more a year  
6. Can’t tell/don’t know  
11. From your observation in these meetings or what you know, who mainly attends these 
meetings? 
1. Both men and women equally  
2. Mainly women attend  
3. Mainly men attend  
4. Can’t tell  
5. Don’t know  
 
12. Why do you think it is the above persons who attend these meetings more? 
 
1. They care most about water in the household 
2. They are affected most when water is not available 
3. They spend/incur expenses when water-related 
diseases attack household members 
4. Are more educated than women 
5. Don’t care about water or its availability in the 
household 
6. Spend money on repair and maintenance of water 
pump/source 
7. Men send women/their children to represent them 
in the meetings 
8. Are responsible for attending the meetings 
9. Others (specify)  
 
13. What are the major issues discussed whenever these meetings take place? (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. Accountability for funds  
2. Payment of contributions  
3. Operation&Maintenance  
4. Cleanliness and hygiene  
5. Safeguarding the water source 
6. Conflicts over the use of the water 
source 
7. Other (please specify) 
 
J: HOUSEHOLD CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SUSTAINABLE UTILIZATION 
OF SAFE WATER IN THE COMMUNITY 
 
1. What kind of sensitization or training on safe water service delivery have you or a member of your 
household received in the past?( MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
1. None received (stop here) 
2. Don’t know  
3. Forming water user committee  
4. Cleaning the water source  
5. Undertaking minor repairs  
6. Operation of the water source  
7. Management of community 
contributions  
8. Setting and enforcement of bye laws  
9. Can’t remember    
10. Other (please specify) 
 
2. If training was received, who trained or sensitized you in the following areas (READ OUT) 
 
 Government official 
(specify………………………
………………) 
Local politicians 
(specify……………………
…………………) 
NGO/project staff 
(specify…………………..
) 
Don’t know /don’t 
remember 
1. Forming water user 
committee  
    
2. Cleaning the water     
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source  
3. Undertaking minor 
repairs   
    
4. Operation of the 
water source 
    
5. Management of 
cash contributions  
    
6. Forming& 
enforcing bye 
laws  
    
7. Others (please 
specify) 
    
 
3. When was the last time you were sensitized? 
1. Within this month  
2. Months ago  
3. About a year ago  
4. About two years ago  
5. Don’t know / can’t remember  
6. Never/has never attended any 
sensitization/training 
7. Others (specify) 
4. Who was mainly represented in the last training you attended on safe water service delivery 
in the community? 
 
1. Both men and women were well represented 
2. Men were more represented 
3. Women were more represented 
4. Can’t tell/don’t know 
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Annex II: Broad and specific principles of good governance 
Principles  Specific principles of Good Governance under each of the broader principle 
 
Legitimacy and 
Voice 
Participation: All people should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intention. Such broad 
participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively. Freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media 
are important for ensuring that people can participate. Provision of decision making autonomy through to lower levels of government through ‘real’ devolution rather than 
lower level governments merely executing the tasks and instructions given them by the central government is fundamental. 
Consensus orientation: Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies 
and procedures of governance. It calls for patience, good leadership and information sharing to allow a shared consensus among stakeholders. 
 
Direction 
 
Strategic vision: Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such 
development to be achieved. There should also be an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded. Strategic visions 
should be both clear and permanent. 
Coherency: Taking into account the increasing complexity of the socio-economic and political environment. Decisions and policies made are conscious and respond to this 
complexity. Policies and actions are coherent, consistent and easily understood by stakeholders to avoid confusion. 
 
Performance 
 
Responsiveness: Institutions and methods must endeavor to serve all citizens. This principle means that all citizens know that they are taken into consideration by the people 
or institutions in charge. Sensitive ‘governors’ should have a characteristic which is ready to answer, sympathetic and sensitive to problems, can understand and implement the 
needs and wishes of the public. 
Effectiveness and efficiency: Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources. The extent to which previously stated goals 
and objectives of an activity have been met, the extent to which the civil service is independent from political pressure, the quality of public services i.e. policy formulation 
and implementation, and whether the government is credibly committed to policy effectiveness. 
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability: Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This 
accountability differs depending on the organizations and whether the decision is internal or external and is mainly social but can also be physical and financial resources 
accountability. The absence of petty and grand corruption and the presence of an incorruptible police force are key ingredients of good governance. 
Transparency and openness: This calls for the free flow and sharing of information among development actors and the communities they serve. Processes, institutions and 
information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them. To communicating to the public (in an 
accessible language) the decisions of national governments or institutions that serve the public. Providing access to information when requested by the public. 
 
Fairness 
 
Equity and inclusiveness: All people irrespective of their gender, physical or socio-economic status have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. When all 
citizens are able to elect representatives or to participate directly in the political decision making process, a society is inclusive and equitable. 
Rule of Law: Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement constitutes a good measure of good governance. Individual loyalty to laws becomes a function of the 
public confidence in law enforcement agents such as the police and the judiciary and once this is achieved, the sustainability of government becomes possible.  
Adapted from: Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003); van Doeveren (2011); Akif Ozer and Yayman (2011a) 
